

**PRESERVATION AND PLANNING ASSESSMENT OF THE
THE CARILLON BATTLEFIELD**

TICONDEROGA, ESSEX COUNTY, NEW YORK
American Battlefield Protection Program Grant (#GA P19AP0047)



Submitted to:

**Margaret Staudter
Fort Ticonderoga
30 Fort Ti Road
P.O. Box 390
Ticonderoga, New York 12883**

Submitted by:

**Kathleen Kenny and John G. Crock, Ph.D.
University of Vermont
Consulting Archaeology Program
111 Delehanty Hall
Burlington, Vermont 05405**

Report #1332

November 5, 2021

This report is based upon work funded by a grant from the Department of the Interior, National Park Service. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Department of the Interior.

ABSTRACT

This report combines documentary research with geospatial analysis to assist the interpretation and management of the Carillon Battlefield portion of Fort Ticonderoga, a National Historic Landmark located on Lake Champlain in Ticonderoga, New York. This work is designed to provide the basis for planning and management of the significant archeological features and deposits associated with military defensive works collectively known as the French Lines, initially constructed during the French and Indian War and later rebuilt and reused during American Revolutionary War. By presenting a history of the battlefield that intentionally highlights the spatial data imbedded in historic maps and first-hand accounts we provide a platform for ground-based interpretation and protection of the well-preserved archeological record at the site. The report describes the creation of a Geographic Information System (GIS) for site management, provides a preliminary KOCOA military terrain analysis for the Carillon Battlefield of July 8, 1758, and makes general recommendations for the ongoing preservation of the site's historic Euro-American and early Native American resources. This project was supported by a grant from the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) of the National Park Service and was prepared utilizing the Secretary of the Interior's *Standards and Guidelines for Archeology and Historic Preservation* (36 CFR 61).

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MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

The *Preservation and Planning Assessment* for the Carillon Battlefield portion of Fort Ticonderoga in Ticonderoga, Essex County, New York was conducted by the University of Vermont Consulting Archaeology Program (UVM CAP) in collaboration with Fort Ticonderoga site managers with the support of an American Battlefield Protection Program grant (#GA P19AP0047). The Carillon Battlefield portion of the National Historic Landmark property is well-preserved and spans variable topography ranging from lower sections in open agricultural fields on Lake Champlain to core areas within more elevated wooded areas farther inland. The project area and entire property are archeologically sensitive for precontact and European Contact period Native American sites and historic Euro-American sites and features, primarily those associated with the property's significant late 18th century military history. As such, any and all ground disturbing activities on the property, with the exception of ongoing agricultural cultivation, should be reviewed for their potential to disturb significant archeological resources associated with the historic property.

The focus of this report is on the Carillon Battlefield and French Lines portion of the overall property and includes an extensive review of documentary evidence referencing the battlefield and subsequent events occurring on this portion of the property as well as a KOKOA analysis of the 1758 Battle of Carillon. In addition to the work presented here, the project also includes the development of a database in ArcGIS with an online dashboard that can be used in conjunction with hand-held applications for recording and managing archeological features and finds, as well as threats to the historic battlefield landscape. The integration of maps and first-hand accounts of the Carillon Battlefield with non-invasive aerial survey data provides a powerful geospatial foundation for site management and public education that also will help guide research questions for future investigation. Management recommendations include protocols for review of ground-disturbing undertakings by Fort Ticonderoga, assessing and managing vegetation and other potential threats, including looting, along with procedures should human remains be discovered on the property.

INTRODUCTION

This *Preservation and Planning Assessment* focuses on a portion of the Fort Ticonderoga property, in Ticonderoga, Essex County, New York, one the most remarkably well-preserved complexes of Native American and historic Euro-American archeological sites in the Champlain Valley and broader northeastern United States (Figure 1). This report combines documentary research with geospatial analysis to assist in the interpretation and management of the Carillon Battlefield portion of Fort Ticonderoga. Together with the geospatial applications developed as part of this project, this work is designed to provide the basis for planning and management of the significant archeological features and deposits associated with military defensive works collectively known as the French Lines, initially constructed during the French and Indian War and later rebuilt and reused during the American Revolutionary War. Rather than presenting an encompassing military history, this report focuses specifically on the documentary evidence that can assist in defining the physical extent of the Carillon Battlefield and the identification of the landscape and/or archeological features associated with the Battle and how they may (or may not) be distinguishable from features representing areas reconstructed by American troops during the Revolutionary War. By presenting a history of the Battlefield that intentionally highlights the spatial data imbedded in historic maps and first-hand accounts we provide a basis for ground-based interpretation and management of the well-preserved archeological resources preserved within the Carillon Battlefield portion of the historic property. The work presented here is supported by a National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) grant (#GA P19AP0047) to Fort Ticonderoga.

Fort Ticonderoga, a National Historic Landmark, played a significant role in two major 18th century conflicts, the French and Indian War (1754-1763) and the American Revolution (1775-1783). The Battle of Carillon, fought on July 8, 1758, was one of the largest battles of the French and Indian War and represents the main focus of the present project. Two decades later, the fortifications were transformed by American troops during the American Revolution. While the configuration of the French Lines was preserved by the Americans in most areas, they were altered in others, and in all areas the earthworks were enhanced to form the basis of the archeological features most visible today. It is important to note that, in addition to the Carillon Battlefield's rich historic era military history, the same area also likely preserves an extensive record of occupation over prior millennia by Native American populations, based on artifact collections and predictive modelling of Native American settlement in the Champlain Valley. While cultural resource management recommendations concentrate on Euro-American Carillon Battlefield and 18th-century fortifications, this report also addresses the property's archeological sensitivity for Native American cultural resources.

One of the products of the present assessment and plan is a Geographic Information System (GIS) database that combines historic research with aerial and ground survey to form the basis for future planning, management, and archeological inquiry. This work combines historical documentary evidence, including maps, first-hand accounts, and other reports that provide spatial details of the Battlefield with digital surface topography generated from aerial LiDAR and photogrammetric surveys. The geospatial analysis is designed to promote a better understanding of the archeological landscape, enhance public education, and generate questions




Figure 1. USGS map showing the project area and location of the Carillon Battlefield ("Ruins") and Fort Ticonderoga, Essex County, New York.

for future research. The information developed as part of the present study was also used to complete an initial KOCOA analysis of the battlefield.

CULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING

The environmental setting of the Fort Ticonderoga property is critically important to its human history and essential to understanding its important military history. Located at a narrow point in Lake Champlain, adjacent to the La Chute River outlet and situated opposite Mount Independence on the Vermont side, the Ticonderoga Peninsula has been a highly attractive and strategic location for human occupation for millennia. The geomorphological character of the Fort Ticonderoga property and its environs was primarily shaped by the regression of the Laurentide glacier from the Northeast approximately 13,700-13,400 cal BP (Dyke et al. 2003; Richard and Occhietti 2005; Ridge et al. 1999). As the climate warmed and the glacier retreated northward, glacial Lake Vermont formed, covering the Champlain Lowlands. Lake Vermont drained sometime around 13,000 cal BP and soon thereafter the basin filled with sea water, connected to the Atlantic Ocean via the St. Lawrence River Valley to the north. This new, major inland water body, referred to as the Champlain Sea, is argued to have existed until about 10,000 years ago and to have been a magnet and conduit for the first human populations into the region (Crock and Robinson 2012; Robinson et. al. 2017). At its greatest extent, the Champlain Sea inundated what is now the Ticonderoga Peninsula (Figure 2). As a result, the project area was not available for human habitation during the initial settlement of the region by Native Americans during what archeologists refer to as the Paleoindian periods.

As soon as the sea receded, however, the project area presented a prime area for occupation given its prominent location on Lake Champlain at a natural transportation corridor/crossing of the lake, and adjacent to one of the most significant river confluences on the lake's western shoreline. The project area's level terrain, combined with its proximity to various lacustrine, riverine and wetland resources likely attracted Native American occupation as early as the Early Archaic period, approximately 10,000 years before present and throughout every subsequent time period prior to the arrival of Europeans. The Ticonderoga Peninsula is likely the location where Samuel de Champlain killed several Mohawks in the first Contact made between Europeans and Native people in the Champlain Valley (e.g., Hackett 2008). Peninsulas such as Ticonderoga and Crown Point on the New York side of Lake Champlain and Chimney Point and Mount Independence on the Vermont side were important habitation, meeting and resource extraction locations for Native Americans before European Contact and extensive Colonial era settlement. Evidence of Native presence within the project area exists in countless artifact collections from the property, including those presently curated by the Fort Ticonderoga Museum. Reference to artifact finds in the local area is made by H. P. Smith in his 1885 *History of Essex County* as well as in Parker's later *Archaeological History of New York* (1922) helping to document both the volume of archeological deposits that accumulated over thousands of years that drew artifact collectors, but also the archeological potential of the property to retain significant information about the unwritten pre-European human history of the Ticonderoga peninsula.

The group of features collectively referred to as the 'French Lines' are located about 0.57 miles (0.91 kilometers) northwest of the lakeside fortification known as Fort Ticonderoga




Figure 2. USGS map showing the estimated extent of the ancient Champlain Sea in relation to the current Lake Champlain shoreline and the project area.

and extend about 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) across the whole Ticonderoga Peninsula, from the La Chute River on the south to Lake Champlain on the north. The Ticonderoga Peninsula trends southeast to northwest and is roughly 1.4 miles long by 0.7 to 1 mile wide and includes about 600 acres. It is defined on the south by its steep to precipitous slopes rising above the La Chute River,¹ flowing from the outlet of Lake George. On the southern side of the La Chute River stands Mount Defiance, which looms over the Ticonderoga Peninsula, topping out at 854 feet above mean sea level (Figure 3). Extending south of the Ticonderoga Peninsula is South Bay, a long narrow arm of Lake Champlain that leads about 24 miles to Whitehall, New York. To the east, on the Vermont side of the lake, across a channel that is about 1,470 feet wide and about 20 feet deep, stands Mount Independence, a large distinct hill that rises up quickly from the lakeshore to an elevation of 302 feet above mean sea level or about 205.5 feet above the modern lake level. To the north of the Ticonderoga Peninsula, Lake Champlain becomes gradually wider as it extends northward.

The Ticonderoga Peninsula itself is divided between a low flat plain (north) and an elevated plateau (south). The lower plain ranges from about 100 to 120 feet above mean sea level and about 3.5-23.5 feet above the modern level of Lake Champlain. In the vicinity of the French Lines, the low flat that extends from the toe of the heights to Lake Champlain, which is about 2,200 feet away. On the lower plain in this area there is a significant unnamed drainage that is about 1,475 feet in length and flows roughly south to north before connecting to the lake. This drainage is located about 400 feet in front of the American redoubts. To the rear of the American redoubts, the low flat is now used for agricultural purposes. The historic maps suggest that portions of this area may have been wetter in the past, but may have been subject to some artificial draining to improve their agricultural potential. There were at least two springs recorded on the low ground within the present project area that may have been of importance to Native American and/or later European military occupations. To the northwest of the American Redoubts, the low flat starts to rise, first with a series of small knolls gathered near the bottom of the heights, but then giving way to higher ground that is incised by a dendritic drainage system that has formed a series of steep sided reentrants (draws/ravines).

The top of the plateau ranges from about 191 feet above mean sea level (or 94.5 feet above the level of the lake) near Fort Ticonderoga to about 269 feet above mean sea level (or 172.5 feet above the level of the lake) on top of the Heights of Carillon, a distinct rise about midway along the elevated portion of the Ticonderoga Peninsula, about 3,000 feet from Fort Ticonderoga. Fort Ticonderoga is commanded by the Heights of Carillon, the crest of which is about 78 feet above the fort (Figure 4). The French Lines are located on the Heights of Carillon. Near the French Lines, on the southerly side of the plateau, there is a steep slope leading down to the La Chute River about 600 feet away. This slope is a largely a scree slope. It is shallow to

¹ In this report, the modern names of the natural features will be used. However, it is important to also know the alterate names. The historic period French accounts often refer to the La Chute River, as the ‘Lac St. Sacrament River’ or as the ‘River of the Falls.’ The stretch of water north of the Ticonderoga Peninsula, now considered part of Lake Champlain, was commonly referred to in the French accounts as the ‘St. Frederic River.’ This is because, for the French, Lake Champlain started at the narrows between Crown Point and Chimney Point, about 13 miles north of Fort Ticonderoga, and extended to the north. In the French accounts, Lake George is known as ‘Lac St. Sacrament.’ In some of the early English accounts, Lake George is referred to as ‘Lake Horicon.’ Mount Defiance was also known as ‘Rattlesnake Mountain’ (English) or ‘Montagne des Serpents a Sonnette’ (French). Mount Independence was once known as ‘Sugar Loaf.’

bedrock and has some areas of exposed ledge. Near the French Lines this slope has a narrow bench about halfway down. This bench is about 160 feet from the main part of the French Lines and is roughly 160 feet wide. In other places along the southern part of the Ticonderoga Peninsula, the slope is steep and more continuous (e.g., without a break in the slope) or is precipitous. To the west of the French Lines, the land gradually slopes downwards for about 1,100 yards before ending at the foot of elevated ridge that rises to about 300 feet above mean sea level. This ridge has a commanding view of both the Heights of Carillon and Fort Ticonderoga beyond (Laramire 2020:51). Between the Heights of Carillon and Fort Ticonderoga there is a large ravine that has been considerably altered by the construction of the railroad cut through it.




Figure 3. Key landmarks in the vicinity of the project area. (Base Map: Ticonderoga NY-VT. 15-Minute Quadrangle (1:62,500). Edition of 1902, Reprinted 1945 [Surveyed 1894]. United States Geological Survey, Washington, D.C.).




Figure 4. "Ticonderoga Point and Ruins" by Montgomery Livingston (1816-c. 1860) (Smithsonian, American Art Museum, Renwick Gallery, Gift of Olin Dows, 1978.152.85; <https://americanart.si.edu/artwork/ticonderoga-point-and-ruins-14842>). The view is looking west from Mount Independence. Mount Defiance is to the left with the La Chute River at its base. Fort Ticonderoga is to the right of center.

The soil near the French Lines on the Heights of Carillon is Vergennes silty clay loam. This soil is a moderately well drained soil that is derived from a glaciolacustrine deposit formed on a glacial lake plain from very fine sediments. It is a relatively deep soil with a minimal rock content. The texture of this soil, especially after about 20 inches (or 50.8 centimeters) or so below the ground surface, is often described as dense sticky and plastic, but, if dry, it can become rock hard. This soil can be dug, but the process is difficult and a mattock would be particularly useful. Along the sides of the elevated part of the Ticonderoga Peninsula, the soil is generally classified as Farmington loam. This soil is a well to excessively drained soil that is often shallow to bedrock (e.g., 10-20 inches). It is derived from till deposits and is very rocky (with a rock content ranging from 5-35%). The part of the low flat plain near the 'Redoubt next the French Lines' is also Vergennes clay. The soil around the 'Semi-Circular Redoubt' is Kingsbury silty clay loam. This is a deep and somewhat poorly drained soil that is derived from lacustrine sediments deposited on a level lake plain. Like Vergennes silty clay, Kingsbury silty clay loam is often described as sticky and plastic. The soil in the area near where the Jersey Battery was located is Hartland very fine sandy loam. This is a very deep well drained soil that derives from a sandy glaciolacustrine deposit. Finally, the soil in the area on the lower plain near the lakeshore near the American Redoubts, is classified as Niagara silt loam. This is a deep poorly drained lake plain soil derived from a glacio-lacustrine deposit. This soil is often low and wet but can be used agriculturally if drained.

Soils are important to military earthworks. The soil on site can impact the time and manpower needed to build the defensive works. The soil type determines the degree of slope that can be maintained by the mounded-up material and may also influence the depth to which the ditch in front is excavated. The type of soils used to build the earthworks may also influence their long-term preservation and management. The clayey soil on top of the Ticonderoga Peninsula occasionally merited comment in the historical record. For example, on June 3, 1777, Colonel Ebenezer Francis wrote to Jeremiah Powell from Ticonderoga noting, “what can we expect from Soldiers unclothed by day & no Blankets to shield them from this Cold Clay by night”² Gen. Jeffery Amherst went so far to say that the soil on the upper part of the Ticonderoga Peninsula was more of a hinderance than the enemy shells in his 1759 siege of the fort.

While the Fort Ticonderoga property has been largely protected from development since the early 1800s, there have been two significant changes which may have adversely affected the historic and older Native American archeological resources on the property. In 1871, the Addison Railroad was built with a ferry bridge at Larrabees Point (*Argus and Patriot* October 5, 1871) from Vermont to New York crossing the northern shoreline of the Peninsula. Between 1873 and 1874, the above-referenced Delaware & Hudson Railroad cut through the Ticonderoga Peninsula south to north with a deep railroad cut and a tunnel. As mentioned, this latter construction altered the topography and hydrology of the area behind (east of) the French Lines and undoubtedly destroyed archeological resources once present along the corridor in the process.

² Ms. letter: Ebenezer Francis to Jeremiah Powell, in the Henry Stevens Papers, Vol. 2. pp. 165-167; Vermont State Archives and Records Administration, Middlesex, Vermont.

PROJECT METHODOLOGY

Archival Research

In the production of this report, an effort was made to locate as many primary accounts describing the Carillon Battlefield and the French Lines as possible. These descriptions were essential for evaluating the historic period maps, georeferencing military positions, and for completing the KOCOA Military Terrain Analysis. Following the procedures set out by the U.S. National Park Service in Kristen McMasters and David Lowe's *Battlefield Survey Manual: American Battlefield Protection Program* document (Revised 2016) and available on-line at https://www.nps.gov/subjects/battlefields/upload/SurveyManual_New-2016_Reviewed.pdf, historical accounts were “evaluated according to source, time, intent, bias . . . and usefulness” (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). Furthermore, in this case, an effort was also made to identify what part of the battlefield the observer may have been located in as well as to identify “details in the account [that] can be linked to actual ground locations” (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). In Appendix A, the entire potentially relevant sections of the first-hand accounts are provided in alphabetical order under the name of the writer followed by their full source citation. This format was chosen because many of the accounts were written without regular punctuation and/or were written in French and the act of excerpting quotes or translating passages to illustrate points inherently runs the risk of inadvertently changing the meaning. Therefore, it was decided to include the extended original text as part of this report as an aid to future researchers.

The maps located during the research phase of this report are included in Appendix B. The maps were evaluated for both the information they offered and for their cartographic accuracy. In looking at the maps, the essential questions were who made it, was it based on actual survey (e.g., scaled with locations “in proper relationship and relative distance on the landscape”), if not, how was it made, and when / why the map was made (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). In the map assemblage there are quick sketches (e.g., cognitive/memory maps, which are not to scale and are more of a “subjective and selective” representation); reconnaissance maps (a sketch map made by an individual practiced in skills such as pacing and distance estimation (though also not exactly to scale); maps made from actual survey; and composite maps (maps made using one or more earlier maps and augmented by other sources written or verbal) (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). However, even among the surveyed maps (limited by the technology of the period), some of the longer distances and angles were a little less reliable. One way to think of several of the early maps of Fort Ticonderoga is as a few well-made surveys (using built features as baselines) stitched together by estimated or very roughly measured distances and with the shoreline sketched in. However, some of the historic maps effectively used the hatchuring technique to indicate the topography reliably (e.g., Brehm-Brasier c. 1759). One of the notable outcomes of the review of historic maps is the recognition of inaccuracies that are repeated by other subsequent versions or re-interpretations, all traceable to an initial misrepresentation or error in measurement.

Geospatial Analysis

To establish the geospatial database for the project a Geographic Information System (GIS) was developed, beginning with publicly available map data and subsequently including new data acquired specifically for the project. Fortunately for the project, one of the most valuable geospatial “layer” assets for studying the Carillon Battlefield and the French Lines is aerial LiDAR imagery compiled by the State of Vermont that happens to include coverage of the New York side of Lake Champlain in the vicinity of Fort Ticonderoga (Figure 5). To augment the high-resolution LiDAR coverage, the UVM CAP worked with the UVM Spatial Analysis Laboratory (SAL) to produce, via photogrammetry, a Digital Surface Model (DSM) for the property. This work included the use of a *senseFly eBee RTK* UAS. Six 25-minute flights were conducted over the project area by UVM SAL at an average elevation of 399 feet AGL in overlapping parallel and perpendicular flight lines. All flights complied with FAA Section 333 exemption and FAA Part 107 UAS regulations. The photographic data gathered during the aerial survey was then processed using *Pix4D* to generate overhead imagery in a 3-band, true color, GeoTIFF format, orthorectified in NAD 1983 State Plane New York US survey meters (Figure 6). This imagery was then used to create topographic data with a 5 centimeters maximum pixel size, and a horizontal accuracy of +/- 10 centimeters or better. Subsequently these data were processed to yield a photogrammetrically derived point cloud in LAS (3-D point cloud interchange format) with image matching key points from all photos with vertical accuracy of +/- 10 centimeters or better (hard ground surfaces). Ultimately, a photogrammetrically derived raster surface model was generated from the point cloud to produce the DSM in GeoTIFF format to be incorporated into the GIS (Figure 7).

While the historic maps examined for this study (see Appendix A) were all informative in some way, only two were considered to be cartographically accurate enough to lend themselves to georeferencing in ArcGIS with only minimal distortion. Using the LiDAR and DSM base layers, both the Brehm-Brasier (c. 1759) and Wintersmith (c. 1780) historic maps were georeferenced using common features including defensive lines and identifiable topographic and landscape features, along with standard algorithms applied within ArcGISPro (Figure 8 and Figure 9). The resulting overlays provide powerful visual models of landscape features central to the Battle of Carillon, as well as tools for investigating military decisions both defensive and offensive.

Following the establishment of the project’s base layers and the georeferencing of the historic maps, these datasets were integrated into a comprehensive cloud-based, mobile-friendly mapping and data visualization solution that will serve as Fort Ticonderoga’s system for site mapping and management. An ArcGIS Operations Dashboard was constructed to allow data collection, data entry, and data visualization in a desktop or field context using base-layers in conjunction with one another, such as historic maps and LiDAR imagery that have been built in (Figure 10). The integration of digital data also allows for potentially revealing 3D visualizations by draping the georeferenced historic maps onto site topography (Figure 11). Used in conjunction with hand-held applications such as Esri’s Collector or Field Maps, this platform allows for both management of resources and threats to the historic property as well as advanced analysis for authorized users. The GIS webmap created as part of the management and assessment project therefore can form the basis for routine maintenance and site management in addition to a

platform for visualizing long-term planning and investigations of research queries, including those generated by the georeferencing of maps and the geolocation of first-hand accounts.



Figure 5. Aerial LiDAR hillshade imagery showing the Carillon earthworks and other archeological features. Note the railway cut through the site.



Figure 6. Photogrammetric mosaic of imagery of the Fort Ticonderoga property captured by UVM Spatial Analysis Lab's Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). Note Fort Ticonderoga in the lower portion of the image, battlefield earthworks are located in the wooded area in upper left.




Figure 7. Digital Surface Model (DSM) hillshade image of the Fort Ticonderoga property generated from photogrammetry of images taken with UVM Spatial Analysis Lab's Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). Note Fort Ticonderoga in the lower portion of the image and battlefield earthworks in upper left.



Figure 8. Brehm-Brasier map (c. 1759) (<https://collections.leventhalmap.org/searc/commonwealth:hx11z174f>) georeferenced onto modern topographic map.



Figure 9. Wintersmith map (c. 1780) (Source: John Carter Brown Library, Providence) georeferenced onto modern topographic map.




Figure 10. Screenshot of Brehm-Brasier map (c. 1759) overlaid on LiDAR hillshade imagery within the ArcGIS Desktop Data Manager (Source: VCGI; <https://collections.leventhalmap.org/searc/commonwealth:hx11z174f>).



Figure 11. Screenshot of Wintersmith map (c. 1780) overlaid on LiDAR hillshade imagery within the 3D viewer in the ArcGIS Desktop Data Manager (Source: VCGI; John Carter Brown Library, Providence). Note the rail line cut that did not exist at the time the historic map was drawn and the relief on the steep slope south of the Heights of Carillon and the French Lines.

CARILLON BATTLEFIELD & THE FRENCH LINES HISTORIC BACKGROUND

Due to the shortcomings of the historic period maps (discussed in depth below), none could be accurately georeferenced to show the likely ‘core battlefield’ area or to reliably show troop movements. This deficiency was addressed by augmenting the map data with eyewitness accounts that describe troop movements and/or the battlefield’s defining features. Given the volume of information pertaining to the Battle and its geospatial aspects, a basic ‘framework narrative’ was developed to explain how the provisional battle maps that are included in this report were created. While not a comprehensive history of the Battle, the order of events presented here is critically important to the process of evaluating the potential contribution of each map and personal account for the interpretation of the archaeological record of the Battle and broader Fort Ticonderoga property.

To assist future researchers, where first-hand accounts are referenced, in-text citations are listed using the last name of the person who made the observations, followed by the names of others with related, similar, confirming or contradicting accounts. To further document the process of ‘crowd-sourcing’ geospatial data, the relevant portions of each referenced first-hand account is provided in more complete detail in Appendix A. This method allows for a rapid expansion of the framework narrative into a more detailed history, will facilitate the critical review of this document by future researchers, and/or support independent interpretation. The Appendix A reference document can be expanded as more accounts may surface. Similarly, references to historic maps are made in-text and copies of these maps are presented in Appendix B to assist future research. References to secondary sources are provided in a more traditional format.

Fort Ticonderoga (Carillon)

Following the Battle of Lake George on September 8, 1755, French colonial engineer Lt. Michel Chartier de Lotbinière, a close friend of the royal governor at the time, Marquis de Vaudreuil, oversaw the construction of Fort Ticonderoga (Carillon) between October of 1755 and October of 1757 (Laramie 2020:51, 58; Struik 1956:236). Lotbinière sited the fort on the southeastern point of the raised portion of the Ticonderoga Peninsula. The fort overlooks several strategic points including: the narrow channel between the Ticonderoga Peninsula and Mount Independence to the east, South Bay and the outlet of the La Chute River to the south, and Lake Champlain to the north. However, the fort itself is commanded by Mount Independence, Mount Defiance, and the Heights of Carillon (Laramie 2020:57-58). While Lotbinière foresaw the need for an outer work across the Heights of Carillon to guard the western land approach to the fort, due to a lack of money and manpower, he instead created established forward posts closer to Lake George as the first line of warning of a British approach from that quarter (Laramie 2020:57-58). Tradition holds that Lotbinière ordered the preservation of the stand of timber on top of the Heights of Carillon to be used in the construction of a hasty defensive line at that location should the time come (Laramie 2020:58-59).

French Lines I

In March of 1758 the English Secretary of State's, Sir William Pitt, plans for three simultaneous military expeditions against the French arrived in the colonies (Schutz 1951:307). These campaigns included one in the Ohio River region, one against the Fortress of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island, and one directed into the heart of Canada towards Montreal and Quebec by way of Lake Champlain (Schutz 1951:307). British Major Gen. James Abercromby was placed in charge of the effort against Canada that would move via Lake Champlain and oversaw the raising of a roughly 16,000-20,000 man combined British and Provincial task force. By late May to early June, the lead elements of his army had moved northwards by way of Albany to the southern end of Lake George³ (Chartrand 2000:30-31; Skaarup 2001:3). According to a French officer, Pierre Pouchot, “on the 5th of June some prisoners taken up by a party of Nepissens informed us that the English army had begun to assemble at Ft. George” (quote Pouchot). In response to this advance, the French reinforced Fort Ticonderoga with several battalions of French Regulars (see Pouchot) and on June 30th Gen. Louis-Joseph de Montcalm arrived to take command of the post (Chartrand 2000:47).

On July 1, Montcalm, along with two military engineers, Capt. Nicolas Sarresource Maladre De Pontleroy and Capt. Jean-Nicolas Desandrouins, as well as two other senior officers, Capt. Louis-Philippe de Hebecourt of the La Reine and Lt. Jacquot (or Jacquau), chose the ground for a ‘retrenchment,’⁴ to protect the westerly land approach to Fort Ticonderoga (see Anonymous 12, 14; Bougainville; Doreil 2; Montcalm 1 & 2; Levis). Capt. de Pontleroy (1717-1802), a native of Marseilles, had served in the French Engineer Corps since 1736⁵ and was, in 1758, Canada's chief engineer, while Capt. Desandrouins (1729-1792), a native of Verdun, and a member of the French Engineer Corps since 1752, was serving as field engineer deployed with the ground troops⁶. Together, these officers settled upon a site on the Heights of Carillon, a distinct rise about midway along the elevated portion of the Ticonderoga Peninsula, about 3,000 feet (roughly 0.57 mi)⁷ or “about half a cannon shot” (quote Murray 1), from the fort as the place to build a line of defense (see also Anonymous 8; Bougainville; d'Hugues; Montcalm 1; and Pouchot).

At 4 a.m. on July 6, 1758, as the lead elements of the British army approached ‘the Landing’ at the northern end of Lake George by boat, Montcalm ordered de Pontleroy and Desandrouins to mark out (or trace) the defensive line and set the 2nd Battalion of Berry along

³ Lake George is about 34 miles long.

⁴ This work was a “retrenchment,” meaning a “work raised to cover a post and fortify it against an enemy” (James 1802:np).

⁵ [Biography – SARRE SOURCE DE PONTLEROY, NICOLAS – Volume V \(1801-1820\) – Dictionary of Canadian Biography \(biographi.ca\)](#) He was appointed chief engineer in New France in 1757, over Michel Chartier de Lotbinière, the preferred man of Gov. Vaudreuil, and arrived at Fort Ticonderoga with Montcalm late June 1758.

⁶ [Biography – DESANDROUINS, JEAN-NICOLAS – Volume IV \(1771-1800\) – Dictionary of Canadian Biography \(biographi.ca\)](#)

⁷ The historic period estimates of the distance between Fort Ticonderoga and the French Lines appear to confirm that the French Lines were always in the same general area as the presently visible remains. For example: Pierre Pouchot said the camp is on heights 400 toises (2,558 ft) from the fort (see Pouchot); Gen. Montcalm said the defensive lines were 650 fathoms (3,900 ft) from the fort (see Montcalm 1); and Capt. d'Hugues said the hill was west of the fort 5000 toises (3,197 ft) (see d'Hugues).

with the laborers who were assigned to both the artillery and to the engineers to work⁸ (see Anonymous 2, 3, 12; Bougainville; Lapause; Levis; and Montcalm 1 & 2;). Apparently, these men had about one third of the line well underway by that evening (see Anonymous 12). The next day, July 7, 1758, the rest of the French force, which had been stationed nearer to Lake George, joined in the construction of the defensive works on the Heights of Carillon (see Anonymous 2, 3; Bougainville; Doreil 1; Lapause; Montcalm 2; and Pouchot;). The French army worked quickly. As one account noted, “it was a race to see who would build the best defenses all believed that the enemy would arrive at any moment” (quote Anonymous 14). It was reported that by “about three o’clock in the afternoon” the men had completed much of a log and earth breastwork (quote Anonymous 12) and the lines across the Heights of Carillon were considered to be “in a defendable state the same evening” (quote Bougainville) though it was observed that the line had points “both good and bad” (quote Montcalm 2). The axes were then handed off to the four companies of Canadians and La Marine, including those of de Raymond, St. Ours, Lanaudiere, and Gaspe, who had struggled to build a defensive position at the bottom of the hill to the right of the main work since about noon on the 7th⁹ (see Anonymous 12, 14).

The main component of the French defensive line was a log and earth breastwork located on the Heights of Carillon. The left wing of this work “rested on an escarpment” overlooking the steep slope down to the La Chute River about 674 feet away (quote Anonymous 3; see also Bougainville). The right wing was also “protected by a declivity” though it was “less precipitous than that on the left” (quote Anonymous 3; see also Anonymous 4 and Maurès Malartic 2). French officer, Capt. Pierre Pouchot estimated that the main work was “about 980 paces in circumference” (or roughly 2,450 feet) (quote Pouchot) while another writer declared that the “extent” of the lines “was about 300 and some toises” (or about 1,918.5 feet) (quote Anonymous 12). Between the two wings, the center of the line “followed the sinuosities of the ground, keeping the top of the heights” (quote Montcalm 1 see also Anonymous 3; Bougainville; Maurès Malartic 1; and Pouchot).

It appears that much of the breastwork was about 6 feet thick and about 8 feet high, and was composed of a double row of more or less squared off “large trees, laid lengthwise one over the other” (quote Anonymous 13) and locked together by dovetailed joints at the angle points and dovetailed cross pieces, with the interior space filled with soil taken from the area just in front of the structure (see Anonymous 3, 5, 8, 14; Arnot 1; Bougainville; Brehm; Montcalm 1; Nichols, Searing; Skinner; and Tinkham). Various accounts also indicate that the structure had “slits left open between them [the logs] at a proper height, for loop holes” (quote Searing, see also Spicer), or was “pierced with a double row of loop-holes” (quote Anonymous 13). The upper part of the breastwork was also “covered with bags of earth” (quote Anonymous 13) or sods thereby “making a third line of fire” (quote Anonymous 5). Overall height estimates for the

⁸ This group of unarmed workmen totaled about 300 men (see *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Volume X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp .788);

⁹ After the battle, Col. Louis de Bougainville revealed that not everything had gone smoothly in the construction of the works. He noted in his journal for August 2, 1758, “all of the hatchets were of plain iron without steel [edges], also all bent like pancakes at the first blow. The colony just missed destruction through the poor quality of the hatchets. Where would we have been without our abatis?” (quote Bougainville).

breastwork vary between 5 and 10 feet with most accounts indicating about 8 feet¹⁰ and was high enough to provide sufficient protection for defenders from direct fire (see Anonymous 5, 13; Arnot 1; Gen. Abercromby 1; Capt. Abercromby; Lee; and Nichols). According to Joseph Nichols of Bagley's Massachusetts regiment, "their Breast works which was Built So High that Our Enemy Could Stand Behind & Receive our Fire without Danger" (quote Nichols). British regular, Capt. James Murray noted,

"the French . . . were entrenched after the following manner: They had cut trees laid one above another a man's height and in the outside there was brush and logs for about 45 paces from it which made it impossible to force their breastworks without cannon . . . Between one and two we marched up and attacked the trenches and got within twenty paces of them and had as hot a fire for about three hours as possible could be, we all the time seeing but their hats and the end of their muskets" (quote Murray 1).

Another British regular, Lt. William Grant, noted that, "the enemy's breast work was about nine or ten feet high, upon the top of which they had plenty of wall-pieces fixed, and well lined on the inside with small arms" (quote W. Grant).

Immediately in front of the breastwork, the French built an 'abattis' (also often spelled 'abatis'). To avoid confusion, in this report, the term 'abattis' is used for the dense intentionally arranged rows of small trees or large branches with their butt ends anchored to the ground and their upper branches, stripped of leaves and small twigs and sharpened to points, placed pointing outwards from the defensive line and interlaced with each other. The more modern term 'slashing' will be used for the area of the randomly felled trees that lay beyond the abattis.¹¹ According to Pierre Pouchot, "the parapet was covered by branches interwoven, presenting their points most difficult to tear from the palisade" (quote Pouchot). Provincial soldier, Peter Pond noted that the, "British Put thare Plan on fut to March Over the Works But the Limbs and tops of the Trease on the Side for the Diek Stuck fast in the Ground and all pointed at upper End that thay Could not Git threw them til thay ware at Last Obliged to Quit that plan" (quote Pond). An anonymous English or Provincial observer wrote, "a large abattis of trees fixed in front along the whole length made the work still more formidable" (quote Anonymous 5; see also Gen. Abercromby 1; Anonymous 3, 13, 14; Bougainville; and Montcalm 1). French officer, Jean-Guillaume-Charles Plantavit de Margon de Lapause appears to indicate that the area covered by the abattis could have been up to 5 to 6 toises [or 30-36 feet] in extent (see Lapause). British officer, James Murray noted that, "they [the French] had cut trees laid one above another a man's height and in [sic] the outside there was brush and logs for about 45 paces" (quote Murray 1).

Beyond the abattis and extending outwards about 100 to 120 yards (300 to 360 feet) or 40 to 50 toises (256 to 320 feet) from the breastwork lay the slashing (see Anonymous 1, 5; Arnot 1; Eyre; Maurès Malartic 2; Pouchot; and Searing). This was a wide swath of the white oak and white pine forest (see W. Grant; D. Perry; and Pond) where, according to one French defender,

¹⁰ There could be a few reasons for the variation in the reported height of the breastwork. For example, the French engineer officer, Desandrouins, later indicated that the line had some sections that were built too low (Gabriel 1887:166). It is also possible that some observers were estimating the entire 'relief' of the work, with 'relief' being technically measured from the bottom of the ditch in front to the top of the parapet or breastwork

¹¹ According to one military treatise, "trees cut down so as to fall in all directions form what is known as a slashing. It is better, where the trees are intended to be used as an obstacle, that they be cut so as to fall towards enemy; and, in case of smaller trees, which might be moved by a few men, the trunks should not be cut entirely through, but only enough to allow the trees to fall . . . It has the serious defect of being easily burned when dry" (Wheeler 1898:178).

“Large trees were also felled, in order to see the enemy arrive more clearly and at a greater distance” (quote Anonymous 14). Provincial soldier, Peter Pond, noted that, “the French had Cut Down a Grate number of Pinetrease in front of thare Camp at som distance (quote Pond). Rev. Samuel Hopkins recorded that,

“for when they came near the French entrenchments, they found they had fallen a great number of trees before their entrenchments, which much resembled trees blown down by a hurricane, lying from the ground 10 feet, so that there was no passing them but by climbing or creeping” (quote Hopkins; see also O. Partridge).

Col. William Williams wrote that the enemy had, “fell’d trees Cris Cross” (quote W. Williams). William Grant of the 42rd Regiment of Foot noted, “they took care to cut down monstrous large fir and oak trees &c., which covered all the ground from the foot of their breastwork, about the distance of a cannon shot every way in their front” (quote W. Grant).¹²

Beyond the slashing and possibly just inside the tree line there was another defensive work. James Searing of the New York unit wrote, “a little advance from the principal work, was a sort of fence made of loose logs which served to cover the out parties” (quote Searing). Capt. William Hervey also noted that there was a forward work, “made of loose logs which served to cover the out parties” (Hervey quoted in Bellico 2010:155). According to Caleb Rea of Bagley’s Massachusetts regiment, “the Battle lasted hot ‘till 3 or 4 after Noon when our men only fired fro [sic] y^e Breastwork they first recovered of y^e Enemy, and from Trees, Stumps, Loggs &c.” (quote Rea).

The disorganizing effect of the slashing and the abattis on the movement of the attacking formations is one of the most common things mentioned in the British and Provincial accounts of the battle. For example, one anonymous soldier wrote,

“the Ground was so clogg’d up with Logs, Trees and Brush by the Enemy to impede our March, that the Troops could not march regular and fast, and as they marched three deep they had enough to do to fill up the vacant Places which were made by the Dead and Wounded” (quote Anonymous 7).

Col. William Williams, the commander of one of the Massachusetts Provincial regiments, wrote of the Regulars’ attack that the slashing, “mighty impeaded them, and finally prevented their doing anything to purpose saving bringing their men to the Slaughter” (quote W. Williams). Maj. Robert Rogers noted, “we toiled with repeated attacks for four hours, being greatly embarrassed by trees felled by the enemy without their breastwork” (quote Rogers 1). Another Englishman reported, “the French had for upwards of an [sic] hundred Yards beyond the Breast-Work, filled the Ground with large Logs, Stumps, Brush, &c. which retarded the advancing of our People, and proved a prodigious Difficulty to them” (quote Anonymous 1). William Grant noted that it was,

“the difficult access to their lines was what gave them a fatal advantage over us: they took care to cut down monstrous large fir and oak trees &c., which covered all the ground from the foot of their breastwork, about the distance of a cannon shot every way in their front. This not only broke our ranks, and made it impossible for us to keep our

¹² Additionally, in some areas there may have been something akin to pickets set out as an obstacle. According to Gen. Abercromby, he “found the ground Cover’d with felled Trees, the Branches sharpened & pointed outward, and a vast number of Pointed Stakes drove into the Ground, which rendered the road to the Enemies works . . . almost impassible” (Gen. Abercromby quoted in Bellico 2010:158).

order, but it put it entirely out of our power to advance briskly; which gave the enemy abundance of time to mow us down like a field of corn, with their wall-pieces and small arms” (quote W. Grant).

However, the stumps and felled trees in the slashing as well as any standing trees within range of the French Lines could also have also been used by the English and Provincial forces as cover.¹³ Garrett Albertson of Johnson’s New Jersey regiment reported after his regiment had moved to “within gunshot” of the French Lines that, “several of us were covered by a large pine log, where we would drop and load, then rise and fire over the log, until our ammunition was almost spent; my firelock at length got so hot I could not handle it” (quote Albertson). David Perry of Preble’s Massachusetts regiment later recalled that, “we got behind trees, logs and stumps, and covered ourselves as we could from the enemy’s fire” (quote D. Perry). On the French side, Col. Louis-Antoine de Bougainville commented, “their light troops and better marksmen, who protected by the trees, delivered a most Murderous fire on us” (quote Bougainville). Benjamin Jewett of Fitch’s Connecticut regiment noted, “Ye regalars were drawed up within five rods [82.5 feet] of ye breastworks in plain sight and ye French kept behind ye breastwork and fired smartly on them. Ye New Ingland men kept behind tres and logs as much as they cold, but ye regulars kept so nigh and in plain sight that ye French cut them down amazin” (quote Jewett).

In addition to the main defensive work stretching across the Heights of Carillon, the French had two ancillary positions. To the left of the main line, there was an abattis located about 160 feet southward from the edge of the heights on a slight shelf, roughly 160 feet wide, about midway down the steep slope leading to the La Chute River (see Appendix B: Anonymous 3, 4). During the battle, the companies of Capt. Duprat of La Sarre and Capt. Bernard of Béarn were posted here “on the bank of the river to prevent the enemy . . . [from] turning our left” (quote Doreil 2; see also Pouchot; and Appendix B: Anonymous 3). Theoretically, this position could be supported by the left side of the main line on the heights as well as by seven cannons mounted at the fort, “which bear on that point” (quote Anonymous 12). To the right of the main work, the Canadians and La Marine built another abattis at the bottom of the “pretty steep slope, with a double face” (quote Anonymous 12). According to one source,

“the Canadians began to work on the defenses on the 7th, at noon, having been unable to have axes earlier; their defenses began at the bottom of the small mountain where the Queen’s regiment [La Reine], a little behind it one had it continue to the River Saint Frederic. We worked hard to perfect it until noon of the next day” (quote Anonymous 14; see also Lapause).

This defensive work appears to have extended from the foot of the northerly side of the Heights of Carillon about 639.5 feet northwards on the low flat plain to the head of a distinct drainage that leads further northwards about 1,460 feet to Lake Champlain (see Anonymous 3, 12, 14; and Bougainville as well as Appendix B: Anonymous 3). According to one French account, this

¹³ Prior to the battle, French engineer, Capt. d’Hugues, recommended that the ground in front of the works be cleared “for a distance of fifty toises [about 319.75 ft],” warning “that no large trunks of trees be piled up at the extremity” (quote d’Hugues). It appears likely that the battle was prolonged because the British and Provincial forces found cover within range of the French Lines.

position was, “under the protection of the fire from our intrenchment” on the heights as well as, theoretically (though not practicably), by the guns of the fort (quote Doreil 2).

To defend their line, the French relied mainly on muskets,¹⁴ but also employed swivels, wall pieces, and even, perhaps, some “Hand Grandoes” (quote Anonymous 7 see also Anonymous 1; Nichols; Searing; and W. Williams). Many of the participants would later attest to the staggering volume of fire achieved at points during the battle. For example, Capt. Desandrouins estimated that each of the French soldiers had “fired 70 to 80 shots” during the engagement (Desandrouins quoted in Bellico 2010:160). Col. William Williams noted,

“for 6 hours or more there was by far the heaviest Fire I ever heard, the Earth for the whole time Shook like the beginning of an Earthquake, there was not the least Space of Time but there was firing and about the middle of the p.m. it was greatly Increased by Musketry, wall pieces swivels &c.” (quote W. Williams).

The layered defensive work built by the French in just two days, was on the whole, effective in battle. While a handful of British and Provincial soldiers made it to the breastworks, most did not. The area within about 15 or 20 paces of the breastwork was considered a place of “certain death” (quote Anonymous 5; see also Bougainville; Pouchot; and Levis). Not only were the French Lines a deadly trap for the attackers, they also provided reasonable protection from direct fire for the defenders. Several of the British and Provincial accounts convey the sense of futility that the attackers felt in firing at the French defenders. Capt. Salah Barnard of Williams’ Massachusetts regiment observed that, “a part of the Highlanders forced themselves within the first lines of y^e Enemy^s Breast work, But were soon obliged to quit the same & Retreat a few yards Back where they stood fast & Fought Like Brave Soldiers, with as much Likelihood of doing Service as if they had discharged so many Rounds into the Lake” (quote Barnard 1). Although perhaps not in the battle himself, Col. Melancthon Taylor Woolsey of the New York unit related that, “many brave fellows, who were set as targets to be fired at by the enemy, without being allowed to return the fire; and had they returned it, would have been to but little purpose, as the enemy had a breastwork of wood and earth which quite covered them” (quote Woolsey). One anonymous soldier noted that the French, “raised their Huts above the Trenches, which our People fired at; they having Ports to fire through, and were covered by the Sod; that we did them but little Damage, excepting some of their Hats being shot to Pieces” (quote Anonymous 7). Another anonymous British soldier summed up the essential problem of attacking the French Lines particularly well,

“never was there in the World such a piece of ground to fight on. It was so very bad that after we were within gun shot the enemy might easily fire 10 Rounds before we got up the length of their Intrenchments and that in the face of such a fire of small arms, Wall pieces, and musquets as I never saw before . . . but alas after we came to the trenches we found them above 6 ft. high without a posy of getting in, and so had the same fire to stand in coming back” (quote Anonymous 10).

Battle of Carillon: Opposing Forces

¹⁴ James Searing with the New York unit noted that, “many of their muskets loaded only with buckshot” (quote Searing).

The French forces at the Battle of Carillon were under the command of 46-year-old Gen. Louis-Joseph de Montcalm, who had served in the French army since he was 15-years old (Skaarup 2001:48-49). With him were eight somewhat understrength battalions of French Regulars along with some Canadians and Troupes de la Marine, for a total of about 3,526 effectives (Table 1). The combined British and Provincial force totaled approximately 15,350 effectives (Table 2). This force was under the command of 52-year-old Maj. Gen. James Abercromby, who had first served in the British army when he was 11 years of age and had combat experience as an officer in the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748), but who had been primarily engaged as a member of Parliament between 1734 and 1754 (Chartrand 2000:17-18).¹⁵

Table 1. French Order of Battle at Carillon August 8, 1758.

Unit	Effectives	Casualties	~Loss%
La Reine (2 nd Battalion)	345-365	8 k; 49 w	15.6- 16.5%
Béarn (2 nd Battalion)	410	13 k; 39 w	12.7%
Guyenne (2 nd Battalion)	470	26 k; 38 w	13.6%
La Sarre (2 nd Battalion)	460	10 k; 33 w	9.3%
Languedoc (2 nd Battalion)	426	11 k; 41 w	12.2%
Royal-Roussillon (2 nd Battalion)	480	3 k; 18 w	4.4%
2 nd Battalion Berry	450	19 k; 30 w	10.9%
Detachment of the 3 rd Battalion Berry	50	6 k; 8 w	28%
Troupes de la marine	150	See below	*
Canadians	250	See below	*
Native Allies	15	n.a.	n.a.

Sources: For troop strengths see *Adventures in the Wilderness: the American Journals of Louis Antoine de Bougainville, 1756-1760*, edited by Edward Pierce Hamilton (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, (1964) p. 231. For casualties see an anonymous document entitled, “*Relation de la Victoire Reportee Sur Les Anglois Le 8 Juillet 1758 Par L’Armee Du Roi Commandee Par Le Marquis De Montcalm in Guerre Du Canada Relations Et Journaux De Différents Expéditions Faits Durant Les Années 1755-56-57-58-59-60.*” Included in H.R. Casgrain. Imprimerie De L.-J. Demers & Frere, Quebec (1895):149-164 (see pp. 162-163).

Notes on Table 1

- The “Colонie” total loss was reported to be 10 k; 13 w. “*Relation de la Victoire Reportee Sur Les Anglois Le 8 Juillet 1758 Par L’Armee Du Roi Commandee Par Le Marquis De Montcalm in Guerre Du Canada Relations Et Journaux De Différents Expéditions Faits Durant Les Années 1755-56-57-58-59-60.*” Included in H.R. Casgrain. Imprimerie De L.-J. Demers & Frere, Quebec (1895):149-164 (see pp. 162-163).
- In addition to the above, Col. Bourlamaque and aide Marechal des logis Bougainville were also wounded. “*Relation de la Victoire Reportee Sur Les Anglois Le 8 Juillet 1758 Par L’Armee Du Roi Commandee Par Le Marquis De Montcalm in Guerre Du Canada Relations Et Journaux De Différents Expéditions Faits Durant Les Années 1755-56-57-58-59-60.*” Included in H.R. Casgrain. Imprimerie De L.-J. Demers & Frere, Quebec (1895):149-164 (see pp. 162-163).
- A note on the Berry Battalions. According to Dr. Matthew Keagle, the Fort Ticonderoga Museum’s Curator, the Berry was a three-battalion regiment when it arrived in New France. However, only two of the battalions served at Ticonderoga. These were the 2nd and the 3rd Battalions. However, in many accounts, even in period accounts, the 2nd Battalion is often referred to as the 1st, while the 3rd Battalion is often referred to as the 2nd. In this report, the firsthand accounts in Appendix A have not been changed to reflect this, but remain as written. However, the 2nd Battalion is properly indicated on the prospective battle maps included in this report. The 3rd Battalion Berry, although nominally posted at the fort, provided *at least* a

¹⁵ See also the biography in the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* available on-line at http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/abercromby_james_4E.html.

small detachment to supply the front lines with ammunition. According to one account, “from the commencement of the attack, munitions of war continued to be carried from the fort to the intrenchment by means of horses; but as there was not sufficient number of them, a portion of the 2nd [actually the 3rd Battalion] with the workmen were employed in this transportation which caused us the loss of 30 to 40 men, the enemy continually firing at them” (quote Anonymous 12; see also Anonymous 14).

Table 2. British & Provincial Order of Battle at Carillon August 8, 1758.

Unit	Commander	Effectives (Approx.)	Casualties	~Loss%
27 th Regiment of Foot (Blakeney's / Inniskilling)	Lt. Col. William Haviland	500-650	21 k; 101 wd; 3	19.3% to 25%
42 nd Regiment of Foot (Lord John Murray's / Highland "The Black Watch")	Lt. Col. Francis Grant	1,086	203 k; 298 w; 0 m	46.1%
44 th Regiment of Foot (Gen. James Abercromby's)	Maj. William Eyre (w)	850	43 k; 153 wd; 9 m	24.1%
46 th Regiment of Foot (Thomas Murray's)	Col. Samuel Beaver (k)	650	68 k; 141 wd; 12 m	34%
55 th Regiment of Foot (Lord Howe's)	Lt. Col. John Donaldson (k)	650	41 k; 125 wd; 3 m	26%
1 st Battalion 60 th Regiment of Foot (Royal Americans)	See Notes	550	23 k; 97 w; 0 m	21.8%
4 th Battalion 60 th Regiment of Foot (Royal Americans)	See Notes	900	27 k; 133 w; 0m	17.8%
80th Regiment of Light-Armed Foot (Gage's Light Infantry)	Col. Thomas Gage	350-450	4 k; 16 w; 0 m	4.4% to 5.7%
Massachusetts Provincial Regiment (in support service see note below)	Col. Timothy Ruggles	375	0 k; 0 w; 2 m	0.5%
Massachusetts Provincial Regiment	Col. Thomas Doty	770	0 k; 5 w; 0 m	0.6%
Massachusetts Provincial Regiment	Col. William Williams	470	4 k; 13 w; 0 m	3.6%
3 rd Massachusetts Provincial Regiment	Col. Jonathan Bagley	450	6 k; 11 w; 0 m	3.8%
Massachusetts Provincial Light Infantry Regiment	Col. Oliver Partridge	980	5 k; 8 w; 2 m	1.5%
Massachusetts Provincial Regiment	Col. Jedediah Preble	525	7 k; 19 w; 1m	5.1%
Rhode Island Provincial Regiment	Col. Henry Babcock (w)	680	18 k; 52 w; 0 m	10.3%
3 rd Connecticut Provincial Regiment	Col. Eleazer Fitch	475	5 k; 6 w; 3 m	2.9%
4 th Connecticut Provincial Regiment	Col. David Wooster	425	3 k; 16 w; 0 m	4.5%
1 st Connecticut Provincial Regiment (in support service see note below)	Col. Phineas Lyman	500	None	0%
2 nd Connecticut Provincial Regiment	Col. Nathan Whiting	475	n.a.?	n.a.?
Rogers Rangers [The Companies of Rogers, Stark, Burbank, and Shepard (300) along with two companies of Stockbridge Native Allies (80)]	Maj. Robert Rogers	380	17 k; 19 w; 2 m	9.5%
Regiment of New York Provincials (see note below)	Col. Beamsley Glazier / Col. Oliver Delancey	~1,300 (or 850?)	28 k; 61 w; 0 m	6.8% (10.5%?)
New Jersey Provincial Regiment	Col. John Johnson	615-850	11 k; 47 w; 2 m	9.8-7%
Corps of Armed Battlemen	Lt. Col. John Bradstreet	1,600?	17 k; 34 w; 0 m	3.2%?
Native Allies	Sir William Johnson	300-400	na	n.a.
Royal Artillery	Maj. Thomas Ord	125	na	n.a.

Sources: *Boston-Evening Post* July 24, 1758, *Boston News-Letter* July 27, 1758; Chartrand 2000:29; Skaarup 2001:3, 44, 46; Stark 1860:26).

Notes on Table 2.

- The New York force attached to Abercromby's army was under the overall command of Chief Colonel Oliver Delancey. This was a large force created under an act "for raising, paying and clothing 2,680

soldiers, to join the forces of the neighboring colonies . . . [to invade Canada] in Conjunction with a Body of His Majesties Regular Troops" (Stokes 1922:697). This force was to have 29 companies (Wood 1828:137-138). Of these, at least six companies had been detached prior to June 18, 1758, and posted at "Shenectady, Steenaraby [Stone Arabia] and fort Harkman upon the Mawhak River" (Mulligan 1992:297-298 [Diary of Charles Clinton]). According to Charles Clinton, the detached companies included, "Capⁿ Ogdon from Westchester at fort Harkman; Capⁿ Hand from Long Island at Stanwix Capⁿ Peter Yates at fort Harkman, Capⁿ Vanvaghta at Canajochary both of Albany County Capⁿ Crane of Dutches County at Canagogchery Capⁿ Badgely of the Same County at fort Harkman" (Mulligan 1992:297-298 [Diary of Charles Clinton]). As of the writing of this report, it appears that all (or most) of the rest of the New York companies were sent to the join campaign against Fort Ticonderoga and they may have been arranged into two battalions, one under Col. Melancthon Taylor Woolsey and one under Col. Beamsley Glazier (see "Moneypenny Orderly Book" in *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum* Vol. XII. No. 6 (October 1970):434-461; for the orders given July 2, 1758, on page 436). According to Col. Henry Babcock of the Rhode Island regiment, on the 6th of July, after the army landed "at the advance guard" at "about two o'clock P.M. the whole army marched, saving a battalion of the York regiment, who were posted as a guard on our bateaux." It appears that Col. Woolsey's battalion of New Yorkers were left at the landing and tasked with not only guarding the boats, but the French prisoners taken on July 6 who had been placed temporarily on a nearby island (see Babcock; Gouldsbury; and Putnam, as well as "Moneypenny Orderly Book" in *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum* Vol. XII, No. 6 (October 1970). pp. 434-461; for the orders given July 7, 1758, on page 440). It appears that Col. Glazier's battalion continued to the battlefield in the company of Col. Delancey. In describing the battle of the 8th, a published letter from a member of the New York force notes that, "Col. Glazier also signalized himself during the whole action" (*New York Mercury* [New York, New York], July 24, 1758, "Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman at Lake George dated July 11, 1758," p. 2.). Based on the casualties reported among the officers in the battle, it is likely that the companies present on the battlefield included those of Capt. Ebenezer Seely (Ulster); Capt. Gilbert Potter (Suffolk); Capt. Peter Coyne (Albany); and, probably, Capt. Peter Stuyvesant (Kings) (Wood 1828:137-138; see the "Names of the British officers Killed and Wounded near Ticonderoga July 8, 1758," in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Vol. X. John Romeyn Brodhead ed. Weed, Parsons, and Company, Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp.:728-732). However, there were certainly other companies present and more research is needed to identify them (Wood 1828:137-138). Immediately after the Battle of Carillon, the New Yorkers were sent west with the men from New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts and were reunited with the six companies already in that area to participate in Bradstreet's campaign to Oneida, the Great Carrying Place, and, eventually, Ft. Frontenac (the battle at the last location occurring on August 26-28, 1758). It appears that, at this point, the New York companies were reshuffled into three battalions: one under Lt. Col. Bartholomew Le Roux (who had been wounded in the thigh on July 8), one under Col. Melancthon Taylor Woolsey, and one under Col. Col. Beamsley Glazier (Mulligan 1992 [Diary of Charles Clinton]:297-298, 300-304). For the "Muster Rolls of the New York Provincial Troops 1755-1764" see *Collections of the New-York Historical Society for the Year 1891*; Printed for the Society, New York, New York (1892):54-134. There is some question as to how many New Yorkers were on the field at the Battle of Carillon. It appears that some of the troop strengths listed by Chartrand 2000:29 may have been derived from Hugh Arnot's "Journal or Proceedings of the Army under the Command of Maj. Gen. Abercrombie from June y^e 17th until July y^e 9 Campaign 1758" (see Nicholas Westbrook's article "Like Roaring Lions Breaking From Their Chains: The Highland Regiment at Ticonderoga." in *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XVI, No. 1 (1998): pp. 16-93; on p. 30-31). Arnot gives the number of New Yorkers present in the area on June 17 at 1,700. If these men were roughly split between Glazier and Woolsey at the time of the battle, then those on the field would be closer to 850. However, more research is needed.

- As of the writing of this report, it is not entirely clear who the field commanders of the 1st and 4th Battalions of the 60th Regiment of Foot (Royal Americans) were on the day of the battle. In 1758, the 1st Battalion was under the overall command of Lt. Col. Henry Bouquet. However, at the time of the Battle of Carillon, he along with part of the battalion were in service in Pennsylvania. According to Fort Ticonderoga Museum's curator Dr. Matthew Keagle, Maj. John Tullikens may have been in charge of the 1st Battalion during the battle. Furthermore, according to Dr. Keagle, the commander of the 4th Battalion, Lt. Col. Frederick Haldimand, had been appointed to command the Grenadiers on the day of the battle and that Maj. John Rutherford probably became the field commander of the battalion with possibly Capt. Baron Dietrich Herbert Munster of the 1st Battalion assuming the command of the unit after Maj. Rutherford was killed.

Please refer to *A Brief History of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, 1755-1948*, Third Edition published by Gale and Polden Limited, Aldershot, England in 1948 (p.4) and *The Annals of the King's Royal Rifle Corps*, Volume I, by Lewis Butler and published by Smith, Elder & Co., in 1913 (pp xxi, 60-61).

- The New Jersey regiment, under the command of Col. John Johnson, was known as the ‘Jersey Blues.’ The *Pennsylvania Gazette* of June 8, 1758, in its ‘New York letter of June 5th’ reported, “a few days ago the New Jersey forces of between 1,100 and 1,200 of the likeliest well-set men for the purpose have perhaps turned out on any campaign, passed by this place for Albany. They were under Col. Johnson, and all in high spirits: their uniform blue, faced with red, grey stockings and buckskin breeches” (Bowen 1892:61). Bowen added that, “the pay per diem at this time was, “Captain 6s; lieutenants, 5s; sergeants, 4s; corporals 3s6d; privates, 3s” (Bowen 1892:61). For more information about the organization of this regiment see: *Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the State of New Jersey*. Volume IX. Edited by Frederick W. Ricord and Wm. Nelson. Daily Advertiser Printing House, Newark, New Jersey (1885): pp.184-186.
- The Rhode Island regiment was under the command of 22-year-old Col. Henry (‘Harry’) Babcock (Babcock 1903:64; Updike 1847:314-315). Babcock had entered Yale “at twelve years and took his degree at sixteen, at the head of his class” (Babcock 1903:64; Updike 1847:314-315). “At the age of eighteen, he obtained from the Legislature . . . a charter for an independent company of infantry and was appointed captain” and subsequently served in the campaigns of 1755, 1756, and 1757 (Babcock 1903:64; Updike 1847:314-315). In March of 1758, the General Assembly of Rhode Island voted to raise a regiment of 1,000 men; including nine new companies to join Capt. Ebenezer Whiting’s “continuous service” company (Chapin 1918:11). All of the Rhode Island companies “except those under Potter and Wall, moved against Ticonderoga” (Chapin 1918:11-12). According to Henry Babcock’s son, Maj. Paul Babcock, “in July 1758” his father “marched 500 of his men with the British Army against Ticonderoga” and “had 110 men killed and wounded, and was wounded himself by a musket ball in the knee” (Updike 1847:314-315). For more information about the organization of this regiment see Chapin 1918:20.
- In the lead-up to the battle, Col. Timothy Ruggles of Massachusetts was assigned to command the 2nd Brigade of the Right Wing of Provincials (the wing commanded by Col. Preble), which was composed of his own regiment and that of Col. Bagley’s (see “Moneypenny Orderly Book” in *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XII, No. 6 (October 1970): pp. 434-461; for the orders given July 2, 1758, on page 436). However, Ruggles’ own regiment of about 375 men was “detailed as rear guard at the saw-mills, where it threw up earthworks” during the time of the battle (Nourse 1889:67, see also Putnam and Nichols). According to Samuel Fisher, the breastwork built by Ruggles’ regiment became a field hospital (see Fisher). Col. Ruggles, however, *may* have continued to the battlefield in his role as the commander of the 2nd Brigade of the Right Wing. A history of Hardwick, Massachusetts, includes the following anecdote, “before the attack on Ticonderoga, in 1758, Brigadier Ruggles earnestly objected to the order of battle proposed by General Abercromby, and suggested another, which involved much greater personal hazard to himself. Abercromby, however, with true English obstinacy, persisted in his own plan, and was repulsed with disastrous loss. When they met, on the next morning, to the General’s formal salutation the Brigadier responded, ‘Good-morning, General Abercrombie I hope your terrible defeat yesterday may be sanctified to you’” (Paige 1883:81). Rufus Putnam indicates that several men from this regiment (including himself) were detailed to bring ammunition up to the battlefield and gained first-hand observations of the battlefield in addition to any information that they may have gathered from others (see also Harris).
- Col. Phineas Lyman’s Connecticut regiment consisting of about 500 men was also kept back at the sawmill (see Putnam). It is possible that Lyman’s regiment made it at least part way to the battlefield as a rearguard late in the day having reportedly left the sawmill area at about 3 p.m. (see Putnam). As the senior Provincial officer, Col. Lyman commanded the three brigades of the ‘Left Wing’ of Provincials (with each brigade made up of two regiments) (see “Moneypenny Orderly Book” in *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum* Vol. XII, No 6 (October 1970): pp. 434-461; for the orders given July 2, 1758, p. 436).
- Col. Ebenezer Nichols’ Massachusetts regiment brought up the train of Gen. Abercromby’s army and spent its time guarding and strengthening posts along the long line of communications (e.g., at Fort Edward, Fort Miller, Halfway Brook & etc.). However, about six companies of the regiment arrived at Lake George a few days before the battle, where they were once again placed on guard, much to the disappointment of the men (see Foster, Holt, Richardson; Thompson; and Wesson).
- Also associated with this army, but not in this battle was a New Hampshire regiment. This regiment had been raised under Col. John Hart with roughly 800 men (New Hampshire Adjutant General 1866:198).

There is some confusion concerning this regiment. The New Hampshire Adjutant General Report states that about 200 men under Col. Hart were sent to join the expedition against Louisburg, while the rest “did duty under Lt. Col. John Goffe, on the western frontier” (New Hampshire Adjutant General 1866:198). Furthermore, Moneypenny’s Orderly book clearly mentions both Col. Hart and Lt. Col. Goffe in the general orders issued by Gen. Abercromby on July 15, 1758 (see “Moneypenny Orderly Book” in *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum* Vol. XII, No. 6 (October 1970): pp. 434-461; for the orders given July 15, 1758, on p. 445). However, what is clear is that the New Hampshire men arrived in the vicinity of Lake George too late to participate in the battle of the 8th. Neither Hart or Goff is mentioned on a list of Provincial units at Lake George on July 2, 1758 (see “Moneypenny Orderly Book” in *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XII, No. 6 (October 1970): pp 434-461; for the orders given July 2, 1758, on p. 436). Furthermore, Amos Richardson, a Provincial soldier in Col. Ebenezer Nichols’ regiment, which was left at the south end of Lake George during the main army’s advance on Ticonderoga noted that on July 7th “a Bought Eight Hundred of New hamsher men” had arrived there (quote Richardson). This observation is supported by the account of Lt. Samuel Thompson, also of Nichols’ regiment, who noted that on July 7th, “the Hampshire forces came to us in the afternoon” (quote Thompson). Col. Oliver Partridge noted in a letter to Col. Thomas Williams of Deerfield dated “Camp at Fort Edward, West Side y^e river below y^e Island June 22, 1758” that, “the General is vastly uneasy that the Connecticut, Road Island & New Hampshire Troops lye behind” (see copy of Ms. letter in Henry Stevens Papers, French and Indian War Documents, Vermont State, Archives and Records Administration, Middlesex, Vermont).

- There was another Massachusetts regiment raised in 1758 for the campaign against the French which served under the command of Col. Joseph Williams and had marched to western New York before the Battle of Carillon. Col. Oliver Partridge noted in a letter to Col. Thomas Williams of Deerfield dated “Camp at Fort Edward, West Side y^e river below y^e Island June 22, 1758” that, “poor Col. Jos. Williams is to spend his summer with his whole reg^t on Mohawk river” (see copy of Ms. letter in Henry Stevens Papers, French and Indian War Documents, Vermont State Archives and Records Administration, Middlesex, Vermont). In “A Journel of an Expedition Against Canaday By Moses Dorr Ensign of Capt. Parker’s Company Roxbury May 25, 1758” and which is included in an article entitled “Documents: Fort Frontenac and Fort Stanwix” in *New York History*. Vol. 16, No. 4 (October 1935): pp. 449-464; Moses Dorr noted in the beginning of his journal, “to Effectually Cary on the Expedition all the Provinces on the Contianant have Raised Great Numbers of Men . . . the Province of Massachusetts Bay are Getin Ready Seven thousand men under ye Command of the Colonels Ruggles Doty Nicholes [sic] Williams Bagley Williams and Prebble Esqrs” (p. 452). Dorr, who served in Col. Joseph Williams’ regiment, reported on “June 22 . . . on our March to fort Edward and Marcht Near 4 miles and met a Poast from fort Edwards with orders from General Aby Crumby [Abercromby] for Colo Williams to March his Regt to Shenatady and releave Colo Bagley” (p. 453). “June 24th Marcht from half moon to Loudens-ferry and met Colo Bagley’s Regiment from Schenatady . . . ” (p. 454). “Juley 6th we hear that General Abercrumby with 18000 men has marcht for Ticonderoga” (p. 454). “Juley 13th There is a report in town that our forces at Ticonderoga are Defeated and Come back to fort William-henry with the Los of 900 men killed and about 1100 wounded” (p. 454).
- Chartrand 2000:29 also notes that Abercromby’s force included 75 men of Maj. Israel Putnam’s “Connecticut Rangers.” This could be true. According to *A History of Connecticut* by Elias B. Sanford the colonial troops at Ticonderoga, “might have been more effectively used, could they have been permitted to follow tactics to which they were accustomed; as it was, the Connecticut troops did valorous duty as sharpshooters; and Major Putnam, who acted as aid, showed both skill and discretion” (Sanford 1887:163-164).
- Chartrand 2000:29 also includes Capt. Lovell’s New Hampshire Rangers with 90 men in Abercromby’s army. The post-war memoir of Thompson Maxwell, a soldier with Capt. Lovell’s company, indicates that this unit was in the campaign of 1758 and was in the area, but does not clearly place it on the Carillon Battlefield (see excerpts of *The Remarkable Military Life of Major Thompson Maxwell* printed in *The Transcendental Eye: Historical Papers Concerning New England and Other Points on a Great Circle* by Franklin Benjamin Sanborn edited by Kenneth Walter Cameron. Transcendental Books, Hartford, Connecticut (1980): pp. 59-63. More research is needed.
- Col. Jedidiah Preble’s Massachusetts regiment was composed of five companies from the District of Maine and “four and a part of another” companies from other parts of Massachusetts (Society of Colonial War in the State of Maine 1905:84). At least a part of this regiment was initially (in early June) sent to western New York but was apparently recalled and rejoined the regiment by late June (see “Journal of a Provincial

Officer, in the Campaign, in Northern New York, in 1758” in *The Historical Magazine* [aka. *Dawson's Historical Magazine*]. Second Series. Vol. X., No. 2 [August 1871]:113-122).

- Both Col. Wm. Williams and Col. Doty’s regiments were reportedly drawn from the Boston area (*Maryland Gazette*, [Annapolis, Maryland], August 31, 1758, “From the Great-Carrying Place August 13, 1758.” p. 3).
- There is still work needed to sort out the Connecticut regiments present on the field. There is good evidence that Wooster’s and Whiting’s were on the battlefield. However, while Eleazer Fitch’s regiment is listed with casualties, two members of the regiment, Benjamin Jewett and Lemuel Lyon, appear to indicate they were not in the battle. For example, Lemuel Lyon reported that on the 8th, “then marched back 2 or 3 regiments to the Landing place to guard & help Get up Artillira and we worked all the fore noon onloading the Battoes and at noon we set out down to the Mils with the Artillira & we got near the Mils and we had orders to leave the Artillira their and go back & get our arms and we went down to the Mils of our regiment 2 Hundred were ordered to go over on the point to keep the French from Landing their and we stayed while next morning son 2 hours high.” Benjamin Jewett wrote, ‘Ye 8 day ye artillery was caryed in ye morning towards ye fort, and sum fire began, and abought noon ye army marcht down to ye breastwork to ye French. Ye Connecticut ridgaments did not go, but kept chiefly upon ye south side of ye lake.’ It is possible these men were in detached companies and that a part of the regiment got to the field. Or that the regiment arrived fairly late on the field. For miscellaneous evidence of Col. David Wooster’s regiment presence on the battlefield see Anonymous 1854:18.
- Aside from Sir William Johnson’s native allies, the British force at the Battle of Carillon also included two companies of Stockbridge warriors with Rogers Rangers (Chartrand 2000:29). It is also important to note that at least some of the New York companies raised by Col. Delancey, included Native Americans within its ranks, notably members of the Shinnecock and Mantauks tribes from Long Island, of which some may have been present at the Battle of Carillon (Witek 1994:215-216). This situation could also be true of Col. Johnson’s New Jersey regiment, which in its recruiting noted that it would accept “whites or well affected Indians” (*Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the State of New Jersey*. Volume IX. Edited by Frederick W. Ricord and Wm. Nelson. Daily Advertiser Printing House, Newark, New Jersey [1885]:184). Additionally, Bougainville mentioned the presence of British Native Ally force with a “Capt. Jacob.”

The Battle of Carillon

On July 7, 1758, at about 11 a.m. or 12 p.m., Maj. Gen. James Abercromby sent Lt. Col. John Bradstreet with the 44th Regiment of Foot, six companies of the 1st Battalion of the 60th Regiment of Foot, and at least two Massachusetts regiments (including those of Col. William Williams and Col. Oliver Partridge) as well as some batteau men and/or rangers from the ‘Landing Place’ at the northern end of Lake George about two miles further north to secure the river crossing on the La Chute River (see Gen. Abercromby 1; Anonymous 1; Aront 2; Babcock; Cobb; Eyre; Glasier; Hervey; Parkman; O. Partridge; and W. Williams). Beginning around 2 or 3 p.m. Abercromby moved the rest of the army¹⁶ up to the sawmill near the river crossing (see Gen. Abercromby 1; Arnot 2; and Parkman). By nightfall, a new bridge had been built across the La Chute River to replace the one destroyed by the retreating French (see Gen. Abercromby 1 and Glasier).

That night, the British Regulars and some of the Provincial regiments established their camps in the vicinity of the sawmill, which lay about 1.5 miles from the French Lines and about 2 miles from Fort Ticonderoga (see Gen. Abercromby 1; Anonymous 5; Cobb; Champion; Jewett; and Parkman; see also Appendix B: Rivez 1 & 2 and Arnot). British regular, Capt. Hugh Arnot, noted, “the Army lay upon their Arms that Night, part on the East side & part on the west

¹⁶ Except for a New York battalion that was held back to guard the boats and supplies (see Gen. Abercromby 1; Anonymous, 7; Babcock; and Gouldsbury).

side of the Lake where there was three Large & strong Breast works of logs" (quote Arnot 2). Arnot also indicates on his sketch map of the campaign that three of the camps near the sawmill had "breastworks abandoned by ye Enemy" and was the place "where our Army lay the night before & after the attack" (see Appendix B: Arnot). It appears that the Provincial regiments that remained on the southern side of the La Chute River included (but not limited to) Fitch's Connecticut regiment (see Jewett); Whiting's Connecticut regiment (see Pond); Johnson's New Jersey regiment (see Albertson); and Babcock's Rhode Island regiment (see Babcock) (see also Anonymous 7). However, four of the Massachusetts regiments, including those of Williams, Preble, Doty, and Partridge, moved even closer to the French Lines before camping for the night¹⁷ (see O. Partridge and W. Williams; see also Appendix B: Rivez 1 & 2). Capt. William Hervey of the 44th Regiment of Foot noted that about, "1200 provincials and light troops advanced beyond the second hollow (brook) and intrenched themselves," but that his unit camped on a hill between the saw mill and the provincials" (quote Hervey). According to Col. Oliver Partridge, "Col prebble Doty Wm^s & I with our [?] were ordered to go half way to y^e French Fort & encamp which we did" (quote O. Partridge). According to Col. William Williams, "Col^o Prebble & I was order'd, sun about 1½ hour high to advance to an Eminence within ¾ of a mile of the Enemys Breastwork and there to make a Breastwork around us to secure ourselves which we did with the greatest Dispatch, made a good one, and at 9 at night Col^o [Partridge] joyn'd us" (quote W. Williams). Other accounts give the estimated distance to this forward camp as ¾ to 1 mile from the sawmill and locate it on a rise or the top of a hill within "about a mile from the French Advance guard" (quote Estabrooks; see also Barrows; Parkman; and Sweat). Samuel Cobb of Preble's regiment also places this camp one mile from the fort (see Cobb). An anonymous French account states that, "in the evening, judging by the fires, the enemy had passed the Falls, and had reached within 7 or 800 toises [4,476.5 or 5,116 feet; / 0.84 or 0.96 mi] of our intrenchments" (quote Anonymous 12). This observation is also supported by French accounts made after the battle. For example, it was reported that on the 9th, as soon it was daylight, French volunteers under the command of M. de Bernard ventured out and found an abandoned retrenchment made by the English located "on the road to the falls," which they promptly burned (quote Maurès Malartic 2 see also Levis) (Figure 12).

At the French Lines on the night of the 7th, at about 5 p.m. Col. Francois-Charles de Bourlamaque assigned each of the seven French battalions that would man the lines about "one hundred and twenty-seven paces" to defend (quote Maurès Malartic 1 & 2; see also Anonymous 14 and Lapause). The assigned ground was reported to be "nearly the same" as where they had worked building the defenses (quote Bougainville). The army slept on its arms that night with orders for "the guards, to line the abatis, to patrol frequently outside and to keep the fires burning" (quote Maurès Malartic 2: see also Anonymous 2, 12 and Montcalm 2).¹⁸ From his position near the sawmill, Garrett Albertson of the New Jersey regiment reported that he "heard the French all night chopping and felling timber to fortify their breastwork, and they plainly saw our fires" (quote Albertson). Hugh Arnot also noted that, "the Enemy was constantly at work the night before the attack" (quote Arnot 1).

¹⁷ It appears that Bagley's Massachusetts regiment lost its way while marching to the sawmill on the night of the 7th and only caught up with the army on the morning of the 8th (see Noyes).

¹⁸ It was reported that during the night, "some shots were fired" (quote Anonymous 12).




Figure 12. Conjectural camp locations and pre-battle movements of the British and Provincial forces before the Battle of Carillon.

On the morning of the 8th, starting at about 5 a.m. and continuing up until the start of the general engagement at about mid-day, the French forces spent their time improving their defenses (see Lapause; Maurès Malartic 2; and Montcalm 1 & 2). Some of the French soldiers worked, “to strengthen the abitis” (quote Maurès Malartic 2 see also Anonymous 2, 3; Bougainville; Levis; Maurès Malartic 1; and Montcalm 2), while the rest of the men began the construction of two batteries and a redoubt (see Anonymous 3; Bougainville; and Montcalm 1; see also Appendix B: Anonymous 3 and Lotbinière). One of these batteries was located on the French left and some distance behind the French Lines. This battery was to mount six cannons “placed to fire” at the La Chute River and on the slope below the left of French Lines, where there was a possible landing area not covered by the guns of the fort (quote Montcalm 1 see also Bougainville). On the right, the soldiers started work on a 4-gun battery on the plateau just behind the main breastworks. This battery was to be placed to command the flat plain below (see Bougainville and Montcalm 1; see also Appendix B: Anonymous 3 and Lotbinière). At the same time, just a short distance away, but a little closer to the fort, the French soldiers started work on a redoubt that was “intended to protect the right” (quote Bougainville) at a point where the slope up to the heights was “not as steep” (quote Montcalm 1) and which could be used to approach the French Lines from the rear (see Appendix B: Anonymous 3, 4 and Lotbinière). The Canadians and La Marine also, “continued their abattis; but as there were several alarms, they were, as yet, only within 100 toises [639.5 ft], or thereabouts, of the height at 11 o’clock in the forenoon” (quote Anonymous 12 see also Pouchot). None of these works would be finished before the battle commenced. One anonymous Frenchman noted, “we had begun to make a battery of four pieces of cannon between the Queen’s regiment and the Canadian brigades, but the enemy did not give time to complete it” (quote Anonymous 14; see also Bougainville and Montcalm 1). Gabriel de Maurès Malartic noted that at about, “midday the regiments of La Reine and Béarn began to build up some epaulements, to provide cover to enfilade some of the heights, when we began to hear a lot of shots fired from our left” (quote Maurès Malartic 1 see also Maurès Malartic 2).

Beginning at about 7 a.m on the morning of the 8th, the English and Provincial units left their camps, starting a process that continued for several hours, with some of the units not getting onto the road until mid-morning or later. One anonymous soldier noted, “at 10 o’Clock the next Morning the Army marched towards the Fort” (quote Anonymous 7). Rufus Putnam of Col. Timothy Ruggles Massachusetts regiment, whose unit was left behind near the sawmill, suggests that the last elements of the attack force did not leave that area until about 11 a.m (see Putnam). Capt. David Waterbury of David Wooster’s Connecticut regiment noted,

“July ye 8th 1758. Rise early in the morning and Got Brecfast and Our Orders was to be Ready to march at a minutes Warning and Likewise we was and between Eleven and twelve a Clock Our Orders was to March up towards their Fort the Regulars Marcht in the front four in Rank and Fifteen Hundred in Files and the Proventials Marcht in the Rear of the Regulars in the Same Form by then the Rear of the Army had Marcht the Front of the Regulars had Got Within about three Quarters of a mile of the Fort Where the French had Erected a Breastwork”¹⁹ (quote Waterbury).

Capt. James Abercromby noted that, “the whole Army marched in One Column” (quote Capt. Abercromby) and John Noyes, of Bagley’s Massachusetts regiment, reported that, “we marched

¹⁹ From these accounts, it appears that the head of British column was arriving on the battlefield before tail left sawmill.

up In a String that was too mile long" (quote Noyes). William Parkman, a member of one of the Massachusetts regiments that started out from the more forward camp of Provincials of the night previous, noted, "we arose in high spirits, and lay by until eight o'clock, and then we marched up and formed in a line a little distance from the enemy's breastwork" (quote Parkman). From other accounts, it appears that regiments further back in the queue may have had time to accomplish extra tasks such as bringing up cannon from the Landing, escorting engineers on intelligence gathering missions, bringing up supplies, or, possibly, helping to build some defensive positions near the sawmill before taking the road to the battlefield (see Spicer and Smith).

The single road traveled by the English and Provincials to the battlefield does not appear to be part of the modern road network, though this has not been confirmed as of the writing of this report. Capt. Pierre Pouchot noted that,

"the land which stretches from the Falls to Carillon, formed an elevated peninsula, the summit of which was rounded, and sinuous, with ridges and elevations at intervals. The road from Carillon to the Falls, is along this summit. There were three or four hills, which run from this summit to the river at the falls, and there the road passes between these hills which rendered it susceptible of defence [sic], for the distance of the eighth of a league" (quote Pouchot).

Furthermore, the period maps drawn by or attributed to Lt. Charles Rivez also suggest that this road passed over a few distinct hills, including the rise that the four Massachusetts regiments had camped on the night before the battle, and crossed the upper portions of a few reentrants along its route (see Appendix B: Rivez 1 & 2; and Moneypenny).

Robert Rogers and his Rangers led the overall advance (see Rogers 1). At about 300 yards from the French Lines, his men came under fire from an estimated 200 French soldiers (see Rogers 1). These men were most likely part of the French advance guard or 'out party' composed of grenadiers and volunteers who were stationed in the woods about "150 paces" in front of the abattis²⁰ (quote Maurès Malartic 2 see also Pouchot and Appendix B: Anonymous 3). The initial contact forced Rogers to deploy his men into line (see Rogers 1). He then, "marched up to [his] advanced guard, who [had] maintained their ground and the enemy immediately retreated" (quote Rogers 1). Lt. Col. John Bradstreet's bateaumen then assembled on Rogers' left and Col. Thomas Gage's 80th Light Infantry on Rogers' right (see Anonymous 1 and Rogers 1) (Figure 13). Together, these units established a screen about 200 yards away from the French Lines (see Arnot 2 and Babcock), which the rest of the army deployed behind over the next three hours (see Hopkins and O. Partridge). During this time, the French continued to work on their defenses. Peter Pond of Nathan Whiting's Connecticut regiment wrote of the enemy, "While som ware Entrenching Others ware Employed Cutting of the Limbs of the Trease and Sharpening them at Both ends for a Shevoe Dufrease, others Cutting of Larg Logs and Getting them to the Brest Works. At Lengh thay ware Ready for Our Resapton" (quote Pond).

²⁰ If a 'pace' is about 3 ft this would be 150 yards. It is possibly in this area that the French had their light log fence defensive work.




Figure 13. Battle of Carillon reconstructed from first-hand accounts, Map 1.

At about 9 or 10 in the morning, while the British army was moving into position, Sir William Johnson and his Native American force of about 300 to 400 men stationed themselves on the slopes of Mount Defiance, “a high ground within 700 yards of the Fort” (quote Arnot 2), where they made a lot of noise and took a few random²¹ shots at the French who were working on their defenses (see Gen. Abercromby 1; Anonymous 2, 3, 4, 8; Arnot 2; Bougainville; Cleaveland; Levis; Maurès Malartic 2; Nichols; Pouchot; Searing; Spicer; and Tinkham). After an initial alarm, and except, for a few return shots from Bernard’s men, the French generally “amused ourselves by not replying” (quote Bougainville; see also Arnot 2; Maurès Malartic 2; and Spicer).

As indicated above, Abercromby’s first line consisted of Col. Thomas Gage’s 80th Light Infantry (right), Maj. Robert Rogers’ Rangers (center), and Lt. Col. John Bradstreet’s Bateaumen (left) (see Anonymous 1; Rogers 1; and W. Williams). Abercromby’s next line was composed of six Provincial regiments including one battalion of New Yorkers on the far left probably led by Col. Beamsley Glazier (but under the overall command of Col. Oliver Delancey), then five Massachusetts regiments consisting of, left to right, those of Col. Jonathan Bagley, Col. William Williams, Col. Oliver Partridge, Col. Jedediah Prebble, and Col. Thomas Doty (see Barrows; O. Partridge; Rogers 1; Tinkham; and W. Williams²²) (Figure 14). The Provincials set up their line in the woods (see O. Partridge) at a point variously described as, “within a quarter mile of the French advance guard” (quote Estabrooks), “within 3 gunshots of the French fortification” (quote Hopkins); “ab^t 2 musket Shot of y^e French entrenchment” (quote O. Partridge). or “out of cannon fire of the intrenchments” (quote Gen. Abercromby 1). The location of this line was also described as being 165 to 200 yards behind the screening force of ‘Irregulars’²³ (see Estabrooks and Rogers 1). The initial battle plan appears to have called for these Provincial regiments to post themselves “in a Double rank” (quote W. Williams) with their “right extending to Lake George, and the left to Lake Champlain” (quote Gen. Abercromby 1) (see also Anonymous 1; Fuller; O. Partridge; and W. Williams). However, period accounts suggest that this line actually extended slope to slope rather than lake to lake, “with a front extending to the whole length of the work” (quote Searing), possibly four ranks deep (see Tinkham). Sgt. Seth Tinkham of Doty’s Massachusetts regiment noted, “we Drawed up 4 Deep” (quote Tinkham see also Barrows). Joseph Nichols of Bagley’s Massachusetts regiment noted, “Next to Major Rogers Party Drew in the Provincial Forces in two Curcles two deep around theire Breast Work” (quote Nichols).²⁴

²¹ Meaning that they were firing at the extreme limit of musket range with the barrels of their guns angled up at about 45 degrees.

²² This is different than the original plan which appears to have called for this line to be as follows, “on the Left, the first Battalion of New York Regiment; On their Left in the following Order 1) Bagley 2) Williams’ then Patridges Dotey’s Ruggles & Prebbles” (quote Anonymous 1 Version1).

²³ However, it is noted that Sgt. Seth Tinkham of Doty’s Massachusetts Regiment estimated a much shorter distance between the irregulars and the first Provincial line. He wrote that the, “Light Infantry about 10 Rods [165 ft] before us Expecting Every moment To be fired upon” (quote Tinkham).

²⁴ This seems to indicate that the first line of Provincials, of which he was a part, was four ranks deep. However, it could also mean that the first line and rearguard line of Provincials were each two ranks deep. However, the units of the rearguard were initially located fairly far away from Rogers’ line.




Figure 14. Battle of Carillon reconstructed from first-hand accounts, Map 2.

Gen. Abercromby's battleplan called for these Provincial regiments to establish a static line roughly 350 to 400 yards from the French Lines where they were to stay put and serve as a shield against a counter charge by the French, should the main British assault fail²⁵ (see Gen. Abercromby 1; Anonymous 1; Babcock; Estabrooks; Fuller; Hopkins; Nichols; Rea; and W. Williams). The provincials were to let the attacking columns of Regulars pass through their ranks "and Do the Work" (quote W. Williams; see also Babcock; Barnard 1; Eastbrooks; Fuller; and Hopkins). The actual mechanism of the 'passage of lines' maneuver is not known as of the writing of this report. One anonymous soldier wrote that, "intervals were left between the Regiments" (quote Anonymous 1). Archelaus Fuller of Bagley's Massachusetts regiment wrote, "the Regelsars was to march threw we to open to the right and left in order for them to fors the Brest work" (quote Fuller). Col. Henry Babcock noted that the, "Regulars were to form a Line behind the first line; who after they were formed, were to pass thro' the first line, they making Avenues for them; after that they were to form the Line again" (quote Babcock). The Rev. Samuel Hopkins recorded that the provincials were to, "march within 3 gunshots of the French fortification, and there ly [sic] on their arms flat on their bellies; that the Regulars should pass over them and make the first assault" (quote Hopkins).

Of the Regulars, the 27th Regiment of Foot and the 1st and 4th Battalions of the 60th Regiment of Foot (Royal Americans) under the overall command of Lt. Col. William Haviland were to be deployed on the right (see Eyre). The 44th and 55th Regiments of Foot, under the overall command of Lt. Col. John Donaldson, were to be in the center and the 46th Regiment of Foot, under the command of Col. Samuel Beaver, and the 42nd Regiment of Foot (the Black Watch), under the command of Lt. Col. Francis Grant, were to be on the left (see Eyre). Each of the British regiments were to be led forward by a captain and 50 men taken from the regiment (designated as 'pickets') who were to be closely supported by their regiment's Grenadier company (see Gen. Abercromby 1; Albertson; and Babcock). They, in turn, were to be followed by the regiment's "battalions in brigades" (quote Rogers 1) arrayed with a broad front (see Eyre) and with each battalion marching "three deep" (quote Anonymous 7 see also Eyre). Abel Spicer of Whiting's Connecticut regiment noted that the Regulars, "marched up the breast works ten deep" (quote Spicer).²⁶ The Regulars had orders to move forward without stopping to fire and close with the French works with bayonets fixed and muskets shouldered, 'under pain of death' (see Gen. Abercromby 1; Anonymous 1, 7, Arnot 2; Babcock; and Lee).

About 300 yards behind where the British Regulars initially assembled (before the 'passage of lines'), were the rearguard units consisting of Col. Henry Babcock's Rhode Island regiment (probably on the right; see Babcock; Champion; and Tinkham as well as Appendix B: Cleaveland), Col. John Johnson's New Jersey regiment (towards the center, see Brainard), and three Connecticut regiments, believed to be those of Col. Eleazer Fitch,²⁷ Col. David Wooster,

²⁵ Col. Oliver Partridge had a slightly different take on this plan. He wrote, "y^e Regulars came who was to attempt y^e French line which if y^r could not carry y^r were to retire & draw out the French to us who were formed in y^e woods ab^t 2 musquet Shot of y^e French entrenchment" (quote Partridge). Sgt. Seth Tinkham of Col. Doty's Massachusetts regiment wrote, "Had Major Rogers had his Liberty and Done as he Intended we Should have Drawed them out of their Breastwork" (quote Tinkham).

²⁶ Spicer may be describing the line of pickets, the grenadiers, the battalions/regiments three deep, and, potentially, a line of reserves viewed all together. It is also possible that some of the British regiments, especially those on the left who arrived on the run, did not deploy as planned. However, there is no documentary evidence of this at this time.

²⁷ See the Table 1 Notes about the Connecticut Regiments.

and Col. Nathan Whiting (probably on the left)²⁸ (see Anonymous 1 and Champion see also Appendix B: Moneypenny).

According to Maj. Robert Rogers, “while the army was forming, a scattering fire was kept up between our flying parties and those of the enemy” (quote Rogers 1). Joseph Nichols noted, “As near I can guess it was about 10 o Clock when small parties of each force Begun to fire from each parties & so continued an hour or more” (quote Nichols). At about 10:30 a.m., when some, but not all, of the British army had gotten into place, the New York battalion moved forward on its own (see Capt. Abercromby; Babcock; O. Partridge; and Rogers 1). According to Col. William Williams, “Col^o D Lancey being a mind to see more than he could see from the post the pilot put him in, advanced so far as to come nigh before he was aware and the attack really began before the Regulars came up” (quote W. Williams). According to Capt. James Abercromby, “orders were given, the Attack not to begin till the whole Army was formed & then a point of war would be beat for the Attack. But most unluckily this order was not kept up to, for the New York Reg^t by Accident fell upon an Advanced Guard of the enemy” (quote Capt. Abercromby). There is a possibility that the New York unit may have been drawn forward by the sound of scattered fire to their front right by the bateaumen who were engaged with the French Advance Guard and/or the ‘flying parties.’ Sgt. Seth Tinkham of Doty’s Massachusetts regiment later wrote that, “Co^l Bradstreet [sic / of the bateaumen] Come up with his Reg^{ts} and Drove on and Lost almost all his men” (quote Tinkham). Joseph Nichols of Bagley’s Massachusetts regiment later wrote, “Orders was Soon Given to the New York Forces to Repaire to Rogers Assistance”²⁹ (quote Nichols). Possibly compounding the problem was the likelihood that the New York battalion did not have a full complement of skirmishers in front of it (see Anonymous 1 and Rogers 1). Whatever the trigger for the advance, at about 200 yards from the French Lines, the New York unit started to take fire, but managed to drive the French pickets who were in front of them back to the breastworks (see Anonymous 1). It is possible that by undertaking this movement the New York unit found itself at the edge of the woods or just in the slashing. According to one New Yorker, “this Regiment had now the whole Fire of the Enemy for near an Hour” (quote Anonymous 1). Archelaus Fuller of Bagley’s Massachusetts regiment wrote, “before the Reagelars came up the fier began very hot” (quote Fuller). Robert Rogers noted, “at half an hour past ten, the greatest part of the army being drawn up, a smart fire began on the left wing, where Col. De Lancey’s (the New Yorkers) and the batteaux men were posted” (quote Rogers 1).

It appears that the heavier exchange of fire between the New York battalion and their French counterparts tricked the British, especially those on the right flank, into thinking that the attack had been ordered. At about 12:30 p.m. the British force began its main assault (see Anonymous 3; Bougainville; Montcalm 1; Pouchot 1; and W. Williams). Rogers and the 80th Light Infantry were ordered to move up, push any stray French soldiers back into their works, then take cover to allow the Regulars to pass (see Anonymous 1; Arnot 2; Babcock; and Rogers 1). Pierre Pouchot later stated that the French volunteers, grenadiers, and advanced guard who had been covering those working on the defenses, “held the enemy in check for some time” before falling back “in good order” (quote Pouchot; see also Anonymous 3; Bougainville; and

²⁸ The exact order of these regiments is not known at this time.

²⁹ This reference makes sense if Joseph Nichols meant that the New Yorkers believed they were to support the unit partially in front of them, who were actually the Bateaumen and not Rogers Rangers who were supposed to be there.

Maurès Malartic 2). Joseph Nichols of Bagley's Massachusetts regiment noted, "then Rogers [and?] his party & Light Infantry begun to draw near the Breast Work—The Enemy at the same time Sallied out upon our men from theire Breast Work & the Fire was Exceeding Hot Indeed" (quote Nichols). Elijah Estabrooks of Preble's Massachusetts regiment wrote that the Rangers, "crept up and shot down several of their sentries" (quote Estabrooks). Not long after this, Maj. Thomas Proby of the 55th Regiment of Foot led the pickets (probably from of the 27th Regiment of Foot and the two battalions of the 60th Royal Americans) on the British right forward (see Anonymous 5; Capt. Abercromby; and Bryant). Gabriel de Maurès Malartic noted that, "at midday the regiments of La Reine and Béarn began to build up some epaulements, to provide cover to enfilade some of the heights, when we began to hear a lot of shots fired from our left" (quote Maurès Malartic 1). The French soldiers, "without waiting for the signal" (quote Pouchot). raced to their posts where "the battalions lined the abati, three deep, having their grenadier companies and pickets in line of battle in their rear, ready to march wherever needed" (quote Maurès Malartic 2). Pierre Pouchot noted that they were, "just in time" forming up "as the head of the enemy's columns had begun to emerge from their covert of fallen trees" (quote Pouchot). Robert Rogers recorded that,

"Major Proby marched through with his pickets within a few yards of the breast-work, where he unhappily fell, and the enemy keeping up a heavy fire, the soldiers hastened to the right about when Col. Haldiman came up with the grenadiers to support them, being followed by the battalions in brigades for their support" (quote Rogers 1 see also Anonymous 5, 13).

According to Hugh Arnot, "the Picquets and Grenadiers after boldly advancing within a small distance of the Breast work with shoulders Arms were oblig'd to retire; not only occasion'd by the heavy fire from the Enemy but from the almost inaccessible road to the Breast work & y^e height of the same" (quote Arnot 2 see also Albertson) (Figure 15).




Figure 15. Battle of Carillon reconstructed from first-hand accounts, Map 3.

At this stage of the battle, Gen. Abercromby was still bringing up his troops, deploying them from right to left (see Eyre). According to Capt. James Abercromby, “all this time the General imagined it was only our Irregulars [who were engaged] but to his great surprise, when he came up with the Highlanders he found all the rest of the Regulars attacking the Intrenchment” (quote Capt. Abercromby). Maj. William Eyre of the 44th Regiment of Foot noted,

“the Attack was made, I am Sorry to Say not in the most Regular Manner, some of the Reg^t beginning before the Others were form’d . . . The Pickets and Granediers With the Reg^t to the R^t began the Attack before the Center Brigade had formed . . . I found the Attack had been began some time before I could form Our Reg^t this being done, all was left for each Commanding Officer of A Reg^t to do, was to support & march up as quick as they could to get Upon their Ground And so on to the Intrenchm^t” (quote Eyre).

Garrett Albertson of the New Jersey regiment noted that, “the different regiments then, in rotation, marched one after another until the whole army came into action” (quote Albertson). Capt. James Abercromby wrote, “the Picquets . . . rushed on to the attack before any of our Army were formed . . . as the Reg came up they joined piecemeal in the attack” (quote Capt. Abercromby). Capt. William Hervey of the 44th Regiment of Foot noted that, “the picquets were drove back before half the army was come to their ground, the Highland regiment run along the front of our regiment marching up” (quote Hervey). It may have been at about this point that Hugh Arnot noted that the,

“attack would have stop’d there until our Cannon came up if it had not been from a heavy fire from the irregulars and Provincials gave with a huzaa at the same time, which made our Gen believe & was so told (for He could not see what was a doing) that some part of the Army had enter’d their Lines, then the whole Army was order’d to March up at attack (quite out of Breath from their Distance)” (quote Arnot 2).

From the French perspective, the English army’s disjointed attack may have made it appear that, “the enemy’s columns were “strengthened by reinforcements they were constantly receiving” (quote Maurès Malartic 2).³⁰

One anonymous French or Canadian observer noted, that, “the English came in 4 columns of 14,000 men, three on the height and one on the slope of the hill. The one on the right attacked our left first, and in little time the fire became general” (quote Anonymous 14; see also Appendix B: Anonymous 3, 4 and Lotbinière). As noted above, the assault on the French left was launched by the two battalions of 60th Regiment of Foot and the 27th Regiment of Foot. In this attack, it appears that a part of this force swung off to their right to the point that the French thought the British were, “trying to turn the trenches” (quote Montcalm 1 see also Anonymous 3). This group of British soldiers hit the part of the French Lines principally manned by the La Sarre (see Anonymous 3; Bougainville; Montcalm 1; and Pouchot). The other part of this English force reportedly headed towards the salient angle between the Languedoc and Berry (see Anonymous 3; Bougainville; Montcalm 1; and Pouchot). Soon after, the 44th Regiment of Foot and 55th Regiment of Foot moved toward the French center, which was principally defended by

³⁰Similarly, another Frenchman noted, “approaching 4 o’clock the fire slowed down a little. The English general Abercrombie had left a reserve of 6000 men at the falls. He brought in five thousand of them, who joined the others, and again began a stubborn fire, but they found a resistance as strong as the first time” (Anonymous 14).

the Royal Roussillon³¹ (see Bougainville and Montcalm 1). By about 1 p.m., the British left had started their advance toward the French right, generally aiming towards the point between the Béarn and the La Reine regiments (see Anonymous 1, 3, 14; Bougainville; Montcalm 1; and Pouchot). One of the units on the British left drifted toward the crown of the heights and was, at some point, able to enfilade the positions held by the Béarn and La Reine (see Pouchot). The other part of the British left, consisting of the Black Watch regiment, at first marched “towards the bottom, on the right of the hill” (quote Anonymous 12) far enough that the French became concerned for their weak defenses on the low flat ground (see Levis and Pouchot). Levis, who was posted behind Guyenne, “perceived them, ordered M. de Raymond’s troop [of Canadians and La Marine] to make a sortie by the wood, in order to outflank that column” (quote Anonymous 12). This may have been done, but there is a fair amount of controversy in the documents as to the role the Canadians played and what effect they had on the battle (see Anonymous 14; Bougainville; and Doreil 3). It appears that Highlanders “nearly met with the front of Canadians” (quote Anonymous 14) at which point they came under fire (probably long-range), from both the Canadians (near their abattis) and the La Reine (in the defenses on the heights). At this point, depending on the translation, the Highlanders edged towards their right and by moving either ‘uphill’ or ‘along the slope of the hill’ (Anonymous 14), in order “to avoid a double flank fire” (Anonymous 12; see also Anonymous 3), engaged the La Reine at the right salient of the French Lines (see Anonymous 14; Levis; and Pouchot). Once on the heights, the Highlanders joined the other part of the British left (see Anonymous 12) and “became hotly engaged” (quote Pouchot). Eventually they were forced to withdraw (see Anonymous 12 and Levis). As the English initial assault ebbed, the Canadians may have had the opportunity to again fire on the left flank of the Highlanders “which a few times came within range” (quote Bougainville).

This assault by the British Regulars was directly supported by members of Col. Thomas Gage’s 80th Light Infantry, Maj. Robert Rogers’ Rangers, and Lt. Col. John Bradstreet’s Batalemen. According to Hugh Arnot, during the attack, “the Irregulars did so too keeping a Fire upon the Enemy from behind Loggs and Trees” (quote Arnot 2). French officer, Pierre Pouchot stated, “in the intervals between the columns, several small bodies of troops were scattered, who by their fire, greatly incommoded those in the intrenchments” (quote Pouchot). The effectiveness of these British ‘irregulars’ may have been especially telling where, according to Pouchot, “on our left,” the British “were able to take the cover of a little bank that protected them” (quote Pouchot). Louis de Bougainville went further by saying, “these different columns were intermingled with their light troops and better marksmen, who protected by the trees, delivered a most Murderous fire on us” (quote Bougainville; see also Levis).

Throughout this time, the first line of provincials had stuck to their orders and had stayed put. Joseph Nichols of Bagley’s Massachusetts regiment reported, “our Regiment had no orders to March so we Stood Still & Viewed the Action” (quote Nichols). The Rev. Samuel Hopkins noted that,

“after some time a colonel came down from the engagement, and declared that the orders were that the provincials should come to the assistance of the Regulars. The Provincial colonels said this was contrary to the orders they had; therefore their men should not stir. Not long after other Regulars colonels came down and swore that it was

³¹ This attack may not have been done in a coordinated manner.

the general's orders that the provincials should make an assault the regulars being broken and defeated. Most of our colonels, knowing that there were no such orders, and that the attempt would be in vain and only prove the death of many of their men refused to stir" (quote Hopkins).

According to an officer in the 1st Battalion of the 60th Regiment (Royal Americans),

"our people had the utmost difficulty in penetrating the abattis. The passage through which destroyed our order. An hour later a report was made that the entrenchment was impregnable, and that it would be better to retire in good order, but no definite reply was received on the subject" (quote Anonymous 5).

Instead, this source indicates that, "orders were sent to all the regiments to advance: they were brought into action" (quote Anonymous 5).³² At about this time, the first line of Provincial regiments moved up a little in support, but not much. Joseph Nichols of Bagley's Massachusetts regiment reported, "in about an hour—Orders for Col [Bagley] Regiment to march up Directly—We march'd a Small Space & then Orders came to Halt" (quote Nichols; see also Fuller). William Parkman of one of the Massachusetts regiments noted, "we lay some time, but the fire at eleven o'clock growing very hot, we marched some what nearer, where we lay until near sunset" (quote Parkman). Abner Barrows of Doty's Massachusetts regiment recorded that after arriving on the field;

"we Lay thair two or three hours Divers Guns Wair Fired in our front Till all In a Sudden thair was a very Brisk fire in our front We Lay a Short Time Prepared for the Enemy But perceiving thay Did not Come then the Regiment that Lay Before Us advanced forward and our Regiment marched Briskly the fire Continued in one Continued Volley the Biggest Part of five hours." (quote Barrows).

Elijah Estabrooks of Preble's Massachusetts regiment recorded, "we marched within 30 or 40 rods [165 to 220 yards] of the French trenches and set the battle in array. And we had about as smart a fight for about 4 hours" (quote Estabrooks). Col. William Williams noted, "as the fire grew Exceeding heavy we advanced too nigh for a sustaining party and the only way we had to secure Ourselves was by making the men lay flat and some were kill'd & Wounded in that position" (quote W. Williams). David Perry of Preble's Massachusetts regiment wrote that,

"we got behind trees, logs and stumps, and covered ourselves as we could from the enemy's fire. The ground was strewed with the dead and dying. It happened that I got behind a white-oak stump, which was so small that I had to lay on my side, and stretch myself, the balls striking the ground within a hand's breadth of me every moment, and I could hear the men screaming, and see them dying all around me. I lay there some time. A man could not stand erect without being hit, any more than he could stand out in a shower, without having drops of rain fall upon him; for the balls came by the handful" (quote D. Perry).

Observers even further back also took note of the action in front. Benjamin Jewett of Fitch's Connecticut regiment wrote,

³² Elijah Estabrooks of Preble's Massachusetts regiment wrote, "when the general came up with the regulars he ordered the whole of our provincials on the right wing. And the regulars with the rangers on the left wing" (quote Estabrooks). By this, Estabrooks *may* have meant that when Gen. Abercromby made it to the field with the Highlanders, he ordered the attack to continue by adding the Rhode Island and the Jersey Regiments to the assault on the right and/or center) and ordered the first line of Provincial regiments up into a closer support position.

“Ye regalars were drawed up within five rods [82.5 ft] of ye breastworks in plain sight and ye French kept behind ye breastwork and fired smartly on them. Ye New Ingland men kept behind tres and logs as much as they cold, but ye regulars kept so nigh and in plain sight that ye French cut them down amazin” (quote Jewett).

Abel Spicer of Whiting’s Connecticut regiment noted, “the provincials marched after them but did not venture so near and they had a small wood for to cover them and there was but a few of them killed” (quote Spicer). Peter Pond, also of Nathan Whiting’s Connecticut regiment observed of the Regulars assault that, “three forths ware Kild in the attempt But the Grater Part of the armey Lade in the Rear on thare fases til Nite while the British ware Batteling a Brest work” (quote Pond).

From their new position, the Provincial units took some long-range shots at the French. One anonymous regular noted,

“for such a damnable fire no man in this army ever saw before: the provincials lost very few. Except the York Regiment who lost some; true indeed the Provincials never were engaged. They came up to sustain us, but they began to fire at such a distance they killed several of our men, and yet upon the whole they behaved extremely well”³³ (quote Anonymous 10).

While in this position, the officers of the first line of Provincials had to work hard to keep some of their men who were evidently caught up in the moment in line, and they were not always successful. Joseph Nichols noted, “several of the Soilders went up without Orders was Killed & Several wounded our Capt Took much Care to Keep up back from Going Forward” (quote Nichols). Col. William Williams noted, “it was impossible to keep our men back, and those that ventured up shar’d the same fate with the Regulars, but by my running from Wing to Wing I prevented mine in some good measure and I believe suffered as little as any Reg’t having but 2 kill’d & 13 wounded” (quote Williams; see also Hopkins) (Figure 16).

While the first line of Provincials never joined the general assault, about an hour into the fight two regiments initially assigned to the rearguard, Babcock’s Rhode Island regiment and Johnson’s New Jersey regiment, were ordered forward to join the Regulars (see Albertson; Babcock; Estabrooks; Smith; and Tinkham). Col. Henry Babcock, the commander of the Rhode Island regiment, wrote, “about an hour after the Attack, I was ordered to march with the regiment to relieve those that had been engaged. We went up within about 40 Yards [120 feet] of the Breast-work” (Figure 17) (quote Babcock). At least one of Babcock’s men, Pvt. William Smith, went even further than this and got to the very foot of the French works (see Anonymous 11). Garrett Albertson of the New Jersey regiment reported, “our orders were then to march on within gunshot of the breast-work, and every man to shift and cover himself as well as he could, behind trees, stumps or logs, which they did” (quote Albertson; see also Brainard).³⁴

³³ One member of the New York battalion noted that, “we received considerable damage from our friends in the rear who fired at random” (quote Anonymous 1 Version 1). It is not clear if this friendly fire came from the Massachusetts units or, possibly, from the Connecticut units.

³⁴ The action taken by the Rhode Island and New Jersey regiments is further evidenced by the casualties that they sustained (see Table 2; see also Anonymous 10; Cobb; Gouldsbury; Rea; and S. Williams).




Figure 16. Carillon Battle reconstructed from first-hand accounts, Map 4.



Figure 17. Col. Henry Babcock (1736-1800) by J. Blackburn of London 1756 (in the Babcock Genealogy. Complied by Stephen Babcock, and published by Eaton & Mains, New York, New York, 1903:64).

The remaining rearguard units, consisting of three Connecticut regiments (Fitch, Wooster, and Whiting), did not join the attack, but were apparently close enough to the action at some point as to give and receive fire. According to the Rev. John Cleaveland, “the Connecticut Regiments were not in the fight except Col. Whiting’s and Col. Wooster’s who came up about Sun an hour high” (quote Cleaveland; see also Champion; Pond; and Spicer; see also Appendix B: Moneypenny). A document entitled “A Return of the Arms in Col. Wooster’s Regiment lost in immediate Service in the Campaign” reveals that Benjamin Jones and Samuel Smith were killed on July 8 (thereby losing their guns) and that James Prindle “split his Gun” the same day (Connecticut Historical Society 1905:90). Solomon Mack,³⁵ of Maj. Joseph Spencer’s company of Col. Nathan Whiting’s regiment, noted in a post-war recollection, “in this contest I narrowly escaped-a musket ball passed under my chin, within an inch of my neck” (Connecticut Historical Society 1905:35; Smith 1880:18-19). Both Fitch’s and Wooster’s Connecticut regiments reported a handful of casualties (see Table 2).

One part of Gen. Abercromby’s overall battle plan that might have saved the day, if had it succeeded, took place on the La Chute River. Early in the morning of the 8th the British built two crafts each capable of carrying two 6-pounder cannons (see Anonymous 5, 6; Bougainville; Glasier; Levis; Maurès Malartic 2; Putnam; Searing; and Spicer). The plans called for the cannons and one royal howitzer to be towed down the river by “ten whaleboats” (Bellico

³⁵ Solomon Mack was the maternal grandfather of Joseph Smith of the Mormon Church (Smith 1880:18-19).

2010:156), land at “an open place” (Bellico 2010:156) at the foot of Mount Defiance (see Appendix B: Moneypenny) that had been “described by the engineer,” Mathew Clerk (quote Searing see also Bellico 2010:156). Once disembarked, they were “to enfilade the enemy works” (quote Searing see also Anonymous 5). The flotilla started off at about 11 a.m. or 12 p.m. (see Glasier and Searing). At about 1 p. m., they passed the point where the river widens to meet Lake Champlain (Bellico 2010:156). At this point, the little fleet came under small arms fire from the companies of Bernard and Duprat as well as the grenadier and light companies of the Royal Roussillon under Sieur de Poulaires who had hurried the spot (see Bougainville and Montcalm 2). To this firepower was added three cannons of the fort, which were directed by M. de Louvicourt and/or Lemercier³⁶ (see Bougainville and Montcalm 2). The boats caught out in the open “could find no such place described” to land³⁷ (quote Searing). The cannon from the fort soon sank two of the vessels leading to the hasty withdrawal of the rest (see Anonymous 5; Bougainville; Levis; Montcalm 2; Maurès Malartic 2; and Searing).

During the main assault, all of the regular units had pushed into the slashing and abattis, with many men getting within a few yards of the French Lines, and some getting onto the works themselves, only to be beaten back. The British Regulars then appear to have reformed their lines in the slashing and continued a stand-up duel with the French before eventually pulling back to the cover of the woods. Capt. Salah Barnard of William’s Massachusetts regiment observed that the Regulars at the breastworks, “were soon oblig^d to quit the same & Retreat a few yards Back where they stood fast & Fought Like Brave Soldiers” (quote Barnard 1). An anonymous French account recorded that on the French right, “the enemy kept constantly, until half-past three o’clock, at the foot of the abatis, vainly trying to clear it, but seeing that was not possible, . . . reentered the wood in order to rally” (quote Anonymous 12; see also Anonymous 14). British officer, Hugh Arnot indicates that at about this point, “the Regulars then retreated to about 200 yards distance & there form’d” (quote Arnot 2). This movement apparently caused a brief lull in the battle.³⁸ As one French account indicates, “Twas then only a simple discharge of musketry from one side to the other until [quarter] past 4 o’clock, when they again showed themselves” (quote Anonymous 12). French observer Gabriel de Maurès Malartic noted that “at ½ past 5 o’clock, the fire began to slacken” and that “some soldiers were allowed to go out who took some prisoners” (quote Maurès Malartic 2).

In the late afternoon or early evening, the British started their final assault. At first, the British did “not engage in such numbers as the first time; then the fire became hotter than ever” (quote Anonymous 12). The Black Watch again headed towards the regiments of La Reine and Béarn, at “the right angle of the entrenchments,” but soon shifted to their right to join the column that had previously attacked the Royal Rousillion near the center to focus on the salient angle occupied by the regiment of Guyenne (see Anonymous 2, 3; Bougainville; and Levis). Making

³⁶ There is debate over who commanded the cannon at the fort. See M. de Vaudreuil’s Observations on the ‘Narrative of the Victory Gained over the English on the 8th of July 1758 by the King’s Army, under the command of the Marquis de Montcalm’ in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Volume X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp. 786-798, on p 795.

³⁷ Modern maps suggest that most of the shoreline at the foot of Mount Defiance is fairly steep and that landing cannon in that area would have been a challenge.

³⁸ Note: the differences in reported times for various events latter in the day causes some confusion as to the precise timing of the events.

no progress, the two attacking columns gave up on the Guyenne and shifted towards the Royal Roussillion and Berry (see Bougainville). Gabriel de Maurès Malartic observed, “the enemy made a new attempt with no better success than the first” (quote Maurès Malartic 2).

Near the end of the day, Col. William Williams, whose regiment was in the first line of provincials, sought to start a field work a short distance to the rear of his combat position. He later wrote,

“having been from morning to Sun about $\frac{1}{2}$ an hour High without water or any other refreshment I drew off my Reg^t 20 rods [330 feet] and then went to look for the Gen^l but could not find him, I asked his aid de Camp Cap^t Cunningham where the Breastwork or Intrenchment was to be made, he show’d me, I went to work with what axes I had fell a No of Large white pine Trees which the French hearing did fire Merryly upon us, I then repaired toward the Lake to get spades, Shovels &c and found the Batteaux all gone off” (quote W. Williams; see also Barnard 1, Glasier, and Putnam³⁹).

Throughout the day, the British and Provincial wounded headed to or were taken back along the road towards the sawmill. Rufus Putnam of Timothy Ruggles’ Massachusetts regiment, who had spent most of the day near the sawmill, noted,

“at about Sun an Hour high, there was another Party sent down to carry powder, under the command of Ensign Brown, among whom I was . . . When I came to the Army. . . I was very much amazed to see so many of our men killed and wounded. The path all the way was full of wounded men” (quote Putnam).

Abel Spicer of Whiting’s Connecticut regiment observed, “in the evening after the battle here there lay men, some dead, some wounded that could not go. The roads was so full that a man could hardly walk without treading on them” (quote Spicer). On the 10th, a French detachment discovered many wounded men, along with discarded supplies and “nearly 500 dead bodies ‘junked on one side and another’ of the road (quote Doreil 2). Some of the wounded may have stopped at the camps built by the Massachusetts regiments the night before the battle. Abner Barrows of Doty’s Massachusetts regiment wrote, “we Carred of the Wounded men about a mile to Whair our Brest Work was Made” (quote Barrows). Other wounded men continued on to the sawmill and eventually, to the ‘Landing’ at the northern end of Lake George. Rufus Putnam noted that on the morning of the 8th, “Col. Lyman’s and Col. Ruggles’ Regiments were left at the Mills as a Rear guard, and to build a Breast-work in, or for Defence [sic] if the Enemy attacked us in the Rear” (quote Putnam). However, Samuel Fisher of Ruggles regiment stated that they were, “to heave up a brest work to Receive the wounded” (quote Field). Joseph Nichols of Bagley’s Massachusetts regiment wrote, “when we Carried off Some our Wounded men & I am apt To think many was Left to the Marcy of the Enemy. Our Regiment and Chief of the men that Engaged the Enemy Retreated back to a breast work that Col. Ruggles Regiment made in the Time of Battle” (quote Nichols). Abel Spicer noted that, “the wounded was carried along, them that could not travel, and them that could travel went along back again, to the place where we

³⁹ Rufus Putnam of Ruggles’ regiment later wrote that later in the day of the battle “when I came to the Army they were Retreated into a Breast-work that Col. Williams, men had builded” (quote Putnam). Depending on the timing, Putnam could mean this work or the fortified camp on the road to the saw mill occupied by Williams’ regiment the night before the battle.

landed” (quote Spicer). According to historian Bellico, “two weeks later Bougainville revealed that ‘a great number of [British] corpses on litters’ were discovered” (Bellico 2010:162).

At about 7 or 7:30 p.m. the British began their final withdrawal from the battlefield (see Anonymous 2, 12; Bougainville; and Maurès Malartic 2). According to one French account, “when the retreat of the enemy commenced, the fire slackened by degrees and entirely ceased” (quote Anonymous 12). Sporadic firing was reportedly, “kept up till dark” or about sunset (quote Anonymous 2 see also Anonymous 9; Barnard 1; Bougainville; Champion; and Glasier). Up until that time, the firing never really stopped. John Noyes of Bagley’s Massachusetts regiment wrote that the battle, “begun about Noon and they Kept a Continual firing while Sun Set there was no Sessation arm [sic] Not won minuet” (quote Noyes). However, as David Perry of Preble’s regiment recorded, “once in a while the enemy would cease firing a minute or two, to have the smoke clear away, so they might take better aim” (quote D. Perry see also Anonymous 14 and O. Partridge). Garrett Albertson of Johnson’s New Jersey regiment stated that when they left the field, “the minute the word was given ‘March!’ the piquet guard left over the field of battle, fired a heavy volley upon the French, that were out plundering our dead and wounded, with candles and lanterns” (quote Albertson).

The English retreat was confused. David Perry of Preble’s regiment noted, “we lay there till near sunset and, not receiving orders from any officer, the men crept off, leaving all the dead, and most of the wounded” (quote D. Perry). Henry Champion of Whiting’s Connecticut regiment noted, “little before sunset we were ordered back to a breast-work about a mile, and in ye night ordered back to ye Landing. I being on guard round ye breast-work with 75 men, and not notified till some time after ye Regiment was gone off, I came up with our Regiment at ye Landing after sunrise” (quote Champion). Some of the regiments appear to have stopped briefly at the forward camp used by the four Massachusetts regiments the night before the battle prior to retracing their steps to the sawmill. According to Oliver Partridge, “Col. Williams & I with our provincials were where we Lodged the night before ab^t midnight we [accidentally?] found out the whole army were moving off” (quote O. Partridge). Caleb Rea noted that it was, “remarkable that y^e greater part of y^e Provincials new nothing of the Retreat, but as we may suppose the orders were given to y^e Rere when they drew off y^e next Party followed and so on till they all came off, and left the ground they knew not for what” (quote Rea see also Spicer). John Noyes of Bagley’s Massachusetts regiment noted, “we came of to the brest work and all the Rigulars Came of all the rest & left us behind and we was Raled about midnight and we Stayd while all the wounded ware Carried by us and then we Came of and we got down to the Lake by about Sun Rise and we got all into the Battoes” (quote Noyes see also Gen. Abercromby 1; Glasier; Putnam; O. Partridge and W. Williams).

Discussion of Maps

Shortly after the battle, Col. Louis-Antoine de Bougainville noted in his journal:

“someone has produced a sketch in which appear the fort, the defensive lines, the battle, the movement of troops. On one of the bastions [of the fort] there is shown a man who, arm passed through the painter of a bateau watches the affair through a telescope” (Hamilton 1964:238).

While the figure with the telescope has yet to be found, there are three maps that may depict the earliest version of the French Lines available at this time. The first map, entitled, “*Plan du fort*

Carillon et du Camp retranche pour ‘l’opposer à l’attaque des anglaise avec l’ordre des Colonnes à l’action du 8 Juillet 1758,’ is in the collections of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France⁴⁰ (see Appendix B: Anonymous 3). The cartographer is unknown; however, this map is likely the one discussed in a letter written by Governor M. de Vaudreuil to M. de Massiac dated Montreal 4th August 1758; in which Vaudreuil writes,

“The troops of the Marine, the Canadiens and the Indians had to themselves a space as large as the rest of the army, although it does not include the quarter of that intrenched ground; as soon as they received orders, they advanced with ardor to charge the flank of the enemy who wanted to penetrate that part defended by Chevalier de Levis . . . The plan of the fort and of the intrenchments, will enable you sufficiently to understand the risks he [Montcalm] incurred in his arrangements, without my having to point them out to you; it is sufficient to show that the troops of the Marine, the Canadiens and Indians were too feeble to resist and prevent the enemy from turning the intrenchments, and that they were masking the fire of the artillery and musketry of the fort” (in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Vol. X. John Romeyn Brodhead ed. Weed, Parsons, and Company, Printers, Albany, New York [1858] pp. 779-783).⁴¹

This is a scaled map with hachured landforms. In addition to the French Lines, it includes the relative location of the abattis manned by the Canadiens and La Marine below the right wing of the main line, the incomplete unconnected 4-gun French battery on the right side of the main line, the scarcely started redoubt near the last mentioned feature, the post manned by Bernard and Duprat on the left, and the relative location of the abattis in front of the lines and the general location of the French Advanced Guard. This map also depicts the British assault in three groups at the left, center, and right of the French Line.

The second map, entitled, “*Carte des environs fort de Carillon en Canada à Madame la Marquise de Pompadour*,” is also in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France collection MARGRY in the folio, “Realitive à l’historie des Colonies et de la Marine francaises, Lettres et journaux de Bougainville” (see Appendix B: Anonymous 4). This map carries no information about its creator or when it was made, but its cartouche indicates that it was associated with Madame de Pompadour. This scaled map has a high level of agreement between the hachured landforms and the actual lay of the ground in the immediate area of the French Lines. However, it is poor in its depiction of the northerly shoreline of the Ticonderoga Peninsula and is considerably off with the distance from the French Lines to Fort Ticonderoga. This map shows a French perspective of the English attack. Like the Anonymous 3 map, this map depicts part of the British forces moving well off to the French right and downhill. This map also shows the general locations of the individual French units at the breastworks, the position held by the Canadiens and La Marine and the post occupied by Bernard and Duprat. This map depicts four main British assault groups and emphasizes the action on the French left and right. A version of this map with much of the detailed topographic information removed was included in H.R. Casgrain’s *Les Francais ou Canada, Tours* (1926) (see Chartrand 2000:59). A similar map, though not a direct copy (having some minor differences in the rendering of the roads and of some of the natural features such as

⁴⁰ The National Archives of Canada appears to have a non-colorized version of this map (see Bellico 2010:152).

⁴¹ This letter appears to have been part of a campaign by Vaudreuil to get rid of Montcalm, possibly in favor of de Levis.

drainages and the coastline), can be found in the National Archives of Canada (see Bellico 2010:156).

The third map, entitled, “*Plan du Fort de Carillon, et de ses Environs avec L’attaque des Retranchments faire Par une Armee Anglaise de 25000 Homes aux ordre de Mylord Abercrombie Le 8^e Juillet 1758*” is now held in the William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (see Appendix B: Lotbinière). This map was Gen. Jeffery Amherst’s personal copy of an original map that was drafted by the French military engineer Michel Chartier de Lotbinière and captured at Quebec in 1759 (<https://clements.umich.edu/staff-favorite-map-of-ticonderoga/>). While Lotbinière was familiar with the ground, having superintended the construction of the fort between 1755 and 1757, it appears that he was not present during the Battle of Carillon, rather he arrived shortly afterwards and left for Quebec on July 15, 1758.⁴² Lotbinière’s map depicts the British forces during the battle, possibly based on eye-witness accounts. However, strangely, this map does not show the French units in their combat positions, but rather shows them in the camp that they established on July 11, 1758.⁴³ Although this map shows the French Lines, it does not include the defensive position held by the Canadiens and La Marine or the position occupied by Bernard and Duprat. Given the time that Lotbinière is known (as of the writing of this report) to have been on site after the battle,⁴⁴ he may have included some of the initial post-battle alterations and/or some of the proposed plans to fix the French Lines into his map. For example, this map appears to integrate the formerly separate four-gun battery on the right, which was completed the day after the battle, into the main line. It appears that the redoubt on the right near the four-gun battery, which was started the day of the battle, was never completed.

While the English maps made at or about the time of the battle are a little rougher, cartographically they are still informative. One of these maps is entitled, “[British attack upon Ticonderoga July 7 & 8, 1758],” and has been attributed to Lt. Charles Rivez, “a French Huguenot officer with engineering experience” then serving with the 60th Regiment of Foot (see Appendix B: Rivez 1) (Chartrand 2000:59). This map is now in the collections of the Clements Library at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. It provides some information about the general approach and withdrawal route of the English army as well as the approximate locations of the British encampments on the night before the battle. There is a similar map, also attributed to Rivez, entitled, “*A Map from the Landing Place to Ticonderoga.*” c. 1758, in the Royal Trust Collection (see Appendix B: Rivez 2). Furthermore, there is another map that is very similar, but unattributed, entitled, “[A map showing the northern part of Lake George and Fort Ticonderoga],” in the British Library Collection. This last map is stylistically like the previous two, but it does not include the British camp locations.⁴⁵ English maps covering the same general area as the maps above, but giving even less detail related to the battle, include the map

⁴² See Hamilton 1964:245.

⁴³ Louis de Bougainville noted in his journal on July 11, 1758, “all the army went into camp between the defensive line and the fort . . . The two Berry battalions camped on the ridge of Carillon between the fort and the hospital” (Hamilton 1964:242).

⁴⁴ As of the writing of this report, it is not known if Lotbinière ever returned to this post before it was lost to the British in 1759. There may be more information in his papers, which are now in the collections of the New York Historical Society Library. This collection has an undated plan of Ticonderoga that was not examined for this report.

⁴⁵ This map is available on-line through the Boston Public Library’s Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center and can be viewed at <https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:hx11z343v>.

entitled, “*Sketch of the Country Around Ticonderoga*,” by Lt. Elias Meyer of the Royal Americans (c. 1758) (see Appendix B: Meyer); a different unattributed map also entitled, “*Sketch of the Country Around Ticonderoga*,” which is in the collections of the William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,⁴⁶ and a map entitled [*Fort Edward to Ticonderoga*], which is part of the Thomas Gage Papers in the collections of the William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.⁴⁷

A few British maps provide some information about the battle. For example, the sketch map made at the time by Alexander Moneypenny of the 55th Regiment of Foot, which originally accompanied a letter written by Moneypenny to John Calcraft on July 11, 1758,⁴⁸ includes the general location of Lt. Clerk's proposed battery on the shore of Mount Defiance opposite the French Lines and gives a general indication of the British troop positions during the battle of July 8, 1758 (see Appendix B: Moneypenny). Of note, is the location of what appears to be a group of Connecticut regiments north of the road to the sawmill and what could be interpreted as the wayward New York battalion. Also, of note is the spacing of the first and second line of provincials and their position relative to the French Lines. This map also shows a little more of the lower flat plain than previous maps, but it also appears to suggest that this area had either woods, wetland, and/or rough ground that could have made it difficult for troops to maneuver in. A similar, but more simplified, map of the battle entitled, "*A Plan of the Country from the Landing Place with the Encampments and Marches of the Troops Under Major General Abercrombie to the Attack of Ticonderoga,*" created by T. Phinn (possibly influenced by Moneypenny's map), was published in the August 1758 issue of the *Scots Magazine* (see Appendix B: Phinn).⁴⁹ The Phinn map gives a very general impression of the battle, especially in providing a highly stylized depiction of the British Regulars' intended attack formation, emphasizing the layering of the skirmishers, grenadiers, and Regulars. The sketch map made by Capt. Hugh Arnot of the 42nd Regiment of Foot not only gives some information about the road taken from the sawmill and about the camps used by the British the night before the battle,⁵⁰ it also shows, to some degree, how the British attackers may have perceived the French Lines⁵¹ (see Appendix B: Arnot). The very rough sketch of the battle made by John Cleaveland, now in the collections of Fort Ticonderoga Museum, Ticonderoga, New York, may have been somewhat compromised by the fog of war, but it is the only map that places the Rhode Island troops on the battlefield (see Appendix B: Cleaveland).

The post-war map entitled, “*A Plan of the Town and Fort of Carillon at Ticonderoga; with the Attack Made by the British Army Commanded by Genl. Abercrombie, 8 July 1758*,” by Thomas Jefferys was created from multiple sources c. 1768 (see Appendix B: Jefferys). On this

⁴⁶ This map is available on-line at [William L. Clements Library Image Bank: Sketch of the country round Tyconderoga, \(umich.edu\)](#).

⁴⁷ This map is available on-line at [William L. Clements Library Image Bank: \[Fort Edward to Ticonderoga\]. \(umich.edu\)](#).

⁴⁸ This map was published in *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Vol. XVI., No. 1; [1998]* (see foldout) with the permission of the anonymous private owner and with a photo credit to Tad Merrick.

⁴⁹ A copy of this map can be found in the collections of Fort Ticonderoga Museum, Ticonderoga, New York.

⁵⁰ Arnot may have identified the defended camp built by the Provincials as an abandoned French work, however, more research is needed to confirm that.

⁵¹ For example, James Searing of the New York unit stated that the main French line was “well flanked with two bastions and two redoubts [sic]” (quote Searing).

bastions and two redoubts [sic] (quote Scaring).

map, the plan of the French Lines and the topography appear to derive from the Lotbinière map, though with some changes (see Appendix B: Lotbinière). For example, Jefferys depicts a distinct ‘bean’ shaped hill to the south of the French Lines, which does not correlate with the actual lay of the land. This hill feature, however, would be copied into a few subsequent maps such as the map included in Mantes’ *History of the War in North America 1754-1764* and the Revolutionary War period map entitled, “*A Map of Ticonderoga with the old and new lines and Batteries taken from An Actual Survey & other Authentick Informations*” c. 1777 (see Appendix B: Anonymous 9). Jefferys’ map has some other inaccuracies. For example, it identifies the French camp on the map as the “Incampment of the French before the Engagement.” This is not correct. Most of the French forces were deployed closer to Lake George in the days before the battle and were posted at the lines on the night before the battle (Chartrand 2000:50). The camp on the map appears to be the one to which the French army moved on July 11, 1758. Jefferys’ map also includes the 6-gun battery overlooking the La Chute River as complete, which it wasn’t at the time of the battle (but he does copy Lotbinière here). Most importantly, however, Jefferys redraws the area of combat dramatically by shifting the English forces southward. On his map, the British left is nowhere near the French right. Curiously, Jefferys chooses not to copy Lotbinière’s map in this regard. Jefferys’ map also appears to rely on the intended battle plan to place the British units (see Anonymous 1 Version 1). In so doing, the map puts the English Light Infantry, the “batoe men” and the Rangers in their assigned positions, and not in the positions that they ended up in. (see Anonymous 1 Version 1 and Rogers 1). The Provincial lines are also depicted as stated in other printed source materials and not as they were on the field as a result. This map erroneously has Col. Ruggles’ regiment on the field and leaves both Preble’s Massachusetts regiment and Babcock’s Rhode Island regiment off.

The Jefferys map appears to be the basis of the unattributed map entitled, “*The Attack of Ticonderoga: Major General Abercromby Commander in Chief*,” which was included in M. Mante’s *History of the War in North America 1754-1764* (see Chartrand 2000:60). Another version of this map, made by John E. Gavit, appears in Volume II of the *Memoir Upon the Late War in North America Between the French and English 1755-60 Followed by Observations Upon the Theatre of Actual War and By New Details Concerning the Manners and Customs of the Indians; with Topographical Maps* by M. Pouchot (Translated and edited by Franklin B. Hough, and Printed for Elliot Woodward, Roxbury, Massachusetts, 1866). Both of these latter maps include the individual French units on the battlefield in the positions generally described by the French officers present, except that these maps place the “Colonials and Canadians” in the main defensive line on the Heights of Carillon and not on the lower flat plain and fail to put the two volunteer companies of Duprat and Bernard on the slope off the French left. These maps also position the French forces as more clustered towards the front of the lines, possibly in line with the concept of ‘inherent military probability.’ These maps basically follow Jefferys in placing the British units on the field, except that they label the first line of Provincials as six “Boston regiments,” forgetting the New York Battalion.

One undated and unattributed map in the National Archives of Canada entitled, “*Plan of the retranchements en avant du Fort de Carillion attaques le juillet 1758*” erroneously places the Battle of Carillon onto a map showing the French Lines as they existed in the fall of 1758 or the spring of 1759 after they were redesigned and extended across the low flat plain (see Appendix B: Anonymous 5). This map even includes the entrenchment that the French built to cover their

boat landing after they had completed the extension of the French Lines in September of 1758. Therefore, it is possible that the base of this map is the product of an independent survey made several months after the battle (or taken from a surveyed map yet unknown). This map has a style and features not seen on other maps. In depicting the battle, this map shows five British attacking groups and emphasizes not only the attacks on the right and left (often emphasized by earlier maps) but also the assault on the French center. Finally, it appears that the c. 1790 German map produced by L. Therbu and Hugo Coentgen entitled, “*Attaques Des Retrenchments Devant Le Fort Carillon En Amerique*” in the Library of Congress, was inspired by the previously described map (or a copy thereof; compare the shorelines and the island at the mouth of the La Chute River) (see Appendix B: Therbu-Coentgen). However, on the Therbu-Coentgen map the French Lines are drawn with more severe and, arguably, unrealistic salients.

French Phase II

Although the French Lines had been effective in battle, they were not without their problems.⁵² Several French officers noted that the lines could be enfiladed in places, particularly on the left and the right where a lack of traverses had led to casualties (see Bougainville; Maurès Malartic 2; Montcalm 1 & 2; and Pouchot). Additionally, French engineer Jean-Nicholas Desandrouins noted that some sections of the line, “lacked firing steps because they were built too low” (Gabriel 1887:166). As soon as the shooting had died away and the guns had been cleaned, the French set out to address the most glaring problems of their defenses. Expecting a renewed attack, the next day they, “worked all night to secure defilade against the neighboring heights by traverses, to perfect the abatis of the Canadians and to finish the batteries on the right and left” (quote Bougainville; see also Lapause; Levis; and Maurès Malartic 2 & 3). This hasty work was carried on into next day, July 9, and somewhat into the 10th (see Bougainville; Lapause; and Levis). The four-gun battery on the right had its guns placed the day after the battle⁵³ (quote Bougainville; see also Montcalm 1). While working on fixing the lines, the French also had to divert some of their manpower to bury the dead of both armies. This difficult task was mainly done between July 9 and July 11 (see Lapause; Levis; and Maurès Malartic 2). At the time, some French observers estimated that the number of English bodies in front of the lines and along the road at 500 to 800 (see Doreil 2 and Levis), but Montcalm put the number higher saying that “2000 corpses which lie among our abbatis” (quote Montcalm 2). On July 10, Gabriel de Maurès Malartic commented that they, “had the English buried who were beginning to infect the outside of the abati” (quote Maurès Malartic 2). On July 11, Montcalm moved the French encampment to the area between the French Lines and Fort Ticonderoga, east of the ravine (see Bougainville and Montcalm 2).

While the immediate threat had passed with the withdrawal of the English army to the southern end of Lake George, the French still strongly believed they would make another attempt on Ticonderoga before the end of the campaign season, and began to extend and improve the French Lines. Pierre Pouchot noted, “on the 11th, we began to correct our intrenchments, having good occasion to know their faults” (quote Pouchot). Gabriel de Maurès Malartic noted on the 12th July 1758, “began to work at the abatis and to give it the form of an intrenchment” (quote Maurès Malartic 1 & 2). In this work, the lines would be extended to both to Lake Champlain and to the La Chute River and much of the works that lay between these points would be

⁵² One early 19th century source describes the process of field fortification as follows: “a project of fortification is commonly the result of much reflection; but in the field it is quite the otherwise; no regard is to be had to the solidity of the works; everything must be determined on the spot; the works are to be traced out directly, and regulated by the time and number of workmen, depending on no other materials than what are at hand, and having no other tools than the spade, shovel, pick-axe and hatchet. It is therefore in the field, more than anywhere else, that an engineer should be ready, and know how to seize all advantages at first sight, to be fertile in expedients, inexhaustible in inventions, and indefatigably active” (James 1802:np).

⁵³ The urgency to build this battery can be illustrated by a comment made by Pierre Pouchot who wrote after the battle, “the colonial and Canadian troops who occupied the intrenchments on the flat, who were not in condition for defence [sic], but by continual sorties, they dissuaded the English from attempting anything on their side, where they could have easily turned their works had they known their ground, and the facility of taking them.” Indeed, if the Canadians had been dislodged, the British may have been able to gain the heights between the French Lines and the Fort (quote Pouchot; see also Appendix B: Anonymous 4 and Lotbinière).

realigned and/or strengthened⁵⁴ (see Bougainville and Doreil 2). In mid-July, Bougainville noted in his journal, “the defensive works of Carillon and the project of the outer works to be built there have been outlined” by “Sieurs Pontleroy and Desandrouins” (quote Bougainville). He also noted that, “the soldiers are going to occupy themselves for the rest of the campaign working on them”⁵⁵ (quote Bougainville).

Between July 11 and July 13, reinforcements arrived in the form of about 3,000 Canadians under the command of Pierre Rigaud and some 600 native allies, raising the total French force to about 6,669 (see Bougainville; Doreil 2; Levis; and Pouchot). Beginning on July 13 or 14, 1758, and continuing for the next two and a half months, many of these men (except perhaps for the Native Allies) would work almost exclusively and “without break to perfect the retrenchment” (quote Levis; see also Lapause). When complete, the new line would be about a mile in length and have a few batteries built into it (see Appendix B: Brehm-Brasier). Lapause noted on July 14th that 690 men were employed on the defensive works (see Lapause). On July 30th, he recorded that, “workers were employed to extend the entrenchments to the left as far as the river and repair the rest.” (quote Lapause). On August 3rd, 1758, Capt. Pierre Pouchot of Béarn traced “a redoubt to secure the right of the intrenchment” near Lake Champlain (quote Maurès Malartic 2; see also Levis). It appears that keeping some of the troops hard at work with the ax and spade was a challenge. Bougainville noted on August 4, 1758, that, “work continues. They led the Canadians there, half an hour later almost all had disappeared and one no longer knew where to find them again” (quote Bougainville). Just a few days later, on August 7, 1758, a “fire broke out in the intrenchment, and was eventually extinguished” (quote Maurès Malartic 2).

The British closely monitored the French activities through scouting parties, informants, and by interrogating prisoners of war and/or deserters. In August, a few deserters reported that the French at Ticonderoga had, “lately been considerably reinforced; have 8 Battalions complete, besides 15 Companies of Troops des Colonies, Canadians and Indians; an Entrenchment 15 Feet thick, and a Ditch 10 Feet broad, overlooked by three Batteries” (quote Anonymous 15). In early September, a scout reported, “the Enemy have erected some Bloc-houses at their Breast work” (quote Anonymous 16).

In August some of the Canadian militia returned home leaving 3,623 Regulars and 1,933 of Troop de la Marine and Canadian militia at Fort Carillon along with “about 250 workmen and cannoneers” to carry on (quote Bougainville). On August 21, 1758, the French raised a large cross “at the foot of the entrenchments” (quote Bougainville; see also Levis). The following year, the British would record some details about this feature. In a letter dated August 4, 1759, the Reverend Eli Forbush noted,

“when I visited the Fort which was about 9 o’clock Fryday Morning 27th I found many monuments of Superstition which would furnish a curious mind with abundant Matter for Speculation --One thing I cant omit, near ye Breast where so many Spilt yr

⁵⁴ Although the lines were significantly altered in places by this project, some sections may not have been completely changed. Many years later, in 1772, Robert Innes noted that, “the outside loggs are evidently the same that were there when we attacked they are now to the height of three [logs] full of shot holes, balls are everyday cut out of them” (quote Innes).

⁵⁵ But it was hoped that they would also “try to finish the fort,” if possible (quote Bougainville).

Blood last year, was a cross erected of 30 Feet high, painted red with this Inscription in lead on yt side next to ye Breastwork ‘Sone Principes eorum Sicut oneb et heb et Zebee et’ and under this at ye Fort was this inscribed in Lead, viz ‘Hoc Signum Vincit’ (quote Forbush).

William Amherst also noted that, “in the center of the line at Ticonderoga, the enemy has erected a very high cross, with a large grave dug, and left open before it” (quote W. Amherst).

On September 1, 1758, Louis de Bougainville noted,

“today the eight battalions with their flags worked on the defenses which have been almost entirely rebuilt. Attacked on all sides and forced to divide our weak forces, it is necessary to supplement [small] numbers by skill. These works will have five trees for a base, for above, three, two, and one. It would be wished that a ditch could be built around, but it is feared that ledge will be found too soon” (quote Bougainville).

On September 5, 1758, he noted,

“continuation of work on the defenses by all eight battalions. I believe that they would have been able to find enough earth to have made a ditch in front which would have improved the defense of the [log wall] works, would have protected them from [being set on] fire, which would have spared us taking them down this fall and remaking them in the spring” (quote Bougainville).

It appears that at least the top of the log portions of the lines were moved for the winter. Dietrich Brehm reported in February of 1759, “that the Top logs where thrown down for fear we should burn them” (quote Brehm). Montcalm left for Canada on September 6, 1758, leaving Levis in charge. Levis, “continued to work with the same activity to perfect the entrenchments” until September 12, 1758, when it was declared that the lines were complete and the army was given two days off⁵⁶(quote Levis; see also Bougainville).

After the short celebratory break, the French soldiers started work on a, “second line of entrenchments from the fort to the river” [meaning Lake Champlain] (quote Levis). In October a British scout reported that he had seen,

“upwards of a Thousand Camps, and Huts, outside the Fort; they have greatly added to the Strength of the Fort, having made three Trenches one within another, which extends from Lake to Lake (as the Fort stands on a Point of Land) so convenient, that if they should be drove out of one Trench, they can retreat to the next, and so to the Third; and each of them, to all, Appearance, very strong” (quote Anonymous 17).

However, at least one of these additional lines was not completed. A French prisoner of war reported in 1759, “that there was another Work to be made on the Inside of the Lines, but for want of hands, it has been laid aside, and only the Form traced out” (quote Brehm).

In early October of 1758, Bougainville noted, “on the fourth for the first time it snowed, but only a little. Then the weather became fine again; it is magnificent, and if the English do not take advantage of it to come attack us we can no longer count on them this autumn” (quote Bougainville). On October 26, Capt. Pierre Pouchot noted, “we learned from another deserter, that the English had broken camp to go into winter quarters, that they had evacuated Fort George, and sunk their barques” (quote Pouchot). This marked the end of the campaign season.

⁵⁶ On October 4, Bougainville noted, “they have built a new battery at the defense line which covers all the lowland” (quote Bougainville). It is not clear as of the writing of this report what defensive work he is referring to.

In early-to-mid November, most of the French Regulars headed to Canada for winter quarters leaving about 300 Regulars, “composed of pickets of our battalions,” and 100 La Marine under the command of Capt. Louis-Philippe le Dossu d’Hebecourt of the La Reine to garrison the fort⁵⁷(quote Montcalm 3 see also Bougainville).

In late February of 1759, d’Hebecourt’s men intercepted an English scouting party near Ticonderoga, capturing a sergeant who told them that the group had included an engineer who was supposed to, “lift the plans of the fort and the entrenchments” (quote Levis). This activity clearly signaled the British Army’s renewed interest in Ticonderoga. Early in 1759, English Lt. Dietrich Brehm made a detailed report on the French defenses. He found, “that these Lines were new made since we left them and are about 150 yards [sic]⁵⁸ nearer the Woods than the former Lines” (quote Brehm). He saw that, for the most part, the breastworks were built in the same way as the lines encountered in 1758, being a double row logs, some up to 30 inches across, tied together with wooden cross pieces with some sections having buttress, the lowest part of the wall being 7½ feet high (see Brehm). However, some portions of the main line had been considerably strengthened. He noted that two of the salient angles had been raised higher than they had been and had been remade as batteries built of earth with parapets about 14 to 15 feet thick at the base, 7 feet high, and 5 feet across on top (see Brehm). The batteries also had a ditch, “about 15 or 16 feet wide and 4 feet deep,” in front of them and they had been further strengthened by the addition of palisades (of which those “before the Embrasures are Fraz’d and the rest are perpendicular”) (quote Brehm). One of these batteries, the one located at the “highest part of the ground,” also had a magazine built for it (quote Brehm). The line had two ‘sally ports’ each equipped “with Pallisades [sic] and Gates to open and shut and a Breastwork on the inside to defend them” (quote Brehm). Brehm, however, also indicated that some sections of the line were just built of log with “no Ditch before it” (quote Brehm). About the ground leading up to the works, Brehm reported that, “in front of the whole line was an abatis, about 20 to 25 paces in breadth that were in some places close to the Breastwork and at others 50 paces distant” (quote Brehm). He also noted that the ground before the lines was cleared for about 450 paces from the breastwork with “a few large Logs” lying there (quote Brehm).

Brehm’s observations were later confirmed by others after the capture of the fort in 1759 (Figure 18). For example, Henry Skinner, a British regular artillery officer, stated that the lines “are made of squared logs, with earth rammed betwixt, much as in the same form as last year” (quote Skinner). Provincial soldier, Lemuel Wood noted,

“about 60 rod from ye fort on ye west is ye grand Breastwork from Lake to Lake built with Logs and Earth 8 or 10 feet high Some of ye top Logs 3 feet through [...] it is built full of Short Crooks and angles so yt it may be Cleard Every way with Places for Cannon to Play on [...] on ye out-Side a Large Row of brush about 41 Rods [676.5 feet] off [...] under ye breastwork a magazine” (quote Wood).

Still later, in July of 1767, Francis Grant described the 1759 French Lines as follows,

“at the top of the rising ground to the Westward of the Fort” are the works, “these lines still remain entire, and are very strong. They extend all the way from the river to the Lake, about 2 miles in length, flanked at every place, they are built of large round logs of wood, and are about 8 feet thick at bottom, narrowing to the breadth of one log at

⁵⁷ Reportedly, part of the garrison’s winter work was to reinforce the casemates (see Desaudroins).

⁵⁸ This is what the published transcription has. However, the measurement is more likely to be 150 paces or feet.

top. These logs are very large, and at the angles are mortised into one another; the lines are about man height. At the top of the hill there was a battery piquetted and entrenched, and the whole lines were defended by fallen trees, with their branches sharpened; upon the whole, nothing could be stronger of the sort" (quote F. Grant).




Figure 18. Changes made to the French Lines made in 1758 after the Battle of Carillon.

Discussion of French Phase II Maps

The best maps for showing the results of the French work on the French Lines after the battle of 1758 are those made by the British after their capture of Fort Ticonderoga in 1759. Foremost among these maps is the one surveyed by British engineers Dietrich Brehm and William Brasier entitled, “*A Survey of the Fort at Tienderoga and its Environs with the French Lines and Part of Lake Champlain,*” which is now in the collections of the British Library (see Appendix B: Brehm-Brasier).⁵⁹ This map is quite accurate in its depiction of the French Lines, though the angle and distance of the long linear work on the low flat plain may be a shade off. This map includes the location of several important natural features, such as the various springs on the property. The Brehm-Brasier map appears to be the direct source of the map entitled, “*Plan of the Fort at Tienderoga and Environs at the head of Lake Champlain November 1759,*” by William Skinner (see Appendix B: Skinner). Furthermore, the Brehm-Brasier map appears to have been redrawn in a black and white version entitled, “*Plan of the Fort at Tienderoga at the Head of Lake Champlain 1759,*” by Mary Ann Roque for her volume, *A Set of Plans and Forts in North America Reduced from Actual Surveys*, which was published in 1765 in England, a copy of which is in the collections of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum (see Appendix B: Roque).

In addition to the period maps, two early 19th century maps produced by the United States Engineer Department, Topo[graphical] Bureau c. 1815,⁶⁰ copies of which are in the collections of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum⁶¹ are also important in analyzing the French redesign and expansion of the French Lines in 1758 (see Appendix B: U.S. Engineer Department 1 & 2). Although a little rough, these maps suggest that the French defensive works from the late summer to early fall of 1758 were still traceable in between the later American built redoubts on the low flat plain in the early 1800s. This possibility is supported by observations made Theodore Dwight Jr., an early travel writer, who indicated that the three forward (western) redoubts and the linear French defensive work on the plain could still be seen in 1831. He wrote that the fortifications,

“commenced on the east side at a battery of heavy cannon on the shore, about a quarter mile south of the ferry. The remains of the breastwork can yet be seen. The lines were drawn in a zig-zag; first stretching off to the right, along the side of marshy ground to a cluster of bushes where was a battery; and then to the left to the verge of a wood, where was another” (quote Dwight).

The English Siege 1759

By May of 1759, the French Regulars had returned to Ticonderoga. That month, it was reported that Gen. Francois-Charles de Bourlamaque, who then had charge of Ticonderoga, “is on the march with a corps of 3,000 men, consisting of the Battalion of the Queen and the two of Berry, Colony Troops and the Canadians. This body will be gathered and camped on the heights

⁵⁹ A note on the bottom of the map indicates that, “the Fort and Lines by Lieu^t Brheam [sic] Assistant Engin^r., the Ground Survey’s November 1759 by W. Brasier Draughtsman to the Ch: Engineer.”

⁶⁰ The ‘Corps of Topographic Engineers’ appears to have been established in 1813, but the “Topographic Bureau” appears to have been established in 1818. A little more research should be able to clarify the date of the maps. For example, the maps could have been transferred to the Bureau when it was established.

⁶¹ Copies of these maps are also available at the National Archives RG77, CWMF. D-38-3.

of Carillon from the 15th to the 20th of the month” (quote Montcalm 4). Bourlamaque, however, had orders not to engage in a fight for Fort Ticonderoga, but to delay as long as possible then fall back to Isle-aux-Noix when seriously pressed (Bellico 2010:191).

The British Army, now under the command of Gen. Jeffery Amherst, returned to the area on July 21, 1759 and quickly moved to take the sawmill and the ground “opposite their breast work” (quote Rogers 2). It appears that engineer officer William Eyre had drawn up an elaborate plan for taking the French Lines entitled, *“Project for the Attack of Ticonderoga proposed to be put in Execution as near as the Circumstances and Ground will admit”* (see Appendix B: Eyre 1& 2 and Brasier 3). On landing, the British army immediately began cutting a new road “from Lake Champlain to the Saw Mill River for the carrying on of the Siege” (quote J. Amherst 3 see also J. Amherst 4) and started to bring up a large quantity of supplies including cannons, ammunition, powder, tools, food, tents & etc. from the Landing and across the “Carrying Place” to sustain their effort (see Barnard 2; D’arcy, Dibble; Gavit; Hurlburt; Rogers 2; Skinner; Webster; Wood; and Woods).⁶²

On July 23, 1759, Gen. Amherst marched his army in order of battle up to the French Lines only to find that the French had withdrawn into Fort Ticonderoga (see Anonymous 20 and Webster). One stunned British soldier wrote,

“why they did not make a Stand in the Lines or else entirely demolish them, is I believe, astonishing to every Body here—It is not easy to conceive the Strength of these Lines—the immense Labor and Pains taken to construct them—so strong, that I believe 10,000 Men could defend them against the whole Musquetry of America” (quote Anonymous 21; see also J. Amherst 1; D’arcy; Forbush; Gavit; and Wood).

Two brigades of English Regulars went into camp on the outer side of the French Lines, with tents two deep, and immediately ‘turned’ or ‘reversed’ the works by building a ‘Banquette’ (or fire step) of logs and earth on the outer part of the French Lines “so that the Picquets of each Regiment can stand upon it and defend the Breastwork without pulling any of the Breastwork down” (quote Wilson; see also J. Amherst 2; Goodrich; and Moneypenny 2). By doing this, the British had, in their estimation, “rendered their [the French] Works as serviceable to us as if we had made them ourselves” (quote Anonymous 20). Three battalions of Provincials camped a little further back from the Regulars in the woods and a hospital was established near “Worsters Regiment, near the Road coming into Camp” (quote Wilson; see also J. Amherst 2 and Anonymous 23). On the 23rd, Gen. Amherst “opened trenches at three different places” to lay siege to Fort Ticonderoga (quote J. Amherst 2; see also Barnard 2; Forbush; and Murray 2). The three approach trenches were to eventually to include ‘fascine batteries’ (see Appendix B: Dwight). Several hundred men were daily tasked with cutting the fascines, with many of them working under the eye of Sgt. Murray of the Royal Highland regiment (see Rogers 2; Webster; and Wilson).

Upon the very first sighting of a British soldier, the French in Fort Ticonderoga began to shell them (see Rogers 2; Skinner; and Woods). As one man noted, “from the Fort began the briskest and most violent Cannonading that was ever known from such a small Place” (quote Anonymous 23). Provincial soldier Eli Forbush wrote that when the “enemy perceived our

⁶² All of the heavy transport work was done by hand, as no horses were available before the 26th (see Skinner and Wood).

disposition, they raised a smart cannonade upon us, but without Effect, those that were intrenching between ye Breastwork and ye Fort had by this time covered ymelves” (quote Forbush). However, the French gunners soon found their range and their fire remained continuous and deadly for the remainder of the short siege (see Anonymous 20, 24; J. Amherst 2; Barnard 2; Bayley; Gordon; Merriman; Murray 2; Rogers 2; Skinner; True; Webster; Wood; and Woods). Some of the fort’s fire was directed at the approach trenches. For example, on July 25, Lemuel Wood recorded that, “six men were ‘kiled in ye trench with a bomb” (quote Wood; see also Anonymous 23 and Skinner). However, the guns and mortars were also brought to bear on the camps located just beyond the French Lines. The camp of the Regulars was well within the range of the fort’s 13-inch mortars, which could throw a roughly 200 -pound shell in a high trajectory up to 2,900 yards, as well as from the cannon, firing on a lower trajectory, with a maximum range of roughly 2,000 yards and effective range of about 1,000 yards. The distance from the French Lines to the middle of the fort being only about 1,100 yards. The French Lines now offered a degree of protection to the British from the more direct fire of the cannon, but not so much from the plunging trajectory of the mortars. British regular, James Murray noted, “that we were nigh point blank of the cannon shott but the line had been of so much hurt to us last year saved our men this” (quote Murray 2; see also Anonymous 20; D’arcy; and General Orders 1). Another British regular recorded that,

“tho’ they kept a continual Fire could not make the least Breach in them; so that what they erected for their Strength, became our chief Support, and was the Means of saving many of our Lives. The 24th and 25th their Fire was so hot upon us that in an Hour’s Times they fired 95 Balls and 35 Shells, most of them at the Encampment of our Regiment, which tore many of our Tents, broke several Firelocks, wounded some Men, and killed one; his Body was blown away in such a Manner by the Shell, that scarce any part of it could be found” (quote Anonymous 20).

Another writer added, “not a Man in the Army was in any Safety, or could get a Wink of Sleep for shot and Shells falling ever where” (quote Anonymous 23). Jesse Parsons related that one night, “one of their Shells burst in A tent and Kill’d Every Man in it” (Parsons quoted in Bellico 2010:194). Unsurprisingly, there have been numerous reports of shell fragments being found up to “a mile away from the fort in the French Lines” (quote Anonymous 25). Another 20th century report stated more specifically that, “back of the French Lines . . . There are numerous round shell craters, six to ten feet in diameter, twelve to twenty-four inches deep, and it was discovered in the middle of each one a hole about two feet across, containing anywhere from six to a dozen fragments of thirteen-inch mortar bombs” (quote Anonymous 41).

All the while, the work on the approach trenches continued on through tough soil (Vergennes silty clay loam). Gen. Amherst went so far as to say, “their shot and shells do not so much retard our operations as the ground we work on, it being an uncommon weighty, stiff clay” (quote J. Amherst 4; see also Forbush; General Orders 1; Wilson). On July 25, 1759, it was recorded that, “the enemy have kept an incessant fire on the trenches these last twenty-four hours, they have now got the distance to the camp, and gall us considerably, four being killed by a shell, and several wounded; notwithstanding these annoyances, we have carried our approaches within six hundred yards of the fort” (quote General Orders 1). As of July 26th, the trenches for at least two of the siege trenches had been completed and the carpenters were preparing their gun platforms (see Amherst 2). At least two of the British batteries⁶³ were set to open on the next

⁶³ It is possible that one trench was abandoned due to ground conditions or was simply not completed in time.

morning. These appear to have included one battery with six 24-pounders and one with a battery of mortars, *possibly* consisting of two 10-in mortars and one 13-in mortar⁶⁴ (see Anonymous 23; J. Amherst 2; General Orders 1; Montresor; Skinner; and Wood).

The exact locations and configurations of these siege trenches and batteries do not appear to have been mapped at the time, but there are some clues in the written descriptions of the events. For example, on July 25th British artillerist Henry Skinner noted that, “in the night they carried the approaches within 600 yards of the place” (quote Skinner). Later, Gen. Amherst wrote that he had two batteries ready to open: one of six 24-pounders that “were about 400 yards [1,200 feet] from the fort on the right” and one battery located “about 450” yards [1,350 feet] on the left (*Journal of Jeffery Amherst* quoted in Bellico 2010:194). However, it is possible that some part of the trenches for the infantry support for the artillerists and excavators *may* have been even closer. For example, Samuel Merriman noted that on the 23rd of July he, “went to trenchen upon ye Enamies ground with in forty Rodes [660 feet] of ye french fort” and on the 25th of July he reported that, “ye armi hath entrench within 30 Rodes [495 feet] of ye french fort” (quote Merriman). Jacob Bayley noted that, “we intrenched 30 rods [495 feet] within their breastworks [sic] and got up the cannon and mortars” (quote Bayley). One soldier wrote that on the 26th of July that his regiment was in the trenches and was, “posted near the Glacis of the Fort, in order to cover our Workmen at the Batteries, in case the enemy should offer to sally out” (quote Anonymous 20). The descriptions and distances given in the accounts above appear to describe a method of siege similar to that seen at the English siege of the fort at Niagara, New York, in 1759⁶⁵ (Figure 19).

Just before the English siege batteries could open the French forces abandoned the site, blew up the south-east bastion and powder magazine of Fort Carillon, and left by way of the lake. One British soldier noted a bit grumpily of the short campaign, “they thought it most expedient to retire to the Fort, and, after obliging us to go thro’ all the Form and Ceremony of a Siege [left]” (quote Anonymous 21). The British moved their camp inside the French Lines on July 27 (Figure 20 and Figure 21) (see J. Amherst 3 & 4). Having taken the fort, Gen. Amherst immediately destroyed his siege works. Wilson noted in his orderly book, “as soon as the working Parties of Provincials arraive, the Approaches and Batteries to be immediately levell’d” (quote Wilson). Gen. Amherst also ordered that, “the Rangers, Light Infantry and Grenadiers, Lymans and Worcesters Regiment will interly destroy the Road they have made in their Front, by laying Loggs across and cutting some Trees in necessarie so as to make in impassible from

⁶⁴ Anonymous 23, stated that there were “six 24 pounders and two Hawitzer Mortars.” It is also noted that two 12-pounders were also brought up, but they were positioned on either side of the British camp for its defense and were not specifically there for the siege operation. Gen Jeffery Amherst wrote on July 24, “I got up two twelve-Pounders, one for each Flank of the Camp” (quote J. Amherst 2; see also Wilson).

⁶⁵ In February of 1759, French engineer, Capt. Jean-Nicolas Desandrouins laid out a possible siege scenario for Fort Ticonderoga. He wrote, “if we assume that the enemy has the same knowledge of the terrain that we have, something we shall know soon after his arrival, he will make the big ravine in front of the last camp of Languedoc and Guyenne the base of his trench” (quote Desandrouins). He noted that the enemy could bring cannons ammunition digging equipment and fascines &etc. to this area under a degree of cover (see Desandrouins). However, Desandrouins also noted, that if the besiegers worked too close to the fort, “the present ledge made the digging of trenches impossible over much of the area. In such case, the trench must be built above ground by placing two rows of earth filled gabions with a space between forming a protected passageway, but one that could be destroyed by artillery fire relatively easily” (quote Desandrouins).

Lake Champlain to the Road leading from the Saw Mills to the Fort, that the Brush may grow up and no Appearance of a Road may remaine" (quote Wilson; see also J. Amherst 3 & 4 and Hawks).



Figure 19. Detail of a map entitled, “A Plan of Fort Niagara and its Environs with the Attack made thereupon in the Month of July 1759” attributed to William Eyre c. 1759 belonging to the Royal Collection Trust (accessed at. RCIN 732108 - Map of Fort Niagara, 1759 (Fort Niagara, New York... (rct.uk). This map shows an example of a contemporary English siege work with approach trenches and batteries (south is to the top of this map).



Figure 20. "A View of the Lines and Fort of Ticonderoga [sic] Taken from a hill on the south side of the South Bay in 1759" [possibly by Thomas Davies] (Retrieved from the Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, <http://www.loc.gov/item/20004662203/>).



View from Mt. Defiance looking northeast across the Fort Ticonderoga peninsula into Vermont. The dark line across Lake Champlain is the Rutland R. R. trestle.

Figure 21. *View of the Ticonderoga Peninsula from Mt. Defiance* (Register of the Officers and Members of the Society of Colonial War in the State of Maine; Also History, Roster and Record of Colonel Jedidiah Preble's Regiment Campaign of 1758 Together with Capt. Samuel Cobb's Journal. Marks Printing House, Portland, Maine, 1905 (between p. 110 and 111).

Discussion of Maps Depicting the Siege

Two sketch plans of the proposed siege of the French Lines attributed to William Eyre are located in the Royal Collection Trust. One is entitled, “[*Ticonderoga 1759*]” (see Appendix B: Eyre 1) and the other is entitled, “*Project for the Attack of Ticonderoga proposed to be put in Execution as near as the Circumstances and Ground will admit of*” c. 1759 (see Appendix B: Eyre 2). A more polished version of the above sketch maps was added to a base map that included more of the surrounding territory is also entitled, “*Project for the Attack of Ticonderoga proposed to be put in Execution as near as the Circumstances and Ground will admit*” (see Appendix B: Brasier 3). This map is attributed to William Brasier and is in the Library of Congress’ William Faden Collection. The base of this map appears to be very similar to the maps produced by Charles Rivez (especially the copy now in the British Library). The siege planning maps only vaguely show the changes made to the French Lines between 1758 and 1759.

Maps of the actual siege of Fort Ticonderoga are lacking⁶⁶. Reportedly in 1865 Horatio Seymour, the former governor of New York State, donated “an original manuscript map of Fort Ticonderoga drawn at the time of its capture by Lord Amherst in 1759-showing the position of the English batteries, regiments, &c., also the interior arrangement of the fort, and lines of defence [sic]” to the Long Island Historical Society (now the Brooklyn Historical Society) (Anonymous 1856:130). This map has not been located and there is a chance that it is a copy of a map already available, but imperfectly described. At this time, the only visual representation of the siege batteries found during the preparation of this report comes from Daniel Dwight’s Powder Horn (see Appendix B: Dwight) on which the artist, inscribed three ‘fascine batteries’ along with other potentially significant features (Fort Ticonderoga Museum PH-008). Interestingly, this rendering appears to suggest that two of the siege trenches started near openings in the French Lines. Some information, such as the relative position of Amherst’s artillery park, is included on the rough sketch map entitled, “*Ticonderoga, As it was*” from the Library of Congress; (see Appendix B: Anonymous 7) as well as on the possibly related map entitled, “*A Perspective View of Lake George*” by H. Skinner and John Hinton from the Boston Public Library’s Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center (see Appendix B: Skinner-Hinton). This latter map appears to be related, in part, to the maps by Rivez or Eyre.

The early twentieth century survey maps commissioned by the Pell family identifies a series of features marked as “entrenchments” much closer to the fort than the French Lines (see Appendix B: Anonymous 12). Being outside of the current project area, these possible features were not researched at this time and it is unclear what they represent (e.g., actual entrenchments, natural and/or quarry features mistaken for entrenchments, British siege works, or structures, such as the French workshops that were once in this area). However, possible entrenchments were also reported in this same area in 1831 when Theodore Dwight Jr. noted,

“in proceeding from the French lines south towards the fortress, by a gentle decent, the surface of the ground appears to have been in some places smoothed in former times by the plough and by the removal and cutting away of rocks, to render it convenient for the evolutions of troops, and the use of artillery. A close observer will also remark

⁶⁶ This is most likely because the siege only lasted for a few days.

that he passes the remains of several distinct lines of small redoubts, placed at equal distances, and ranged in the form of a quincunx . . . *There are two old intrenchments, 270 and 150 yards from the fortress*; and then comes the edge of the outer ditch or counterscarp, where there was a row of palisades. Five steps more bring you to the walled side of the ditch, which is still eight feet deep in some places, and therefore impassable except where it has been partially filled up. Its breadth is generally about 8 or 9 yards, and the wall of the fortress on the other side in some places 20 or 24 feet high.” (quote Dwight, emphasis added).

The American Works

The English army remained at Fort Ticonderoga throughout the latter years of the French and Indian War,⁶⁷ and continued to occupy it with a token presence for many years afterwards. However, no documentary records were found during the preparation of this report to suggest that anything was done to improve, alter, or maintain the French Lines during this time. Rather, it appears that the French Lines stood abandoned for about seventeen years until the American Revolution. On May 10, 1775, the Americans took Fort Ticonderoga unopposed. In the summer of 1775, Maj. Gen. Schuyler established a small outpost at Ticonderoga and at least Col. Benjamin Hinman’s Connecticut Regiment was on the ground in June of 1775 (*Virginia Gazette* July 1, 1775).

In mid-July of 1776, portions of the American army retreating from a failed attempt to take Quebec began to arrive in the vicinity of Fort Ticonderoga. Three brigades were sent to Mount Independence and one brigade from Pennsylvania “encamped on the hill near the old French Lines” (*Norwich Packet*, August 19, 1776; see also Lacey). When the troops arrived, they found that there had been “but Little preparation for fortifying”⁶⁸ (quote Beebe; see also Metcalf). Although the old French Lines were still quite discernible, they were in ruin. A few months previous, in April of 1776, Charles Carroll wrote that the,

“famous lines made by the French in the last war . . . were constructed of large trunks of trees, felled on each other, with earth thrown up against them . . . they had, besides felling trees, lopped and sharpened their branches, and turned them towards the enemy; the trunks of the trees remain to this day piled up as described, but are fast going to decay” (quote Carroll; see also Livingston).

John Lacey of the 4th Pennsylvania noted,

“these lines consist of a string [decayed] of Redoubts or Breast Work, [picketed] with a ditch on the outside, which had been picketed, and appeared to have once been a formidable [sic] works, but now gone very much to decay and out of repair. They extended across a point or Neck of Land from the Southern to the Northeast bend of [the Lake] Lake Champlain, [our new camp adjoining it. These lines had gone almost down,

⁶⁷ For example, in the fall of 1760 Capt. Allen Maclean of the New York Independent Company was in command at Ticonderoga (*Maryland Gazette*, November 13, 1760, “Fresh Advices from Bengal.” p. 2).

⁶⁸ On June 8, 1776, Philip Schuyler wrote to Gen. Putnam from Fort George, “I hope to see an engineer to repair Ticonderoga it is [?] to keep that place, but in my opinion a fort on the ground opposite to it would more effectively serve us against the enemy” (Copy of Ms. Letter in Henry Stevens Papers, Vermont Secretary of State, Vermont State Archives and Records Administration, Middlesex, Vermont, Vol. 2., Folder 3. pp. 261-262).

the ditch nearly filled up with rubbish.] as far as the heights extended, to a Marsh or Morass on the Margin of the Lake" (quote Lacey).

On July 18, 1776, the Pennsylvania Brigade moved into camp behind the old French Lines, made themselves at home, and got to work fixing the defensive works⁶⁹ (see Lacy and Van Vetchen). James Wilkinson noted,

"as soon as the rear of our army got up from Crown Point, and the camp was pitched, our labors were directed to the improvement of the old French lines, and the erection of new works on the same side of the lake, and also on Mount Independence, which is separated from Ticonderoga by a strait about 80 poles wide" (quote Wilkinson).

On July 31, 1776, Gen. Anthony Wayne wrote to Benjamin Franklin,

"Col St Clair, Dehaaes, & myself are in possession of Mont Calms lines. We shall render them more formidable than they ever were in a few days . . . Col St Clair and myself have commenced Engineers in chief, We amend, form, and alter such part, and parts of the old french Lines as We think proper a plan of which is here inclose'd. I rest assur'd that if Burgoyne makes an Attack upon Us the British Troops will meet a worse fate than when under Abercrombie in 1758" (quote Wayne 1).

Work was apparently pushed ahead with all haste. On July 15, 1776, Persifer Frazer wrote, "should our enemies forbear their approach for 2 or 3 weeks I think we shall be able to give a very good account of them should they attack us" (quote Frazer). By the late summer of 1776, British scouts were reporting back to their commanders details about the American activity.

Early in August, one agent reported that,

"at Ticonderoga . . . [there were] About 2000 men, most of them employed in repairing the old French lines with a parapet of earth and fashines⁷⁰ [sic] four and a half [feet?] high fronted with a ditch ten feet wide but not dug three feet deep anywhere.

Three cannon 18 & 12 pounders mounted on the lines near the road to the sawmill"

(quote Anonymous 26).

In late July or early August of 1776, American engineer, Col. John Trumbull, made a map of Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence on which he indicated that the portion of the Old French Lines on the Heights of Carillon had been repaired and that the section of the lines on the low flat remained to be repaired (see Appendix B: Trumbull Map 1). Gen. Anthony Wayne wrote to Benjamin Franklin on September 1, 1776, "St. Clair and myself have Rendered the old french lines much Stronger than ever" (quote Wayne 3).

In August of 1776, engineer Lt. Col. Jeduthan Baldwin of Brookfield, Massachusetts, turned some of his attention to building a system of mutually supporting redoubts⁷¹ on the lower plain to replace the defensive line built in that area by the French in the summer to early fall of 1758. On August 8, 1776, Baldwin laid out "a redoubt on the North end of the French lines by

⁶⁹ For example, Persifer Frazer recorded on October 2nd, 1776, "almost the whole of our regiment have good chimneys built to their tents and many of the soldiers have good warm huts built which makes them live much more comfortably" (quote Frazier).

⁷⁰ Revetments are generally placed while the parapet is being constructed; sods are common but so are fascines (bundles of sticks roughly 6 feet long and 7 inches across) (Lendy 1857:79-80).

⁷¹ It is likely that these redoubts were positioned about a 'musket shot' apart from each other. During this time, a musket shot, appears to have been considered to be about 300 yards (Barbieri 2013: n.p.). This distance would give two adjoining works an overlapping field of fire for muskets (within their effective range of about 100 yards), meaning that the two redoubts could control the space in-between them.

the lake.” (quote Baldwin 1). This was an irregular redoubt, designed for seven cannons and became known as the ‘Jersey Battery’ after the regiment that was primarily responsible for its construction between August 8 and September 12, 1776⁷² (see Adams; Field; McIntosh; and Tuttle). On August 15, 1776, Baldwin “laid out & began 2 Redoubts on the North end of the old French Lines,” which he numbered redoubts Number 3 and 4 (quote Baldwin 1). On August 20, 1776, Baldwin noted in his journal, “Went with General Brickett to the Redoubts. Laid out “a ½ Circular” redoubt,” which he numbered Redoubt Number 2 (quote Baldwin 1). On August 24, 1776, Baldwin noted that he had, “Laid out a Redoubt on the North West side on the plain at the old French Lines” (quote Baldwin 1). As of the writing of this report, it is unclear which defensive work this is referring to.

Around this time, work on both the French Lines and the new redoubts apparently slowed somewhat due to difficult weather. On August 28, 1776, Gen. Horatio Gates wrote to Gen. George Washington,

“we are exerting our utmost Industry to Fortify this Post, a Plan of which is Inclosed [sic]. The Weather of Late has been so uncommonly Wet and Stormy for the Season, that we are much retarded in our Works. As the Enemy feel alike the Inclemency of the Season, I hope we shall be prepared for them when they come” (quote Gates 1; see also Appendix B: Trumbull 2).

Despite the difficulties, by about late October or early November the first round of work on the French Lines and the redoubts had probably been completed. In a letter to his wife, Betsey, dated October 26, 1776, Baldwin wrote, “we are expecting anytime to be attacked by our Enemies. We are now ready to have them come if they please” (quote Baldwin 2).

In the winter of 1776-1777, the attention of the American engineers at Ticonderoga was directed into building the ‘Boom’ and the ‘Great Bridge’ across the lake to Mount Independence. Baldwin noted on October 17, “begun to make a log across the Lake of Chain to prevent the Shipping coming past the Jersey [sic] Redoubt” (quote Baldwin 1; see also Backus). However, work on the French Lines was renewed early in 1777⁷³ and continued at least into late May (see Baldwin 1). In late February of 1777, British scouts reported that the Americans were installing an abattis “round part of their Lines” (quote Grant & Davie). On May 16th, 1777, James Wilkinson noted in a letter to Gen. Gates that, “one whole company of carpenters are constantly employed in forming a kind of friezed abbatis, on the exterior of the glacis of the French lines”⁷⁴(quote Wilkinson 1).

⁷² However, a traverse was added late in October (see Tuttle).

⁷³ In February of 1777, Gen. Philip Schuyler wrote to Gen. George Washington about various conjectural plans for the French Lines, “Mr. Pellesier [Christopher Pelissier] has certainly not taken much pains to inform himself of the Country as he supposes that the Ground in Front of the Intrenchments he proposes can be laid under Water—I am very confident that it cannot be done in any part there. My Intention was to fortify Mount Hope for the Reason he gives, and which I suggested to him—To draw a Line from that to the old French Lines, supported by a strong Redoubt between from the Foot of the Eminence on the right Flank of the old French Lines: to continue the Lines to the Lake by the nearest Way and to have this part of the Lines defended by a Ditch, which if twelve or fifteen Feet deep, I believe, may be kept full of Water out of the Lake—if the Enemy should attack any part of these Works and carry them a Retreat is secured by the Bridge between Mount Independence and Tyondaroga or by Battreas . . .” quote Schuyler). This vision, however, was never realized.

⁷⁴ Although no documentary evidence has been found so far, it appears that the Americans did not think the ditch in front of the parapet (described variously as 3 to 5 feet deep) was a significant obstacle, possibly because the depth

On March 21, 1777, British informant Samuel Adams reported that the Americans “have raised a Breastwork all round where the French had their Lines on the high ground and picketed the ditch⁷⁵ in about 8 feet depth—There are two pieces of cannon facing the South, and they have also, embrasures [sic] to put 7 guns in these breastworks . . . The rebels have a Battery of 4 pieces of Cannon at the Sandy Battery—there are three Batterys between that and the fort facing the River.” Around the same time, prisoner of war Ichabod Tupper told his captors that, “the French lines are Repaired with a new Breastwork and the ditch picketed—There is an Abbatis round part of these lines and some Cannon Mounted in them.” (quote Tupper). In April of 1777, British scout, Capt. Justus Sherwood, noted that the, “Old French Lines Newly Repaired, These lines are destitute of Cannon and are but indifferently picketed all round” (quote Sherwood). The recently built redoubts did not particularly impress the British either. Capt. Sherwood reported, “the five “Redoubts on the Lowlands by the Lake . . . are not fortified, nor is there any notice taken of them . . . these posts are but indifferently manned, and that with raw undisciplined Yankeys” (quote Sherwood).

On May 11, 1777, Baldwin ordered the last major change to the French Lines⁷⁶ with the creation of a large redoubt integrated into the main part of the French Line on top of the Heights of Carillon (see Baldwin 1 and Wilkinson) (Figure 22 and Figure 23). On May 16, 1777, James Wilkinson wrote,

“the works are precipitated on the plan laid down by Colonel Baldwin: the redoubt at those lines goes on fineley; it is formed by certain lines beginning at the east end of the curtain on which the three north embrasures [sic] are opened, and closing at the south sally-port” (quote Wilkinson).

In June of 1777 James MacIntosh, a local resident and British informant, summarized nearly all the changes made to the defensive works at the French Lines over the previous year, “A Redoubt of Seven Embrasures built where the French Sandy Battery was, close to the water Side and about a musquet [sic] Shot from the Old Fort; two other Redoubts between it and that Fort; the First has three Embrasuers [sic] and the other two, one face fronting the River and the other flanking the [sic] large Redoubt; that between the Seven Gun Redoubt and the nighest [sic] end of the French Lines there are two Redoubts fronting this way or northward, one mounting three Guns, the other two, each about Pistol Shot distant; at the Beginning of the French Lines there is a long Battery without Embrasuers [sic] for three Guns, behind which on a rising ground there is a half moon Battery for small Arms to fire over the last mentioned Battery; then on the French Lines

may have been hindered by the soil type. This may have led them to add more obstacles in this part of the Lines early in 1777. The ‘frieze abbatis,’ may or may not be associated with the “double trench” feature visible today

⁷⁵ Although not specifically described in any of the documents reviewed for this report, the term ‘picket’ in this context may be referring to ‘small pickets,’ which were stout sticks, 1-2 inches in diameter and from 2 to 3 ft long pointed at both ends, driven into the ground with one or two feet projecting and “placed at small distances from one another” that were often installed in the ‘ditch in front’ (Lendy 1857:67; Wheeler 1898:175-176).

⁷⁶ The square redoubts located behind the French Lines also date to about this time. According to Baldwin’s journal, on May 9, 1777: he “laid out & began a Redout between the french lines & ye old fort on high ground;” on May 28, 1777: he “began another redout on the high ground N.W. from the fort in ye rear of ye french lines;” and on May 29, 1777: he “Laid out a redout to ye Left between ye old fort & french Lines.”

one Gun on an Embrasuer [sic] that flanks the three Redoubts fronting the North. Still going along the lines, cross the opening for the main wagon Road, which is Shut up at pleasure with the Chevaux de Frise as do all the other Barriers; close to it (the Road) there is a Battery of three more Guns having Embrasuers [sic] for Nine pounders fronting still to the north" The Lines then turn and face the westward where there are three Embrasuers [sic] fronting my house, then the Lines turn toward the East, fronting Southward in which there is one Gun in Embrasuer [sic] to defend a Barriere [sic] thro [sic] which pass foot passengers, the line then turns to the Southward facing the westward no Guns, being intended to be defended by Small arms, at the south end of which there is a magazine capable of containing large Quantity of Powder dug in the Parrapet, the walls Stone, Roof Beams covered with Sodd [sic], and is a kind of Bomb Proof, at this Angle of the Lines the Ground breaks off to a Steep Rocky Cliff, at the Foot of which is the River that runs from the Sawmills and an abatis [sic] made on the Bank by cutting down a quantity of Small White Oaks" (quote McIntosh).

Image removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act

Figure 22. American Changes to the French Lines.



Figure 23. Detail of “*A View of Ticonderoga from the Middle of the Channel in Lake Champlain*” by James Hunter c. 1777 (British Library, Kings’ Topographical Collection, Shelfmark Maps K. Top121.107.a; Courtesy of the British Library).

Upon their approach toward Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence early in July of 1777, one English observer noted,

“the enemy appeared to be posted as follows: A brigade occupied the old French lines upon the height northward of the fort of Ticonderoga. These lines were in good repair, and had several intrenchments behind them, chiefly calculated to guard the northwest flank, and they were further sustained by a block-house. To the left of these works, about a mile, the enemy had saw-mills and a post sustained by a block-house, and another block-house, and a hospital at the entrance of Lake George. Upon the right of the French lines, and between them and the old fort there were two new block-houses, and a considerable battery close to the water-edge” (quote Anonymous 28).

However, the French Lines were not to be tested in battle again as the Americans opted to withdraw from both Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence in the face of a well positioned and superior British force on the night of July 6, 1777. A letter published in the *New-York Gazette* summarized the American position,

“our force consisted of about 4000 men, including the corps of artillery and artificers, who were not armed; a considerable part of which were militia; we could not bring above 3000 fit for duty . . . Their strength being so very superior to ours, obliged us to tamely sit still, and see them erect batteries all around us, without hazarding a sally; two batteries were erected in front of our lines, on higher ground than ours, within half a

mile; on our left, they had taken post on a very high hill overlooking all our works; our right would have been commanded by their shipping and the batteries they had erected on the other side of the lake, that our lines at Ticonderoga would have been of no service" (Almon 1778:360-361).

Map Discussion

The work undertaken by the Americans from 1776 to 1777 transformed the mixed log and earth defensive line built by the French into a full set of formal earthworks. The new works were rebuilt with a fascine interior revetment, with a deepened, widened, and (possibly), picketed ditch in front, with several rehabilitated and some new gun emplacements, a second ditch in front along most of the western face of the main part of the line on the Heights of Carillion (possibly for a ‘frazied abattis’), possibly with areas palisade-type defenses on the left, and fronted by an abattis. The Americans also transformed the old line on the lower flat plain to a series of mutually supporting redoubts.

A series of maps clearly illustrate the changes made to the French Lines between 1776 and 1777. First, there is Col. John Trumbull’s map entitled, “*Ticonderoga & its Dependencies August 1776*” (see Appendix B: Trumbull 1) in the Library of Congress’ Geography and Map Division Collection. This map appears to date to the early part of August 1776. It shows the French Lines on the plateau as “repaired” and shows the part of the French Line across the low ground ending at the battery on the lake shore labeled “to be repaired.” This map also has an area behind the French Lines on the lower flat labeled as “intended redoubt.” Similarly, the map included in *General Persisor Frazer: A Memoir* also depicts the “French Lines in Summer of 1776” and still shows the section of the French Lines on the lower flat plain with the older version of the battery at the edge of the lake (see Appendix B: Anonymous 8). Another map from this time is the untitled map made by Jonathan Potts (see Appendix B: Potts), which is now in the collections of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum (MS 2098). This is a sketch map that was most likely made after the redoubts were built, but before the Pennsylvania brigade left. This map is important because it shows the line of ‘pickets’ along the front of the main works.

Col. John Trumbull’s second map of the area, made later in August of 1776, entitled, [“*Original Water-Color Plan Made by Colonel John Trumbull in Fort Ticonderoga August 1776, by order of General Washington*”] is in the collections of the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Yale University (see Appendix B: Trumbull 2). This map includes the then new American redoubts on the low flat plain (labeled south to north as the ‘Redoubt Next French Lines,’ the ‘Semicircular Redoubt,’ and ‘Jersey Redoubt.’ It also shows the French Lines on the Heights as an earthen parapet with a single ditch in front and adds what may be a palisade-type defensive obstacle extending off the left side of the line.⁷⁷ This map also shows the extent and arrangement of the Pennsylvania brigade’s encampment behind the French Lines.

⁷⁷ Although not described directly in the archival records uncovered so far, it is possible that the additional defensive feature added to the left of the front edge of the lines may have involved a palisade, or similar structure. Palisades were “stakes made of strong split wood, about nine feet long, six or seven inches square, three feet in the ground, in rows about 1.5 or 3 inches asunder, placed in the covert way, at three feet from and parallel to the parapet or side of the glacis, to secure it from surprise . . . they are usually fixed perpendicularly, though some make an angle inclining

A map of Fort Ticonderoga made by an unknown cartographer that was included in the *Letters from Joseph Carleton and Thomas Hutchins 1779-88* (Ms. in the Records Relating to Military Affairs, Papers of the Continental Congress Compiled 1774-1789; National Archives M247), probably dates to after October of 1776 (after the Jersey, Semi-Circular and Redoubt Next French Lines were built), but before May of 1777 (when the redoubt integrated in to the main part of the Old French Lines on the crown of the Heights of Carillon was built) (see Appendix B: Carleton-Hutchins). The interesting points of this map are the inclusion of a possible work located north of the old French Lines, but south of the Redoubt Next French Lines and another possible work located about 1,000 feet in front of the French Lines to the west northwest. No supporting archival evidence for either of these possible works have been found as of the writing of this report.⁷⁸ This map also depicts two independent three-sided works located behind (eastwardly of) the French Lines and facing towards Fort Ticonderoga. These features are not on Trumbull's watercolor map of August 1776, but had been integrated into the main defensive line by 1777. The map entitled, "*Map of Ticonderoga, Mount Independence et cet. from St. Clair's Court Martial*" from the collections of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum was produced after July 1777 (see Appendix B: Anonymous 10). This map is useful as it shows the three-sided works located eastwardly of the French Lines as connected to the main line, and includes the large redoubt built into the lines on the Heights of Carillon as well as the nearby square redoubts, and identifies them all as American constructions.

However, the full extent of the American effort on the French Lines is best shown in Lt. Charles Wintersmith's (Carl Gottfried Julius Winterschmidt) "*Plan of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, including Mount Hope, and shewing the rebel works & batteries, as they were when His Majesty's troops took possession of them on 6th July 1777, expressing also the encampment of the British on the 5th instant, with the extensive communication which was made in one day for the transport of the heavy artillery from the 3 Miles Point to the proposed batteries, including likewise Sugar Hill, where a battery of 4 12 pounders would have been ready to open on the 6th at noon*" now in the collections of the John Carter Brown Library in Providence, Rhode Island, Fort Ticonderoga, and the University of Vermont in Burlington, Vermont (see Appendix B: Wintersmith). This exhaustive map is the most accurate map showing the American works.⁷⁹ This map shows details of the works down to the locations of embrasures, the traverses, and magazines within the redoubts. Some of these features are hard to see in the field today. This map also shows the double trench system on the western face of the French Lines on the elevated plateau along with the possible stockade or palisade feature extending off the lines to the south.

towards the ground next the enemy" (James 1802:np). palisades stout palings 7 ft above 3 ft below ground with cross tie (riband to top rail) spaced with gaps (O'Brien 1875:87).

⁷⁸ However, the one at the bottom of the hill makes military sense as it would be able to cover the space from the base of the hill and the "Redoubt Next French Lines." It is possible that these features may have been only planned or they could have existed as simple log structures.

⁷⁹ Charles Wintersmith also produced a map entitled, "*Plan of Part of Lake Champlain from Crown Point to Tienderoga*" c. 1777 which now is part of the Germin Map collection at the William L. Clements Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. This map can be viewed on-line at [William L. Clements Library Image Bank: Plan of part of Lake Champlain from Crown Point to Tienderoga. \(umich.edu\)](http://www.lib.umich.edu/collections/germin-maps/plan-of-part-lake-champlain-crown-point-tienderoga).

Finally, there are two other well-made detailed period maps, though not as accurate as the Wintersmith map (especially in the angles and distances along the main French Line), that are apparently related. This includes the unattributed, undated map entitled, “*Plan of Carillon ou Ticonderoga which was quitted by the Americans in the night from the 5th to the 6th of July 1777*” in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (see Appendix B: Anonymous 11) and a map made by Michel Capitaine du Chesnoy also entitled “*Plan of Carillon ou Ticonderoga which was quitted by the Americans in the night from the 5th to the 6th of July 1777*” now at the Library of Congress (see Appendix B: Chesnoy). According to historians Brown and Cohen, “Capitaine usually drew battlefield maps after he had made a firsthand reconnaissance. However, in October 1777 he was still recuperating in North Carolina from an illness contacted on his voyage from France” (Brown and Cohen 2015:95). The interesting point to these maps is the inclusion of a distinct drainage feature east of the Jersey Battery, which is also seen on the Brehm-Brasier map and on the Carleton-Hutchins map.

After the Wars

After the British reclaimed Ticonderoga on July 6, 1777, the general orders were given to preserve the defensive works and its related features. For example, on July 17, 1777, it was ordered that “the Abbatis round the different works at Mt. Independence and Ticonderoga, are by no means to be destroyed or made use of for fire wood” (Wallace 1951:306) and on August 5, 1777, the orders read, “None of the huts between the old fort of Ticonderoga and the French lines on any account to be pulled down, as they are intended for use” (Wallace 1951:319). As the British main army moved south to the battles of Hubbardton, Bennington, and Saratoga, a small force consisting of the Infantry Regiment Prinz Friedrich (German) and the 62nd Regiment of Foot occupied Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. The 53rd Regiment of Foot replaced the 62nd Regiment of Foot in August and stayed on post until after Burgoyne’s surrender. Among the last units leaving Ticonderoga was the Regiment Prinz Friedrich, which left in early November of 1777 (Watt: 2002:309).

After the end of the American Revolution, the property reverted to state ownership (Bellico 2010:263). In 1804, the “Garrison Grounds” were granted by the legislature to Columbia and Union Colleges so they could either rent, lease, or sell the property to raise funds (Bellico 2010:263, 265). William Ferris Pell (1779-1840) leased the property beginning c. 1816, and eventually bought the 546-acre property from the colleges in 1820 (Bellico 2010:265).

Beginning at an early date, the site became a magnet for curious visitors. Many visitors have described the old defensive works. Among the more detailed visitor accounts are those of Capt. Alden Partridge of Norwich University who visited in 1820; the early travel writer, Theodore Dwight Jr., who visited c. 1831; and the 1901 magazine article by George Perry (see Dwight; A. Partridge, and G. Perry).

In the post-war years, the property was actively farmed and the area of the French Lines on the elevated plateau, including the area around the fort, was generally used as pasture and the lower flat was used for cultivated crops, though the American redoubts there were not disturbed (Figure 24 and Figure 25) (see Anonymous 30, 32, 36, 37 and Pell 1 & 2). Eventually, however, most of the old Carillon Battlefield returned to forest. In 1875 a visitor noted that the battlefield area had



Figure 24. Detail of a stereoview of the Ticonderoga the farm buildings, by Seneca R. Stoddard c. 1870-1875, looking west from the fort (Fort Ticonderoga Museum, 1999.0009).



Figure 25. Detail of a stereoview entitled "Battlefield at Ticonderoga," showing a portion of the Carillon Battlefield, by E. & H. T. Anthony, photographers c. 1860s-1880s (Fort Ticonderoga Museum, 2000.0060). The sign reads, "Abercrombie's Defeat / July 8, 1758, Loss 2000."

a “new growth of timber” (quote Anonymous 34). In 1901, a magazine contributor, George Perry wrote, “the battleground is now completely covered with a growth of trees, mostly oak, while upon the breastworks themselves stand some gigantic pines” (Figure 26) (quote G. Perry).

The most significant 19th century changes to the property included the construction of two different railroad lines across the property. In 1871, the Addison Railroad built a line across the lake from Larrabees Point to the northern edge of the Ticonderoga Peninsula on a causeway having a 300 feet pontoon section (Walker 1960:50-51). This line passed through the area near where the Jersey Battery may have been. Shortly afterwards, in c. 1873-1874, the Delaware and Hudson Railroad built a line north-south through the Ticonderoga Peninsula. This was accomplished by building both an 800-foot cut through the old ravine behind the French Lines, and by carving out an 18-foot-high, 14-foot-wide, and 300-foot-long tunnel through the bedrock (*Rutland Daily Globe* August 18, 1873).⁸⁰ In 1908, Sarah and Stephen Pell bought out the other heirs to the property and began to reconstruct the fortress, beginning a new chapter of history for the property.



Figure 26. View of Abercrombie's battlefield from “Ticonderoga” by Geo. W. Perry in The New England Magazine April 1901 (New Series 24(2):119-127; image on p. 123).

⁸⁰ For a detailed description of the tunnel construction see Anonymous 33.

Post-War Map Discussion

Some of the earliest post-war maps of the site were produced by the United States Engineer Department, Topo Bureau and are now included in the collections of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum (see Appendix B: U.S. Engineer Department 1 and 2). As noted previously, these maps are compelling, because they have earthworks indicated that are not on the historic maps. These works may represent fragments of earlier sections of the French Lines, uncompleted works and/or unrecorded works or they could be altogether different features interpreted as defensive works by the cartographers. Another early post-war map that depicts the French Lines, is a sketch map made by Jared Sparks in c. 1830 (see Appendix B: Sparks). The original of this map belongs to the Houghton Library, Harvard University and was reprinted in Bellico 2010:272. This is an illustration of the earthworks as they were left behind by the Americans. According to historian, Russell Bellico, Sparks was “a prolific writer and editor of documents pertaining to American history” and was later a professor of history and then president of Harvard (Bellico 2010:268). Bellico reports that Sparks found the French Lines “yet in a good state of preservation, and perfectly distinct in every part” and it was “about 900 yards” in length and with some areas having a “double trench” (Bellico 2010:271). The early 20th c. property surveys commissioned by the Pell family are also interesting (see Appendix B: Anonymous 12). These maps not only show the French Lines by actual survey, but they also include other possible entrenchment features (including some located closer to the fort) and may give a relatively accurate representation of the coastline near the site of the Sandy/Jersey Battery. This might be able to help determine how much of that area has been lost to erosion.

POTENTIAL ARCHEOLOGICAL FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE FRENCH LINES

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Figure 27. Ground-truthing digital data. View of the front (western side) of the American “Semi-Circular Redoubt” (looking southwards 2020).

KOCOA Military Terrain Analysis

Introduction

The KOCOA military terrain analysis, as applied by the ABPP program, is used to methodically break down extensive and diverse battlefield landscapes to identify the natural features (topography, hydrology) and the cultural features (created by people, including military engineering features built by the opposing forces) that influenced the tactics used in and impacted the outcome of historic battles (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). The key landscape features are categorized according to acronym ‘KOCOA,’: Key Terrain, Observation, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach and Withdrawal. Some features may have more than one reason for significance.

- *Key Terrain* is any area or feature that affords a marked advantage to whichever combatant seizes or controls it. Key terrain often “dominates the immediate surroundings by relief”⁸¹ (e.g., high ground with good observation and clear fields of fire) or has “some other quality that enhances attack or defense” (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). For example, key terrain could be a road junction, a bridge/ford, a mountain pass & etc. Certain key terrain features were of paramount importance; these may be considered ‘decisive’ or ‘critical’ terrain. Although not always present, decisive terrain includes those portions of the battlefield that must be held by the defense or taken by the attackers to achieve victory or accomplish the mission (Fonzo 2008:1; McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.).
- *Obstacles* are natural or cultural features that block, delays, diverts, turns, channels or disorganizes the movement of an attacking military force (Fonzo 2008:1; McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). Such features assist defenders, both physically and psychologically, and impede attackers. Examples include natural features such as unfordable watercourses, very steep slopes or cliffs, swamps, dense vegetation, rough ground, and man-made features such as fences, buildings, ditches, field fortifications, or even plowed fields (Fonzo 2008:1; McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). Often commanders sought to anchor one or both flanks of a military formation on a significant natural obstacle (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). There are two basic kinds of obstacle: an “existing obstacle,” one on the landscape prior to the battle, and a “reinforcing obstacle” those “placed on the battlefield through military effort and are designed to strengthen the terrain” (e.g., earthworks or abatis) (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). “The presence and difficulty of obstacles determine whether terrain is unrestricted, restricted or severely restricted” (Catts, Selig, and Bradley 2017:35).
- *Cover and Concealment* the term ‘cover’ applies to any feature that affords significant protection from direct and/or indirect enemy fire, while ‘concealment’ applies to any feature that affords protection from enemy observation (Fonzo 2008:1; McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). Cover may be provided by relatively small-scale features such as low walls (under 4 feet), buildings, or sunken roads, swales, rocks, and trees & etc. Concealment features are usually larger-scale and not only provide protection from fire but can also screen troop positions or

⁸¹ In the 18th and 19th c. this concept when applied to elevated terrain was often known as ‘command’ (e.g., “when a hill or rising ground overlooks any of the works of a fortification and is within reach of cannon shot” (James 1802: np).

movements from being seen (e.g., walls over 4 ft, structures, forests, ravines, riverbanks, entrenchments, ditches, ridges, and intervening hills) (Fonzo 2008:1; McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.).

- *Observation and Fields of Fire* includes any area or point that provides the opportunity to see deployed forces, both friendly and enemy, in terms of their location, concentrations, and movements and/or to gain information about the surrounding terrain that could influence the strategy and/or tactics of either side (e.g., obstacles present, approaches, fields of fire, dead spaces & etc.) (Fonzo 2008:1; McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). Related concepts include line of sight, fields of fire, and dead space or ground. ‘Line of Sight’ is an unobstructed view from point A to point B. Places with good lines of sight make good points of observation. ‘Fields of Fire’ refers to the area that a weapon or group of weapons may effectively cover from a given position. This is a combination of the effective range of the weapons employed and a given position’s line of sight. ‘Dead Space’ or ‘Dead Ground’ is the area that cannot be seen or fired upon from a particular position within the maximum range of the weapon at that location (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). In selecting Fields of Fire, an attempt was made to avoid Dead Ground.
- *Avenues of Approach and Withdrawal* are corridors or zones that allow for the rapid/free movement of forces to or away from an objective or the enemy. While these avenues are “primarily defined by the transportation network” existing at the time of the battle (e.g., roads, trails, farm lanes, railroad cuts, rivers/waterbodies), they can also include other relatively “unobstructed ground routes” (e.g., open fields, passable woods, creek beds, and draws) (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). The best avenues of approach and withdrawal also provide effective concealment to screen movement (Fonzo 2008:1). An associated concept is that of a ‘Mobility Corridor,’ which is an area where movement of a force is channeled due to terrain constrictions.

Native American Considerations

As Sivilich (2019) points out, Native Americans often had “radically different perspectives” on the military use of the landscape (Sivilich 2019:102-103). In response to European colonial pressure and technologies, Native American developed and refined tactics which placed a much higher tactical emphasis on concealment, stealth, surprise, speed, and mobility (Malone 2000; Sivilich 2019). European tactics were often incapable of responding to these tactics effectively.

One British observer wrote following the British disaster at Fort Carillon, “the Indians we had with us who viewed the affair at a distance, allowed us much more bravery than the French, but say we are not half so cunning” (Anonymous 10). Similarly, in mid-September 1758, Capt. Charles Lee of the 44th Regiment of Foot wrote of the possibility of going back to “make another attempt on Ticonderoga,” but noted, “the Indians will not go with us. They told the General that the English Army had very fine limbs but no head.”

Military operations in the early part of the French and Indian War, from the beginning of the conflict in 1755 up to about 1758, relied heavily on Native Allies, particularly the French. Additionally, both French and British forces employed Euro-American irregulars (i.e. Canadian

militia and British rangers) who operated in similar fashions to Native forces. However, as French officer, Col. Louis Antoine de Bougainville noted around 1758, the course of the conflict changed. He wrote, “now war is established here on the European basis. Projects for the campaign, for armies, for artillery, for sieges, for battles. It no longer is a matter of making a raid, but of conquering or being conquered” (Hamilton 1964:252). Nevertheless, the Native Allies of both sides continued to hold a key role in the conflict, especially as scouts, in pursuit of disorganized forces, and as an effective aspect of psychological warfare.⁸²

Defining Features & KOCOA Maps

The landscape features identified through the archival sources which may be located on the ground, either as an above ground feature or as an archeological feature, that fall into one or more KOCOA categories, are considered “Defining Features” (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). The Defining Features of the Carillon Battlefield are presented below in Table 3. Once a battlefield’s defining features have been identified, the Battlefield Boundary and the Core Areas can be delineated. The Battlefield Boundary is a single contiguous, “historically defensible” (e.g., supported by historical source materials and/or archeological evidence) boundary following the natural contours around the battlefield that includes all of the defining features beginning from the moment “one side or the other has moved to initiate combat” to the point when the adversarial forces broke contact and, therefore, should “accurately reflect the extent of the battle” (see Figure 3) (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). The battlefield boundary includes the core area of combat, locations of significant preliminary or post-battle skirmishing, the approach and withdrawal routes, the location of any deployed units, encampments (only if they are the initial position of any attacking or defending force), and key logistical areas (e.g., a cannon park, a headquarters site, supply dumps, and hospitals) (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). It also “includes ground over which units maneuvered in preparation for combat” (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). The Core Area includes the area where “the most significant combat occurred,” and where “casualties were incurred” (see Figure 3 and Figure 28) (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). “The position of any unit that fired weapons or that came under fire should be included” within this boundary (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.). At this time, there is a need for further research before the Potential National Register Boundary Map can be made for this battlefield. However, such a map would highlight those areas within the Battlefield Boundary that retain a reasonable degree of integrity, architectural and/or archeological, meaning those portions of the historic battlefield that “still convey a sense of the historic scene” and can be preserved (McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.).

⁸² After the Battle of Carillon, Gen. Montcalm wrote, “what a day for France, if I had only two hundred Indians to let loose at the close of the action, and to serve as guides to a strong detachment” see “Copy of the Letter written by M. de Montcalm to the Marquis de Vaudreuil July 9, 1758.” In *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Volume X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp. 748-750; on p. 49.

Battle of Carillon: Defining Features

Table 3. Defining Features of the Carillon Battlefield.

Defining Feature	KOCOA Analysis	Integrity	Location & Significance
English Camps*	Avenue of Approach and Withdrawal	n.a.	Cultural Features. Camps from which the British and Provincial forces left the morning of the battle to attack the French Lines. The exact locations of these sites remain to be determined. (See main text as well as the Rivez and Arnot maps for general locational information on these features).
The Road “up from the saw-mill”*	Avenue of Approach and Withdrawal	n.a.	Cultural Feature. Original path not yet identified. This road served as the British army’s Avenue of Approach and Withdrawal on July 8, 1758.
Mount Defiance	Observation Field of Fire (minor)	High	Topographical Feature. This is a prominent hill located south of and overlooking the Ticonderoga Peninsula. This landform was used by British engineers on the 7 th and 8 th of July 1758, to view the French defensive works and to gather information used to direct offensive operations. It was also used by Sir William Johnson and the English Native Allies to take some extreme-range shots at the French in the immediate lead up to the main battle.
La Chute River	Avenue of Approach and Withdrawal, Field of Fire	Good; Subject to Natural Changes	Natural Feature. Avenue of Approach and Withdrawal located south of the Ticonderoga Peninsula and north of Mount Defiance. This watercourse was used by the British forces to float cannon down from the area below the sawmill to a position on the lower part of Mount Defiance from which they could enfilade the French defensive works. The attempt was turned back by some small arms fire from the French near the shore of the Ticonderoga Peninsula and by cannon fire from Fort Ticonderoga. The British were also discouraged in this mission by unclear directions. The hydrology and sedimentation in this area appears to have changed somewhat since the construction of a railroad causeway.
The Heights of Carillon	Key Terrain / Decisive Terrain Avenue of Approach and Withdrawal, Field of Fire	High	Topographical Feature. A distinct elevated area on the Ticonderoga Peninsula, defined by steep slopes to the north and south, a ravine between it and Fort Ticonderoga to the east, and long gentle slope to the west. This ground was both an initial skirmish area and the primary battle site. This ground commands Fort Ticonderoga. If the British took the Heights, then holding the

			fort would have been untenable for the French.
Woods West of the French Lines	Cover & Concealment Field of Fire	High	Natural Feature. A forest of white oak and white pine beginning about 250-360 ft from the log and earth breastwork of the French Lines. This area is the site of the initial skirmishing immediately preceding the battle. These woods also provided some concealment for the deployment of the attacking British force and cover for the first line of Provincials throughout much of the battle.
French Forward Works	Cover & Concealment	Ephemeral Feature, but location is protected	Cultural Feature. A loose barrier/fence of logs located on the gentle western slope of the Heights of Carillon, all or partially in the woods. This was the French first defensive combat position used by their out parties to skirmish with the head of the British army. Portions of this work may have been used by British forces as cover.
“French Lines” (Breastworks)	Cover & Concealment Obstacle	Mostly replaced by later constructions, but can be appreciated	Cultural Feature. Reinforcing Obstacle / Military Engineering Feature. This was the main French defensive combat position. It was a log and earth breastwork about 8 feet high and 6 feet thick with loop holes for firing that was built on highest ground across the elevated portion of the Heights of Carillon. This area was the focal point of the combat.
Slashing & Abattis	Obstacle Cover & Concealment	Ephemeral Feature, but location is protected	Cultural Feature. Reinforcing Obstacle / Military Engineering Feature. Extensive area of randomly felled trees, possibly with sharpened branch stubs, in a space extending about 250-360 feet in front of the French log and earth breastwork. Closer to the breastwork it transitioned to area of densely packed anchored sharpened trees and/or large branches immediately in front of the works. These features were a key to preventing the British force’s ability to close with the breastwork. However, to some extent these features also provided cover for English & Provincial troops during the battle.
The Low Plain	Avenue of Approach and Withdrawal, Key Terrain Field of Fire	High	Topographical Feature. This is the approximately 2,000-2,200 feet of ground lying between the toe of northern slope of the elevated plateau of the Ticonderoga Peninsula and Lake Champlain. A part of this ground was occupied by the Canadian militia and Troupes de La Marine behind an abattis during the battle. The French command felt this area was vulnerable. If this area was lost, the British forces may have been able to take the French works on the plateau from the rear. This area was the scene of some exchange of

			fire between the opposing forces. This is a known burial area.
Drainage / Wetland on the Low Flat	Obstacle	High	Topographical Feature. This is a distinct drainage ravine / wetland about 1,600 feet long, up to 7 feet deep and up to 60-70 feet across that anchored the right flank of the Canadian and La Marine position on the low flat.
Hill Slope South	Obstacle	High	Topographical Feature. Hill slope about 140-150 feet high that defines the southern edge of the elevated portion of the Ticonderoga Peninsula. The slopes in this area range from about 18% on the lower part and from 30 to 60% on the upper part.
Hill Slope North	Obstacle Field of Fire	High	Topographic Feature. Hill slope about 80-90 feet high with a roughly 26% slope that defines the northern edge of the elevated portion of the Ticonderoga Peninsula. This feature limited the area of maneuver for the attacking British forces and helped to funnel the far left of the British line towards the Heights of Carillon.
The “little bank”	Cover & Concealment Field of Fire	High	Topographical Feature. A small, localized natural swale & berm feature located off the southwestern corner of the French Lines on the Heights of Carillon. This feature reportedly protected English soldiers who were enfilading the French Lines with small arms fire. The exact location of this feature is yet to be identified in the field.
Fort Carillon Fort Ticonderoga	Field of Fire	Good (Reconstruction, but effectively conveys the conditions at the time of the battle)	Cultural Feature. Military Engineering Feature. Log, masonry, and earthen fort located about 3,000 feet east of the French Lines on the eastern point of the elevated portion of the Ticonderoga Peninsula. During the battle, the cannon of the fort turned back the British attempt to land field pieces on the lower skirt of Mount Defiance that would have been able to enfilade the French Lines.
English Hospital Site*	Avenue of Approach and Withdrawal	n.a.	Cultural Feature. The temporary hospital area was used for only a few hours but had a breastwork enclosure. The precise location of this site has not yet been determined.

*More research is needed to identify the exact locations of these Defining Features before their integrity can be properly accessed. All of these features are currently on private property and may only exist archeologically.




Figure 28. Detail map of the Core Area of the Carillon Battlefield (see Figure 3 for a broader view of this area as well as the potential Battlefield Boundary area).

Battle of Carillon: Defining Features Additional Information

Mount Defiance

(Observation, Field of Fire)

Mount Defiance is located south of the La Chute River between Lake George and Lake Champlain. This landform reaches a maximum elevation of about 854 feet above mean sea level and its summit is about 585 feet above the top of the Heights of Carillon. This feature played a few different roles in the battle. This landform was used by a few different English engineers, including Lt. Mathew Clerk and Lt. Charles Rivez, and other British officers on the 7th and the 8th of July, to view the French positions on the Ticonderoga Peninsula and gather information that was used to direct the offensive operations. Gen. Abercromby noted that, “before I undertook the Attack, we had the Reports & Opinions of two very expert Engineers, who had been on that Ground at different Times before and had seen the Ground & Works the preceding Night and that Morning” (quote Gen. Abercromby 2). More specifically, late on the 7th Lt. Clerk, James Abercromby, John Stark, and 400 rangers went to Mount Defiance to reconnoiter the enemy position (Bellico 2010:153). Early the next day, Lt. Charles Rivez also went to the hill to observe the situation (Bellico 2010:155). Abel Spicer of Nathan Whiting’s Connecticut regiment related that on the day of the battle (the 8th) that, “Captain John Stanton with about half of his men and as many more from other companies that was a mind for to go with him went with the engineer to the top of a mountain against the fort for to view it and for to see if he could find any place for to plant their artillery to advantage” (quote Spicer; see also Smith). Gen. Abercromby later wrote that,

“early in the morning of the 8th, I sent Mr. Clerk, the engineer, across the river on the opposite side of the fort, in order to reconnoiter the enemy’s intrenchments. Upon his return, and favorable report of the practicability of carrying those works, if attacked before they were finished, it was agreed to storm them that very day” (quote Gen. Abercromby 1).

Mount Defiance was also used by Sir William Johnson and the English Native Allies associated with him as a position from which to take some extreme long-range shots at the French defenders while they were still preparing their defenses on the morning of July 8. (see Gen. Abercromby 2; Anonymous 4, 8; W. Grant; Hervey; Lee; Loring; and Spicer). These random shots were probably taken at some 650 to 700 yards and were ineffective except, perhaps, to show the presence of the English Native Allies (see Arnot 2).

English engineer officer Lt. Mathew Clerk had devised a plan to transport a few field pieces on boats down the La Chute River to the base of Mount Defiance to enfilade the French position. Although this was attempted, it was not successful as the boats were turned back before they could find their intended landing place (see Anonymous 5, 6; Glasier; Bougainville; Levis; Putnam; Maurès Malartic 2; Montcalm 3; Searing; and Spicer). If this action had been successful, the outcome of the battle could have been different. Mount Defiance is probably the feature referred to by Capt. Charles Lee of the 44th Regiment of Foot who later wrote, “there was one hill in particular which seem’d to offer itself as an ally to us, it immediately commanded the lines from hence two small pieces of cannon well planted must have drove the French in a very short time from their breast work” (quote Lee).

The Road “up from the saw-mill”

(*Avenue of Approach and Withdrawal*)

The period accounts indicate that on the morning of July 8, 1758, Abercromby’s army marched from their camps near the sawmill on the La Chute River and from their advanced camps in one long column to the Heights of Carillon along the road “up from the saw-mill.” This was a pre-existing road. It was probably opened c. 1756 by Michel de Chartier de Lotbinière, who had the first sawmill built on the La Chute River to support the construction of Fort Carillon. As of the writing of this report, it appears that, for the most part, the old road is not part of the present road network. The information provided by Pierre Pouchot, a French officer, and Charles Rivez, an English engineer and map maker, appear to suggest that the road from the sawmill at the time of the battle ran more along the higher part of the Ticonderoga Peninsula passing over slight rises as well as crossing through the upper portions of a few reentrants (draws) along the way. Specifically, Pouchot wrote,

“the land which stretches from the Falls to Carillon, formed an elevated peninsula, the summit of which was rounded, and sinuous, with ridges and elevations at intervals.

The road from Carillon to the Falls, is along this summit. There were three or four hills, which run from this summit to the river at the falls, and there the road passes between these hills which rendered it susceptible of defence [sic] for the distance of the eighth of a league” (quote Pouchot).

However, by rough estimation, a small section of the road may be within the current right-of-way of Rogers Street at the eastern foot of Mount Hope in the Village of Ticonderoga. Since, the exact route of the road is not presently known, it is shown as a broad corridor on the KOCOA map. Within the Ticonderoga property, a trace of an old road, which has been previously identified and described as a “long narrow depression running east west,” may or may not be the road ‘up from the saw-mill.’

Heights of Carillon

(*Key/Critical Terrain; Avenue of Approach and Withdrawal; Field of Fire*)

The ‘Heights of Carillon’ refers to the highest part of the Ticonderoga Peninsula. This is a distinct rise located about 3,000 feet west of and about 78 feet above Fort Ticonderoga. Taking the Heights would give an attacker commanding ground over the fort, most likely ensuring its capitulation provided the attackers had enough artillery. Therefore, the Heights of Carillon can be considered decisive or critical terrain within the KOCOA analysis for the Battle of Carillon. The Heights of Carillon was selected by Gen. Montcalm, in consultation with his engineers and other officers, on July 1, 1758, as the place where the French army would make their stand.

The importance of this ground was well appreciated at the time. For example, French engineer, Capt. d’Hugues observed,

“the enemy inclined to besiege Carillon must necessarily render himself master of that eminence in order to cover the landing of his artillery in a cove at its foot, being unable to have it brought by land or by another side of the river, as this is the only place along the shore not exposed to the fort. It is this eminence which ‘tis essential to secure, and a General desirous of preventing the siege, must have a good intrenchement [sic] erected on it” (quote d’Hugues).

Another observer wrote,

“the plan of the intrenchment on the right was determined, and the principal points of the abati on the hill fixed. M. de Bourlamaque, who had been to reconnoitre

the ground between the Falls and the hill, had proposed one somewhat farther into the wood, the left of which rested on the River of the Falls, and the right on a small marsh which discharges into the River St. Frederic; but after having examined the whole, that of the hill was preferred to it for the solider" (quote Anonymous 12).

Similarly, Caleb Rea of Jonathan Bagley's Massachusetts regiment noted:

"but it seems it was absolutely necessary to Reduce this before we cou'd [sic] attack y^e Fort, as it lay before it reached fro' Lake to Lake, half a mile or more in Length, y^e Fort placed on the Point or Neck of Land between y^e Lakes and no coming at but over this Intrenchment" (quote Rea).

The French Lines (Breastwork)

(Cover and Concealment, Obstacle)

This was a log and earth structure about 6 feet thick and 8 feet high that cut across the neck of the elevated portion of the Ticonderoga Peninsula covering a front about 480 yards (as measured in a straight line), but built in an irregular line following the highest ground available along its general route and having a few salient features.⁸³ Although the breastwork allowed for some enfilade fire to reach the defenders (see Bougainville; Maurès Malartic 2; Montcalm 1 & 2; and Pouchot), it was effective as a barrier to the forward movement of the British and shielded the French defenders from much of the direct fire aimed at it. For example, Capt. Salah Barnard of Col. Williams' Massachusetts regiment watched as,

"a part of the Hilanders forc^d themselves within the first lines of y^e Enemy^s Breast work, But were soon oblig^d to quit the same & Retreat a few yards Back where they stood fast & Fought Like Brave Soldiers, with as much Likelihood of doing Service as if they had dischar^d so many Rounds into the Lake" (quote Barnard 1).

Similarly, Col. Woolsey, wrote that the English Regulars,

"were set as targets to be fired at by the enemy, without being allowed to return the fire; and had they returned it, would have been to but little purpose, as the enemy had a breastwork of wood and earth which quite covered them" (quote Woolsey).

Slashing and Abattis

(Obstacle, Cover and Concealment)

From July 6th to the morning of the 8th, the French improved their position on the Heights of Carillon by the construction of a series of obstacles. The combination of the slashing and abattis in front of the log and earth breastwork may have been the key to the French victory. The areas occupied by these obstacles reportedly extended up to about 300 to 360 feet in front of the breastwork. According to English officer, William Grant, it was "the difficult access to their lines was what gave them a fatal advantage over us" (quote W. Grant). The slashing, composed of many trees felled across each other, broke up the lines of the English assault columns. While the densely packed sharpened branches of the abattis halted the British forces' forward progress. Not only were the slashing and abattis physical barriers that blocked the English from getting from their stepping off points to the French breastwork, but more importantly, they were features that slowed the movement of the British significantly. This prolonged their time in the French breastwork's Field of Fire. An English observer noted,

⁸³ For period descriptions of the French Lines see Appendix A: Gen. Abercromby 1; Capt. Abercrombie; Anonymous 3, 5, 13, 14; Arnot 1; Brehm; Bougainville; Lee; Montcalm 1; Nichols; Searing; Spicer; and Tinkham.

“never was there in the World such a piece of ground to fight on. It was so very bad that after we were within gun shot the enemy might easily fire 10 Rounds before we got up the length of their Intrenchments and that in the face of such a fire of small arms, Wall pieces, and musquets as I never saw before . . . but alas after we came to the trenches we found them above 6 ft. high without a posy of getting in, and so had the same fire to stand in coming back” (quote Anonymous 10).

The slashing offered a better area of observation and field of fire for the defenders than a standing forest and created a significant obstacle to the movement of the attackers. The disorganizing effect of the slashing and the abattis on the movement of the attacking troops is one of the most common things mentioned in the British and Provincial accounts of the battle (e.g., see Anonymous 1, 7; Rogers 1; W. Williams). However, both the slashing and abattis were also used by the attacking British and Provincials as cover and probably prolonged the battle.

Text removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act

Image removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act

Figure 29. Screenshot of ArcGIS Dashboard Data Manager with the Lotbinière map overlaid on LiDAR hillshade imagery with the line of site tool applied to a position behind the French defensive works.

The Low Flat Plain (Field of Fire, Key Terrain)

To the right of the French defensive works on the Heights of Carillon lies a low, relatively flat plain that extends northwards to the Lake Champlain shoreline. The part of this ground between the toe of the slope leading down from the Heights of Carillon to the head of a distinct drainage was defended by about 450 Canadians and La Marine stationed at an abattis during the battle. This area was the scene of some fighting, particularly when the Black Watch started their first assault. It appears that they came in front of the Canadians and La Marine before angling up along the slope to engage the French forces on the Heights of Carillon. The

low flat plain may have been more important than the British recognized. French officer Pierre Pouchot later wrote, “the colonial and Canadian troops who occupied the intrenchments on the flat, who were not in condition for defence [sic], but by continual sorties, the dissuaded the English from attempting anything on their side, where they could have easily turned their works had they known their ground, and the facility of taking them.” The concern that Montcalm and the other French officers had for this area appears to be manifested in the attempt to build both a four-gun battery and a redoubt on the ground above, overlooking the low flat, on the morning of the battle (see Bougainville; Montcalm 1; and Pouchot). Later observers also agreed to the potential importance of the low flat. For example, Charles Carroll noted in 1776 on viewing the battlefield commented that:

“it was morally impossible to succeed against these lines with small arms only, particularly in the manner they were attacked; -our army passing before them, and receiving a fire from the whole extent;-whereas, had it marched lower down, or to the north-west of these lines, it would have flanked them” (quote Carroll).

Drainage/Ravine on the Low Flat Plain (Obstacle)

The defensive lines manned by the Canadians and La Marine on the low flat during the Battle of Carillon appears to have been anchored on the head of a significant unnamed drainage that flows from that point about 1,475 feet northwards to Lake Champlain (see Appendix B: Anonymous 3). The LIDAR imagery indicates that this drainage / ravine may be up to 7 feet deep and up to 60-70 feet wide.

Woods West of French Lines (Cover and Concealment; Field of Fire)

The woods to the northwest and slightly down slope from the French Lines was the location of the initial skirmishing between the van of the British army and the French volunteers and grenadiers who had been tasked with screening those working on the defenses on the morning of the 8th. In this area, the French had hastily built log defensive position(s). As the engagement progressed, the forest provided the English and Provincial forces a degree of cover and concealment not only for their nearly three-hour deployment process preparatory to the main engagement, but also for the first line of provincials who moved the edge of the woods to support the British Regulars. The woods also appear to be a rallying point for the British Regulars. However, it could be argued that the woods may have also caused the British some difficulty in coordinating their attack between the different planned formations. It is possible that the British right wing could not see that the formations to their left were not yet in position before they started their assault.

“A little bank” (Cover and Concealment; Field of Fire)

According to French officer, Pierre Pouchot, “in the intervals between the columns, several small bodies of troops were scattered, who by their fire, greatly incommoded those in the intrenchments.” This may have been especially true where, according to Pouchot, “on our left, where they [the British] were able to take the cover of a little bank that protected them” (see Pouchot).

*Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga)
(Field of Fire)*

Although not heavily involved in the battle, the guns of Fort Carillon were part of the French effort that turned back the amphibious mission planned by Lt. Mathew Clerk to land cannon at the base of Mount Defiance. About three guns, firing at roughly 4,000-4,500 ft, managed to sink two of the British vessels, contributing to the withdrawal of the English back up the La Chute. However, probably due to the presence of friendly forces, the guns of the fort were not employed elsewhere during the battle (except perhaps to scare some Canadians back to their positions) (Louis de Bougainville).

*Hillslope South
(Obstacle)*

The rock covered steep hill to the left of the French Lines presented a deterring obstacle to attack from the south as well as serve to funnel the attackers approaching the Heights of Carillon from the west into the prepared defensive works.

*Hillslope North
(Obstacle)*

The slope on the north side of the elevated plateau of the Ticonderoga Peninsula is generally less step and/or in places has a double slope (a steep section, a more level section, and another steep section). However, there are some steep portions. The British approaching from the west appears to have been forced by the slope to make a choice between going towards the Canadians and La Marine (thereby losing contact with other friendly forces on the Heights of Carillon) or angling up the slope to contact the right side of the French Lines on the upper plateau. In this case the natural topography influenced the direction the troops moved in funneling them towards the more strongly prepared defensive works.

EARTHWORK MANAGEMENT

Introduction

Military earthworks are man-made changes in topography created to enhance the defensive potential afforded by the existing ground, which serve both as an obstacle for attackers and protection for defenders. Earthworks can range from simple piled rocks or shallow excavations to complex mounds and ditches forming extensive networks of defensive lines and redoubts. Historic period earthworks can persist on the landscape as visible features (Figure 30) or as entirely archeological features.

Since the 1980s, the United States National Park Service (NPS) has conducted several studies to identify the best practices for the management of historic earthworks. Many talented historians and cultural resource management professionals have subsequently distilled and improved upon the National Park Service's essential findings. The following information draws directly on their work and reference should be made to their reports for further information, particularly the National Park Service's *Sustainable Military Earthworks Management* document available on-line at <http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/hlui/currents/earthworks/index.htm>; the on-line NPS document *Earthwork Husbandry: Assessment of the Principal Earthworks: The Federal 'Fish Hook' Line, Petersburg, VA* available at <https://www.nps.gov/hdp/standards/crgis/earthworks1.htm>, and the 2007 *Cultural Landscape Report and Archaeological Assessment For Victory Woods Saratoga National Historic Park, Saratoga, New York* by Christopher Stevens, Linda White, William Griswold, and Maggie Coffin Brown, which is available on-line at: Hathi Trust Digital Library <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/005777761>.




Figure 30. Early 20th c. postcard of the French Lines. (Kate Kenny collection).

Management Recommendations

Despite their sometimes imposing presence on the landscape, earthworks are fragile cultural resources. The primary threat to earthworks is erosion and ground disturbances from natural processes, such as flowing water, animal burrowing, and tree throws, and from human activity, such as digging by metal detectorists, weed whacker and lawn mower divots, and excessive foot traffic. This management plan focuses on protecting the earthworks from all forms of erosion. The most important way of accomplishing this is the establishment and/or maintenance of continuous vegetative cover (either grass or forest duff) and the prevention of tree-throws.

Process Overview

- Using the aerial survey data as a foundation, continue to map the earthworks (preferably using the ArcGIS dashboard developed for this project and the associated hand-held applications).
- Develop a convention for naming sections or areas of the property to help organize maintenance efforts and create a common spatial referencing language for site managers and subcontractors.
- Conduct an initial assessment of the earthworks to create a baseline for the conditions on site: include the earthwork condition, the status of the vegetative cover, and potential problems. Consider including general soil & forest composition information as well as photographs (see “Assessment” below).
- Create a stewardship/management plan (see “Best Practices” below).
- Prioritize the issues that need to be addressed.
- Undertake only achievable and sustainable actions that focus on the most critical threats and also that have the least impact on the resource and on the greater ecological system.
- Document any actions taken using hand-held applications integrated with the GIS.
- Establish a regular monitoring program (at least annual).
- Consult necessary experts when needed (e.g., certified arborist, forester, pest control expert, soil scientist, native plant specialist, historic landscape architect and/or a professional archeologist/osteologist).

Assessment

1). Assess the Condition of the Earthwork.




Figure 31. Earthwork Condition (after NPS document “Earthwork Husbandry: Assessment of the Principal Earthworks: The Federal ‘Fish Hook’ Line, Petersburg, VA” available at <https://www.nps.gov/hdp/standards/crgis/earthworks1.htm>).

2). Assess the status of the existent vegetative cover.

Table 4. Evaluation of Forest Cover near Earthworks (Direct from NPS guidelines available at <https://www.nps.gov/tps/how-to-preserve/currents/earthworks/assess.htm>).

Good Condition	“is fully-stocked native forest with trees on the earthworks less than 12” diameter at breast height (dbh) where there is a suitable mix of healthy species that range in age. Earthworks are protected under a thick duff layer and minimal bare spots are evident. Animal burrows, holes, human desire paths and invasive species are identified and controlled.”
Fair Condition	“is represented by a thin or spotty forest or some trees on earthworks are greater than 12’dbh. Canopy trees are even aged and range in health. Minimal understory plants exist, and invasive exotic species are present. Thin duff layer and areas of exposed bare soil exist. Animal and human damage is evident.”
Poor Condition	“exhibit mostly large (greater than 12” dbh) trees growing on or near earthworks. Grasses and/or invasive exotic species make up the ground cover. Duff layer does not exist. Animal and human damage evident.”

Table 5. Evaluation of Grass or Herbaceous Cover near Earthworks (Direct from NPS guidelines available at <https://www.nps.gov/tps/how-to-preserve/currents/earthworks/assess.htm>).

Good Condition	“is a sustainable grass-dominated cover. The cover is comprised of continuous healthy predominantly native-where desirable-grasses and herbaceous plants with minimal bare spots (areas of exposed soil are less than 3” x 3”). Animal burrows, or holes, and invasive species are controlled. The primary management strategy: monitor cover and encourage sustainable grass community and inhibit the establishment of trees and shrubs.”
Fair Condition	“is a mix of grasses, herbaceous plants, and woody plants, where grasses and herbaceous plants do not dominate because they are competing with other less desirable species, such as trees, shrubs, or invasive exotic species. The primary management strategy’ remove or suppress selected species and actively promote sustainable grasses and herbaceous plants.”
Poor Condition	“is characterized by exposed soil. Vegetation is widely spaced and not successful in providing continuous cover. The condition may be the result of earthworks that are newly cleared of forest cover or when soil, environmental, or maintenance regimes do not support continuous sustainable cover. The primary management strategy: control erosion and revegetate the site with sustainable grasses and herbaceous plants.’

3). Identify and Map Potential Problems

Including:

- “Hazard Trees” (e.g., trees in poor condition near the earthworks or any trees over 12” diameter at breast height (dbh) located on the earthworks) (Figure 32).
- Active animal burrows.
- Evidence of looting.
- Areas of unwanted and/or excessive traffic.
- Bare spots or areas of dying vegetation.
- Gullies or areas of sheet erosion.
- Failed culverts or underdrains near the earthworks.
- Areas of ponded water in the earthwork ditches (this condition can kill the vegetation) (Figure 33).



Figure 32. Example of a potential ‘Hazard Tree’ (over 12” dbh) located on the earthworks.



View of a part of the French lines in 1758. The leaves and underbrush on the right conceal the embankment. The tree in the foreground at the left is on top of the breastworks.

Figure 33. Image from the Register of the Officers and Members of the Society of Colonial War in the State of Maine; Also History, Roster and Record of Colonel Jedidiah Preble's Regiment Campaign of 1758 Together with Capt. Samuel Cobb's Journal. Marks Printing House, Portland, Maine 1905 (between p. 104 and 105). This image shows water ponded in the ditch in around the turn of the century. Even earlier, in 1875 a visitor noted "this must have been a strong earthwork. At its salient angles the ditch is still deep and filled with water" (Anonymous 35).

Best Practices

Earthworks need a suitable continuous cover of either grass or forest duff or leaf litter to protect the soil from erosion. Bare spots and areas of active erosion should be addressed as quickly as possible. The management plan should also seek to eliminate recreational or maintenance activities that disrupt the vegetative cover or forest floor and minimize potential natural disturbances as much as possible.

In Woods

The various NPS studies conducted over the past few decades all agree that open woods (e.g., having a minimal understory) with a continuous thick healthy layer of duff (the naturally mulching leaf litter) under a mixed age canopy of healthy native trees, having a minimum of large (over 12" dbh) trees growing directly on the earthworks provides an effective, sustainable, low maintenance cover for earthworks. However, even a forest in 'good condition' requires a level of maintenance and monitoring. The aid of a professional forester will be useful in the creation of a site-specific management plan. In the assessment of the trees, several factors should be considered relative to tree location and condition. More hazardous tree conditions include older larger trees (generally more than 12-in dbh, which are more susceptible to windthrow because of their height to crown relationship); trees in poor health (e.g., those with

dead limbs, trunk wounds/cracks; signs of extensive woodpecker activity; evidence of insect damage; or evidence of disease such as blister rust); leaning trees; trees with unbalanced crowns, trees with co-dominant leaders; and/or tree species that have root patterning and/or structure more liable to windthrow. More hazardous tree locations include trees in areas shallow to bedrock; trees in wet soils with restricted rooting depth; trees that are more exposed to wind (e.g., those at edge of the forest or by themselves in the open); or trees in high traffic areas where soil compaction can damage roots. Additionally, the position of a tree on the earthwork also factors into the potential damage that may be caused by windthrow. According to the NPS, trees located on the parapet face next to the ditch may be most damaging, those on top of the parapet moderately damaging; and those on the face of the parapet not adjacent to the ditch may be least damaging. In addition to monitoring the trees, maintenance in woods areas should include keeping the earthworks free of woody shrubs and brush. Although it is commonly stated that the “management goal should be to remove all trees over time on the earthworks that exceed twelve inches dbh,” this may not be entirely practicable, so priority should be given to the removal of hazard trees growing directly on the earthworks that pose a high windthrow or branch drop hazard.

In Grassy Areas

The various landscape studies also indicate that a well-managed continuous carpet of healthy native grass, free of woody species, is also effective way to protect earthworks and is often employed on sections of earthworks that will be publicly viewable and interpreted. In these areas, good maintenance practices (e.g., proper timing of mowing; the blade height of the mowers; and care with the use of the machinery) are important.

Existing Conditions: Carillon Battlefield & French Lines

Following the battle, the earthworks in the area near the French Lines on the elevated plateau were in a pasture for many years and the area was mainly covered more by grasses than trees (Figure 34). Presently, however, an open, but somewhat similar aged, forest dominates most the Carillon Battlefield & French Lines. Today, the earthworks within this forest are well protected. In an initial examination of the site, only one notable place of erosion and bare ground was noted in the area of the opening (an intended entrance/exist) on the far right of the lines. There also may be an area of water ponding in the ditch right in front of the main salient angle. These locations should be double checked and added to the ArcGIS Operations Dashboard, if necessary. However, no animal burrows, stray foot paths, or recent tree throws located directly on the earthworks were seen. There were, however, some trees that could be considered hazard trees. Those areas of the French Lines on the upper plateau now covered by grass are well maintained and appear to be in good condition.

On the lower flat plain, the likely path of the French Lines is mainly located in an active agricultural field, but with small patches of woods that shelter the two readily visible American redoubts. These woods have a fair amount of woody understory in them. Although it may be good to remove the shrubs, it was noted that the woods are so small that the tree canopy may not be able shade out new successive growth, especially at the edges. Therefore, consultation with an accredited forester or historic landscape professional is recommended before any action is taken. The goal of the management should be to continue to shield these earthworks with

vegetation to protect them from vandalism and foot traffic while managing the growth so that it does not present a threat to these comparatively well-preserved features. It is also noted here that the “Redoubt Next the French Lines” is very close to what appears to be a large field drainage ditch. This needs to be evaluated and monitored, as it appears that there is some erosion occurring and if it worsens may adversely impact the earthworks.



Figure 34. Glass plate negative of the “French Lines” (Fort Ticonderoga Museum, 1999.0995).

Managing Natural Threats

Damage from Water

In cases of damage by water, such as from rain runoff causing gullies; sheet erosion in an unvegetated area; or ponding, it is first necessary to diagnose and address the root cause of the trouble and then to repair the damaged area by adding pre-screened soil (to prevent the possibility of introducing outside artifacts or debris into the area) and either covering the exposed soil with organic matter (e.g., wood chips preferably sourced from the site) in the woods or seeding with a non-invasive grass having the best potential root growth for the conditions in grassy areas. Ponding water in the earthwork ditches can kill the vegetation, leading to bare spots and erosion, and requires action. Each situation will be unique, and it may be useful to consult a professional.

Damage from Burrowing Animals

If burrowing animals are causing significant damage in a sensitive area, professional assistance may be needed to determine the type of animal causing the problem and the best method of control, considering humane methods first. After the cause of the problem is addressed, repair the damaged area using screened soil, locally sourced wood chips and/or seed with a non-invasive grass having the best potential root growth for the conditions.

Removal of Hazard Trees

The ArcGIS Dashboard hand-held application includes the ability to digitally “flag” hazardous trees, identify their size and species and categorize them in terms of priority for removal. These may include trees growing into and out of earthworks, those growing into and out of rock walls or trees that present overhanging threats to pedestrians. Once identified, a list of high priority issues can be provided to a tree-service professional, or staff member skilled in tree work. Given the archeological sensitivity of the ground surface, all tree work should be done by hand and not with mechanized equipment unless done under frozen ground conditions or when the trees can be reached from roadways. In terms of process, any branches that may impale the ground should be removed before the tree is felled; use a directional-felling technique to direct the tree away from earthworks or cut the tree down in segments starting at the top. Ultimately; the tree should be cut as flush with the earthwork without disturbing the forest floor. Depending on the species of the tree, an herbicide can be applied to the cut stump to discourage re-sprouting (e.g., coniferous trees generally do not sprout from the stump). After the upper portion of the tree has been removed the remaining stump and root system will eventually rot possibly leading to soil slumping. The site of removed trees should be monitored and any depression should be packed with screened topsoil and topped with site sourced wood chips and/or seeded with a non-invasive grass having the best potential for root growth in the local soil conditions.

Bare Spots

Bare spots on earthworks in woodlands are usually found on steep slopes or in areas of foot traffic. After the underlying issue is addressed, it may be sufficient to use locally sourced wood chips to cover the bare soil. In open lawn areas, diagnose the cause of bare spot (foot traffic, water ponding, excessive shade, insects & etc.), address the underlying problem, then seed with a non-invasive grass having the best potential root growth for the conditions.

Tree Throw Damaging Earthwork

No matter how well vegetation is managed to avoid threats, tree-throws are a common occurrence following wind storms and as a result of the natural life cycle within forested areas of the Champlain Basin and broader Adirondack Park. (Figure 35). Given that the majority of the Carillon Battlefield area is wooded, planning for these events is important. For example, the NPS recommends that there be an immediate response in these situations which offers the best chance to restore damaged site areas or earthworks as quickly as possible. Based on this guidance, it is recommended that trees be cut near the base to enable the “thrown” stump and attached archeological deposits, if present, to be pulled back into place by its still-attached roots. This must be done with extraordinary care and, preferably, by professionals or experienced woodsmen/women given the potential for tension and spring action once the stump is cut from the tree stem. It is important, therefore, to make sure no person is standing next to the root wad



Figure 35. A tree throw on the Fort Ticonderoga property. This one is close to, but not directly on the earthworks and illustrates the potential damage that these events can cause. The boards in the image are related to an abandoned interpretive trail.

when the stump is cut. If the stump does not flip itself back into place, it can be pulled over. The goal is to return the ground surface to grade and maintain, as closely as possible, the provenience of associated archeological materials. Tree throws can also present opportunities for archeological inspection, but unless there is a compelling reason and the resources to properly screen and document exposed or embedded cultural deposits then the best practice is to allow the stump and root mat to decay in place naturally.

Saplings and Low Growth

As discussed above, the ongoing clearing of saplings may be advisable in some areas where it helps to maintain viewshed throughout the site, and can cut down on tree-throw and root disturbance issues decades later.

Stray Foot Traffic

Presently, the earthworks of the French Lines and the American Redoubts are preserved and do not appear to have any unauthorized foot trails on them. At present there are no impediments to visitors walking in, around, and on top of archeological features however, and it does happen. In future development of interpretive trails in the Carillon Battlefield portion of the property, it will be important to include signage that encourages visitors to stay on the trail, emphasizes the fragility of the archeological landscape, and remind visitors to refrain from climbing on the earthworks, redoubts, and stone walls.

Site Interpretation, Appreciation, and Public Education

If, in the future, there is an interest in augmenting the current level of public access to and interpretation of the French Lines, the Battle of Carillon site, and/or the American redoubts, the

two conflicting goals of sharing the site with the public and protecting the resources must be thoroughly considered. Unfortunately, some visitors will climb on earthworks despite any requests to the contrary (Figure 36). In many battlefield parks, an effective plan includes a clearly defined logically laid out interpretive path, often of handicapped accessible construction,



Figure 36. Glass plate negative showing two visitors inspecting the earthworks (Fort Ticonderoga Museum, 1999.1073.066).

leading across the site with one or more viewing platforms with railings situated over the earthworks. This type of construction protects the forest floor and the earthworks from compaction, prevents bare spots and erosion, and offers the visitor better viewpoints to not only see over the earthworks, but to better appreciate the battlefield from an elevated position, and provides a handy site for the installation of interpretive signage.

Improving Vistas

Often to enhance the historic interpretation of a wooded site an improved vista is desired. In this case, strategic thinning is better than clear cutting. In almost all circumstances, cutting should be done at ground level and no stumping should occur to prevent erosion and protect potentially present archeological deposits.

ARCHEOLOGICAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

Artifacts & Features

The Fort Ticonderoga property protects an exceptionally well-preserved suite of ancient and European and Contact era Native American and historic Euro-American archeological resources. In addition to the collections held by the Fort Ticonderoga Museum and private individuals, there are artifacts and features with excellent context across the historic property reflecting millennia of Native American occupation and its Euro-American use extending from the 1600s to the late 1800s present.

The practice of collecting artifacts from the site reaches at least back into the late 18th century, for example,

- In 1772, Robert Innes noted that at the French Lines “the outside loggs are evidently the same that were there when we attacked they are now to the height of three [logs] full of shot holes, balls are everyday cut out of them” (“Robert Innes to James Grant of Quebec, 26 August 1772.” Ms. National Records of Scotland. Transcription by R. Scott Stephenson in the Fort Ticonderoga’s research files).
- In 1842 a traveler reported, “at 11 o’clock we reached Ticonderoga and here we had four hours to ramble about and examine the old ruins and may curiosities of the neighborhood. Part of the walls of the old fort are still standing and the vicinity is still cut up by ditches and entrenchments dug nearly a century since. Returning to the hotel, which stands upon a beautiful spot commanding a complete view of Lake Champlain, we amused ourselves until dinner time strolling about the grounds and inspecting old cannon balls, broken ramrods, parts of musket locks, broken bomb-shells, old rusty gun-barrels, and other relics. . .” (*Times-Picayune* [New Orleans, Louisiana], September 18, 1842, “Correspondence of the Picayune; Burlington, Vt. Sept. 1, 1842.” p. 2).
- In 1858 a visitor reported, “we spent an hour in the broiling sun examining the ruins of the old fortress, at Fell’s [sic] Point, Ticonderoga. The same little girl I saw there a year ago was the only living occupant on our arrival. She sold bullets, with which the ground must still be well peppered, ploughed from the surrounding fields, for four pence. Last year she had good sized iron cannon balls, flint, &c. But now there was evidently a scarcity” (Letter dated Lake George July 7, 1858, reprinted in *Argus and Patriot* [Montpelier, Vermont], May 13, 1875, “Lake George and Ticonderoga.” p. 1).
- In 1872 the Vermont Historical Society arranged for an excursion to Fort Ticonderoga where “the remains of the old fort and military works still attest their original splendor and strength; and in the vicinity of Ticonderoga balls, muskets, swords, and numerous other relics of war are constantly revealed” (*New York Tribune* [New York, New York], July 6, 1872, “Vermont Historical Society.” p. 4).
- In 1883 a visitor noted that, “back of the fort on the edge of the meadow, dwells a thrifty Irish family, with their pigs and geese and turkeys all about them. For relics they have

been on the watch for many years, and now have a large collection, quantities of leaden bullets, grape shot of many sizes, common bullets and broken shell, flints from the gunlocks, soldiers' buttons and many incognita," which the family "offered for sale" (*Burlington Weekly Free Press* [Burlington, Vermont], August 10, 1883, "Notes of a Laker: From Grog Harbor to Fort Ticonderoga." p. 5).

- In 1884 Frederick "Fred" Blake (1853-1923) of Bellows Falls, Vermont, visited Ticonderoga "relic seeking and after ten hours' hard digging, was rewarded by finding an axe of ancient design, a hammer, two spikes, a fragment of shell, and some iron and lead bullets" (*Argus and Patriot* [Montpelier, Vermont], August 6, 1884, "Bellows Falls." p. 2).
- In 1901 James O. Wright (1839-1925), a native of Ticonderoga, New York, but then a resident of Vermont, "had on exhibition several Indian arrowheads and a stone axe found near Fort Ticonderoga" at the Hartland Old Home Day celebrations (*Middlebury Register* [Middlebury, Vermont], September 20, 1901, "Displays of Antiques." p. 9).
- Early in 1929 a newspaper article noted that during 'recent' excavation work at Fort Ticonderoga that, "fire balls, believed to be the only ones left of those used in the Revolutionary days were among the relics found. These were solid shot weighing three pounds each having wooden plugs attached by copper bands. The plugs, rendered highly inflammable by treatment, broke off and became imbedded in the sides of ships against which the shot were fired. In that position they frequently ignited the vessel." This same article reported that "in excavating the Redoubt Lotbinere, the old French hospital site, near where the Grenadier's battery later stood, many small articles were found, including part of a rosary, a woman's broach, a gold ring, several clay pipes, some of them of Indian origin, and many badly chewed bullets" (*Poughkeepsie Eagle-News* [Poughkeepsie, New York], February 1, 1929, "Relics of Old Indian Wars Unearthed at Ticonderoga." p. 4).
- In July of 1929, the New York Historical Society's Field Exploration Committee reportedly excavated some historic and PreContact Native American artifacts on the site.
- In 1933 Godfrey J. Olsen conducted an archeological survey on the Pell property. This survey identified several Native American and historic period resources in the general vicinity of the fort. First, he reported a site "about a mile from the Fort, on the north side of Widow Deal's Cove, which is almost directly opposite the Historic Hand's Cove." At this site "found immense quantities of Indian material lying right on the surface." He indicated that this site was being severely altered by erosion along the lake shore. He wrote, "we found that the largest portion of the site was already in the lake and that all remaining was a small area extending back about 50 feet from the present shoreline. In this area we uncovered great number of arrow points, knife-like blades, scrapers, rejects and blanks, hammerstones and a large quantity of red ochre. It is significant, however, to note that no evidence of pottery having been used on this site was found and that none of the arrow-points in this area were triangular. All were stemmed, some having barbs and others without." Closer to the fort, he reported that, "the area along the lake from Widow

Deal's Cove south to the Fort was thoroughly scouted and tested and many implements were found scattered along the shore-line, having fallen out of the banks during the process of erosion. This was especially true in the immediate vicinity of Mr. Pell's residence where we found evidence of a large village site having occupied that area . . . Here, vast quantities of implements such as knives, scrapers, arrow-points, perforators, hammers, potsherds, etc., were found and, according to information received, large amounts of these articles have been removed in the past from the same area. Here, too, erosion had been working havoc during the past." Olson also noted that, "on the shore along the south side of the Fort considerable evidence of aboriginal camps was found . . It was here that the French established a trading post during the early day of the Fort. Trade articles, such as beads, brass and silver arm bands, Jews Harps, etc., are occasionally found in the area." In this article Olson also describes the early archeological testing on the other side of the lake near Mount Independence and East Creek (Godfrey J. Olsen, "Archeology of Ticonderoga." *New York History*. Vol. 15, No. 4 [October 1934], pp. 407-411).

- One of the artifacts recovered by the Champlain Archaeological Society in ca. 1936-1937 was "a small pottery jar found intact in the soil on the Fort Ticonderoga reservation" (*Burlington Free Press* [Burlington, Vermont], August 25, 1937, "Work of Champlain Valley Archaeological Society to be Explained Tomorrow Evening." p. 4).
- In May of 1938, the 23 members of Troop #10 of the Boy Scouts of America camped at the fort and where it was said they would spend a morning "digging relics in the park" with Milo King, the manager of the fort (*Post Star* [Glens Falls, New York], May 20, 1938, "Local Boy Scouts Plan Camping Trip to Fort Ticonderoga." p. 2).
- In 1942 Milo S. King along with Charles B. Driscoll and Wallace Blood tried metal detecting on the property. According to Driscoll, "Mr. King carried a long-handled shovel. Mr. Blood, familiarly called Gyp, carried a mysterious looking electrical box strapped over a shoulder and hanging under his left arm. In his right hand he carried a pole with a square frame attached to the bottom end. This was connected with the electric box by wires, and the operator wore a headset like those worn by telephone operators. Blood swung his pole and square frame over the grass, two to four inches from the ground. Presently he stopped and let me put on the headphones. As he swung the pole the buzzing sound of the current took on a sharp note at a certain point." At this location, the party uncovered "the iron blade of a mattock, or heavy hoe. Careful washing disclosed the name of an English maker. The same name is on many of the iron tools that have been dug up on the fort site" (*The Salt Lake Tribune* [Salt Lake City, Utah], July 5, 1942, "New York Highlights by Charles B. Driscoll." p. 18).
- In the summer of 1957, the professional archeological survey at the French Village, led by Roland Miner and funded by Harry E. Ward Family, was conducted.

Even though the site has been explored (and looted) by many people over many years, it still retains a remarkable archeological potential and the accidental discovery of artifacts from non-archeological events will happen occasionally e.g., during necessary emergency repairs of

services, from erosion, animal burrowing, tree throws, and discarded by looters. As part of the ArcGIS Dashboard system that has been developed for the project, a method of recording the location, type of exposure, and type of artifact recovered is now in place. This component of the system allows accurate geolocation of these types of finds, along with the seamless inclusion of these artifacts in a geodatabase for the property.

Presently, along with the potential effects of vegetation on earthworks, shoreline erosion and illicit artifact collection appear to be the greatest threats to the archeological resources on the property. The mapping system that has been developed will also be helpful in monitoring these threats over time, and in developing mitigation strategies.

Professionally led archeological survey, evaluation and/or mitigation should only be conducted by qualified archeologists (Code of Federal Regulations 36 CFR Part 61) and should be conducted in advance of ANY anticipated ground disturbing activity on the property (with the exception of agricultural cultivation). Examples of maintenance and planned undertakings by Fort Ticonderoga include, for example:

- Emplacement or replacement of underground services, signage or drainage.
- Construction of new structures and facilities.
- Site loss due to the threat of ongoing shoreline erosion and/or before actions to counter the erosion are undertaken (e.g., installation of rip rap).
- When the spoil from a looter's hole indicates that a human burial may have been damaged (e.g., if there are bone fragments in the loose dirt or on the ground surface). In these cases, the New York State Historic Preservation Office protocol for the identification of human remains (included below) should be followed. Looters may return to the 'hot spot' and cause more damage. Therefore, it may be good to determine whether burials are indeed nearby. Keep in mind that a full exhumation may not be necessary, but that any artifacts encountered in checking the area need to be properly recorded.
- If a particular area exhibits evidence that it is consistently targeted by looters and the area cannot be protected by other means. The downside to this is that looters will simply shift areas to find a new location to exploit.
- In areas where artifacts are uncovered by a significant natural disturbance (e.g., a large tree throw).
- If targeted research questions of sufficient merit and relevance to the interpretive goals of the site are developed, prioritized by Fort Ticonderoga, and funded from fieldwork to curation.

Over the past few decades, battlefield archeology has proven that it can make significant contributions to site understanding and interpretation. At the Carillon Battlefield and near the French Lines archeology may:

- Help locate or verify troop positions and fields of fire.
- "reveal previously unrecorded facets of the battle" (Sue Henry-Renaud in McMasters and Lowe 2016: n.p.).
- Further reveal site use by Native communities through time.

- Examine Native American participation in post-Contact military campaigns.
- Locate soldiers' burial sites.
- Identify the location of earthworks no longer visible at the ground surface.
- Provide information about the lives of soldiers from encampment sites.
- Locate structures / camps related to the site.

Possible Research Questions

- Has the Sandy Battery / Jersey Battery been completely lost to the lake and/or destroyed by the construction of railroads? In this case, an initial survey could use ground penetrating radar (or a similar methodology suitable to the conditions) to better frame an area of interest without ground disturbance. This battery should have been about 400 ft from the Semi-Circular Battery in order to provide mutual support (e.g., create an interlocking defense system). It is also possible to check the U.S. Department of Engineers c. 1815 Map 1, which provides an angle and distance from another battery that is still visible to the inshore corner of the Jersey Battery.
- Is it possible to locate the position of the French Lines in the area between the American redoubts?
- Is it possible to get a better idea about the extent and/or the intensity of the Battle of Carillon on the low flat and the northern slope of the Heights? Where was the Canadiens abattis position exactly? How far did the Highlanders come down towards them? Can concentrations of dropped and fired projectiles locate fighting positions? An excavation by Bruno Frohlich in this general area located two articulated skeletons. He noted that in the block excavation with the burials, he recovered eleven musket balls and indicated that "the original number of musket balls may be significantly higher since there is strong evidence of 'pot hunting' activities . . . in the same area" (Bruno Frohlich 1996).
- Were the two "extra" American positions indicated on the "Carleton-Hutchins Map" ever built (meaning the three-sided work indicated between the 'Redoubt Next to the French Lines' at the base of the hill and the other three-sided feature located about 1,000 feet in front of the French Lines)?
- How were the American defenses built? Are there layers of sod in the structure? Was the ground on either side stripped of topsoil?⁸⁴ Were wood structures used as bulking agents? Does it have artifacts from French and Indian War integrated into it? Is there evidence of how much the ditch has infilled over time? Is there evidence of pickets in the ditch in front? If so, what was their dimensions, depth and spacing?
- Archeology relies on patterns formed by artifacts and features in the ground. While many artifacts taken from the site remain in private hands, some individuals have donated their finds to institutions throughout the country, such as the Bennington Museum (grenade), the Smithsonian Institution, the Washington Headquarters Museum, the New York State Museum, New-York Historical Society, &etc. It might be worthwhile to track

⁸⁴ Lendy 1857:79 noted that in building earthworks "time may be reduced by half, by excavating on both sides."

down any items in other institutions that have proveniences associated with them and add them to the mapping program.

Human Remains

Text removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act



Figure 37. The Rev. Ammi Ruhamah Robbins [Rev Ammi Ruhamah Robbins \(1740-1813\) - Find A Grave Memorial.](#)

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Figure 38 removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act

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Today, human remains may be encountered in a wide range of contexts and become exposed during a variety of possible scenarios including by erosion or by a tree throw, during planned archeological or subsequent construction excavations (e.g., for underground services or the installation of signage, etc.) or unplanned excavations (e.g., for the emergency repair of existing services); by animal burrowing; or through unauthorized excavations (e.g., looting).

In instances where human remains are recovered, Fort Ticonderoga staff should follow protocols laid out by the New York State Historic Preservation Office (NYSHPO) and New York Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation in their Human Remains Discovery Protocol (2021). These include:

- Human remains shall be treated with dignity and respect. Should human remains or suspected human remains be encountered, work in the general area of the discovery shall stop immediately and the location shall be secured and protected from damage and disturbance.
- If skeletal remains are identified and the archaeologist is not able to conclusively determine if they are human, the remains and any associated materials shall be left in place. A qualified forensic anthropologist, bioarchaeologist or physical anthropologist shall assess the remains in situ to help determine if they are human.
- If the remains are determined to be human, law enforcement, the SHPO, the appropriate Indian Nations, and the involved state and federal agencies shall be notified immediately. If law enforcement determines that the burial site is not a criminal matter, no skeletal remains or associated materials shall be removed until appropriate consultation takes place.
- If human remains are determined to be Native American, they shall be left in place and protected from further disturbance until a plan for their avoidance or removal is developed. Please note that avoidance is the preferred option of the SHPO and the Indian Nations. The involved agency shall consult SHPO and the appropriate Indian Nations to develop a plan of action. Photographs of Native American human remains and associated materials should not be taken without consulting the involved Indian Nations.

- If human remains are determined to be non-Native American, the remains shall be left in place and protected from further disturbance until a plan for their avoidance or removal is developed. Please note that avoidance is the preferred option of the SHPO. The involved agency shall consult the SHPO and other appropriate parties to develop a plan of action.
- The SHPO recommends that burial information is not released to the public to protect burial sites from possible looting.

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(Compilers: Kate Kenny, Dr. Matthew Keagle, Margaret Staudter, and James Taub)
Translations by Shelly Naud (except where noted)

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[British Commanding Officer 1758]

[*Official Report; Gen. James Abercromby to William Pitt, Camp at Lake George 12th July 1758*]

"The 7th, the troops being greatly fatigued, by having been one whole night on the water, the following day constantly on foot, and the next night under arms, added to their being in want of provision, having dropped what they had brought with them, in order to lighten themselves, it was thought advisable to return to the landing place, which we accordingly did about eight that morning. About eleven in the forenoon, sent off Lieut. Col. Bradstreet, with the 44th regiment, six companies of the first battalion of the Royal Americans, the bateau men, and a body of rangers and provincials, to take possession of the Saw mill, within two miles of Ticonderoga, which he soon effected; as the enemy who were posted there, after destroying the mill and breaking down their bridge, had retired some time before. Lieut. Col. Bradstreet having laid another bridge a-cross, and having sent me notice of his being in possession of that ground, I accordingly marched thither with the troops, and we took up our quarters there that night. The prisoners we had taken being unanimous in their reports, that the French had eight battalions, some Canadians and colony troops, in all about 6000, encamped before their fort, who were intrenching themselves, and throwing up a breast-work, and that they expected a reinforcement of 3000 Canadians, besides Indians, who had been detached under the command of Mons. De Levy, to make a diversion on the side of the Mohawk river; but upon intelligence of our preparations and near approach, had been repeatedly recalled, and was hourly expected; it was thought most advisable to lose no time in making the attack; wherefore early in the morning of the 8th, I sent Mr. Clerk, the engineer, across the river on the opposite side of the fort, in order to reconnoiter the enemy's intrenchments. Upon his return, and favorable report of the practicability of carrying those works, if attacked before they were finished, it was agreed to storm them that very day: Accordingly the rangers, light infantry, and the right wing of Provincials, were ordered immediately to march and post themselves in a line, out of cannon fire of the intrenchments; the right extending to Lake George, and the left to Lake Champlain, in order that the regular troops, destined for the attack of the intrenchments, might form on their rear. The pickets were to begin the attack, sustained by the grenadiers, and by the battalions: the whole were ordered to march up briskly, rush upon the enemy's fire, and not give theirs, until they were within the enemy's breast-work. After these orders issued, the whole army, except what had been left at the landing place to cover and guard the bateaus and whale-boats, and a Provincial regiment at the Saw-mill, were put in motion, and advanced to Ticonderoga, where they unfortunately found the intrenchments, not only much stronger than had been represented, and the breast-work at least eight or nine feet high; but likewise the ground before covered with felled trees, the branches pointed outwards which so fatigued and retarded the advancing of the troops, that notwithstanding all their intrepidity and bravery, which I cannot too much commend, we sustained so considerable a loss, without any prospect of better success, that it was no longer prudent to remain before it; and it was therefore judged necessary, for the preservation of the remainder of so many brave men, and to prevent a total defeat, that we should make the best retreat possible: Accordingly, after several repeated attacks, which lasted upwards of four hours, under the most disadvantageous circumstances and with the loss of 464 regulars killed, 29 missing, 1117 wounded, and 87 Provincials killed, 8 missing, and 239 wounded, officers of both

included, I retired to the camp we occupied the night before, with the broken remains of several corps, sending away all the wounded to the bateaux, about three miles distance; and early the next morning we arrived there ourselves, embarked, and reached this place the evening of the 9th. Immediately after my return here, I sent the wounded officers and men that could be moved, to Fort Edward and Albany."

Source: "Montcalm's Victory." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. V, No. 5-6 (1940). pp. 140-142.

Abercromby, James Gen. (2)

[British Commanding Officer 1758]

[Letter: Gen. James Abercrombie [sic] to Mr. James Abercromby dated "Camp Lake George 19 Aug. 1758"]

"But before I undertook the Attack, we had the Reports & Opinions of two very expert Engineers, who had been on that Ground at different Times before, and had seen the Ground & Works the preceding Night and that Morning . . . Besides the Enemy were every Minute strengthening the Works, and every Hour Reinforcements were coming up the Lake Champlain to them . . ." (p. 74-75).

Source: "'Like roaring lions breaking from their chains:' The Highland Regiment at Ticonderoga." By Nicholas Westbrook. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. XVI, No. 1 (1988). pp. 16-93.

Abercromby, James Capt.

[English Officer 1758]

[Letter: James Abercrombie [sic] to Harry Erskine dated "Camp Lake George July the 10th 1758"]

" . . . the next morning the 8th it was perceived the Enemy were busy in making an Intrenchment. It was therefore resolved to Attack them before they could finish it, & for that purpose the necessary Orders were given, the Attack not to begin till the whole Army was formed & then a point of war would be beat for the Attack. But most unluckily this order was not kept up to, for the New York Reg^t by Accident fell upon an Advanced Guard of the enemy. The Picquets who were supported by the Grenadeers & they by the Whole Line, rushed on to the attack before any of the Army were formed. As the place was invested by our Irregulars the whole Army marched in One Column, & as the Reg^{ts} came up they joined piecemeal in the attack. All this time the General imagined it was only our Irregulars but to his great surprise, when he came up with the Highlanders, he found all the rest of the Regulars attacking the Intrenchment the Highlanders ran to the left to their ground. But the whole front of the Intrenchment was so full of fallen Trees, it was impossible to move on in Order to the Attack, so that after several repeated efforts during a continued fire for four hours, we found we could make no impression . . ." (p. 68-69).

Source: "'Like roaring lions breaking from their chains:' The Highland Regiment at Ticonderoga." By Nicholas Westbrook. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. XVI, No. 1 (1988). pp. 16-93.

Adams, Samuel

[English Informant 1777]

[Information provided by Samuel Adams to Capt. Samuel MacKay on March 21, 1777]

"Answers to every question demanded by Captain Mackay and to give [?] information of the different forts, fortifications in and about Tyconderoga so help me God." Q. Who commands at Tyconderoga? Ans. Anthony Waine [Q] What number of Rebels are there at the fort? [Ans]

To the best of my knowledge 800 [Q] In what situation is the fort? [Ans] There is nothing done to the fort but picketed where it fell down before except in the west side. That they have raised the stone wall east of the main gate—they have made a gate on the [ground?] west and south sides—The rebels have planted an abatis of brush all round the glascis—That they have raised a Breastwork all round where the French had their Lines on the high ground and picketed the ditch in about 8 feet depth—There are two pieces of cannon facing the South, and they have also, embrasures to put 7 guns in these breastworks—The Rebels have, also, fortified the French Redoubt—There are two Batterys facing the Swamp—They about forty pieces of Cannon and daily expect more—The rebels have a Battery of 4 pieces of Cannon at the Sandy Battery—there are three Batterys between that and the fort facing the River—The French redoubt Mounts 10 pieces of cannon and is surmounted with an Abbatis—They are making a Bridge of large logs across the River to hinder the vessels from coming up to secure the communication with the [colonies?], and to be able to make their retreat to Mount Independent. The Rebels mount a Main guard (a subalterns) in the fort. They plant a sentry at the main gate—They have, also, at guard at the Breast work or French Lines—There is a Brest work at mount Hope to defend the passage going to Lake George they had four pieces on cannon on there last fall—There is a company of men at the Block house-- They detach a lieutenant, and 12 men to the Block house at the landing place on Lake George. The Rebels have a large store of provisions at Fort Ann from whence they supply the different forts this place is only stockade and but one company of men to guard it. They keep their provisions in the Kings storehouse at Tyconderoga and also another store [for] provisions at the French Bakery House there. The rebels have not built any vessels, they have six large and small Three of them is in a line across the River—They have raised a Breastwork Mount Independent and a Battery on the north which mounts 20 pieces of cannon, Om a little hill behind this Battery there is another which mounts 4 pieces where a subalterns guard also mounts —There are 1000 men on Mount Independent— There is a picketed fort round the Barracks—On the South side they have made a Breastwork and they have planted an Abbatis all round the [fort] and Breastwork—The Rebels have a small picketed fort at Skenesbough one company of men there—no vessels building there. At Fort George they have repaired the Kings redoubt and also made a small Fort at the Water side where there is part of a regiment and some cannon—The Rebels bring therein livestock to Mount Independent by a new road which was cut last fall. The rebels have passed a law to oblige the soldiers to serve during the War which discourages the people so that they can hardly get any men to serve. The rebels intentions are to get all the force possible to Tyconderoga to prevent the junction of the two Armys.”

Source: *Haldimand Papers*, H-1737: Images #1199-1202. Available on-line at:
https://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_mikan_105513.

- **Note:** In a separate document, *Haldimand Papers*, H-1737: Images #939-943, dated March 31, 1777, Capt. Samuel MacKay notes, “March 21st. Finding Samuel Adams, a Royalist “who lives on the landing place at Lake George not in a condition to follow us after getting from him every information I suffered him to return, being afraid that by his not being able to march the Indians might kill him. I told Adams that the only thing that could justify me in releasing him, that he should promise to be very particular in his attention to observe the motion of the enemy and obtain all the Information in his power relating to their number &c and that he was to embrace the first opportunity to convey it to the Generals in Canada.”
- **Note:** On November 10, 1776, “the general court marshall now setting are to try the officers & solgiers accused of killing Mr. Adams ox.” (see: *Orderly Book of Capt.*

Ichabod Norton of Col. Mott's Regiment of Connecticut Troops Destined for the Northern Campaign in 1776. Robert O. Bascom. Keating & Barnard, Fort Edward, New York, [1898]. p. 56).

- **Note:** on March 22, 1777, American Lt. Col. Jeduthan Baldwin talked to Adams. According to his journal entry for that date, “Rode out to ye Mills & to Mr Adams. at Evening he came in after being four Days with the Enemy, he with 2 others were going to Sabbath day point with 13 Horses on ye west side of the Lake & were taken by Capt McKoy [sic] with about 18 Cocknewago Indians, about 3 o clock afternoon five miles North of Sabbath day point. Soon after he was taken Capt. Baldwin came along with about 25 Men from Ticonderoga going to Fort George on the Ice. the Indians concealed themselves in ye Woods until about 3 o clock at night. Capt. Baldwin with his mean passed by to Sabbath Day point where they made a fire Ley down & went to sleep, when the Indians attacked then Killed 4 & took 20 which they carried off but Mr. Adams being well acquainted with Capt McKoy [sic], he pleading that he was only an inhabitant did not belong to the Army obtained Leave to return after marching 30” [miles?] (Baldwin 1906:95-96).

Albertson, Garrett Sr.

[Served with Col. John Johnson's New Jersey Regiment]

[British Provincial Soldier 1758]

[July 8, 1758] “. . . lay that night at a place called the Old Saw Mill, about half way to the fort, and heard the French all night chopping and felling timber to fortify their breastwork, and they plainly saw our fires. When daylight appeared, the army was ordered to hold themselves in readiness . . .” (p. 45).

“The grenadiers and light infantry took the lead, and the attack began at the breastwork, but after a bold bloody action, was repulsed with great slaughter. The different regiments then, in rotation, marched one after another until the whole army came into action. When we came near the field of battle, and the bullets began to whistle round us, I felt a tremor of panic and fear . . . Our orders were then to march on within gunshot of the breast-work, and every man to shift and cover himself as well as he could, behind trees, stumps or logs, which they did. Lieutenants Bonnel and Coryell, myself and others, took our stand behind a large pine log which the French had felled to fortify their works. We made our attack about nine or ten o'clock in the morning, and continued in that position till the afternoon, without cannon or mortar pieces, though we had both where we landed, but lay exposed the whole time to the fire of the French from their breast-work, with only small arms. As I before observed, several of us were covered by a large pine log, where we would drop and load, then rise and fire over the log, until our ammunition was almost spent; my firelock at length got so hot I could not handle it. I told Bonnel I had a mind to jump on the log to see what the French were about in their breastwork. “Take care!” said he. However, I jumpt up, and the very moment I stept up, a bullet brushed my hair on one side; I was down quick. I told Bonnel. He answered, “I told you to take care!” I had no desire of trying the log again. The French would often charge their field pieces with grape-shot, and fire away though out army nothing but sulphur, smoke and fire, through the day” (p. 46).

[In describing their withdrawal from the field Albertson wrote:] “The minute the word was given ‘March!’ the piquet guard left over the field of battle, fired a heavy volley upon the French, that were out plundering our dead and wounded, with candles and lanterns. The piquet said, they stumbled over one another and their lights were soon extinguished” (p. 47).

Source: "A Short Account of the Life, Travels and Adventures of Garrett Albertson, Sr." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. VI, No. 2 (July 1936). pp. 43-47.

Alexander, Thomas Ens.

[British Provincial Officer 1758]

[Diary; Served in Capt. Salah Barnard's Company in Col. William Williams' Massachusetts Regiment]

"7th Friday we marched to the mills at the falls. 8th Saturday we went against the fort and was defeated" (p. 404).

Source: *History of the Town of Northfield Massachusetts, For 150 Years, With an Account of the Prior Occupation of the Territory by the Squakheags and With Family Genealogies.* By J.H. Temple and George Sheldon. Joel Munsell, Albany, New York (1875). pp. 303-305.

Allen, Solomon Sgt.

[American Solider 1777]

[Private Correspondence of Sgt. Solomon Allen, of Northampton, Mass. dated September 5, 1776]

"We are fortifying here very fast at both side of the Lake. Upon Mount Independence they have got very strong. We have about twelve thousand men here and in a short time we shall be ready for them. On our side we are encamped about fifty rods from the old French forts; but we are building a new fort down the Lake towards Crown Point,—about a half mile from the old one, at Ti."

Source: "Letter of Solomon Allen." *The Pittsfield Sun* (Pittsfield, Massachusetts), January 2, 1868. p. 2.

American POWs

[American Soldiers 1777]

[Accounts by Capt. Baldwin, Sgt. Ezekiel Roberts, Joseph Graves, and Joseph Williams of Capt. Baldwin's Company of Albany Rangers who were captured at Sabbath Day Point on March 20, 1777]

[Capt. Baldwin] "He says that Colonel Waine [sic] Commands at Tyconderodga [sic] that during the time he was there part of 3 regiments came to this Post to replace the Militia and there might be about 1000 men at Tyconderoga. That there is about 15 pieces of Cannon in the old fort, and that it is picketed round and surmounted by an Abbatis, there is about 3 pieces of cannon mounted in what is called the French Redoubt, but none others as he [knows?] either in the French Lines or in the three redoubts leading from those lines to the Lake side. Did not hear of any more cannon to be sent to Tyconderoga. That there is a Captains Guard in the old Fort who also take the French Lines. What ammunition the Rebels have is lodged in the Magazine in the fort but does not know the quantities there may be. That they have a store of salt provisions as well as flour in the Kings storehouse. They are sinking the piers of New Bridge. It is laid across the river from the old storehouse on Tyconderoga side to the Point of Mount Independent . . ."

[Sgt. Ezekiel Roberts] "gives nearly the same account with Baldwin. That there is 15 pieces of cannon in the Fort as, also, some pieces in the French Lines, but saw none in any of their works . . ."

[Joseph Graves] "gives much the same account with the other man. That there are about 20 pieces of cannon in the old Fort and about other works."

[Joseph Williams]: "agrees with the other two men."

Source: *Haldimand Papers*: H-1737; Images #1247-1250. Available on-line at:
https://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_mikan_105513.

Amherst, Jeffery Gen. (1)

[British Commander 1759]

[Letter to Gov. James DeLancey; dated "Camp at Tienderoga, 27th July 1759"]

"... early on the 23rd we continued our march to the ground which I took possession of in the forenoon, the enemy having abandoned the lines without destroying them . . . As soon as I was set down before the place and after having reconnoitered it, I ordered the trenches to be opened and batteries to be made, which were finished last night, and were to have opened at break of day, but the enemy did not think proper to wait till then . . ."

Source: "The Black Watch at Ticonderoga." By Frederick B. Richards. *Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association*. Vol. 10 (1911). pp. 367-464.

Amherst, Jeffery Gen. (2)

[British Commander 1759]

[July 23] "... as my intelligence was very sure, I proceeded over the broken ground to the Lines instead of marching across and taking Posts to advance in a full Front. On some of the light Infantry appearing the Garrison began to cannonade but the Lines covered the march of the Columns and I put the Lines in my Front, taking Possession of some of the advantageous Ground within, opening communications & throwing up a banquet for the Regts to defend the Lines against any Sortie the Garrison could make and I employed as many men as I had tools for to cover themselves within the Lines. The Army lay on their Arms. The disposition was the two Brigades of English at the Lines, Rangers, light Infantry of Regts & Gages & Grenadiers with three Batt of Provincials covering the Rear. Those Batts at the landing Place to guard Artillery Provisions Batteaus &c. Two opposite Ticonderoga, one at the Post at the Saw mills, two on Communication from the Sawmills to this. They threw Shells and cannonaded from the Fort all day and most part of the night with no effect. I sent for the tents but could get so few up that the Army lay on their Arms all night . . ." (p. 119).

[July 24] [the French] "... kept a continual fire of cannon and throwing Shells opened trenches at three different places & kept working all day . . . We had one Ensign one Corporal & four Privates killed and thirty wounded. I got up two twelve-Pounders, one for each Flank of the Camp, ordered the Artillery to be got up as fast as possible . . . The Trenches advanced apace; I covered the working men by Pic[k]ets . . . Such a continued fire from the Fort the men were obliged to stay all night out of their Tents . . ." (p. 119-120).

[July 25] "In the night past our working party being a little alarmed began to fire, which drew on some fire from the Pic[k]ets who lay on the Lines in front of the Camp . . . with yesterdays work we shall get the Batteries on to night, six 24-pounders in the Park of Artillery . . ." (p. 120).

[July 26] "The Trenches advanced apace and the Batteries to be ready this night. The Artillery will be up that we may open Batteries of six 24-Pounders and a Battery of Mortars . . . Some dispute with the Engineers and Artillery Officers who were to lay the Platforms which I cut very short by finding another to do it, at the same time telling them it was the duty of the Artillery Officers to do it but when I named Lt. Col. Robertson to make the Platforms, the Engineers then took it on themselves" (p. 121).

Source: *Chronicles of Lake Champlain: Journeys in War and Peace*. By Russell P. Bellico, Purple Mountain Press, Fleischmanns, New York (1999). pp. 119-121.

Amherst, Jeffery Gen. (3)**[British Commander 1759]**

[Published letter: *Jeffery Amherst to William Pitt*; dated: "Crown Point August 5, 1759"]

"The 27 of July, I encamped within the Lines and began to level the Trenches and Batteries, filled up the Road I had made from Lake Champlain to the Saw Mill River for the carrying on of the Siege, encamped for Battalions of Provincials near the Fort for repairing the Works, sent 500 Men to Fort George for Provisions . . ."

"31st I ordered the Fort by the Water Side to be put in through good Order, and to be completed, as the Enemy had not quite finished it: Ordered the Fort of Ticonderoga to be repaired upon the same plan . . ."

Source: "From the London Gazette Extraordinary Sept. 10." *Derby Mercury* (Derby, England), September 7, 1759. p. 3.

Amherst, Jeffery Gen. (4)**[British Commander 1759]**

July 26, 1759: "The duty of the trenches is done by regiments, taking it alternatively; we are very busy in forwarding artillery-stores, and expect to open our batteries to night or to-morrow morning; the enemy continue to fire warmly on our approaches, but their shot and shells do not so much retard our operations as the ground we work on, it being an uncommon weighty, stiff clay" (p. 101).

July 27, 1759: "The main of our army, incamped within the lines, began to level our own works, and to fill up the road we have made from lake Champlain, to the Saw-mills, for the carrying on the siege; four battalions of provincials are incamped nearer to the fort for repairing the works" (p. 102).

Source: "Extracts from The General Orders. Major General Jeffery Amherst's Army, 1759." *Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. VI, No. 3 (January 1942). pp.88-106.

Amherst, William**[c. 1758-1760]**

"In the center of the line at Ticonderoga, the enemy has erected a very high cross, with a large grave dug, and left open before it . . ." (pp. 53-54).

Source: *Journal of William Amherst in America, 1758-1760*. John Clarence Webster (ed). Frone and London, Butter and Tanner, Ltd. (1927). [see: FTA P-4030 and FTA 3283 18 March 1758-8 September 1760.]

Anburey, Thomas Sir**[British Officer 1777]**

"Camp before Ticonderoga July 5, 1777 . . . By the scouting parties just returned we learn, that there is a brigade which occupies the old French lines on a height, to the north of the Fort of Ticonderoga; the lines are in good repair, with several intrenchments [sic] behind them, supported by a block-house . . . Upon the right of the lines, between them and the old fort are two new block-houses, and a considerable battery close the water's edge. But it seems the Americans have employed their utmost industry where they are in the greatest force, upon Mount Independence" (p. 19)

Source: "The Taking of Ticonderoga 1777--Thomas Anburey." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. II, No. I (January 1930). pp. 15-22.

Anonymous (1)**[British Provincial 1758]**

[Two versions, probably by the same author, most likely a member of DeLancey's New York Unit] Version I: Ms. Letter in the Bancroft Collection, New York Public Library, New York, New York

“ . . . The Seventh Coll. Bradstreet Marched off with his Command towards the Mills which The Enemy Abandoned on his approach. The Whole army soon followed and possessed themselves of all the Advantagious Grounds there where they Continued All night. The Eight at Day Light The Commanding Officers of the Regiments were acquainted that the French Lines were to be storm'd this morning. A Disposition was Made Accordingly on our Supposition that the French had only a Breast Work of Loggs of about half a mile in Length But it appeared they were Strongly Intrenched and that their Breast Work was Double the Extent the General Imagined. The Grounds had never been properly Reconnoitred which prov'd a fatal circumstance to the Army & will ever be a Reproach on the General. We were Commanded to Invest the Enemy's Intrenchments In the following Order: On the Left, the Rangers; The Centre the Battoe men; on the Right, the Light Infantry who were 200 Yards from the Breast Work. In their rear were, on the Left, the first Battalion of New York Regiment; On their Left in the following Order 1) Bagley 2) Williams's then Patrides Dotey's Ruggles & Prebbles, all Boston Regiments. These were to Support the Regulars in their Attack on the Brest Work, In case they should be forced to Retire & were to be followed by the Jersey & Connecticut forces who were posted in the Rear of the Whole. Intervals were Left between the Regiments of the Covering Party to Admit the Regulars The Rangers Instead of taking Post to the Left employed themselves in firing on the Enemy to the Right so that when our Regiment was going to take Post where we ought to be In ye Rear of our Friends we were surprised by ye Enemy about 200 yards from the Breast Work who fired on us and were repulsed and Drove by the strength of our People Into it, we had now the whole fire of the Enemy on us for near an Hour without any Succour But received Considerable Damage from our Friends in the Rear who fired at Random. At about 1 oClock the Attack was made by the Regulars who were forbid upon Pain of Death to fire till they were within the Breast work. They advanced with the most surprising Resolution Tho but few gained the Post before the Retreat was Sounded. They was very much Difficulted in advancing as the Enemy had cut Down a great number of Trees in the Front of their Intrenchments and filled up the Ground with Logs, Stumps, Brush &c for upwards a Hundred Yards. The Enemy who were Intirely Under cover of a Breast Work Six feet thick and as many High Kept an Incessant and heavy fire upon us from their Swivels & Small Arms mowing Down our Brave Officers & men by Hundreds whilst they Continued only now and then to be seen with their Heads Above the Breast Work. About three oClock our Regiment and those on the left Observing the Regulars were Retiring Pour'd in a very Heavy Fire on the Enemy Intending to Retreat a Little themselves In order to form again being thrown into some Disorder, Indeed some had already begun their Retreat, which It's Supposed the Enemy observed as they Hoisted English Colours, Club'd their Firelocks & Beckoned to us appearing in that manner very thick on the Breast Work on which Maj. Moneypenny order'd the whole to advance cease firing which was Done by Several Platoons on the Left But Coming within 15 or 20 Yards of the Enemy they struck their Colours and threw in upon us a most Terrible and heavy fire such as we had never yet Experienced which killed Multitudes and obliged us to Retire to recover ourselves from the Disorder we were thrown in. Finding it Impracticable to force the Intrenchments the whole were ordered to Retreat. At about 5 oClock we retired to the Strong Grounds about the Mills where we were scarcely arrived before we were ordered to march to our Advanced Post where ye Battoes were which it was prudent to Secure tho' one quarter of the force would have done it and

the remainder of the Army might have Kept Possession of the Mills which is perhaps as Advantagious a Situation and as Strongly Fortified by nature as any Post in the Universe . . .”

Source: “Attack and Repulse at Ticonderoga July 1758.” *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. VII, No. 1 (January 1945). pp. 15-18.

Version 2: was published in newspapers as an “Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman at Lake George dated July 11, 1758.”

“The 8th, at Day-Light, Orders were given for storming the French Lines before Ticonderoga, and a Disposition was made accordingly, in the following Order. On the Left the Rangers; the Center the Battos-Men; on the Right the Light Infantry, to be at 200 Yards Distance, and more, from the Breast Work, in a Line. In their Rear, were on the Left, the first Battalion of the New-York Regiment; on their right six [sic] Boston Regiments: These were to support the Regulars, consisting of six Regiments (in Case they should be forced to retire) and were to be followed by the Connecticut and Jersey Troops, in the Rear of the Whole. Intervals were left between the Regiments of the covering Parties, to admit the Regulars, who were to attack the Breast-Work. The Rangers, by some Mistake, instead of taking Part to the Left, employ’d [sic] themselves on firing on the Enemy to the Right, so that when the New-York Regiment was going to take Post (where they ought according to the Disposition to have been) in the Rear, they were surprised by the Enemy about 200 Yards from their Breast-Work, and drove back by the Heat of our People into it. This Regiment had now the whole Fire of the Enemy for near an Hour.”

“About one, the Attack was made by the Regulars, who were ordered on Pain of Death, not to Fire ’till they were within the Breast-Work; they advanced with most surprising Resolution, tho’ but few had gain’d the Post before the Retreat was sounded. The French had for upwards of an hundred Yards beyond the Breast-Work, filled the Ground with large Logs, Stumps, Brush, &c. which retarded the advancing of our People, and proved a prodigious Difficulty to them, as they were continually falling down, and destroying that Regularity in the ranks, which would otherwise have been observed. The Enemy who were entirely under Cover of a Breast-Work six Feet thick, kept an incessant and heavy Fire upon us, from their Swivels and Small-Arms, mowing down our brave Officers and Men by Hundreds. Major Proby was killed on the Top of the Trench, as were several other Officers. About 3 o’Clock, just as the Regulars were retreating, our Regiment and those on the Left, threw in a very heavy Fire, intending to retire likewise very soon, and indeed some had already begun to retreat, which it is supposed the Enemy observed; they then hoisted English Colours and clubbed their Arms, shew’d themselves on their Breast-Work, and becken’d to us; on which the whole advanced briskly, but coming within 15 or 20 Yards from the Enemy, they struck their Colours, and threw in upon us a most terrible and heavy Fire, such as we had not yet experienced, which killed Multitudes, and obliged us to retire to recover ourselves from the Disorder we were thrown in. Finding it impracticable to force the Trenches, the whole were ordered to retreat; about 5 o’Clock we retired to the Strong Grounds, about the Mills.”

Source: “Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman at Lake George dated July 11, 1758.” *New York Mercury* (New York, New York), July 24, 1758. p. 2.

Anonymous (2)
[French account printed in the *London Chronicle*]

[French 1758]

“Paris, Sept. 23. ‘The following Relation has been received of the Action near Fort Carillon, [Ticonderoga] in the Month of July last, between the French Troops, commanded by the Marquis de Montcalm, and those of England under General Abercrombie. The Marquis of Montcalm being informed, that the English had assembled at the Bottom of Lake Sacrament, and Army of 20000 Militia, 6000 Regular Troops, under the Command of General Abercrombie, with a Design to make themselves Masters of Fort Carillon, and to invade Canada, his first Step was to take Possession of the Falls, on the Side of that Lake. He remained in this Position till the 6th of July, when a Body of the English appeared upon the Lake. He then crossed over the River from the Falls, with all his Troops, and came to encamp under Fort Carillon, where he had already marked out his Entrenchments, and sent out different Detachments to harass the Enemy in their landing. The Marquis de Montcalm, when he arrived at his Camp before Carillon, had only 2800 French, with 450 of the Colony Troops. On the 7th, in the Morning, the whole Army was employed in throwing up Entrenchments, and making Barricades of Trunks of Trees before them. The same Day in the Evening, to our great Joy, there arrived 400 chosen Men, under the Command of the Chevalier de Levis. The Marquis de Montcalm committed the Defence [sic] of the Right Wing to the Chevalier de Levis, that of the Left to M. de Bourlamaque, and reserved to himself the Command of the Center, that he might be the better able to give his Orders. The Army lay all Night upon their Arms. On the 8th, at break of Day, the Generale was beat, that the Troops might know their Posts. After this Motion, the Army returned to work upon the Entrenchments. About Ten in the Morning the Enemy’s Light Troops appeared on the other Side of the River, and made a great Firing, but at such a Distance that we continued our Work without returning it. About Half an Hour after Twelve their Army came down upon us, and all our Troops were instantly at their Posts. Our Left was first attacked by two Columns; the Center was attacked at the same Time by a third Column; and a fourth attacked our Right. As the Colony Troops and the Canadians were not attacked, they came out of their Trenches and took the Column in Flank that attacked our Right, falling on them with great Courage and Fury. About five o’Clock [sic] the Column which attacked the Center, and that which attacked the Right, fell upon the salliant [sic] Angle of the Trenches, where our Danger became very great; but it was timely assisted and the Enemy met with a Resistance that damped their Ardour [sic]. About Six o’Clock [sic], the two Columns of the Right abandoned their Attack, and came to make another Attempt towards the Salliant [sic] Angle and the Centre [sic], and afterwards on the Left, but they were every where repulsed. Between Six and Seven their Army made their Retreat, favoured [sic] by the Fire of their Light Troops, which lasted till Night. The Darkness of the Night, the Fatigue of our Troops, and the Smallness of their Number, the Strength of the Enemy, who were still greatly superior to us, and the Nature of the Ground, would not permit us to pursue the English. We expected them to return to the Attack the next Day, but they had abandoned the Falls and the Carrying-Place; and the Chevalier de Levis, who was sent out to reconnoiter, saw nobody. We reckon the Loss of the Enemy, according to the Report of the Prisoners, to be about 4000 killed and wounded, among whom are several Officers of Distinction. Lord Howe and Major-General Spitall are among the Slain. Five hundred Indians, who were in the English Army, remained behind the whole Time, and would not engage in the Action. On our Side there were 12 Officers, and 92 Soldiers, killed in the Field of Battle; and 25 Officers, with 248 Soldiers, wounded. In a Skirmish on the 6th of July we had a Captain and two Lieutenants killed; a Captain and three Lieutenants made Prisoners; and 184 Canadians killed or taken Prisoners.’”

Source: "9. Paris Sept. 23, The following relation has been received of the Action near Fort Carillon [Ticonderoga] in the Month of July Last." *The Ipswich Journal* (Ipswich, Suffolk, England). October 7, 1759. p. 2.

Anonymous (3)

[French account published in a period newspaper]

"^{7th} In the morning the entire army was employed constructing abbatis; the men at work were protected by some grenadier companied and volunteers . . . Our left wing was composed of the battalions of La Sarre and Languedoc; it rested on an escarpment eighty Toises distant from the River of the Falls; an abbatis crowned the summit of the escarpment and flanked an opening guarded by two companies of Bernard's and Duprat's volunteers. Six cannon were posted behind this opening. The right was guarded by La Reine, Bearn and Guyenne; it also was protected by a declivity, the pitch whereof was less precipitous than that on the left. The troops of the Colony and the Canadians occupied the table land between this declivity and the River St. Frederic, and intrenched themselves there with some abbatis. The cannon of the fort was directed both against this part and the place where the landing might be made, to the left of our intrenchment" (p. 742).

"The centre, preserving the summit of the heights, followed the sinuosities of the ground, and all the parts reciprocally flanked each other. The battalions of Royal Rousillon and the first Berry Battalion composed the centre each battalion had in its rear a company of grenadiers, a picket of reserve along the whole of the front of the line. Intrenchments had to be constructed of logs placed one on top of the other, having felled trees in front, whose branches were cut and sharpened . . . On the evening of the 7th . . . arrival of 400 picked men . . . Chevalier de Levis had charge of the defense of the right; M de Bourlamaque of that of the left" (p. 743).

"^{8th} The generale was beat at the break of day, and all troops reconnoitered their posts; one portion was employed in completing the abbatis, whilst the other was constructing the batteries. At ten o'clock in the forenoon, the enemy's light infantry showed itself on the opposite side of the river and opened a considerable fire, which, the distance being too great, was ineffectual in preventing us continuing the work. At half an hour after noon their army deployed against us. Our guards advanced, the volunteers and grenadier companies fell back and reentered the lines without the loss of a single man. The workmen and all the troops ran, on the first signal, to their arms and to their posts. Our left was first attacked by two columns, one of which endeavoring to turn the intrenchment found itself under the fire of the regiment of La Sarre; the other attacked a salient angle between Languedoc and Berry, [text apparently missing, but footnote adds: "the centre, where the Royal Rousillion was posted, was attacked almost at the same time by a third column"] and a fourth column attacked the right between the battalions of Bearn and La Reine. Captain Raimond [sic], who was in command of the troops that had gone to the level land alongside the River St. Frederic, not being attacked, made a sortie from its intrenchments, took the column attacking our right flank and charged it with intrepidity. About 5 o'clock in the evening, the column which had attacked the Royal Rousillin battalions, threw itself on the salient angle of the intrenchment defended by the battalions of Guyenne and by the left of Bearn; the other of the enemy's columns, which at first had attacked the battalions of La Reine and Bearn, fell upon it also, and the attack became murderous. The Marquis de Montcalm and Chevalier de Levis perceiving it, the former ran thither with some troops of the reserve, and the latter with some detachments from the right. The English, repeatedly repulsed, again made

[French 1758]

another attempt, which had no better success, and were obliged to prepare for a retreat, which was covered by the fire of the light infantry that continued until night" (p. 743).

Source: "French printed Account of the Battle of Ticonderoga: Journal of the affair that took place in Canada on the 8th July 1758, between the King's troops, commanded by the Marquis de Montcalm and those of England, which to the number of twenty thousand men, have been routed by three thousand two hundred and fifty French." *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Volume X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp. 741-744.

Anonymous (4)

[Account in newspaper]

" . . . early next morning of the 8th some Officers were sent out to Reconnoitre. The Information they gave was, that the Enemy were assiduously employ'd in forming Entrenchments from Side to Side of the Neck in Front of the Fort—That at present the Entrenchments might easily Forced—but that if we suffered'd and Delay 'twou'd become impossible . . . the Pickquets were order'd out and led, commanded by Grenadiers, and these by the Battalions. The rest of the Provincials kept Possession of some high Ground in the Rear . . . The Troops with most steady Bravery attack'd the Lines, were repuls'd and retur'd to the Charge several Times—But the Intelligence as to the Incompleteness of the Lines, and the Ease with which they might be forced prov'd a Mistake."

Source: "Boston July 24." *Boston Gazette* (Boston, Massachusetts), July 24, 1758. p. 1.

Anonymous (5)

[Translation of a letter believed to have been written by an officer of the 1st Battalion of 60th Royal American Regiment to his regimental commander, Col. Heneri Bouquet, dated "Camp Lake George July 14, 1758"]

"We went first of all to reconnoitre and found that the enemy had abandoned all his entrenched posts—after rendering them untenable so far as time permitted—as far as Fort Ticonderoga (or Carillon) where they had a good entrenchment. This entrenchment consisted of several broad trees laid lengthways one on top of the other to a height of 7 or 8 feet and pierced with a double row of loopholes. The highest row was topped with sandbags, making a third line of fire. This entrenchment was perfectly flanked and beyond range of musketry fire. A large abattis of trees fixed in front along the whole length made the work still more formidable; a fact which we only realized to our misfortune. At 2 p.m. all regiments except three marched to take possession of the post of vantage on the heights near the Saw-mill, a mile and a half from Carillon. At 4 o'clock they encountered 350 Frenchmen on the hill half-way between the landing place and the Mill . . ." (p. 11).

"On the morning of the 8th orders were given for the construction of two rafts for the conveyance in each of two 6-pounder guns. They were intended to go upstream and either take the entrenchments in rear or enfilade them. But unfortunately the duty of reconnoitering to ascertain whether the thing was feasible had been forgotten, for at about 1 p. m., after ascending the stream and passing the point F, they immediately came under the fire of the guns of the Fort, which opened upon them with so much effect that they were compelled to return to their starting place. It would be a good thing if the plan could have been carried out before losing so many men for nothing. The Fort would have been in our hands at this moment" (p. 12).

[British/Provincial 1758]

[British Officer 1758]

“Having decided to attack the entrenchment, Major Proby of the 55th regiment, marched at the head of all the piquets, and of the supporting Grenadiers. He was followed by all the regular regiments and some of the Provincial, but instead of making a simultaneous attack as he ought to have done in pursuance of his orders, they attacked in single file. Our people had the utmost difficulty in penetrating the abattis. The passage through which destroyed our order. An hour later a report was made that the entrenchment was impregnable, and that it would be better to retire in good order, but no definite reply was received on the subject. Orders were sent to all the regiments to advance: they were brought into action, but all was useless. The French were invisible except as regards the tops of their hats, and maintained a terrible and continuous fire. All who tried to approach within 15 paces met certain death. In spite of this a very hot fire was maintained on both sides up to half-past six, when one regiment after another retired to our camp, which I had entrenched of my own accord on seeing how matters were going” (p.12).

Source: “Ticonderoga 1758.” By Lewis Butler. *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research.* Vol. 1, No. 1 (September 1921). pp. 10-14.

- Note: For the original French version of this document see: “Detailed Statement of Operations at Ticonderoga 1758 (Unsigned letter dated ‘Camp at Lake George July 14th, 1758’)” in *Pennsylvania Archives Selected and Arranged From Original Documents in the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth Conformably to Acts of the Assembly February 15, 1851, to March 1, 1852.* Volume III. By Samuel Hazard. Joseph Severs & Co., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (1853). pp. 472-475.

Anonymous (6)

[British/Provincial 1758]

“New-York July 14. By Letters from Albany we learn, that three deserters from the French, were com over to our people at the Lake, and report, that in the engagement on the 8th instant, a French general, the third in command in Canada, three Colonels and several private men were killed in the entrenchments notwithstanding their uncommon depth; and that Monsieur Montcalm was so certain of being defeated, had our troops been lead to the charge a second time, that he ordered a number of battoes to be kept in readiness to take the garrison of Ticonderoga, as they intended to abandon the fort and entrenchments, as soon as our people had brought up their battering cannon.”

Source: “New-York July 14.” *The Leeds Intelligencer and Yorkshire Advertiser* (Leeds, West Yorkshire, England), September 12, 1758. p. 3.

Anonymous (7)

[British/Provincial 1758]

“...at 10 o’Clock the next Morning the Army marched towards the Fort, where they found a large Entrenchment; Orders were then given to March up and force the same, no Man was to discharge his Piece till Orders from his Officers, upon Pain of being immediately shot, which was not ‘till They came close to the Breast Work, which was strictly obey’d, though an Hundred were shot down before they could come so close to the Trenches as they were order’d, for the Ground was so clogg’d up with Logs, Trees and Brush by the Enemy to impede our March, that the Troops could not march regular and fast, and as they marched three deep they had enough to do to fill up the vacant Places which were made by the Dead and Wounded, which fell heavier on the Officers than Soldiers.-The Slaughter lasted from 12 o’Clock till after two, when the Enemy struck their Colours, and hoisted English; our Troops thinking they would surrender the Fort marched up close to their Entrenchments, on which the Enemy gave them a most dreadful Fire, from their Cannon, small Arms and Hand Grandoes, which swept down great

Numbers of our Men, especially the Regulars-Another Deceit the Enemy put upon us saw they raised their Hatts above the Trenches, which our People fired at; they having Ports to fire through, and were covered by the Sod; that we did them but little Damage, excepting some of their Hats being shot to Pieces.-At 4 o'Clock, P.M. the Army retreated, carrying off as many of the Wounded as they could come at, bringing off the Cannon, &c. and destroying 300 Barrels of Pork and Flour, to prevent the Enemy's having any Advantage of it and by Sun down we came off and left the Ground to the Enemy . . .”

Source: “Boston July 24, Extract of a Letter from Saratoga to a Gentleman in the Town, dated July 12, 1758.” *New Hampshire Gazette* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire), July 28, 1758. p. 1.

- **Note:** John Bremner, an officer with the 55th Regiment of Foot, and a participant in the battle, remarked that the above report was: “the Best account I can yet collect of the Battle or rather slaughter that has Happened to our army Neer Carrilong on Saturday the 8th of July Inst. 1758.” Bremner copied this article, although with a few changes here and there, into his own journal. See: *Journal of John Bremner*. Ms. New York Historical Society, Patricia D. Klingenstein Library, New York, New York.

Anonymous (8)

[British 1758]

[A letter dated “Lake George 10 July 1758,” received by Dr. Midleton, transcribed by Alexander Colden, of New York, and sent to Major Halke, Brigade Major, Carlisle]

“ . . . The morning of the fatal 8th, Broad Street with an engineer was sent to reconnoiter the French Lines; they soon returned with the following account – That the enemy was encamped on rising ground about ½ mile from the Fort, but not fortified, only a few Logs laid one on another as a breast Work. Upon this Intelligence it was thought proper to attempt storming the enemy lines, without loss of time, and immediately the whole army marched and began the attack at 9 o'clock a.m. I have not time to give you the order of battle: let it suffice that our army was repulsed thrice and as often returned to the charge in the space of 4 hours. They were obliged to retreat at the last with the loss of 2000 of our best men and officers. This is only my own opinion, no return being made as yet. Our Intelligence was bad, for the French has a regular entrenchment faced with logs; their trench 20 ft. broad, and parapet in proportion. No Regiment has suffered so much as the Highlanders, part of which got upon the top of the French Lines every time an attack was made, and drove the French from where they entered, but not being properly supported they were often cut off as they entered . . .”

Source: “Eye-Witnesses’ Accounts of the British Repulse at Ticonderoga.” By C. E. Lart. *The Canadian Historical Review*. Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1921). pp. 360-363.

Anonymous (9)

[British Provincial Officer 1758]

[Journal: Served in Col. Jedediah Preble’s Massachusetts Regiment]

“July 7th We marched from where we camped to the end of the Lake where it empties into Lake Champlain which is about one Mile from the Fort brought up 3 of our Brass Cannon and hove up a Breast work for our fortification” (p. 116).

“July 8th Marched on the Army and about 1 o'Clock in the afternoon the Battle began at the French lines and continued a constant firing on both sides until sunset at which time we retreated and retired into our breast work. Our loss killed and wounded and missing is two thousand men. Their number to our is unknown to us. I had of my company killed on the spot and four wounded” (p. 116).

Source: "Journal of a Provincial Officer in the Campaign in Northern New York in 1758." *The Historical Magazine* (aka. *Dawson's Historical Magazine*). Second Series. Vol. X, No. 2 (August 1871). pp. 113-122.

Anonymous (10)

[British 1758]

[*A letter dated "Lake George 12th July." Transcribed by Alexander Colden of New York and sent to Major Halket, Brigade Major, Carlisle*]

" . . . by attacking a French intrenchment without Cannon, we lost all our fine views; however I hope we will soon have at them again. Never was there in the World troops behaved with greater coolness and resolution than our in spite of all their disadvantages, nor never was there in the World such a piece of ground to fight on. It was so very bad that after we were within gun shot the enemy might easily fire 10 Rounds before we got up the length of their Intrenchments and that in the face of such a fire of small arms, Wall pieces, and musquets as I never saw before (and I think I have seen the smartest that happened all last war) but alas after we came to the trenches we found them above 6 ft. high without a posy of getting in, and so had the same fire to stand in coming back--This work might have lasted about 4 hours during which time the six Regular Regiments lost 1526 man besides 97 of our best officers killed and wounded. I am far from being surprised that we lost so few for such a damnable fire no man in this army ever saw before: the provincials lost very few. Except the York Regiment who lost some; true indeed the Provincials never were engaged. They came up to sustain us, but they began to fire at such a distance they killed several of our men, and yet upon the whole they behaved extremely well . . . "

" . . . The Indians we had with us who viewed the affair at a distance, allowed us much more bravery than the French, but say we are not half so cunning . . . "

Source: "Eye-Witnesses' Accounts of the British Repulse at Ticonderoga." By C. E. Lart. *The Canadian Historical Review*. Volume 2, No. 4 (December 1921). pp. 360-363.

Anonymous (11)

[British/Provincial 1758]

[*Extract of a Letter from Lake George July 26*]

"Many of the Wounded in the late Repulse, are recovering, and some got perfectly well. You may know that Major Campbell of the Highlanders died at Fort Edward on the 17th, and on the 18th at the Camp, the principal Engineer of our Army, Mr. Clerk; both these Gentlemen died of their Wounds in the late Storm . . . Should the extraordinary Actions of the Person, which we are to give a Relation of, pass unnoticed, it might render us culpable, in not doing Justice to Merit.—William Smith, a Private, of Capt. John Whiting's Company, in the Rohde Island Regiment, when the Attack was made at Ticonderoga, conceal'd himself under the Enemy's Breast Work, and when any Opportunity offer'd, he improv'd it, by discharging his Piece, with which he killed and wounded many. So soon as discover'd, and by fatal Experience, found to proceed from a dangerous Adversary, a Frenchman step'd upon the Parapet, and turning the Muzzle of his Gun, shower'd a Brace of Balls, which penetrated his Shoulder, and enter'd his Body. This Treatment greatly exasperated him; but when he had recover'd from the Shock which it gave, he was determined to destroy as many more of his Enemies as possible; loaded, and with great Difficulty rais'd himself upon the Lines, and kill'd one; upon which another endeavour'd to get rid of him, by aiming a blow at his Head with a Tomahawk, which with more Fortitude and Dexterity, than Strength, he avoided, by opposing his Hatchet to prevent it, and immediately dispach'd him also, the Hatchet entering his Skull, which requir'd some Time to

force it out, for further Execution. A Regular Officer, observing so much Bravery, sent two of his Men to bring him off, with this Expression, “*Tis a Pity so brave a Fellow should be made a Sacrifice of.*” He is now alive, and in all Probability will recover, which his Resentment may greatly facilitate, as his only Ambition to survive is, to be in a Capacity to take a greater Revenge.”

Source: “Extract of a Letter from Lake George July 26.” *Boston Evening-Post* (Boston, Massachusetts), August 14, 1758. p. 3.

Anonymous (12)

[French 1758]

[Document entitled: “Condition of New France in the Month of May 1758, and Extract of what has occurred there of the most interest during that year.”]

“The plan of the intrenchment on the right was determined, and the principal points of the abati on the hill fixed. M. de Bourlamaque, who had been to reconnoitre the ground between the Falls and the hill, had proposed one somewhat farther into the wood, the left of which rested on the River of the Falls, and the right on a small marsh which discharges into the River St. Frederic; but after having examined the whole, that of the hill was preferred to it for the solider in the woods, who cannot see what is passing behind him, is often tempted to believe that he is turned, which may make him miss. Besides retreat then became more doubtful than on the hill, where he perceived at a glance, the fort by which he was protected and the whole of the intervening ground, as well as everything that might pass on that side . . .” (p. 893-894).

“On the 6th: The enemy being landed, axes were distributed to the 2nd battalion of Berry, to construct the projected abati, the workmen of the artillery and engineers were adjoined to them, and on that day it was advanced more than one-third to the hill” (p. 895).

“7th The abati on the height was continued; on the summit a parapet was constructed of piece upon piece; the whole was finished about three o’clock in the afternoon. Axes were afterwards distributed among the Canadians to protect themselves by a similar abatis at the bottom, on the right of the hill . . . The bottom, which was about five hundred toises wide, was confided to the troops of the Marine and Canadians. As they were only four hundred and some men, they could do but very little throughout the day; in the evening, judging by the fires, the enemy had passed the Falls, and had reached within 7 or 800 toises of our intrenchments. During the night, some shots were fired at our advanced guards; care was taken to keep some detachments outside the intrenchment, and the fires were lighted in advance. The eight pickets of the troops of the Line destined for Corlar, arrived between 8 or 9 o’clock at night” (p. 895).

“8th Chevalier de Levis landed at day-break and went to reconnoitre his post at the intrenchment. The troops of the Marine and Canadians continued their abatis; but as there were several alarms, they were, as yet, only within 100 toises, or thereabouts, of the height at 11 o’clock in the forenoon” (p. 895). “. . . The 2nd battalion of Berry, under M.de Tresseson’s order, was to remain at the fort . . . his grenadier company with the seven other battalions, amounting in all to two thousand eight or nine hundred men guarded the intrenchment of the height, the extent of which was about 300 and some toises. On the left 25 toises from the height, was the River of the Falls; between the one and the other was a very steep slope taken in flank by a branch of the intrenchment, and in front by a detachment of volunteers and the cannon of the fort, seven pieces of which bear on that point. In front of the height is a gorge with a double slope, very steep, of which the slope near the intrenchment was protected by a strong abati that crowned the whole; on the right, the bottom of which I have spoken, was confided to the care of the troops of the Marine and Canadians, and may be 500 toises from the hill to the river. This troop had its left resting on

the height and its right on a point of wood, near the opening where the abatis then terminated; between the height; between the height and that troop was a pretty steep slope, with a" (p. 895-896). "About one o'clock our detachments, and grenadiers, who were in advance, perceived the enemy approaching in three columns; they all came in without any confusion. The signal was given, and the following instant the three columns were seen defiling; the 1st towards the left of the intrenchment, the 2nd against the centre; the 3rd, which appeared the strongest, marching towards the bottom, on the right of the hill. Some Indians and Rangers went in front as guides. Chevalier de Levis, who perceived them, ordered M. de Raymond's troop to make a sortie by the wood, in order to outflank that column. It succeeded so perfectly that its fire, with that of La Reine and Bearn, on the right of the hill, obliged that column to throw itself on the right, in order to avoid a double flank fire. Then all found themselves together on the hill which opened and received the most brisk fire imaginable" (p. 896).

"... the enemy kept constantly, until half-past three o'clock, at the foot of the abatis, vainly trying to clear it, but seeing that was not possible, ascended the hill and reentered the wood in order to rally. 'Twas then only a simple discharge of musketry from one side to the other until ¼ past 4 o'clock, when they again showed themselves, but not engage in such numbers as the first time; then the fire became hotter than ever, and so continued until half-past 5'o'clock, at which time the enemy commenced to retreat. From the commencement of the attack, munitions of war continued to be carried from the fort to the intrenchment by means of horses; but as there was not sufficient number of them, a portion of the 2nd battalion of Berry, with the workmen were employed in this transportation which caused us the loss of 30 to 40 men, the enemy continually firing at them. When the retreat of the enemy commenced, the fire slackened by degrees and entirely ceased at ½ past 7 o'clock in the evening" (p. 896).

"We learned by 38 @ 40 prisoners taken during the action in the sortie on the right, that the enemy had brought to the attack from 13 to 14,000 men of their elite troops; that the General's design was to return with the entire army 20,400 men, next morning . . . Preparations were made in consequence. On the following night four cannon were placed on the right, and six on the left of the hill" (p. 896).

Source: "Condition of New France in the Month of May 1758, and Extract of what has occurred there of the most interest during that year." *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York.* Volume X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp. 890-897.

Anonymous (13)

[English 1758]

*[Account translated from a letter written in French dated Camp at Lake George July 14, 1758.
Original Ms. in the Pennsylvania Archives]*

"Having a few hours to myself, I think I cannot employ them better than in giving you a correct account of what has occurred between the 5th inst., the day on which we proceeded hence on the unfortunate expedition against Fort Carillion . . . I enclose you a little plan, hastily drawn up to render what follows more intelligible . . . Fort Ticonderoga, or Carillon, in front of which was a strong intrenchment, consisting of a number of large trees, laid lengthwise one over the other, 7 @ 8 feet in height and pierced with a double row of loop-holes. The upper side was covered with bags of earth, by which arrangement there was a triple fire. The intrenchment flanked itself perfectly well, and was impregnable to musketry. A huge abbatis of trees which extended outside the entire length, rendered it more formidable. This was not ascertained until after our misfortune" (p. 734-735).

“8th In the morning two rafts were ordered to be constructed to receive each two 6-pounders, which were to descend the river and take the intrenchment in the rear or enfilade it; but unfortunately, people forgot to reconnoiter whether ‘twas feasible, for as soon as it got to be near one o’clock in the afternoon, and the point was passed, they were under the guns of the fort, which did not fail to play on them in such a style that out men found it prudent to return . . . ” (p. 735). “After having resolved to attack the intrenchment, Major Proby, of the 55th regiment, marched the first at the head of all the pickets and of the grenadiers, who were to sustain them; he was followed by all the Regular regiment and some Provincials; but instead of attacking at all at once, and there were no other orders, they attacked according as the defiled; our men had all the trouble imaginable in passing the abbatis of trees, in which act all order was lost. An hour afterwards, t’was reported that the intrenchment was impregnable; and that the best course would be to withdraw in order, but no positive answer was returned on this head; all the regiments were ordered to advance; they were led to battle, but all in vain. The French were invisible; nothing was to be seen of them but a small bit of their caps, whilst they were keeping up a terrible and continual fire. Every man who whished to approach nearer than 15 paces was irreparably dead. Notwithstanding a; that, a most brisk fire was kept up on all sides until half-past six, when one regiment after another retired to the camp, which I intrenched of my own accord, after having seen how the thing was going” (p. 736).

Source: “Another Account of the Operations at Ticonderoga.” *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Volume X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp. 734-736.

Anonymous (14)

[French/Canadian 1758]

[Published in 1844; it is unclear if this is a firsthand account or not; but it appears to be a description of the Canadian Militia’s point of view.]

“ . . . M. le marquis de Montcalm fut tourjours avec ells jusqu’au montent ou on arrivia sur les hautures de Carillon ou il fit camper son armee aux environs ou il voulait faire ses retranchements et ordonna aux Canadiens de prendre le bos du terrain pour leur campement. Toute l;armee resta sous les armes et boueha au bivouac.”

“Le lendemain au martin 7, M de Montcalm de, de Bourlmaque, de Pontteroy [sic], ingenieur en chef du Canada, et Desandrouin, inginieur a la suite des troupes de terre, furent les premiers sur le terrain margue pour faire le retranchement. Tous les officers montrerent un zele qui ne se peut exprimer les soldats y repondirent, et travaillerent avec activite. Ces retranchements etaient d’arbes ronds approaches les uns contre les autres et eleves d’environ cinq pieds, ayant par devant de grosses branches coupers en sifflet les unes sur les autres de facon que cela fesait l’effect de chevaux de frise; l’on avait separe le terrain aux sept bataillone; la Reine a La droite, la Sarre a la gauche; et les autres chacun a leur rang; c’etait a qui ferait le mieux les retranchement et le plus promptement, croyant a tout moment voir l’ennemi arriver. On fit aussides abatis de gros arbes, afin de voir deboucher l’ennemi a decouvert et de plus loin. Les Canadiens commencerent a se retrancher le 7, a midi, n’ayant pu avoir de haches plutot; leur retrenchment perenait au bas de la petite montagne ou etait le regiment de la reine, un peu en arrier en le fesant continuer a la riviere de Saint Frederic. On travailla avec force a le perfectionner jusqu’au landemain midi. On avait commence a faire une batterie de quatre pieces

de cannon entre le regiment de la reine et les brigades canadiennes, mais les enemis ne donnerent pas le temps de l'achevier. . .”

[Two paragraphs omitted]

“ . . . Le 8 a'midi, on entendit le feu commencer sur les gardes advances qui se replierent en bon ordre sans perdre de monde, sur le regiment se la Sarre, les autres gards rentrerent ausi sans confusion. Les Anglais venaient sur 4 colonnes formers de 14,000 homes, trois sur la hauteur et une sur le penchant se la cote. Celle de la droite attaqua le premiere notre gauche, et dans peu le feu devint general. M. de Levis etait a la droit, M. de Boulamaque a la gauche, M. le marquis de Montcalm s'etait place au centre: ce general avait en reserre les huit compagnies de grenadiers, et des picquets pour le porter au besoin pendant le combat. La colonne du penchant de la cote, ou etait le regiment de Montagnards ecossaise qui venait Presque e front des Canadiens a leur premiere ou seconde decharge se replia entierement sur la reine, en montant la montagne pour forcer ces retranchments; cette colonne essuyale fu du regiment de le reine en tete et cehui des Canasiens en echarpe. Jamis combat ne fut si opiniatre et dura si longtemps; c'etait un feu des plans vifs et continue de la droit a la gauche. M. le marquis de Montcalm ne parut jamais si grand que dans cette journee se montrant partout avec un air gai et assure, et s'exposant us plus grand danger comme le moindre soldat, en fessant mouvoir sa reserve pour fortifier les parties qui etaient le plus en danger. M. de Levis et de Boulamaque ont combattu en heros, en meprissant les dangers; ledernier a ete blesse a l'epaule tres dangerreusement; pendant le combat M de Levi sui etait a portee des Canadiens en fit venier a differentes fois des retranchements pour fortifier les endroits qui lui paraissaient affaiblis; apres quoi il envoya le Sieur d'Hert, capitaine aide-major de la reine pour engager les Canadiens a faire des sorties sur cette colonne au penchant de la cote, languelle combattait tourjours avec acharnement. Les 4 brigades canadiennes commandees par sur de Raymond, St. Ours, Lanaudiere et Gaspe, alternativement, firent des sorties sur cette colone en la prenant par derriere et lui tue rant beaucoup de monde. 400 Sauvages, le majeure partie Iroquois, des cinq nations etaient sur une petite hauteur a examiner le combat; ils ne tirerent sur nous que quelques coups de fusils. Sur les 4 heurs le feu se ralentit un peu. Le general anglaise Abercrombie avait laisse une reserve de 6000 homes a la chute. Il en fit venir cinq mille qui joints aux autres recommencерent un feu opiniatre, mais ils trouverent une resistance aussi forte que la premiere fois. L'officer tirait autant que le grenadier; tout le monde s'encourageait avec des cris de vive le roi, qui annoncaient la victoire. M. de Tressesson, commandant du second battalion de Berry, etait reste au fort, il ne fallait pas moins que son activitie pour faire fournir les munitions de guerre aux combattants; car le danger etait grand pour se render du fort aux retranchements. Il y eut une vingtaire d'hommes tues en escortant les poudres et balles. Le Sieur de Louvicon, officer d'artillerie, qui commandait une batterie du fort dirigea sur la riviere de la Chute, vit paraitre plusieures barges anglaises, il fit feu dessus, en desempara deux, les autres se retirement , et ne parurent plus. Le chevalier de Levis sur les 8 hures du soir, voyant une grande fusillage de la part de l'ennemi du cote de la montage, fit crier a tous les Canadiens de sortir de leurs retranchements pour aller faire reculer ceux qui fesaient encore ferme dans cette partie. Ils prirent la fute apres quelques descharges; les Canadiens rentrerent a 9 heures du soir dans leurs retranchements; depuis un heure apris midi jusqu'a ce moment, ils prirent 30 Anglais prisonniers dand les differentes sorties. Ce combat a dure 8 heures sans interruption . . .”

Source: *Relation de la défense des retranchements sur la hauteur de Carillon, à environ six cents toises du fort, le 8 juillet 1758.* Published [Quebec: s.n. 1844].

**Note: A more complete version of this document was located by Shelly Naud at:
[Relation de la défense des retranchements sur l... - Image 8 - Canadiana Online](#)

Translation by Shelly Naud

“The Marquis of Montcalm was always with [the rearguard] until [he] arrived on the Heights of Carillon where he had his army camped in the vicinity where he wanted to make his entrenchments and ordered the Canadians to take the lower ground for their encampment. All kept weapons at hand and bivouacked.”

“The next morning at 7, M de Montcalm, de Bourlmaque, Pontteroy [sic], Canada's chief engineer, and Desandrouin, an engineer following the ground troops, were the first at the marked area to work on defenses. All the officers showed an inexpressiblethe soldiers responded to and worked activly. These defenses were tree trunks set against each other about five feet high with a pile of large sharpened so that it resembled a ‘cheval de frise.’ The area was separated among the seven battalions; the Queen [La Reine] had the right, La Sarre had the left; and each of the others according to their rank; it was a race to see who would build the best defenses all believed that the enemy would arrive at any moment. Large trees were also felled, in order to see the enemy arrive more clearly and at a greater distance. The Canadians began to work on the defences on the 7th, at noon, having been unable to have axes earlier; their defenses began at the bottom of the small mountain where the Queen's regiment, a little behind it one had it continue to the River Saint Frederic. We worked hard to perfect it until noon of the next day. We had begun to make a battery of four pieces of cannon between the Queen's regiment and the Canadian brigades, but the enemy did not give time to complete it.”

[Two paragraphs omitted]

“On the 8th noon, we heard the fire begin on the advance guards who retreated in good order without losing any people, on the La Sarre, the other guards also fell back without confusion. The English came in 4 columns of 14,000 men, three on the height and one on the slope of the hill. The one on the right attacked our left first, and in little time the fire became general. M. de Levis was at the right, Mr. de Boulamaque at the left, Mr. Marquis de Montcalm placed himself in the center, this general had in reserve eight companies of grenadiers, and picquets to carry it if necessary during the fight. The column coming [uphill or along the slope of the hill] were the regiment of Scottish Mountaineers who nearly met with the front of Canadians, who at their first or second discharge, folded back completely on the Queen, climbing the mountain to force these defenses; this column faced the fire of the regiment of the Queen in front and that of the Canadians from the side. Never was a combat so stubborn and lasted so long, there was sharp and continual fire from right to left. Mr. Marquis de Montcalm never appeared as great as on this day, showing himself everywhere with a cheerful and assured air, and exposing himself to the greatest danger as the least soldier, as he moved his reserve to strengthen the parts that were most in danger. M. de Levis and de Boulamaque fought as heroes, scorning the dangers; the last was injured in the shoulder very dangerously; during the fight de Levis was near the Canadians and several times had them fortify places that seemed to him to be weakened; after which he sent the Sieur d'Hert, the Queen's assistant-major captain, to lead the

Canadians in making outings against the column on the slope of the hill who continued to fight fiercely. The four Canadian brigades commanded by the sieurs de Raymond, St. Ours, Lanaudiere and Gaspe, in turn made sorties against this column, taking [them] from behind and killing many people. 400 savages, most of them Iroquois, of the five nations were on a small height examining the battle; they only shot a few rifle shots. Approaching 4 o'clock the fire slowed down a little. The English general Abercrombie had left a reserve of 6000 men at the falls. He brought in five thousand of them, who joined the others, and again began a stubborn fire, but they found a resistance as strong as the first time. The officer fired as much as the grenadier; everyone encouraged themselves with cries of 'Long live the king,' which presaged a victory. Mr. de Trecesson, commander of Berry's second battalion, had remained at the fort, but his activities were necessary to furnish the combatants with ammunition; for the danger was great to travel from the fort to the defensive positions. Some twenty men were killed while (delivering) the powder and bullets. The Sieur de Louvicon, an artillery officer, who commanded a battery from the fort directed at the Fall River [the La Chute], saw several English barges appear, fired on them, disabling two, the others retreated, and no longer appeared. DeLevis at 8 o'clock in the evening, seeing a great fusillade on the part of the enemy from the side of the mount, cried to all Canadians to leave their defensive works to figh back those who were still holding firm in that area. They took filght after a few discharges; the Canadians returned at 9 o'clock at night to their defensive works; from one o'clock until that moment, they had taken 30 Englishmen prisoner during their various sorties. This fight lasted 8 hours without interruption . . ."

Anonymous (15)

[Published letter dated "Oswego, August 30, 1758"]

"The Enemy at Ticonderoga, we hear, from two Deserters come into Fort William Henry, have lately been considerably reinforced; have 8 Battalions complete, besides 15 Companies of Troupes des Colonies, Canadians and Indians; an Entrenchment 15 Feet thick, and a Ditch 10 Feet broad, overlooked by three Batteries . . ."

Source: "A brief Account of the Expedition against Fort Frontenac, in a Letter from an Officer in the New York Regiment, to his Colonel, dated Oswego, August 30, 1758." *The Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), September 21, 1758. p. 3.

Anonymous (16)

[Published letter dated "Rogers' Island near Fort-Edward Sept. 11."]

" . . . came in here Lieut. Holmes of the Rangers, from a Scout to Ticonderoga with about 7 Men; who informs, that he lay very near the Fort, and says that there is a very large Encampment there, and that the Enemy have erected some Block-Houses at their Breast-Work . . ."

Source: "Extract of a Letter from Rogers' Island near Fort-Edward Sept. 11." *The Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), October 12, 1758. p. 2.

Anonymous (17)

[Published letter dated Albany "Oct. 15, 1758"]

"As to any Thing being again attempted against Ticonderoga this Fall, it is wholly laid aside . . ." [also in the report of a scout] "He . . . says, that if Ticonderoga is taken, it must be by Way of South-Bay. He saw upwards of a Thousand Camps, and Huttts, outside the Fort; they

[English Officer 1758]

[English 1758]

have greatly added to the Strength of the Fort, having made three Trenches one within another, which extends from Lake to Lake (as the Fort stands on a Point of Land) so convenient, that if they should be drove out of one Trench, they can retreat to the next, and so to the Third; and each of them, to all, Appearance, very strong."

Source: "Extract of a Letter from Albany dated Oct. 15, 1758." *Boston News-Letter* (Boston, Massachusetts), October 26, 1758. p 1.

Anonymous (18)

[Published Letter]

"A Gentleman in the Army at Lake George, writes, that they are assured there, that the Force at present at Ticonderoga under M. de Levey [sic], consists of the Regiments of Lesar [sic] and Languedoc, with the first Battalion of Berry's Regiment; and a Number of Canadians and Indians, not exactly known."

Source: "Extract of a Letter from our Correspondent at St. Kitts, Dated June 15, 1759." *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), July 15, 1759. p. 2.

Anonymous (19)

[Published Letter]

"Captain Luttridge has brought three French Prisoners, who report, That there were 2000 men at Crown Point and Ticonderoga, that Monsieurs Montcalm and Vadril [sic] were both gone to Quebec, and that Monsieur Levy [sic] was to command at Ticonderoga this Summer."

Source: "Extract of a Letter from Albany dated June 10." *New York Mercury* (New York City), June 18, 1759. p. 3.

Anonymous (20)

[Published letter dated Crown Point, August 8, 1759"]

[Probable English 1759]

[July 22, 1759] "We then took Possession of our Camp Ground, opposite their Breast-work, and lay all Night on our Arms, when the French, kept a continual Firing from their Breast-work on the Hill, and other lurking Places they had in the Woods, but did us little Damage. On the 23rd of July, early in the Morning, the whole marched, in Order of Battle, up to the Enemy's Breast-works, that were near the Fort, of which we took Possession, without the Loss of a Man. We immediately began to throw up a Banquette of Logs, which rendered their Works as serviceable to us as if we had made them ourselves, they being so prodigious strong, and upwards of three Miles in Length, that the Enemy, tho' they kept a continual Fire could not make the least Breach in them; so that what they erected for their Strength, became our chief Support, and was the Means of saving many of our Lives. The 24th and 25th their Fire was so hot upon us that in an Hour's Times they fired 95 Balls and 35 Shells, most of them at the Encampment of our Regiment, which tore many of our Tents, broke several Firelocks, wounded some Men, and killed one; his Body was blown away in such a Manner by the Shell, that scarce any part of it could be found. By the 26th, in the Evening, we had our advanced Trenches finished, our Batteries erected, our Cannon drawn up, and had begun to lay our Platforms. Our Regiment took the Trenches this Night, and posted near the Glacis of the Fort, in order to cover our Workmen at the Batteries, in case the enemy should offer to sally out. About Ten at Night the Enemy set Fire to the Magazine, blew up one Angle of the Fort, and made their Escape by a covered Way to the Lake, leaving an Officer and 30 Men in the Garrison. To fire their Cannon, while the whole embarked . . ."

Source: "Philadelphia, August 30." *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), August 30, 1759. p. 4.

- **Note:** On the approach from Lake George towards Ticonderoga this writer noted that: "Our Regiment had the Honour to lead the Van. The whole Army landed in their Waistcoats, in order to give the enemy a smart Brushing, but met with no Opposition till the whole was formed . . ."

Anonymous (21)

[British/Provincial 1759]

[Published letter: "*Extract of a Letter from Ticonderoga July 27*"]

"The Notice is so short, I have only Time to tell you that we embarked on the 21st Instant, landed the 22d, with-out Opposition, lay on our Arms that Night, and next Day took Possession of the desired Ground, I mean the Lines, which the Enemy had abandoned—an Event so favorable, that it is not to be accounted for. —By the best Intelligence we could get, they had at this Time 2300 Men; and why they did not make a Stand in the Lines or else entirely demolish them, is I believe, astonishing to every Body here—It is not easy to conceive the Strength of these Lines—the immense Labor and Pains taken to construct them—so strong, that I believe 10,000 Men could defend them against the whole Musquetry of America; however, they thought it most expedient to retire to the Fort, and, after obliging us to go thro' all the Form and Ceremony of a Siege, abandoned it early on the 27th, first setting Fire to it, and doing all the Mischief that possibly could be thought of—It is a most excellent Building, and all the Pains imaginable are taking to preserve the Remainder from Destruction—Our Loss is trifling, not amounting, I suppose, to 100, killed and wounded, amongst the former is Colonel Townsend. Our Stay here will be short, I image, tho' there is much to do."

Source: "Extract of a Letter from Ticonderoga July 27." *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), August 9, 1759. p. 2.

Anonymous (22)

[British/Provincial 1759]

[Published letter: "*from Albany on Monday Last*"]

"That on the same Day they marched up to the Breast-Work, between 2 and 300 Yards from the Fort at Ticonderoga, into which the Enemy had retired, entirely evacuating their Breast-Work, and suffered our Troops to encamp near it without Obstruction: Our Army were erecting Batteries to play on the Fort; from whence the Enemy had thrown a considerable Number of Shells, to prevent our People going on with their Works; but had done no great Execution, having killed but 3 or 4 and wounded 15 when the Express left them, which was on the 24th at 7 o'Clock in the Evening: At which Time our Troops were carrying up their Cannon."

Source: "Further Proceeding of the Army, Received from Albany on Monday Last." *Boston News Letter* (Boston Massachusetts), August 2, 1759. p. 1.

Anonymous (23)

[British/Provincial 1759]

[Published letter: "*Extract of Another Letter from the same Place, July 27.*"]

". . . the 23d we saw a great Fire at the Fort, which made us imagine the Enemy had abandoned it; but soon found it was only some Huts and Out-Houses.—All Hands were ordered up as quick as possible, and immediately took Possession of the fatal Lines of last Year, which the Enemy had not force enough to defend, and so went off with all but the Garrison as soon as we appeared; but from the Fort began the briskest and most violent Cannonading that was ever known from such a small Place; Not a Man in the Army was in any Safety, or could get a Wink

of Sleep for shot and Shells falling ever where, particularly among the Regulars who were all few enough to guard the Lines, but the Provincials were incamp'd at a greater Distance.—The Engineer had but just finished the first Battery of Cannon last Night, which were to mount at One o'Clock this Morning with six 24 pounders and two Hawitzer [sic] Mortars; But behold, about 10 o'Clock at Night the Fort appeared in Flames, and the enemy went off towards Crown-Point . . All we suffered by their four Days Cannonading and Bombarding was about 20 Men kill'd and 30 wounded . . . we did not kill them three Men, for we were out of Reach of Musket Shot"

Source: "Extract of Another Letter from the same Place, July 27." *Boston Evening-Post* (Boston, Massachusetts), August 6, 1759. p. 3.

Anonymous (24)

[British/Provincial 1759]

[Published letter: "Hartford 4th of August 1759."]

"Tuesday 24. The Enemy continued their Fire of Shot & Shells from the Fort all last Night, kille'd an Ensign of the Train of Artillery & shot off a Soldier's arm. . . The Enemy keep up a continual Fire from the Fort of Cannon Balls, Bombs, Grape-shot &c but our People maintain their Ground & are preparing with Expedition to return the like . . . At Two o'clock this Day, it was computed, that the Enemy had fired more than 500 Shot & 50 Shells [during that day] . . . The enemy have now burnt all their Houses without the Fort."

Source: "Hartford 4th of August 1759." *New-London Summary* (New London, Connecticut), August 10, 1759. p. 1.

Anonymous (25)

[Archeology/Collector ca. 1956]

"Shells from the 12 inch mortars were found a mile away from the fort in the French Lines"

Source: "The Round Robin." *Mansfield Advertiser* (Mansfield, Pennsylvania), August 1, 1956. p. 6.

Anonymous (26)

[English Informant 1776]

[Information from an English informant or scout]

"At Ticonderoga August 1776 About 2000 men, most of them employed in repairing the old French lines with a parapet of earth and fashines [sic] four and a half [feet?] high fronted with a ditch ten feet wide but not dug three feet deep anywhere. Three cannon 18 & 12 pounders mounted on the lines near the road to the sawmill. The old Fort unrepaired. Three six pounders mounted in the Redoubt. Two pieces of cannon more, but no carriages, two other pieces of cannon sunk in a Batteau [sic]. Two small piles of ball supposed about 5 or 6 Hundred. Three storehouses full of provisions. The new fort at the point to the northeast of the entrance to South Bay about 2,000 men constantly employed intrenching."

Source: *Haldimand Papers*, Roll H-1737; Images #1261-1262. Available on-line at: https://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_mikan_105513.

Anonymous (27)

[American 1776]

[Published letter: Dated August 3, 1776 under the headline "Watertown August 12"]

"We came from Crown Point, the 17th of July, left one regiment there; three brigades are encamped on a hill Southeast from Ticonderoga fort, called Mount Independence, where we are raising some batteries to great advantage; one brigade is encamped on the hill near the old French lines, where they have fortified very strong."

Source: "Watertown August 12." *Norwich Packet* (Norwich, Connecticut), August 19, 1776. p. 3.

Anonymous (28)
[Newspaper Article]

[English 1777]

"The enemy appeared to be posted as follows: A brigade occupied the old French lines upon the height northward of the fort of Ticonderoga. These lines were in good repair, and had several intrenchments behind them, chiefly calculated to guard the northwest flank, and they were further sustained by a block-house. To the left of these works, about a mile, the enemy had saw-mills and a post sustained by a block-house, and another block-house, and a hospital at the entrance of Lake George. Upon the right of the French lines, and between them and the old fort there were two new block-houses, and a considerable battery close to the water-edge."

Source: "The London Gazette Extraordinary." *Ipswich Journal* (Ipswich, England), August 30, 1777. p. 4.

Anonymous (29)
[Newspaper]

[American 1777]

"On the 17 instant, about one o'clock, the camp was alarmed with the firing of a number of guns at a small distance from the French Lines—two soldiers of Col. Hale's regiment were killed and one made prisoner by a party of Indians."

Source: "Extract of a Letter from Ticonderoga Dated June 30." *Pennsylvania Packet* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), July 15, 1777. p. 2.

Anonymous (30)
[Newspaper Article]

[Visitor 1821]

"Happily the garrison ground constituting a farm of about six hundred acres, and including the old French lines, as well as the forts and barracks, has fallen into the hands of a gentleman, whose good sense and just taste will not permit a stone to be removed."

Source: [No Title Article]. *The National Gazette* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), November 21, 1821. p. 3.

Anonymous (31)
[Newspaper Article]

[Visitor 1826]

[The French lines extended] "across the isthmus from one river to the other, covering the fort. The intrenchment [sic] is still to be traced and is as good preservation as many intrenchments [sic] thrown up in the war of 1813 [sic]. It had two redoubts, and a deep abittis [sic], and must have been much higher than more recent works which are less prominent after not so long a lapse of time intervening."

Source: "From the New Hampshire Patriot, Fort Ticonderoga." *Vermont Gazette* (Bennington, Vermont), October 3, 1826. p. 2.

Anonymous (32)
[Newspaper Article]

[Visitor 1846]

"The remains of the breastwork can yet be seen—and their course may be distinctly traced on the ridge of land at its highest elevation. This ridge is very high, and it must have been

a commanding position. The trees which now cover the site have grown since the evacuation of the fortress."

Source: "Traveltainted Imaginary Notes-2." *Bellows Falls Gazette* (Bellows Falls, Vermont), April 10, 1846. p. 2.

Anonymous (33)

[Newspaper Article]

[Report on RR 1873]

"The heaviest of the work on the division for which Gen. Diven has the contract-between Ticonderoga and Whitehall-is the Ticonderoga tunnel and cut, and a series of rock cutting extending at intervals from Putnam Point (just opposite Benson's Landing) to pulpit point, four miles south. They are, some of them, thirty or forty feet in depth-the rock appearing to be a gritty, intractable mongrel between Potsdam limestone which is seen at Whitehall, and sandstone at Ticonderoga, combining nearly all the hard-working qualities of both and none of the good ones. Upon these cuttings-as many as eight or nine in number-there are seven steam drills at work, together with a strong force of laborers to remove the rock when blasted. This latter work seems to offer the greatest obstacles to rapid progress, for the steam drills perform the labor with great rapidity, which before their invention and use, occupied the longest time. The terrible force, and especially the downward force of the explosives used-nitroglycerine [sic], dualine and giant powder-is well illustrated by the fact that when it becomes necessary, from the great depth of the cut, to put in another set of holes below the first after the rock has been removed, great difficulty is experienced in drilling the rock on account of its being filled with seams and cracks, which were caused by the explosions in the rock above. These seams not only divert the courses of the drills and make them bend, but are sometimes so wide that the masses of rock change their positions sufficiently to fasten the drills in the holes, from which they can only be removed by another blast. It is a grand sight to witness-the explosion of one of these nitro-glycerine blasts-but one feels at first an uncertainty in regard to what direction the rocks may take, which keeps his apprehensive interest aroused up to fever heat. When a blast is to be let off a signal is given, so that every one [sic] within range may have a chance to look out for his own safety. Watching the spot intently from a distance, the spectator sees first a slight smoke-like a single puff of steam from the exhaust pipe of an engine, followed by the BURSTING OF HUGE MASSES OF ROCK from their solid beds in a most mysterious manner, and you have ample time to note the appearance of the affair before the sound of the explosion reaches you like a roar of thunder. The smaller fragments of rock sometimes fly an immense distance through the air and a projectile would be as fatal almost as minie [sic] bullets. But familiarity with danger breeds contempt of it, and the workmen within range of the blasts seem to be in a great measure indifferent, trusting to their sharpness of sight to see the flying rocks in time to dodge them. Work upon these cuts will be continued through the winter, and it is believed that early in the season of 1874 the grade will be reached . . . To get through this obstacle a very heavy cut has to be made and a tunnel of 300 feet. The tunnel is pierced to a distance of over 200 feet, leaving less than 100. But the "piercing" is far from comprising the whole work, as it has to be enlarged afterwards. It seems now as if the tunnel would be completed long before the cut. The process of removing the loose stone after a blast is, as we said before, necessarily slow. Only a limited number of men can work in the narrow cut at a time. The rocks are picked by means of a derrick, and put upon cars running upon a track which passes outside of the cut upon the bank, the grade of which is of course quite steep. The cars are then run at frightful speed-of which gravity is the motive power-with their heavy loads. LIKE THE BEDEVILED SWINE OF OLD

down the steep place far out into the water of the bay on a track where they are dumping for a ‘sea wall.’

Source: “New York and Canada Railroad.” *Rutland Daily Globe* (Rutland, Vermont), October 8, 1873. p. 4.

Anonymous (34)
[Newspaper Article]

[Visitor 1875]

“I saw to-day the location of the ground upon which this terrible battle ensued. A new growth of timber covers it now, but the long circuitous earthworks of the French lines are distinctly marked on the landscape. They are located some distance from the fort, but in ready access to it. A gully about five feet deep shows where the heaviest and most effective firing was done, and the location of the abattis can be plainly seen, also a tree, a large oak, standing alone on the receding slope.”

Source: “A Desperate Conflict.” *The Brandon Union* (Brandon, Vermont), May 22, 1875.” p. 4.

Anonymous (35)
[Newspaper Article]

[Visitor 1875]

“The elevation of the Fort is about 60 feet above the water. It is distant from the extremity of the point jutting out into the water about 50 rods; from the Lake shore on the west, eight rods, and on the north about 100 rods. The land toward the point is slightly rolling; on the north it slopes at an angle of 45 degrees; on the south it is very precipitous, with a rock surface. Along this southern surface there seems to have been constructed, before the main body of the fort was built, a breast work, partially of stone, partially of earth . . . About 20 rods due northwest of the ruins . . . are the remains of an oblong earthwork apparently designed for four guns. Traces of a similar earthwork or outlying defense of the main fort are found still further west of north. The burial ground of the fortress is seen in the same vicinity. A redoubt extends across the whole face of the hill on the westerly side almost to the water’s edge, and in the north to the brow of steep declivities. This must have been a strong earthwork. At its salient angles the ditch is still deep and filled with water”

Source: “A Soldier’s Description of the Fort.” *New York Tribune* (New York, New York), May 11, 1875. p. 7.

Anonymous (36)
[Newspaper Article]

[Visitor 1883]

“Ticonderoga is now a mere pasture-ground, where sheep and cattle keep the grass cut short, which a clayey soil affords. Ledges of blue Trenton limestone form the back bone of the point, abrupt at the apex, and steepest on its southern side where a growth of trees pine, oak, and hickory, edge the water. On the north, the approach to level is more gradual, where, down by the lake behind a grove of locust stands a hotel.”

“Back of the fort on the edge of the meadow, dwells a thrifty Irish family, with their pigs and geese and turkeys all about them. For relics they have been on the watch for many years, and now have a large collection, quantities of leaden bullets, grape shot of many sizes, common bullets and broken shell, flints from the gun-locks, soldiers’ buttons and many incognita.”

Source: “Notes of a Laker: From Grog Harbor to Fort Ticonderoga.” *Burlington Weekly Free Press* (Burlington, Vermont), August 10, 1883. p. 5.

Anonymous (37)*[Newspaper Article]*

“The great feature of interest, however, is old Fort Ticonderoga. As one glides from the outlet into the lake he sees over a marsh on the left a gaunt craggy promontory rising abruptly out of the water, a stretching back into the forest a well defined wall or trap [sic] 100 feet above the level of the lake. The railway coming up from Whitehall pierces the barrier by a tunnel. . . . Clambering up its ledges to the summit, one finds a green slightly-rolling plateau, with black rocks outcropping here and there among the grass . . . Sheep are feeding now among the grim ruins . . .”

Source: “Old Ticonderoga.” *Griggs County Courier* (Cooperstown, North Dakota), April 3, 1885. p. 2.

Anonymous (38)*[Newspaper Article]*

“Thirty-one head of cattle, a herd of thirty cows and one yearling bull, were burned to death when a big barn on the S.H.P. Pell farm at Fort Ticonderoga was destroyed by fire. The cattle were owned by the Ticonderoga Pulp and Paper Company, lessees of the farm.”

Source: “Valuable Cattle Burned.” *Enterprise and Vermonter* (Vergennes, Vermont) May 16, 1918. p. 7.

Anonymous (39)*[Newspaper Article]*

“Through the courtesy of Messrs Stephen S. H. Pell, Morris Fitzgerald and Milo King, the big meadow on the Fort Ticonderoga property has been secured as an aviation field. The field is smooth and level and sufficiently large to enable the pilot to land from any direction and to ‘take off’ in similar manner.”

Source: “Aviator to be at Fort Ticonderoga.” *Post-Star* (Glens Falls, New York), August 25, 1920. p. 9.

Anonymous (40)*[Newspaper Article]*

“. . . stroll about this Verdun of America, through the old French lines . . . Pine trees three feet in diameter grow out of the parapets and the bottoms of the trenches.”

Source: “Historic Fort Ticonderoga.” By F.M. Van Natter. *Humboldt Republican* (Humboldt, Iowa), June 17, 1932. p. 2 & 6.

Anonymous (41)*[Report]*

“The most important finds were: about one foot of the muzzle of an iron nine-pounder which had been blown off; the end plate of an iron stove, English or French, which is illustrated; and, back of the French Lines, a most curious discovery. There are numerous round shell craters, six to ten feet in diameter, twelve to twenty four inches deep, and it was discovered in the middle of each one a hole about two feet across, containing anywhere from six to a dozen fragments of thirteen inch mortar bombs. These were fired by the French from a mortar battery on the West Demi-Lune, when General Amherst occupied the French Lines in July 1759. The shells were

[Visitor 1885]**[Newspaper Report 1918]****[Newspaper Report 1920]****[Visitor 1932]****[Archeology ca. 1940]**

exploded with a time fuse and when the explosion came, the bottom part of the shell was blown into the ground. We have located about fifteen of these craters so far, each with its fragments of shells."

Source: "Museum Notes." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. V, No. 5-6 (July 1940). p. 135.

Arnot, Hugh Capt. (1)

[British Officer 1758]

[Personal Letter from Captain Hugh Arnot to the Earl of Loudon dated Stillwater, 1st August 1758. Arnot served with the 42nd Regiment of Foot]

"... The Scetch of the ground I remark'd as we march'd forward, and when we retreated. The form of the Enemys lines, I can't alltogether answer for, As the Right of them I had intirely from hearsay, but can answer for the Left being like unto the Scetch. They had been a work of some time, Logs well squar'd and Dove taill'd; and from 10 to 6 feet high. Besides the space from the lines until about 50 Yards outwards was fill'd with large Logs and limbs of Trees; which retarded our approaching them extreamly [sic]; and intirely broke our Line of attack. The Enemy was constantly at work the night before the attack, and next morning; which our People imagin's was their completing the breastwork (which they held very cheap) but they were only afelling of those loggs and placing of them properly . . ." (p. 27).

Source: "Like roaring lions breaking from their chains: The Highland Regiment at Ticonderoga." By Nicholas Westbrook. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XVI, No. 1 (1988). pp. 16-93.

Arnot, Hugh Capt. (2)

[British Officer 1758]

[Journal. Served with the 42nd Regiment of Foot]

"July 7 Col^o Broadstreet was then detach'd with 1200 Men to take possession of the Saw Mills a strong Post upon the East side of the Lake (or Narrows) which the Enemy had abandon'd, and rebuilt the Bridge which the Enemy had partially destroy'd—" (p. 39).

"The whole army than began their March at 3 o'clock in the Afternoon cross'd over the Bridge at the head of the Falls and marched along y^e road (which is a very good one) to Join Broad-streets Party at the Saw Mills whilst the L' Infantry and Rangers march'd along the Path on the opposite side of the River, the Army lay upon their Arms that Night, part on the East side & part on the west side of the Lake where there was three Large & strong Breast works of loggs" (p. 39).

"July y^e 8th Next Morning the Fort as invested by the L' Infantry on the right, by the Rangers on the left & by the Battoe Men in the Center they drew up within 200 yards of the lines & the Provincials formed in their Rear; S^r William Johnston Join'd the Army this Morning with about 300 Indians who march'd as soon as the Fort was invested to that Point of Land form'd by Lake George and South bay (a high ground within 700 Yards of the Fort) and as soon as the Place was invested began a mock Fight with a great deal of whooping and Noise (Indian fashion) in order as it was suppos'd to let the enemy know we had Indians. The Picquets of the Line advanc'd and began the Attack about 12 o'Clock & were supported by the Granadiers and upon their advancing the Irregulars did so too keeping a Fire upon the Enemy from behind Loggs and Trees. The Picquets and Granadiers after boldly advancing within a small distance of the Breast work with shoulders Arms were oblig'd to retire; not only occasion'd by the heavy fire from the Enemy but from the almost inaccessible road to the Breast work & y^e height of the same . . . It is said the attack would have stop'd there until our Cannon came up if it had not been from a very

heavy fire the Irregulars and Provincials gave with a huzaa at the same time, which made our Gen^l believe & was so told (for He could not see what he was doing) that some part of the Army had enter'd their Lines, then the whole Army was order'd to March up and attack (quite out of Breath from their Distance) which they did bravely did but no effect the Regulars then retreated to about 200 yards distance & there form'd and the Fire was kept up by the Irregulars and Provincials until 7 at Night, when the whole retreated into the two Breastworks mention'd before & lay upon their Arms until 2 o'Clock next Morning when they began to File off for their Battoes . . ." (p. 40-41, 43).

Source: "Like roaring lions breaking from their chains: ' The Highland Regiment at Ticonderoga." By Nicholas Westbrook. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. XVI, No. 1 (1988). pp. 16-93.

Babcock, Henry Col.

[British Provincial Officer 1758]

[Letter to Governor Hopkins July 10, 1758. Babcock commanded the Rhode Island Regiment]

"On the 5th Inst the Army, consisting of 15000 Men proceeded down the Lake, in Batteaus, with 30 days Provisions . . ." (p. 12).

[6th] About 2 o'Clock P.M. the whole army marched saving a Battalion of the New York Regiment, who were posted as a Guard on our Batteaus . . ." (p. 12).

"The next day Col. Broadstreet was ordered with fifteen hundred batteaux men, and two regular regiments, with five of the Massachusetts regiments, to take possession of the saw mill, which we did, without the loss of aman. The same evening, the whole marched up to the saw mill" (p. 12)

"The 8,th (the fatal 8th!) were ordered to proceed in the following Manner: the Bateaux men, Light armed infantry, and the Rangers, were ordered to form a line about two hundred Yards from the French Intrenchments; which extended from Lake George to Lake Champlain; the regulars were to form a Line behind the first line; who after they were formed, were to pass thro' the first line, they making Avenues for them; after that they were to form the Line again. A Captain and 50 Men, out of the Line were detached for Piquets, who were to form in Front; the Grenadiers were to form behind them; and in this Manner, they were to attack the Trenches, and were to march with shouldered Firelocks, till they should get on Top of the Trenches. They accordingly marched on with great Intrepidity, but were received so warmly, that they were obliged to give Ground, after making most vigorous Efforts; they even went up to the Breast-work, but were knocked down so fast, that it was very difficult for those behind to get over the Dead and Wounded. Before the Attack of the Regulars, the Enemy began with firing on the Yorkers in the Rear of the Regulars. The Connecticut, New Jersey, and Rhode-Island troops were ordered to form about 300 Yards behind, who were support them if necessary. About an hour after the Attack, I was ordered to march with the regiment to relieve those that had been engaged. We went up within about 40 Yards of the Breast-work. Soon after I got up, in posting my regiment to the best advantage I could, I received a shot in my left knee; after that finding myself of no advantage. I ordered two men to carry me off, and left the regiment warmly engaged. We have lost no officers. Capt. John Whiting, Lieuts. Russell and Smith are slightly wounded." (p. 12-13).

"Sir William Johnson Joined us four hours before the engagement; but the Indians not being used to attack trenches soon came off" (p. 13).

"The same evening to my great surprise, the whole army was ordered to return to the batteaux, to the great mortification of the chief of the officers" (p. 13).

[Babcock notes that after death of Howe] “we became a confused rabble. We have lost a great many brave officers: in Lord Howe’s regiment, all the field officers were killed” (p. 13).

Sources: *Rhode Island in the Colonial Wars, A List of Rhode Island Soldiers & Sailors in the Old French & Indian War 1755-1762.* By Howard M. Chapin. Printed for the Rhode Island Historical Society, Providence, Rhode Island (1918). pp. 12-13. Also included in: *State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations at the End of the Century: A History.* Volume I. By Edward Field (ed.). The Mason Publishing Company, Boston, Massachusetts (1902). p. 436-437. Another, copy of this letter is in: “New York July 24: the Following further Particulars of the Repulse of our Army at Ticonderoga we have given us in a Letter from Lake George dated July 10, 1758.” *Pennsylvania Gazette.* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), August 3, 1858. p. 1.

- Note: one of the wounded officers in this account was Giles Russell, 1st Lt of Capt. J Whiting’s Company who also served as adjutant (Chapin 1918:121). The other man could be either Edward Smith of Providence, 1st Lt. in Capt. Hacker’s Company or Richard Smith Jr. Ensign in Capt. Jenkes’ Company (Chapin 1918:128-129).

Backus, John

[American Solider 1777]

[Pension Declaration: Served in Col. Simons’ Massachusetts Militia]

[c. Early 1777]: “When I first entered the service I resided in Hancock in the Bay State (Massachusetts) says the militia were called to go to Tinnceroga [sic] to keep the fort till troops could be raised and brought from other places, he volunteered William Douglass was captain of the company to which he was assigned, but cannot remember the names of other commissioned officers of the company, the orderly sergeant name was [?] he heard he was afterwards killed at the battle of Bennington. Col. Simons of Williams Town commanded the regiment he was an old man understood he had been taken prisoner in the French war cannot remember the names of the other field officers. The regiment marched to Albany and was there at Christmas and new years day and then went from there to Ticonderoga had been there but a short time when he was placed in a Redout [sic] a short distance from the main fort as an artillerist together with others of the same regt, the time of service of those stationed in the Redoubt having expired he thinks Gen Wayne had the command as there was such an officer there, but thinks he had only a Col. Commission, the officer who had the care of the hay and the wood went by the name Maj. Hay. There was some continental soldiers there during the winter there was much work done making something like a bridge across a marsh or a part of the lake from the fort to the foot of mount independence which he had nothing to do after he was placed in the Redout as above mentioned where he continued till the ice on the lake began to break up then other troops began to come in and his time of service had expired.”

Source: United States Pension Bureau: Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty-Land Warrant Application Files. Record for John Backus (#S 9,810). *Fold 3.com.*
[www.http://fold3.com](http://fold3.com) : 2010. From National Archives publication M804.

Baldwin, Jeduthan Lt. Col. (1) *[Journal]*

[American Officer/Engineer 1776-1777]

July 24, 1776: “Dind with Genl. Gates & in the afternoon we went round the old French lines with Col De Haws, which our people were at work Very fast.”

July 31, 1776: “This day I was over at point Independence and at the French lines, on the Heights.”

August 8, 1776: "I laid out a redoubt on the North end of the french lines by the lake in the afternoon"

August 15, 1776: "laid out & began 2 Redoubts on the North end of the old French Lines in the afternoon (redoubts Number 3 and 4)"

August 20, 1776: "Went with General Brickett to the Redoubts. Laid out a ½ Circular one (Redoubt Number 2)"

August 24, 1776: "Laid out a Redoubt on the North West side on the plain at the old French Lines"

October 14, 1776: "Mounting all the cannon we had Carriages for & all the carpenters & Smiths making new ones, our men repairing the works & making preparation to receive the Enemy"

October 17, 1776: "Mounting Cannon Making Carriages & c. Begun to make a log across the Lake or Chain to prevent the Shipping coming past the Jersey [sic] Redoubt"

November 3, 1776: "Drawing plans for the Continental States to send by the Comtt"

May 9, 1777: "laid out & began a Redout [sic] between the french lines & ye old fort on high ground"

May 11, 1777: "began the redout on ye Hill at ye french lines"

May 14, 1777: "Viewd [sic] the Lines. At work on ye Redouts [sic]"

May 22, 1777: "a large fatigue part at the French lines"

May 23, 1777: "at the works on the french lines"

May 28, 1777: "began another redout on the high ground N.W. from the fort in ye rear of ye french lines"

May 29, 1777: "Laid out a redout to ye Left between ye old fort & french Lines"

July 3, 1777: "the enemy throwing up one battery in front of ye french lines"

Source: *The Revolutionary Journal of Col. Jeduthan Baldwin 1775-1778.* By Thomas Williams Baldwin (ed). Du Burians, Bangor, Maine (1906).

Baldwin, Jeduthan Lt. Col. (2) [American Officer Engineer 1776-1777]

[*Letter to wife, Betsey, dated October 26, 1776*]

"We are expecting anytime to be attacked by our Enemies. We are now ready to have them come if they please."

Source: Heritage Auctions. April 5, 2016, Lot #49018. [Fortifying Fort Ticonderoga]. Jeduthan Baldwin Autograph Letter | Lot #49018 | Heritage Auctions

Barnard, Salah Capt. (1)

[British Provincial Officer 1758]

[*Journal: Served in Col. William Williams's Massachusetts Regiment*]

"7th We march'd beyond the mils, made a good Breastwork, Lodg'd there, within one mile of the fort at Ticonderoga."

"8th We advanc'd towards the Fort, the Provences were order'd to form themselves into a Line at Some distance before y^e Enemy^s intrenchments, y^e Rangers in the front of our troops, the Regulars were ord^{er} to march through our Troops and advance to their Breast work and force the same with their small arms & Bayonets. they advanc'd in good order to the Breast work, a part of the Hilanders forc'd themselves within the first lines of y^e Enemy^s Breast work, But were soon oblig'd to quit the same & Retreat a few yards Back where they stood fast & Fought Like Brave Soldiers, with as much Likelyhood of doing Service as if they had dischar^d so many Rounds into the Lake, the fight became general about 12 o'clock in the day & continu'd till near sunset very

smart, a great Number of the Regulars were slain, the Rangers & Provenc^{ls} Shar^d in the same fate, but not to that degree with y^e Regulars, the No. of the Slain & wounded I shall put down when I come to the Knowledge thereof-Some of the Provential Reg^{mts} Before the fight was over [?] order^d To Retire Back a little from y^e Enemies Lines and Throw up a Breastwork of Timbers, the wich we had allmost accomplished and then was ordrd off to our Last nights Encampment, Tarried there till about 12 o'clock at night Rec^d ord^{rs} to swing our Packs & march off."

Source: *Journal of Salah Barnard*. In: Henry Stevens Sr. Collection (1753-1862), Vermont State Archives & Records Administration, Middlesex, Vermont. Item Series ID: SE-117, Microfilm F-1454; French and Indian War Papers: Box 1: Folder 4.

Barnard, Salah Capt. (2)

[British Provincial Officer 1759]

[Journal: Served in Col. William Williams's Massachusetts Regiment]

"Monday 23rd Our Troops Take possession of the French Lines without any Loss and but Little opposition, having only a few Cannon shot Thrown at them from y^e Fort, we begin to Entrench the French, set their out Houses &c on fire."

"Tuesday 24th Brig^{dr} Ruggles is ord^{ed} post 25 men at each of the Different places Convenient to make Discovery, and to march the Rest of the Bat^{ln} [illegible] to the mill & take post by the Rhode side & build a Breastwork, which was Done immediately, our Baggage is Br^t from y^e Battrees. The people are Employ^d in bringing Artillery store &c from y^e Landing to the mill, and in opening the Trenches Before the Fort."

"Wednesday 25th Our people continue their works & the Enemy their firing, -- The brave & Honorable Col^o Townsend is slain this Day by a Cannon Ball from y^e Enemy."

"Thusday 26th A Large No. of French Boats were Discover^d Between Crownpoint & this, 20 or 30 of which are come to the Fort, the Enemy Keep up a very Constant fire the whole of this Day. Gen^{rl} Amherst Intends to open his Batteries Tomorrow morning, as yet he has not fired one shot or shell at y^e Fort, the Enemy this Night set fire to the Fort, indeavour to get off . . ."

Source: *Journal of Salah Barnard*. In: Henry Stevens Sr. Collection (1753-1862), Vermont State Archives & Records Administration, Middlesex, Vermont. Item Series ID: SE-117, Microfilm F-1454; French and Indian War Papers: Box 1: Folder 4.

Barrows, Abner

[British Provincial Solider 1758]

[Diary; Served in Capt. Benjamin Pratt's Company of Col. Thomas Doty's Massachusetts Regiment]

"Saturday July the 8 this morning all the Regiments that Lay in their Breast Works traveled about a mile then our Regiment and one more Viz Colo Bagleys Regiment Lay a Long [four?]* two Deep In order for a ambush the Light Infontry Regt Regiment Lay advanced befor Us and we Lay thair two or three howers Divers Guns Vair Fired in our frunt Till all all In a Sudden thair Vas avery Brisk fir in our frunt We lay a Short Time Preprd for them the Enemy But proceving thay Vould thay Did not Com then the Regmet that Lay Before Us advanced forward and our Regiment marched Biskley the fir Continoud in on Continoud Volly the Biggest Part of five howers . . . the French that Ve thus Ingaged Vair in thair Brest Work & in thair Intrenchment our Regulars Began the fir Vith the Enemy thair Was a bundance of them Slain Som Conclude thair was two or 3 thousand of them Slain thair Was som Slain of Every Party that Belonged to Every Provine Slain and Wounded a gratt over Sight that We had Not our Cannon two of our Cannon Got allmost to Us but thay Wair ordered Bak by What Reason I know not o to See the Slain how thick thay Lay on the Grownd When our men Retreated from

them We Carred of the Wounded men about a mill to Whair our Regulars Brest Work was Made . . . the Night after the Battle Was fought the Regements Retreted Back Som to the place Whair We Landed Som of the Regiments Came No further then the Saw mill about two mills thay brot their Wounded men as far as their Next morning the army Gatt Into their Battos made What Speed thay Could away I fear a great many Wounded men fell Into the hands of our Enemy & the Slain all Lay on the spoot." (p. 12-13).

Source: *The Journal of Abner Barrows, 1756-1758*. Transcribed and edited by Len Travers. Ms. in the collections of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.

*Note on this strikethrough by Len Travers: "Barrows seems unsure on this point; Tinkham more confidently recalled 'we drawed up 4 deep.' (Seth Tinkham served in the same regiment see account in this report)]

- **Note:** Another version of this document can be seen in the: *History of the Town of Middleboro, Massachusetts*. By Thomas Weston. The Riverside Press, Cambridge Massachusetts (1906). pp. 95-98.

Bayley, Jacob Capt.

[*Journal*]

"July 23 The army took possession of the French breastwork without the loss of one man. They played smartly on us with the cannon and mortars. We intrenched 30 rods within their breastworks and got up the cannon and mortars" (p. 377).

Source: *History of Newbury, Vermont, From the Discovery of the Coos County to Present Time; With Genealogical Records of Many Families*. By Frederick P. Wells. The Caledonian Company, St. Johnsbury, Vermont. 1902. pp. 376-380.

Beebe, Lewis Dr.

[*Journal*]

[July] "Wednesday 17. This day our Regt. removed for Ticonderoga, arrived there about sun sett; one of our sick died on the way. Another just after we Struck shore. Found great part of the army at this Garrison; but Little preparation for fortifying."

Source: "Journal of a Physician on the Expedition Against Canada 1776." By Frederic R. Kirkland. *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*. Vol. 59, No. 4 (1935). pp. 321-361.

Bougainville, Louis-Antoine de Col.

[*Journal. Served as Montcalm's aide-de-camp*]

[June 30, 1758]: ". . . At three in the afternoon reached Carillon. There we found the eight battalions of French regulars very weak by themselves because of the quantity of bad recruits, still further weakened by the volunteers for light infantry duty that had been drafted for the detachment of the Chealier de Levis . . ." (p. 221).

[July 1, 1758]: "the Marquis de Montcalm went this morning with MM. De Ponteroy, Desandrouins, Jacquau and deHebecourt to reconnoiter the surroundings of Fort Carillion in order to select a battlefield and the place for an entrenched camp. We lack manpower, and perhaps time is also lacking. Our situation is critical. Action and audacity are our sole resources" (p. 222).

[July 2, 1758]: "it has been decided to occupy the heights which dominate Carillon with an entrenched camp, with redoubts and abatis, the left resting on the Riviere de la Chute and on

[British Provincial Officer 1759]

[French Officer 1758]

the right on the one going to St. Frederic; to build in addition a defensive work in the rear resting at its left on Carillon, and the right on a great redoubt which will flank an abatis extended up to the river. . . All that can be done at the moment, and which is being done, it to lay out the works and get the troops at the Falls and the Portage to make as many facines and palisades as their camp duties will permit. The third battalion of Berry, which is in the fort, can furnish only eighty to ninety workers. How to do it with so few people?" (p. 223).

[July 6, 1758]: "... Orders to Sieurs de Pontleroy and Desandrouins to mark out immediately the abatis defenses on the heights [as] determined the first of this month; to Sieur de Trecesson to put the third battalion of Berry to work there . . ." (p. 226).

[July 7, 1758]: "The army was all busy working on the abatis outlined the previous evening by the third battalion of Berry. The workforce was covered by the grenadier companies and the volunteers. Even the officers, ax in hand set the example, and the flags were planted on the works" (p. 229). It [the line] had been, as we have said, traced the evening before on the heights, about 650 toises in advance of Fort Carillon. The left rested on a steep slope eighty toises from the Falls River, the summit crowned with an abatis. This abais flanked a gap behind which we were going to place six cannon it as well as the river. The right also rested on a height whose slope was not so steep as that on the left. The plain, between this height and the St. Frederick River, was flanked by a branch of our entrenchments on the right, and should have been covered by a battery of four guns which was finished only after the action of the eighth. Moreover, the cannon of the fort were directed on this plain as well as on the landing place they could use on our left. The center followed the sinuousities on the ground holding to the high ground, and all parts gave each other flanking [support]. There were, to be sure, several places there, as well on the right, subject to enemy cross fire; but this was because they did not give us time enough to raise traverses. These kinds of defensive works were made of tree trunks, lying one on top of the other, and having in front overturned trees whose cut and sharpened branches gave the effect of chevaux-de-frise. The army worked with such ardor that the line was in a defendable state the same evening" (p. 230).

[July 8, 1758]: "They beat to arms at daybreak so that all the soldiers could know their post for the defense of the works, according to the attached disposition which was nearly the same as that where they had worked" (p. 231). "At the left of the line were the battalions of La Sarre and Languedoc and two of the light companies arrived the night before. Bernad's and Duprat's volunteers guarded the gap formed by the River of the Falls. The battalions of Royal Roussillon, the first Berry and the remainder of Chevalier De Levis' light companies occupied the center. La Reine, Bearn and Guyenne defended the right and in the plain between the escarpment of the right and the St. Frederick River, they had placed the Canadiens and the troops of La Marine who were protected by abatis" (p. 231-232). Along the whole front of the line, each battalion had behind it a company of Grenadiers and a light company in reserve as a support for the battalion as well as to go where necessary. The Chevalier de Levis was charged with the right. Sieur de Bourlamaque with the left, and the Marquis de Montcalm remained in the center to be within range of all parts. The disposition determined and understood, the troops immediately went back to work; part were busy perfecting abatis, the rest at constructing the two batteries mentioned before and a redoubt intended to protect the right. This morning Colonel Johnson arrived at the enemy army with 300 Choctaws, Delewares, and Iroquois, and Captain Jacob with 150 more. Around 10 o'clock we saw them as well as a few light troops on the mountain which is opposite Carillon, the other side of the River of the Falls. They let off a great fusillade, which did not interrupt our work at all; we amused ourselves by not replying. Half an

hour after noon, the English army advanced on us. The grenadier companies, the volunteers, and the advanced guards fired, fell back in good order, and re-entered the lines without losing a single man . . . The left was first attacked by two columns, one which tried to outflank the defenses and found itself under fire of La Sare [sic], the other directed its efforts on a salient between Languedoc and Berry. The center where Royal Roussillon was attacked at almost the same time by a third column, and a fourth carried its attack towards the right between Bearn and La Reine. These different columns were intermingled with their light troops and better marksmen, who protected by the trees, delivered a most Murderous fire on us" (p. 232).

"At the start of the affair a few of the enemy's barges and pontoons advanced down the River of the Falls. Bernard's and Duprat's volunteers, posted in this area, received them in fine style; Sieur de Poulhariez, at the head of the company of grenadiers and of light company of Royal Roussillon also appeared there and the cannon of the fort having smashed two of these barges, they withdrew and did not appear again during the action" (p. 233).

"The different attacks, almost all afternoon and almost everywhere, were made with the greatest of vigor" (p. 233).

"As the Canadiens and colony troops were not attacked, they, from the defenses which sheltered them directed their fire against the column which attacked our right and which a few times came within range. Chevalier de Levis in succession sent D'Herr, captain adjutant, and D'Hainaut, also a captain in La Reine, to order the more active of them to make two sorties and to take this column in the flank. This column composed of English Grenadiers and Scottish Highlanders, returned unceasingly to the attack, without becoming discouraged or broken, and several got themselves killed within fifteen paces of our abatis. Chevalier de Levis twice ordered the Canadians and the troops of La Marine to make sorties and take them in the flank" (p. 233).

"Around 5 o'clock the column which had spiritedly attacked Royal Roussillon, threw itself against the salient defended by the Guyenne regiment and by the left of Bearn. The column, which attacked La Reine and Bearn with the greatest fury threw itself there again with the result that this attack threatened danger. Chevalier de Levis went here with a few troops from the right, at which the enemy was only shooting [and not really attacking]. The Marquis de Montcalm also ran there with a few reserve troops and the enemy met a resistance which finally cooled their ardor. The left continuously withstood the fire of the two columns which tried to penetrate this area . . . throughout the entire affair, the grenadier and light companies of the reserve always ran toward the most threatened places. Around six o'clock the two columns on the right gave up the attack on Guyenne and came to make another attempt at the center against Royal Roussillon and Berry and finally a last effort on the left. At seven o'clock the enemy thought only of retreat, covered by the fire of the light troops, which was kept up till dark" (p. 233-234).

"We even thought that they would try next day to take their revenge, and consequently we worked all night to secure defilade against the neighboring heights by traverses, to perfect the abatis of the Canadians and to finish the batteries on the right and left (which were) commenced in the morning" (p. 234).

"During the action our abatis caught fire outside several times, but it was put out at once, the soldiers courageously passing over the back of it to stop the progress [of the flames]" (p. 234).

[July 9, 1758]: "The day was devoted to the same work and to burying our dead and those the enemy had left on the field of battle" (p. 234).

[July 10, 1758]: “At break of day the Marquis de Montcalm detached the Chevalier de Levis with the eight grenadier companies, the volunteers, and some fifty Canadiens to find out what had become of the enemy army. The Chevalier de Levis advanced to beyond the Portage. He everywhere found signs of a hurried flight . . . Wounded, provisions, abandoned equipment, shoes left in miry places, remains of barges and burned pontoons” (p. 235).

“We had forty-four officers and nearly four hundred men killed or wounded” (p. 236).

“At the start of the affair it was necessary for Sieur de Tprecesson] to fire from the ramparts of Carillon on a large number of Canadiens, who were fleeing towards the boats. One of these fugitives was wounded by the discharge and the others turned back to hide in the shelter of their abatis or remained crouching behind stumps. . . At the first sortie which the Chevalier de Levis ordered the Canadiens and colony troops [to make] Sieur Raymond, who commanded them, called for men of good will to follow him. A small number stepped forward with Sieur Nigon, an officer come from France in 1757 and placed in La Marine regiment. These volunteers advanced; the enemy fired on them once, all disappeared. Sieur de Raymond returned alone, and Sieur de Nigon wounded by a short in the thigh, scarcely found anyone who would bring him back. It was the same on the second sortie; Sieur Denys la Ronde, lieutenant, was the only one who followed M. Raymond” (p. 238).

[July 11, 1758]: “. . . all the army went into camp between the defensive lines and the fort, the flag side, along the flats. The two Berry battalions camped on the ridge of Carillon between the fort and the hospital” (p. 424).

[July 13, 1758]: “Work [on defenses] recommended. First to improve the defensive works and to finish the right and left batteries” (p. 243).

“State of the Army at Carillion July 13: French battalions 3528, La Marine and militia 2671, and Indians 470: Total 6669 (p. 244).

[July 14-24, 1758]: “The defensive works of Carillon and the project of the outer works to be built there have been outlined. They are going to occupy themselves for the rest of the campaign working on them. The works have been outlined by Sieurs Pontleroy and Desandrouins. They will also try to finish the fort” (p. 244-245).

“Sieur de Lotbinière, under the pretext of restoring a shattered constitution, left the fifteenth for Quebec . . .” (p. 245).

[July 30, 1758]: “the prisoners’ statements are almost the same as those of the twenty-first. The enemy, to the number of ten to twelve thousand men, established at the end of Lake St Sacrement, occupy the neighboring islands with detachments. It is not certain if they wish to rebuild the fort or simply to stay there [for] the campaign, [or] if their project is to come again to attack us, or [hold to] the defensive” (p. 253).

[July 31, 1758]: “report of Battalions, Militia, and Colony Troops July 31, 1758: Regular Troops 3528, La Marine soldiers 1,112 Militiaman 2,108 Total 6,748 Indians about 300” (p. 255).

[August 2, 1758]: “all of the hatchets were of plain iron without steel [edges], also all bent like pancakes at the first blow. The colony just missed destruction through the poor quality of the hatchets. Where would we have been without our abatis? It was M. Mercier who has the contractor for them [the hatchets] who received them” (p. 256). “. . . the hatchets, shovels, picks are almost always useless; the hatchets, shovels, picks come on contract” (p. 257). “M de Lotbinière and Company thus have the horse concession for the works at Carillion. Now it is he who makes the money there and who pays the various expenses in his quality as engineer” (p. 258).

[August 4, 1758]: “work . . . continues. They led the Canadians there, half an hour later almost all had disappeared and one no longer knew where to find them again” (p. 259).

[August 17, 758]: “departure of the rest of the militia designated to be sent back” (p. 263).

“The army is reduced to 1,933 of the colony, 600 of whom are militiamen and 200 sick. Workmen, cannoneers, about 250” (p. 263).

From chart: Regulars 3,623 (reduced to 3,193 combatants)

[August 21, 1758]: “cross planted at the foot of the entrenchments” (p. 264).

[September 1, 1758]: “Today the eight battalions with their flags worked on the defenses which have been almost entirely rebuilt. Attacked on all sides and forced to divide our weak forces, it is necessary to supplement [small] numbers by skill. These works will have five trees for a base, for above, three, two, and one. It would be wished that a ditch could be built around, but it is feared that ledge will be found too soon” (p. 267-268).

[September 5, 1758]: “Continuation of work on the defenses by all eight battalions. I believe that they would have been able to find enough earth to have made a ditch in front which would have improved the defense of the [log wall] works, would have protected them from [being set on] fire, which would have spared us taking them down this fall and remaking them in the spring. But it was believed that the enemy would not have given us time to finish them, and that, if only partly complete, in case of an attack they would be more [useful] to the attackers than to us” (p. 272-273).

[September 6-12, 1758]: “It has been decided that M. dePontleroy will go to establish an entrenched post at Frontenac . . .” (p. 277).

[September 12, 1758]: “The work on the defenses has been finished, a battery was built on the right; rest from work the thirteenth and fourteenth” (p. 278).

[September 15-25, 1758]: “they have been working to close the interval between the redoubts of the second line by a ditch and palisades. They also started the covered way and the glacis. The soldiers work at this with great speed because for this work they are paid by the toise and not by the day. The fort would had been finished long ago if they had followed this method. Sieur de Lotbinière never wished it. It was not in the interest of the holder of the canteen privilege that the work should be finished promptly” (p. 278).

[September 29, 1758]: “The Falls camp was withdrawn, and the soldiers of La Marine re-entered the lines. The guard at the [log wall] defenses has been increased” (p. 281).

[October 4, 1758]: “they have built a new battery at the defense line which covers all the lowland [on the right]” (p. 287). “On the fourth for the first time it snowed, but only a little. Then the weather became fine again; it is magnificent, and if the English do not take advantage of it to come attack us we can no longer count on them this autumn” (p. 287-288).

[October-November 1758]: “the withdrawal of the army was set for November 1 and the days to follow. Berry and La Reine, destined to winter in the Quebec government, left Carillon on the first and second, on the third Languedoc, whose quarters are in the Trois Rivieres government; and on the fourth, fifth, and sixth, La Sarre, Royal Roussillon, Guyenne, and Bearn, who have theirs at that of Montreal. The soldiers of La Marine in the same way have departed in accordance with where they are quartered . . . The garrison left at Carillon consists of four hundred men, three hundred regulars and one hundred of La Marine, under command of Sieur de Hebecourt, captain of colony troops who commanded there last winter . . .” (p. 292-293).

Source: *Adventures in the Wilderness: The American Journals of Louis Antoine de Bougainville, 1756-1760.* By Edward Pierce Hamilton (ed). University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma (1964).

Brainard, John

[Provincial Solider 1758]

[Journal]. Served in Col. Johnson's New Jersey Regiment;

Note this text was worked into a description of the battle by a later historian.

July 8, 1758: "On the flat ground" the army was assembling "The 'Blues' passed by the rear of the two columns of regulars, then made a right into line. The officers were shaking the companies into loose lines of skirmishers. Two more columns of regulars were forming up beyond the gap, now filling with Jersey men. At the head of the farthest column, at the left of the battle line, Brainard could hear the din of the squealing bagpipes . . . They were walking east now . . ." Brainard was near the Rangers and General Gage's Light Infantry he "saw a big pine log. There were men behind it and he ran until he too could throw himself down beside them . . . saw that all over the meadow, from behind stumps and bushes and out of little hollows in the ground, men were firing . . . French Lines about 100 yards away" (p. 182-183).

"on the British right, drums began to beat and the two columns the Jersey men had passed moved forward out of the trees. The firing line in the meadow slowed their rate of fire to watch in awe the tight red ranks, trudging out across the sunlit plain" (p.183).

Source: Journal of John Brainard in *Battle for a Continent* by Harrison Bird. Oxford University Press, New York, New York (1965).

Brehm, Dietrich Lt.

[British Officer 1759]

[Reconnaissance Report / Early 1759. Served with the 1st Battalion 60th Royal Americans]

"I went in the night by moonlight to the ennemys lines before Tienderoga and found the same as the Plan shews, or there about; though the distance betwixt the lacke Champlain and the Fall or sawmill River may be a little more, as I could not mesure any angles: the lines are measured with paces, except them parts where there are no figures in the Plan: as I was prevented by the stepnes of the banks, to go with snowshoes to mesure them, there fore guesd the distance as well as I could. The Breastworks of the Lines are made of large dubbel logs fixt with cros pieces of wood, and some parts supported with logs fixt behind it, (which I saw by going into the Sally Port B:) at the saillant angle by E: are several pieces of timber put against the Breastwork (which was hier, the heighest of the whole:) to support the loggs from tumbling down: the lowest part of the Breastwork, which is from M: to N; is 7 ½ feet, the other hights are mentioned in the Plan. There are two Batterys for canon A: and C:- annex'd to the Lines, which are made of earth, with a Breastwork about 14 or 15 feet thik, and about 7 feet high and a Berm of 5 feet wide, upon which are Pallisades, before the Embrasures are Fraz'd and the rest are perpendicular: a Dith of about 15 or 16 feet wide and 4 feet deep is before the Batteries: but the other parts of the Breast Works of Loggs, there is no Ditch before it. Two Sally ports B: and D: with Pallisades and Gates to open and shut and a Breastwork on the inside to defend them. Before the whole Lines are Herrisons or strong branches of Trees, one end of which are made verry fast into the ground and the other inclining outwards, in which there are two places M: and L: left for to sally out at; these Herrisons are in some places close to the Breastwork and at others 50 passes distant; extending in some places 20 or 25 passes in breadth. The ground before the Lines is cleard from the Fall or Sawmill River to Lack Champlain about 450 mesured passes from the Breastwork: having hier and there a few large Loggs laying: and some standing trees in the triangular figure

about the place markt O: in the Plan. The Battery C: lies on the highest part of the ground, but how far it commands it, I could not see by moonlight. The snow was at the point M of the Breastwork so high that I saw over it, and was but one Logg thick, though some parts of the Breastworks may be three Loggs, but as to that I am not certain, as the hights prevented me loking into it. The Loggs are very thick and several of them eseed [sic] two feet or rather 30 Inches Diameter at the thickest end. Intelligence from the Prisoners concerning the Lines. That these Lines were new made since we left them, and are about 150 yards nearer the Woods than the former Lines was. That the Top loggs where trown [sic] down for fear we should burn them. That under the Battery C: is a place made to put Powder, in case of being attak'd. That there are three more Batteries betwixt the Lines and the Fort, which are markt in the Plan with steps, and the No of Canon with Embrasures. That there was another Work to be made on the Inside of the Lines, but for want of hands, it has been laid aside, and only the Form traced out. I could not discover the Road from the sawmill to the lines, it being covered with snow, but I walkt in good clear ground, after I crost a little Run of Water, markt in the Plan. The Bridge at the sawmill is whole, and the Mill is as we left it. The Logggs [sic] of the Breastwork, we made, are not to be seen. The Road from the advance guard to the sawmill is shut up, by having large Trees laid acros it: though for about a half a mile next the Landing place, there will not be much difficulty in getting along, as the Wood is verry [sic] thin on each side. The Warff where our artillery was disembark'd, and the French breastwork at the advanced guard are destroy'd. At the landing place are some logs of our Breastwork remaining. The Trees of Mutton Island are all cut down.””

Source: “A New Description of Fort Ticonderoga.” *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. XI, No. 1 (December 1962). pp. 35-48.

- **Note:** Original Ms. in the Gage Papers, Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Brewer, Samuel Lt. Col.

[American Officer 1777]

[Published Letter. Col. Samuel Brewer to William Heath from Ticonderoga Dated 3rd July 1777]

“Before noon they attacked our picket in front of the French lines; our picket gave way after a brave resistance and retreated within the lines; and brought off the killed and wounded; They ventured to peruse our men so close to the lines, that one of our regiments had an opportunity of discharging two rounds on them, which with a few pieces of cannon, loaded with grape, they scampered away. In the afternoon they rallied again (we had replaced our picket) and made a second attack, but without effect; our picket stood their ground” (pp. 116-117).

Source: “The Heath Papers, Part II.” *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society.* Seventh Series, Vol. IV. John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1904).

- Note: This letter was also published in several period newspapers e.g., “Boston July 14, Extract of a letter from a Colonel in the Northern Army dated Ticonderoga July 3, 1777.” *Pennsylvania Packet* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), July 29, 1777. p. 3.

Bryant, Jacob

[British 1758]

[Letter. Jacob Bryant to Clerk family Friend August 23, 1758]

“ . . . when Major Proby in too great a hurry advanced to the attack with small arms, and was followed in a hurry by the rest . . . ” (p. 85).

Source: “‘Like roaring lions breaking from their chains:’ The Highland Regiment at Ticonderoga.” By Nicholas Westbrook. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XVI, No. 1 (1988). pp. 16-93.

Burgoyne, John Gen.

[English Commander 1777]

[*Letter Gen. John Burgoyne to Lord George Germain dated: “Head Quarters, Skeneborough House July 11, 1777”*]

“The Enemy appeared to be posted as follows: A Brigade occupied the old French Lines upon the Height Northward of the old Fort of Ticonderoga. These Lines were in good Repair, and they had several Intrenchments behind them, chiefly calculated to guard the North-West Flank, and they were further Sustained by a Blockhouse. To the left of these Works about a Mile, the enemy had Sawmills, and a Post sustained by a Blockhouse and a Hospital at the Entrance of Lake George. Upon the right of the French Lines, and between them and the old Fort, there were two new Blockhouses, and a considerable Battery close to the Water-edge.”

Source: “Wednesday’s Post.” *The Derby Mercury* (Derby, Derbyshire, England), August 22, 1777. p. 2.

Cady, Jeremiah Lt.

[American Officer 1777]

[*Pension Declaration. Served with Col. Baldwin’s Artificers*]

“. . . received orders from Col. Baldwin to join him at Ticonderoga that he went with the men who were under his command to Skeneborough where they took boats for Ticonderoga that his service consisted as working as an artificer under Colonel Baldwin and that when not at work as an artificer he had the command of a field piece and a company of artillery men and exercised with the piece and were obliged to turn out with his company and field piece whenever there was an alarm . . . that a short time before the retreat of the American army from Ticonderoga and that the last service of the kind he did was to make a large quantity of shingles. That when the British came to Ticonderoga and the American Army were preparing to retreat he and thirty or forty others volunteered to convey the hospital stores on board some boats or floats, that when the British came on to the French lines as it was ordered and fired a volley . . .”

Source: United States Pension Bureau: Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty-Land Warrant Application Files. Record for Jeremiah Cady (#S 19,582). *Fold 3.com*. [www.http://fold3.com](http://fold3.com) : 2010. From National Archives publication M804.

Carr-Clerke, Francis

[English Officer 1777]

[*Letters to Lord Polworth. Served as Aide-De-Camp to Gen. John Burgoyne*]

Montreal 19th May 1777: “. . . Reports are, that the Rebels have improved the Defence [sic] of Ticonderoga very much, which seems as if they meant to have something of a Stand . . .”

Near Ticonderoga July 5th 1777: “On the 2d July. . . the German Grenadiers on the same Evening encamp’d within Cannon Shot on the West Shore. They fire frequently Cannon Shot on our Camp, but with little Effect having killed only two Men since we have been there, our Camp is sheltered by the several small Ridges in the front . . . The Rebels mean to make a Stand. As their Ground is very strong, their numbers are uncertain. . . I have almost finished a View of the rebel Works on Ticonderoga . . .”

Source: “Letters to Lord Polworth from Francis Francis Carr-Clerke, Aide-De-Camp to Gen. John Burgoyne.” By Ronald F. Kingsley. *New York History*. Vol. 79, No. 4 (1988). pp. 393-424.

Carroll, Charles*[Journal]***[American Visitor/Observer 1776]**

[April 22, 1776]: “When you have passed the bridge, you immediately ascend a pretty high hill and keep ascending till you reach the famous lines made by the French in the last war . . . The trunks of the trees remain to this day piled up as described, but are fast going to decay. As soon as you enter these lines you have a full view of Lake Champlain and Ticonderoga fort, distant about 1/4 of a mile . . . it was morally impossible to succeed against these lines with small arms only, particularly in the manner they were attacked; -our army passing before them, and receiving a fire from the whole extent;-whearas, had it marched lower down, or to the north-west of these lines, it would have flanked them;-they were constructed of large trunks of trees, felled on each other, with earth thrown up against them. On the side next the French troops, they had, besides felling trees, lopped and sharpened their branches, and turned them towards the enemy; the trunks of the trees remain to this day piled up as described, but are fast going to decay. As soon as you enter these lines you have a full view of Lake Champlain and Ticonderoga fort, distant about a quarter of a mile. The land from thence gradually declines to the spot on which the fort is built” (p. 73-74).

Source: *Journal of Charles Carroll of Carrollton: During His Visit to Canada in 1776 As One of the Commissioners From Congress; With a Memoir and Notes.* By Brantz Mayer (ed.). Printed by John Murphy for the Maryland Historical Society (1876).

Champion, Henry Capt.*[Journal. Served in Col. Nathan Whiting's Connecticut Regiment]***[Provincial Officer 1758]**

“7th Marched and got some artillery up to y^e saw-mill within about a mile and half of y^e Fort” (p. 419).

“8th Marched up to y^e French lines y^e Regulars began battle about one of ye clock in ye afternoon. Col: Whiting’s Regiment was ordered up to cover ye Regular’s rear. Killed on ye spot of ye Regulars about 400 and some od men and 1100 wounded Ye Provincials lost about 100, and wounded about one or two hundred. A little before sunset we were ordered back to a breast-work about a mile, and in ye night ordered back to ye Landing. I being on guard round ye breast-work with 75 men, and not notified till some time after ye Regiment was gone off, I came up with our Regiment at ye Landing after sunrise” (p. 419).

Source: *The Champion Genealogy: A History of the Descendants of Henry Champion of Saybrook and Lyme Connecticut, Together with Some Account of Other Families of the Name.* By Francis Bacon Trowbridge. Printed for the Author, New Haven, Connecticut (1891).

Cleaveland, John Rev.*[Journal. Served with Col. Jonathan Bagley's 3rd Massachusetts]***[Provincial Chaplain 1758]**

[July] “7. Friday. This day we marched out again to build ye Bridges so as to march down ye Waggon Road, and to take possession of ye Saw-mills where the Enmy have some small Strength and about the Sun an hour high ye Army began their march to take ye possession of ye Ground near ye Fort . . .” (p. 198).

[July] “8. Saturday. This morning General Johnson with his Indians marched after ye Army before Sun-rise towards Ticonderoga. This has been a most Bloody Fight, our Troops attempted to force the French Entrenchment before the Fort with Small Army and met with very great Loss on our side. Our men acted with ye greatest Intrepidity and one or two Companies of

the Highlanders and Regulars were almost entirely cut off, many were slain and many came in wounded the number of both are not yet known tho it is conjectured that a Thousand are among ye Killed and wounded! Captain Whipple received a Ball in his Thigh which Lodged there; Lieut, Burnham received a mortal wound in his Bowells and Lieut Low was Slain as we suppose, the last that was seen of him he was sitting down with a mortal wound. The conduct is thought to be marvellous [sic] strange to order the entrenchment to be forced with Arms when they had cannon not far off and Numbers sufficient to keep ye Enemy off till we had entrenched and placed our Cannon and Bomb mortars so as to play upon ye Enemy; most of our forces retreated toward ye Landing where ye Battoes lay!" (p. 198).

"the Regulars who were to march thro these yt lay before and make the attack upon the Breast-Work and to be covered in their retreat, if driven back, by the provincials; but the French not pushing the Regulars when they retreated, the Provincials were ordered up. The Connecticut Regiments were not in the fighr except Col. Whiting's and Col. Woosters's who came up about Sun an hour high" (p. 199).

Source: "Journal of Rev. John Cleaveland June 14, 1758-October 25, 1758." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. X, No. 3 (1959). pp. 192-236. [Ms. in the collections of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum].

Cobb, Samuel Capt.

[Provincial Officer 1758]

[Journal. Served in Col. Jedidiah Preble's Massachusetts Regiment]

"July 7th, 1758. We marched from where we camped to the end of the Lake, where it empties into Lake Champlain which is about one mile from the Fort. Brought up three of our brass cannon and hove up a breast-work for our fortification" (p. 19).

"July 8th 1758, Saturday, Marched on the Army and about 1 o'clock in the after noon the Battle Began at the French Lines and Continued a Constant fireing on both Sides till sun Sett at which time we Retreated and Retired into our breast work our loss killed and Wounded and Missing is 2 thousand Men their Number to ours is unknown to us I had 2 of my Company killed on the Spot and four Wounded" (p. 19).

Source: "The Journal of Captain Samuel Cobb May 21, 1758-October 29, 1758." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XIV, No. 1 (Summer 1981). pp. 12-31.

D'arcy, Peter Capt.

[British 1759]

[Letter dated July, 27, 1759]

"We marched up to the lines the 21st which was the day after we landed & wch are as Strong and as well laid out as ever I saw in my life, but these we found abandon'd by them as they retired into the Fort, we Encampt immediately in the lines which Secured us intirely from their Cannon, so those works proved of as much Service to us this year, as they did of desservice the last, after the General had made the proper disspossitions to secure our rear, not a man but was employed in making roads landing our provisions and Stores, and making our approaches and Batteries and this mostly under their own works, it appear'd from the 21st by their preparations as if they indended to make a brave defence, but on seeing our batterys almost completed and ready to open this morning after sending away their Troops and effects which they have been doing every night Since we have taken possession of the lines. They last night to our great Surprise blew up part of the Fort."

Source: “A Family Letter to the Secretary of State, Ticonderoga, 1759.” By Nicholas Westbrook (ed.). *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XV, No. 5 (1993). pp. 389-391.

D’Hugues, [?] Capt.

[French 1758]

[*Letter from M. d’Hugues to Marshal de Belle Isle (Department de la Guerre, Paris)*].

“Fort Carillon stands on a rock in a tongue of land formed on the West by the waters of the Falls of Lake St. Sacrament; on the Southwest by the Bay; and from the south to the North it is bounded by the river which leads into Lake Champlain” (p. 707).

“West of the fort, at a distance of five hundred toises, is a steep hill having several faces; it borders on its left the River of the falls, and on its right forms a very steep curtain which commands a plain of 700 toises that terminates at the Fort Frederic river. The enemy inclined to besiege Carillon must necessarily render himself master of that eminence in order to cover the landing of his artillery in a cove at its foot, being unable to have it brought by land or by another side of the river, as this is the only place along the shore not exposed to the fort. It is this eminence which ‘tis essential to secure, and a General desirous of preventing the siege, must have a good intrenchement erected on it, which he must even have continued across the plain as far as the Fort Frederic river. That line, 1000 toises in length, forms the base of the angle on which Carillon stands. This intrenchment of trunks of trees to be felled at the moment they are required, must be fraised with dry branches well lopped and entangled together; the approaches to it ought to be encumbered by that abates for a distance of fifty toises, observing particularly that no large trunks of trees be piled up at the extremity. Whatever need there be of wood on other occasions, it must be taken from some other quarter, and that side must be left unstrapped of the trees which will be found very handy in urgent necessity. This intrenchment, which can be completed in twice twenty-four hours, and well-guarded by six thousand men, would cost the party desirous of forcing it, a great many lives, and I even dare assert that, were it well defended, ‘twould not be carried by an army three times more numerous than that defending it. This work is already begun on the Northeast of the fort, by a abates of about 400 toises which was constructed three years ago, when digging a trench (*trance*) down to the river of Fort Frederic in order to be able to destroy the bateaux and sloops coming from that direction” (p. 708).

Source: “Remarks on the Situation of Fort Carillon and It’s Approaches.” *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Vol. X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp.707-710.

Desandrouins Jean-Nicolas

[French Officer / Engineer 1759]

[*A document written at Montreal in February of 1759 and attributed to Jean-Nicolas Desandrouins*]

“The present ledge made the digging of trenches impossible over much of the area. In such case the trench must be built above ground by placing two rows of earth filled gabions with a space between forming a protected passageway, but one that could be destroyed by artillery fire relatively easily. The writer speaks of the enemy establishing batteries on or near the top of the glacis. This seems quite unlikely, as the distance to the fort walls would be only 40 or 50 yards, or even less, and determined musketry from the ramparts could effectively silence batteries placed so close” (p. 198).

“If we assume that the enemy has the same knowledge of the terrain that we have, something we shall know soon after his arrival, he will make the big ravine in front of the last

camp of Languedoc and Guyenne the base of his trench. At night he will easily bring up there by boat materials, artillery, and munitions; all such transport would be too difficult on the other front, and the lengthy communication which he would have to make to reach the earthen redoubt would moreover balance the petty advantage he would achieve. Besides he would be very prompt to seize the first moments of springtime, if he does not give us time to put the front of the big demi-lune in as good condition as the other, which will certainly remove any indecision in this respect" (p. 213-215).

[Desandrouins also worried about the covered way, he wrote]: "have posts and frequent patrols in the covered way, whence from time to time it is necessary to fire musket shots at those who appear within range to make a very moderate use of the fort's artillery except for cannon firing ricochet" (p. 203). [A note in the article defines ricochet firing as "skipping the cannon ball along the ground" (p. 203)].

"Everything possible was done last fall to procure for the garrison the means of obtaining overhead cover for themselves and strengthening the casemates against the effect of bombs" (p. 203).

"One should do everything possible to put the parapets, demi-lunes, covered way, ditches, palisades, etc., etc., in a state of perfection; or at least will be done stripping off the rock from the foot of the glacis in front of the little demi-lune as far forward as possible. One will fill up the ravines and hollows that water or subsidence have formed on the glacis . . ." (p. 205)

"It is essential to do everything to complete all the casemates" (p. 205).

"The discharge of both large and small mortars must continue with the utmost vigor during the entire course of the siege; but if they are limited, it is necessary to save them for when the enemy will have his way on to the rock" (p. 213).

"It is essential to spare no care of being informed of the moment the trench is opened. For this purpose every night three or four of the bravest men will be placed for this purpose flat on the ground or behind points of rocks, as near as they can to the big ravine, who will come and give warning the moment they hear the enemy's workers come so that one will at once light things up with fire balls, in order to direct the artillery and the fire of the wall pieces, blunderbusses, rampart muskets, and other arms whose range is greater than that of a musket" (p. 215).

"From the very first night the enemy will commence , if he whishes, to establish a few mortars in the big ravine" (p. 215).

"He will work from the first night, or at least that following at the establishments of his cannon batteries. They cannot be better placed then on the crest on this side of one of the other of these two ravines to ruin the defenses of the small front of the fort, and on its left, another battery to fire on the big demi-lune" (p. 217). "If he establishes his first batteries at M. de Levis' hut, they will be with musket range, being only one hundred and ten or one hundred and twenty fathoms from the angle of the covered way in front of the salient of the small demi-lune. If he is in haste to put them at the camp of Languedoc and Guyenne, they will be less effective, but they will be out of musket range, being more than seventy fathoms farther away. However, it will always be necessary to risk a few shots, and to use the wall pieces, rampart muskets, etc, to fire into the embrasures" (p. 217).

"During the opening of the trench and the establishment of the batteries, the cannon should be served briskly, as we have said, both day and night, to delay as much as possible the fatal moment when the enemy will make use of his cannon" (p. 217). "One must not fail from the very first night to put to use during those following fireballs to light up the workers" (p. 217).

“His progress will be slow and his lodgements badly made, because the ground is hard, and in front of the glacis he will find nearly fifty fathoms of rock exposed in several places. When he has reached there, he will find a little earth around the hut of the brigade major, but he will have trouble advancing for a long time and probably will grope to find the easiest way; for if he advances too much on the left, as would be the natural route, he will find steep rocks; if he prefers to go across the old workshops, earth will soon be lacking. Thus he can arrive at three different choices; the first that he follow the route the least lacking in earth, and he runs the risk of being enfilated, cut to pieces or seem from the back of the salient of the big demi-lune; the second that he will advance foot by foot, keeping well covered and taking advantage of all the earth he will fine on his way, and bringing forward and surplus n baskets or sand bags . . . the third which to my mind would be the best and speediest, that he crowns by a large and deep parallel all the ground where our work shops are, and that he gathers together a quantity of facines, gabions, especially sand bags, that he from there on a good night establishes a parallel toward the foot of the glacis . . . the lodgement on the glacis will be made in two hours under shelter of musketry” (p. 219).

Source: “Memoir on the Defense of the Fort of Carillon.” *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XIII, No. 3 (1972). pp. 197-226.

- **Note:** The unnamed editor of this article provided a good brief explanation of the method of siege common for the time: “the main objective of the attacker was to make an effective breach. This could be done only by relatively heavy artillery, firing from close range, as close perhaps as 200 yards. The normal procedure . . . was to start a trench from behind a sheltering hillock at a rather considerable distance from the fort. The trench would slant so that fire from the fort could not rake it. After some distance it would make a sharp turn to slant in the other direction, and thus the trench would zig-zag forward. Occasionally a parallel would be dug, a trench extending out from the zig-zag and roughly parallel to the front being attacked. Batteries might be established in it and musket fire delivered from it. At some point, perhaps 400 or so yards from the objective, a battery would be established, and the cannon of the fort, which of course would be firing at the advancing trench, would be taken under fire. When the trench was sufficiently close to the walls of the fort the main breaching battery would be installed. This would require relatively heavy artillery, 18 or 24 pounders. It would then become a duel between the artillery of the two sides, as one sought to knock down a wall and the other trying to prevent such action. The defender also had one other possible course, that of making a sortie and destroying the assaulting battery, but this was really only postponing the final result” (p. 197-198).

Dibble, Ebenezer Ens.

[English Provincial 1759]

[Diary. Served in Capt. Tarball Whitney's Company of Col. David Wooster's Connecticut Regiment]

[July 23, 1759, Ticonderoga]: “Wee martch to the mils and ye frencht and indians came and fiered on us Briskley and wounded som of us when wee was making the Bridg to Bring our Cannan over to the Breast work” (p. 315).

[July 24, 1759]: “. . . wee was employed in gitin of fashens [fascines] to make a Battery in the Trenches” (p. 315).

[July 25, 1759]: “. . . our Cannon Got to the front of our Ridgments on wensday afternon” (p. 315).

[July 26, 1759]: “Thirsday the frentch Left the fort and Blue up the Magzene at 11 a clock at night and the Cannan was Loaded and smal arms all for a Snare” (p. 315).

[September 21, 1759]: “. . . our Chimnys Boult this day at Ticonteroga” (p 317).

[September 24, 1759] “Cap^t Whitney Got his hous don and our men is well as common and Cros as Sin Ticonteroga 1759” (p. 317).

Source: “Diary of Ebenezer Dibble Ensign 10th Co. 3rd Reg’t Connecticut Troops in the Year 1759 also Ensign 4th Co. 2nd Reg’t (Col. Nathan Whiting in 1762); Between these dates he had been 2d Lieut. 11th Co. 3rd Reg’t of State Militia in 1760.” By T.S. Woolsey. *Papers and Addresses of the Society of Colonial Wars in the State of Connecticut*. Vol. I of the Proceedings of the Society. General Society of Colonial Wars (1903-1910). pp. 311-329.

Digby, William, Lt.

[English Officer 1777]

[Served with the 53rd Regiment of Foot]

[Ticonderoga] “. . . is situated on an angle of land, which is surrounded on three sides by water and that covered by rocks. A great part of the fourth side was covered by a deep morass; where that fails; the old French lines still continued as a defence on the north west quarter. The Americans strengthened these lines with additional works and a block house. They had other posts and works with block houses on the left towards Lake George. To the right of the French lines they had also two new block houses with other works” (p. 214).

Source: *The British Invasion from the North: The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne, from Canada, 1776-1777, with the Journal of Lieut. William Digby, of the 53d, or Shropshire Regiment of Foot*. By James Phinney Baxter. J. Munsell’s Sons, Albany, New York (1887).

Doreil (1)

[French 1758]

[Letter M. Doreil to M. de Oremille dated “Quebec 28th July 1758”]

[July 6, 1758]: “The Marquis de Montcalm, . . . set the whole army at work on the abatis, under the direction of Mess^{rs} de Pont le Roy and Desandrouins. The work was commenced with order, continued the day of the 7th, and completed the morning of the 8th. Never was such work finished so apropos, nor of such essential utility for the good of the state . . . the enemy deployed at half-past noon on the same day, the 8th, in four principal columns; advanced within 45 paces with great boldness; and were received with heroic firmness and courage, and always repulsed for the space of seven hours of the briskest and most obstinate fighting . . .” (p. 763).

Source: “M. Doreil to M. de Oremille.” *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Volume X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp. 762-764.

Doreil (2)

[French 1758]

[Letter M. Doreil to M. de Moras dated “Quebec 28th July 1758”]

“. . . the arrangements made for the defence of the abatis. On the right the battalion of La Reine; next that of Bearn and that of Guyenne. In the center, Roussillon; four troops of 64 men who arrived the previous night . . . the second battalion of Berry [end p. 744]. On the left, the battalions of Languedoc and La Sarre . . . The eight companies of grenadiers and two troops of 64 men belonging to those which were to march with Chevalier de Levis, formed the reserve, and were distributed to the left and center. The volunteers of Captain Duprat, of the regiment of LaSarre, and those of Captain Bernard, of the Bearn regiment, were posted on the bank of the

river to prevent the enemy . . . [from] turning our left. A few Colonial troops and Canadians, numbering about 400 men with a few officers, were stationed . . . [on the right] . . . under the protection of the fire from our intrenchment [and the guns of the fort with] some abatis in front of them. The third battalion of Berry, under the orders of M^r deTrecesson, its commander, was with the exception of the grenadier company, detailed to guard Fort Carillion and to convey ammunition to the abatis" (p. 755). "The attack which was attended with most danger, was that made by both the enemy's right columns combined, and on that part of the abbatis defended by the Guienne [sic] battalion" (p. 745). "M^r de Pont le Roy, Captain en premier of the Corps Royal, Chief Engineer of Canada, and M^r Desandrouins Captain en second and Engineer attached to the French troops . . . had the abbatis constructed in 24 hours" (p. 745).

[The British retreated] ". . . abandoning wounded, provisions, ammunition, implements. &etc. A detachment which went out on the 10th, has discovered all these on the road and nearly 500 dead bodies junked on one side and another" (p. 746).

"M. de Rigaud arrived at Carillon with some Colonial troops, Canadians and about 600 Indians, only on the 13th" (p. 746).

[Montcalm] "informs me on the 17th, that he has advanced a party of Canadians and Indians to encamped at the Portage. The remainder and the Colonial troops are encamped at the Falls, and the eight French battalions are working industriously in constructing regular intrenchments and in finishing Fort Carillon. M. de Pont le Roy and under his orders, M. Dessandrouins are directors of the work. M. de Lohbiniere is here since the fifteenth" (p. 746).

Source: "M. Doreil to M. de Moras." *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Volume X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp. 744-747.

Doreil (3)

[French 1758]

[Letter M. Doreil to Marshall de Belle Isle (Department de la Gurre) dated "Quebec 28th July 1758"]

[The disposition of the troops]: "on the right the battalion of La Reine; next that of Bearn and that of Guyenne. In the center, Royal Rousillon, four troops of 64 men arrived the previous night. . . [with Chevalier de Levis]; the second battalion of Berry. On the left the battalions of Languedoc and La Sarre. . . . The eight companies of Grenadiers and two troops of 64 men [of Chevalier de Levis] . . . formed the reserve and were distributed to the left and center. The volunteers of Captain Du Prat [sic] of the regiment LaSarre and those of Bernard captain in the Bearn regiment, were posted on the bank . . . the third battalion of Berry under the orders of M de Trecesson . . . with the exception of the grenadier company, detailed to guard Fort Carillon and to convey ammunition to the abatis" (p. 752).

"I must say in truth that the Colonial troops and the Canadiens have behaved very indifferently. M. de Trecesson, the Commandant, has been obliged to fire on some of them who were abandoning their post, in the two sorties ordered on the right by Chevalier de Levis; few officers, soldiers and Canadiens made a sortie after orders to that effect had been given . . . Nevertheless, . . . I have considered it for the good of the service to praise them in a Narrative which was to be published" (p. 745).

Source: "M. Doreil to Marshall de Belle Isle." *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Volume X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp. 752-756.

Dwight, Theodore Jr.**[Visitor 1831]**

[The fortifications] “commenced on the east side at a battery of heavy cannon on the shore, about a quarter mile south of the ferry. The remains of the breastwork can yet be seen. The lines were drawn in a zig-zag; first stretching off to the right, along the side of marshy ground to a cluster of bushes where was a battery; and then to the left to the verge of a wood, where was another. Their course may be distinctly traced in this manner, across the ridge of land at its highest elevation, over to the brow of a steep bank looking towards the outlet of Lake George. The ground is so high on the top of this ridge, that it must have been a commanding position when clear of trees. The woods that now so much interrupt the site, have grown up since the evacuation of the fortress, after the revolutionary war. There is a fine spring of water near the western part of the French lines, where a bloody engagement occurred between two hostile parties during the battle. Bodies of men have been dug up hereabouts within a few years, and shot were formerly very frequently found in old timber . . . In proceeding from the French lines south towards the fortress, by a gentle descent, the surface of the ground appears to have been in some places smoothed in former times by the plough and by the removal and cutting away of rocks, to render it convenient for the evolutions of troops, and the use of artillery. A close observer will also remark that he passes the remains of several distinct lines of small redoubts, placed at equal distances, and ranged in the form of a quincunx . . . There are two old intrenchments, 270 and 150 yards from the fortress; and then comes the edge of the outer ditch or counterscarp, where there was a row of palisades. Five steps more bring you to the walled side of the ditch, which is still eight feet deep in some places, and therefore impassable except where it has been partially filled up. Its breadth is generally about 8 or 9 yards, and the wall of the fortress on the other side in some places 20 or 24 feet high . . . ” (p. 180-181).

Source: The Northern Traveler and Northern Tour: With the Routes to The Springs, Niagara, and Quebec and the Coal Mines of Pennsylvania; also the Tour of New-England. New Edition. J. & J. Harper, New York, New York (1831).

Estabrooks, Elijah Pvt.**[Provincial Solider 1758]**

[Journal. Served with Col. Jedediah Preble's Massachusetts Regiment]

[July 7, 1758, starting from the sawmill area] “. . . we also marched off about one mile to the top of a hill, about one mile from the French Advance guard. And built a breast-work and camped there that night” (p. 121).

[July 8, 1758] “. . . we marched from there up the road within a quarter of a mile of the French advance guard, and drew up in a line from Lake Champlain to the great Lake Haricon [sic] all our provincials and Colonel Purdy's [sic] and Major Roger's Rangers were drawn up in a line about 30 rods within us. And they crept up and shot down several of their sentries. And we had orders to keep our lines. And not advance, nor fire a gun on pain of death, until the regulars with the Rangers had gone up and set the battle in array. And if they were too strong for them they were to retreat in our rear. And then we were to advance in order to drive them back until they had recruited . . . but when the general came up with the regulars, he ordered the whole of our provincials on the right wing. And the regulars with the Rangers on the left wing. And we marched within 30 or 40 rods of the French trenches and set the battle in array. And we had about as smart a fight for about 4 hours . . . ” (p. 127).

Source: Ticonderoga Soldier: Elijah Estabrooks Journal 1758-1760: A Massachusetts Provincial Soldier in the French and Indian War. By Harold A. Skaarup. Writers Club Press, New York, New York (2001).

Eyre, William Maj.

[British Officer 1758]

[Letter to Robert Napier dated Lake George 10th July 1758; Served with the 44th Regiment of Foot]

“. . . the 49th [sic 44th?] Six companies of the Royal Americans, & four Reg^{ts} of Provincials marched to take possession of the Saw Mill, this As I observed to You before was the nearest Way to the Fort; Upon Our Arrival there we found it Abandoned & the Enemy fled likewise from the Other Side of the River, And retreated to their Breast Works before the Fort. Our Rangers And light Armed Troops with some of the Provincials pursued them to that Place, where they continued all night the Enemy not daring to sell out; Upon this the whole Army follow’d And cross’d the River And Encamp’ed opposite the Saw mill, this Place [end p. 420] is one Mile And A half from y^e Enemy’s Fort, the Carrying Place is also one Mile a half A Cross. the next Morning it was resolved to Attack the Intrenchm^t, & in consequence of it all the Commanding officers of the Reg’t were called together; as I had the honour to be at the head of the 44th Was one of the Number: I remember it was asked whether We should Attack three or four deep, it was carry’d for three, the next question if the Granadiers & Pickets of the Reguliers should attack at the Same time of Support each Other. it was agreed’d to support each Other. There was a Plan of the Ground, & the Intrenchm^t given in by M^r Clerk Who had the Direction of the Brigade . . . the Attack was made, I am Sorry to Say not in the most Regular Manner, some of the Reg^t beginning before the Others were form’d, particularly the Brigade-I think to the R^t which consisted of the 27th Regt & two Battalions of the Royal Americans,-that of the left was the 42^d & 46th the center the 49th [sic] & 55th Col. Holiman, commander the Granadiers which Supported the Pickets, that were under Major Proby who began the Attack. Unhappy for us we presently found it a most Formidable Intrenchm^t & not to be forc’d by the Method we were Upon. for upwards of one hundred Yards in front of it. Trees were fell down in Such a Manner that it Broke our Battalions before we got near the Breastwork, as we march’d a Battalion in front three deep; I was of opinion we should attack it in Column, each Reg^t picking one, or two to Support each Other, As we could more easily force Our Way thro’ the fell trees than by making so large A Front, but it was said this would cause confusion; in short, it was said, we must Attack Any Way, and not be losing time in talking or consulting how, but it’d hard to describe which way. The Pickets and Granadiers With the Reg^t to the R^t began the Attack [end p. 420] before the Center Brigade had formed; we Marched from y^e R^t, the Center Brigade followed, the Left brought Up y^e Rear, We form’d to the left when we came Upon Our Ground; this I know, the Reg^t upon My R^t & left did so, Apprehend the Other did the Same. I found the Attack had been began some time before I could form Our Reg^t this being done, all was left for each Commanding Officer of A Reg^t to do, was to support & march up as quick as they could to get Upon their Ground And so on to the Intrenchm^t. after it was found that this Scheme would not do, we remained some time before We had any order to do Any thing; I cannot tell how Matters were going on in the whole, but it was plain, some thing should be undertaken; We had at last orders to draw off the Regulars, & some Provincial Reg^{ts} were order’d Up; we retreated to two Breastworks that were made between this Place & the Saw Mills, And After that, (towards Evening) All the Troops filed off by the Saw mill A Cross the River, & so continued their March to the Landing Place that night . . .” (p. 419-421).

Source: *Military Affairs in North America 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle*. By Stanley McCoy Pargellis. D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, New York (1936).

Field, Samuel**[American Solider 1777]***[Pension Declaration. Served in Col. Wells' Massachusetts Militia]*

"I was not in any battle or skirmish at this time though there was much firing on both sides & particularly from a work of ours called the Jersey Redoubt, which was on the Lake, North of the old French fort I one day saw a smart skirmish between a strong picket guard of our troops v. a large body of the enemy outside the old French lines . . ."

Source: United States Pension Bureau: Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty-Land Warrant Application Files. Record for Samuel Field (#S 15,830). *Fold 3.com*. [www.http://fold3.com](http://fold3.com) : 2010. From National Archives publication M804.

Fisher, Samuel**[British Provincial 1758]***[Diary. Served in Col. Timothy Ruggles' Massachusetts Regiment]*

[Westbrook noted that Samuel Fisher had recorded in his diary that Ruggles' regiment had been held in the rear, and then ordered]: "to heave up a brest work to Receive the wounded . . . The guns did roar like thunder & from about Noon till about Sun Sett there was a Steady fire & the groans of the wounded Men were Continually Sounding in our Ears in Short the Doctors had more than they Could Do & Many a poor Solider came in with his farewell Shott, this was a Dolfull Sight to behold. I see 3 Men Come in together which were hilanders that were Every one Shott in the Right thigh & believe were all wounded with one Shott" (p. 46).

Source: "Like roaring lions breaking from their chains: The Highland Regiment at Ticonderoga." By Nicholas Westbrook. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XVI, No. 1 (1988). pp. 16-93. [Ms. at Library of Congress].

Forbush, Eli**[Provincial 1759]***[Letter from Rev. Eli Forbush, Camp at Ticonderoga, to Reverend Stephen Williams, Long Meadow, Massachusetts, 4 August 1759]*

" . . . taking possession of all ye most advantagious ground near ye Fort . . . As ye enemy had not force nor Courage to man ye lines yt Prov'd so Fatal to our Brave Troops last year, we took possession of them without much opposition, and before Day of ye 23d Began to intrench and ye Body of ye Army incamped behind ye breastwork, which covered them from ye enemies fire, as soon as it was light and ye Enemy perceived our disposition, they raised a smart cannonade upon us, but without Effect, those that were intrenching between ye Breastwork and ye Fort had by this time covered ymelves, and ye Breastwork was a Defence to ye Camp, they continued to Canonade and to throw yr Shells, and we continued to intrench advancing nearer, the Gen'l ordered yt no fire shd be Returned upon ye Enemy (except in Case of Necessary Defence) till He had all ye Batteries ready to open at once, and as ye trenches were long ye Digging Bad, the whole could not be compleated till Thursday night ye 26 or rather Fryday ye 27. when ye Batteries were to be opened at once, the enemy seemed fully Sensible of ye Fatal Consequences of Such heavy Batteries for a Little after midnight between ye 26 & 27 they Blew up ye magazine and made off" (p. 19-20).

[In the fort]: "we found 13 Pieces of Cannon mounted, 4 Mortars two 13 Inch, two 9. Other Artillery is found Sunk in ye waters" (p. 20).

[Losses]: "according to ye Returns yt have been made is 96 killed and wounded, 20 only of which was kild on ye spot" (p. 22).

“When I visited the Fort which was about 9 o’clock Fryday Morning 27th I found many monuments of Superstition which would furnish a curious mind with abundant Matter for Speculation ---- One thing I cant omit, near ye Breast where so many Spilt yr Blood last year, was a cross erected of 30 Feet high, painted red with this Inscription in lead on yt side next to ye Breastwork “Sone Principes eorum Sicut oneb et heb et Zebee et...” and under this at ye Fort was this inscribed in Lead, viz “Hoc Signum Vincit.” --- Thse are the most remarkable, yt has fell within my notice since I wrote last” (p. 22-23).

Source: “A Letter From Carillon.” *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. I. No. 6 (July 1929). pp. 19-23. [Ms. in the collections of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, MS.1919].

Foster, Asa Capt.

[Provincial Officer 1758]

[Journal. Served in Col. Ebenezer Nichols' Massachusetts Regiment]

“July 1. We marched to the half way brook and found Col. Nichols with a part of his regiment posted there. They had about half an acre of land picketed in . . .” (p. 184).

[July] “2 . . . in the afternoon we were ordered to march to the Lake, viz part of six companies, and we expected to go off to Ticonderoga directly we arrived at the advanced guard at the Lake in the evening. I should have mentioned that Col. Commins [sic] marched with this command, together with the Major and six captains of the regiment, being one myself” (p. 184).

[July] “3. We marched into the camp at the Lake and found a very large encampment, and after Col. Commins had been to the General he came and informed us that we are to be stationed at this place, which was very disagreeable to most of us. After some time I went down to the Lake to see the preparation that were made to attack the enemy, which was truly wonderful. We pitched what tents we had at the Easterly side of the camp and made ourselves as comfortable as we could . . .” (p. 184).

[July] “6 This day early in the morning about 16000 or 18000 men embarked on board the bateaux and the whale boats and set off . . . After the fleet rowed off I was ordered into the place where the old fort stood” (p. 184).

[July] “9 Sabbath day. We this morning heard from the Army at the Narrows endeavoring to force the French entrenchments met with considerable loss to the number of 1500 killed and wounded, chiefly regulars, and before night to our astonishment we saw the fleet coming back” (p. 184).

Source: “Diary of Capt. Asa Foster of Andover, Mass., Concerning Operations of the British Army in the French and Indian War, 1758.” Communicated by Hon. Arthur B. Calef, of Middletown Connecticut. *The New-England Historical and Genealogical Register.* Vol. LIV. (1900). pp. 183-188.

Frazer, Persifer Capt.

[American Officer 1776]

[Private Correspondence. Capt. Persifer Frazer served with 4th Battalion PA]

[July 15, 1776]: “. . . since my last our destination is altered and our Camp is removed close to the old French lines, a place which has already cost the English many thousand men and as we are repairing them with expedition, should our enemies forbear their approach for 2 or 3 weeks I think we shall be able to give a very good account of them should they attack us” (p. 97).

[July 25, 1776]: “We are now encamped close within the old French Lines together with the First and Second Pennsylvania Battalions and we are constantly employed with all the men that can be spared from other duty” (p. 98).

[July 31, 1776]: “. . . out every day at Work on the Lines, some of our people complain of the Fever and flux the weather Being continually wet and disagreeable” (p. 102-103).

[October 2nd, 1776]: “Almost the whole of our regiment have good chimneys built to their tents and many of the soldiers have good warm huts built which makes them live much more comfortably” (p. 121).

[October 28, 1776]: “Monday morning 28th October at 9 oClock the Alarm Guns were fird When our People man’d the lines at ½ after Nine the Enemies Spy Boat appeared in sight and Came In within Gun Shot, When three Cannon Was fird from the Jersey Redoubt one from the Sandy Battery East of the Jeresys & one from the Ronzallie [Roundulette] Trumbull . . .” (p. 213).

Source: *General Persifor Frazer: A Memoir: Complied Principally from His Own Papers.* By Persifor Frazer (ed). No Publication Information. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (1907).

Fuller, Archelaus Lt.

[British Provincial Officer 1758]

[Journal. Served in Capt. Andrew Fuller’s Company of Col. Jonathan Bagley’s Massachusetts Regiment]

“Friday y^e 7 [1758] the army marched from the Landing our Rigemeint marched down the western side of the lake lolted Lay down to rest before dark orders came for to march on. we marched threw a Large brook uery bad to pass about half the Rigament got to the meils I was last and lay Down with the other part of the Reg vary wet and cold.”

“Saterday y^e 8 [1758] very early in the morning we marched after the Regimint came up with them whear we gained the army and now coms on the soreful account thes onfortenat day Mag^r Rogers was orered in furst Line then the prouenshuls was ordered in a line from Lake to Lake then the Regelars was to march threw we to open to the right and left in order for them to fors the Brest work we had ordered to keep our ground in order for a resarve fier But before the Reagelars came up the fier began very hot the Regalors hove down thair pak and fixed their bayarnits came up in order stod and fit very coragerly our men droed up very ner and was ordered to make a stand the fit came on very smart it held about eaight ours a sorefull Sit to behold the Ded men and wounded Lay on the ground hauing Som of them legs thir arms and other Lims broken other shot threw the body and very mortly wounded to hear thar cris and se thair bodis lay in blod and the earth trembel with the fier of the smal arms was a mornfull our as ever I saw we marched of the grownd before dark, down to the mils . . .” (p. 214).

Source: “Journal of Col. Archelaus Fuller of Middleton, Mass., in the Expedition Against Ticonderoga in 1758: From the Original Formerly in the Possession of Mrs. Martha J. Averill of Middleton.” *Essex Institute Historical Collections.* Vol. XLVI (1910). pp. 209-220.

Gates, Horatio Maj. Gen. (1)

[American Officer 1776]

[Letter from Horatio Gates to George Washington dated “Ticonderoga August 28th 1776”]

“In the mean Time, we are exerting or utmost Industry to Fortify this Post, a Plan of which is Inclosed. The Weather of Late has been so uncommonly Wet and Stormy for the Season, that we are much retarded in our Works. As the Enemy feel alike the Inclemency of the Season, I hope we shall be prepared for them when they come.”

Source: <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-06-02-0128>.

Gates, Horatio Maj. Gen. (2)

[American Officer 1777]

[Letter from Horatio Gates to George Washington dated "Albany 24 May 1777"]

"... the Barracks at Ticonderoga, and Mount Independence, will not Contain more than One Thousand Officers and Men; the Huts that were built last Campaign, might for ought I know, contain One Thousand more; but these being made of Earth, and flimsily put together, are mostly in Ruins. But Neither the Huts, or Barracks, are the proper Summer Stations for they are too remote from the Redoubts, Lines, and Batteries; which must be defended by Troops properly encamped near them."

Source: <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-09-02-0510>.

Gavit, William

[British Provincial 1759]

[Private Letter; Dated "28 July 1759"]

"... the Next morning about ten a Clock the army marchd and Possesd themselves of the Lines that Has Cost US To many Brave Lives without the Loss of one man and amediately went to Intrenching and Erecting and drawing up the artillery Batteries against the fort which would Been Ready to be opened yesterday morning but In the Night they Abandoned their fort . . . their Lines was a Very Good Battery Against Cannon Impossible to be taken with Small arms had they Had men to keep it."

Source: "The Gavit Letters 1759." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. XIV, No. 4 (1983). pp. 217-219.

General Orders (1)

[English 1759]

"Camp before Ticonderoga July 23rd, 1759, The troops lay on their arms last night; and, this morning, the enemy, observing that the General was drawing up his artillery, and preparing to attack them in a regular formal manner, spared him the trouble by abandoning their intrenchments, of which his Excellency immediately took possession, with all the grenadiers of his army; and the troops were incamped behind the lines, the ground being instantly marked out for that purpose; the enemy fired warmly on the trenches from the fort; but the uncommon height of their breast-works were now become extremely useful, in covering our people from their shot and shells . . . We are erecting a redoubt to defend the landing-place; and throwing up a breastwork of trees, from thence to the Saw-mills to protect the road."

"July 25th, 1759 . . . Two twenty-four pounders, and a thirteen-inch mortar, with their ammunition, were brought up this morning . . . the enemy have kept an incessant fire on the trenches these last twenty-four hours, they have now got the distance to the camp, and gall us considerably, four being killed by a shell, and several wounded; notwithstanding these annoyances, we have carried our approaches within six hundred yards of the fort."

"July 26th, The duty of the trenches is done by regiments, taking it alternatively; we are very busy in forwarding artillery-stores, and expect to open our batteries to night or to-morrow morning; the enemy continue to fire warmly on our approaches, but their shot and shells do not so much retard our operations as the ground we work on, it being an uncommon weighty stiff clay."

Source: "The Amherst Expedition Against Ticonderoga 1759: Extracts From The General Orders Of The Army." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. VI, No. 3 (1942). pp. 88-106.

General Orders (2)

[British 1777]

July 17, 1777: "The Abbatis round the different works at Mt. Independence and Ticonderoga, are by no means to be destroyed or made use of for fire wood" (p. 306).

August 5, 1777: "None of the huts between the old fort of Ticonderoga and the French lines on any account to be pulled down, as they are intended for use" (p. 319).

Source: "The British Occupation of Fort Ticonderoga, 1777." Transcribed and Annotated by Willard M. Wallace. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. VIII, No. 7 (1951). pp. 301-320.

Glasier, Benjamin
[Diary]

[British Provincial Soldier 1758]

"The Seventh Day they went forrod to the mils and Drove them off from their and took twenty one more prisoners and sent for us to Come up their to Build Bridge and we went of and took nothing with us Save our guns and axes and went up and Built the Brige and Got Dun just as it was Dark and then we ware ordered Back to get our things and to goo Back that night. But it was so Dark when we got Down that we Could not find our things So we Did not goo till the next morning" (p. 76).

"The Eight Day went up again and went to work to Build two floting Baterys for to Cary the Canning on and the armey marched forad and Begun to ingague them abought Eleving a Clock, and they got four Canning on the Baterys and went Down the Lake So nigh the forte that they firde the Canning on them. So that they Could not go any further and ware abliged to Return Back So we went to heaving up a Brest work there and the armey fought them till dark to Beat them ought off their trenches But Could not So they took Severell prisnours and Come off with the Lose of 4842 men kild dead and abought five or six hundred wounded and we ware orderd to march Back to the place where we Landed that Night" (p. 76-77).

Source: "French and Indian War Diary of Benjamin Glasier of Ipswich, 1758-1760." *The Essex Institute Historical Collections*. Vol. LXXXVI (1950). pp. 65-92.

Goodrich, Josiah
[Orderly Book]

[British/Provincial 1759]

"Camp at Ticonderoga July 23, 1759 . . . the Rigt to march and Incampt As soon As ye ground Is markt out for them the Regulars Who Are to Defend ye Brest Wook must emediately Rais Banquit In ye front of ye senter of each Rigt With Logs And earth so that every pequit of each Rigt Can stand upon it to Defend ye brest Woork [without pulling any of the breastwork] Down As It covers ye Camp from ye shot."

"Camp before Ticonderoga 24 of July 1759 . . . House of office to be made In ye Rear of ye Camps & Wells to be Dug for each Regt that ye men may Git Water As easy As possible."

Source: "The Josiah Goodrich Order Book." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XIII, No. 6 (Fall 1980). pp 412-431.

Gordon, Archibald Capt.

[British Officer 1759]

[Private Correspondence, Letter by Capt. Archibald Gordon of the 27th Regiment of Foot, dated "5 August 1759"]

"Ticonderoga and the very strong lines are now in our possession with the loss of 16 men killed and fifty one wounded by the Enemies Cannon & Shells. Tom and I narrowly escaped by getting behind a friendly stump of tree, when an eighteen pound Shot Struck the Stump and Almost buried us with Sand and dirt" (p. 144).

Source: "Men of the 27th Foot: Two Portraits by Lt. Col. Ian McCulloch CD: Thomas Busby, Grenadier (1735-1798); Lt. Col. Archibald Gordon (Ca. 1710-1762)." By Lt. Col. Ian McCulloch CD. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XVI, No. 2 (1999). pp. 129-151.

Gouldsbury, John

[*Diary. Probably served in a Massachusetts Regiment, soldier was associated with Brookfield Massachusetts*]

[July 7, 1758]: "The greater part of the Army Marched Toward the Fort the Remainder Stayed with the Battalions having most of the provision on Board. Near by where we landed there is a small Island Where we kepted the Prisoners."

[July 8, 1758]: "We had a Smart Engagement with the French our men Trying to force their Breast Work we lost a great many men the Regulars with Highland Regiment Suffered Much being in the Front."

Source: "A Relic of the French War." *St. Albans Weekly Messenger* (St. Albans, Vermont), July 7, 1876. p. 2.

Grant, Francis

[*Journal*]

[July 18, 1767]: "At the top of the rising ground to the Westward of the Fort, are Mr. Montcalm's breast work or lines, at which General Abercromby was defeated in 1757 [sic]. These lines still remain entire, and are very strong. They extend all the way from the river to the Lake, about 2 miles in length, flanked at every place, they are built of large round logs of wood, and are about 8 feet thick at bottom, narrowing to the breadth of one log at top. These logs are very large, and at the angles are mortised into one another; the lines are about man height. At the top of the hill there was a battery piquetted and entrenched, and the whole lines were defended by fallen trees, with their branches sharpened; upon the whole, nothing could be stronger of the sort."

Source: "Journal from New York to Canada, 1767." *Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association*. Vol. XXX (1932). pp. 181-196.

Grant, John & John Davie/Davis

[*Account given by John Grant and John Davie or Davis, February 20, 1777*]

"That John Davie one of the men, the other being afraid of being discovered by his language, went into their works and Fort at Tyconderoga: he found they were strengthening and stockading round the Fort, and making an abbatis round part of their Lines: The Rebels were also at work on and fortifying Mount Independent on the East side—that the garrison consisted of the 6th Battalion of Pennsylvanians and the 4th Battalion of New Jerseys, the rest of Militia that came here this winter and amounting in the whole about 500 men, but great numbers of them sick with fever and small pox—That no kind of preparation for Building Vessels &c was going forward either on Lake George or at Tyconderoga."

Source: *Haldimand Papers*, H-1737; Images #930-932. Available on-line at: https://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_mikan_105513.

- **Note:** "John Grant and John Davis [?], an Invalid from the Royal Regt. of Artillery, left Albany on the 6th of February 1777. They were sent by Major Edmonstone of the 45th

[?] Regiment to deliver a verbal message to the commander in chief. “Grant being a Highlander, Major Gray examined him in his own Language.”

Grant, William Lt.

[English Officer 1758]

[Published Correspondence, Served with the 42nd Regiment of Foot]

“The seventh we spent in reconnoitering the French lines before Ticonderoga, and finding out the easiest approaches to them. The engineers who had been sent to take a view of the lines this day, reported to the General, that they could be easily forced, even without cannon, if they were attacked with sprit...” (p. 56).

[8th] “The piquets of the army, with the grenadiers were ordered to begin the attack; and in the meantime the whole army advanced to sustain the piquets and grenadiers. The attack began a little past one in the afternoon, and about two the fire became general on both sides; which was exceedingly heavy and without any intercessastion insomuch that the oldest soldiers present never saw so furious and incessant a fire. The affair of Foutenoy was nothing to it, I saw both. We laboured under unsurmountable difficulties: the enemy’s breast work was about nine or ten feet high, upon the top of which they had plenty of wall-pieces fixed, and well lined on the inside with small arms. But the difficult access to their lines was what gave them a fatal advantage over us: they took care to cut down monstrous large fir and oak trees &c., which covered all the ground from the foot of their breastwork, about the distance of a cannon shot every way in their front. This not only broke our ranks, and made it impossible for us to keep our order, but it put it entirely out of our power to advance briskly; which gave the enemy abundance of time to mow us down like a field of corn, with their wall-pieces and small arms, before we fired one single shot, being ordered to receive the enemy’s fire to we came up close to their breast work . . .” (p. 57).

Source: “‘Like roaring lions breaking from their chains:’ The Highland Regiment at Ticonderoga.” By Nicholas Westbrook. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XVI, No. 1 (1988). pp. 16-93.

Graves, Eliphilet

[American Solider 1776]

[Pension Declaration. Served in Col. David Wells’ Massachusetts Militia]

[c. late 1776] “. . . proceeded to Ticonderoga and there joined the American forces under the Command of General St. Clair. The principal part of the time the deponent was on fatigue duty cutting to build a bridge and breast works.” <Solider Reenlisted in April 1777> “. . . proceeded to Ticonderoga . . . most of the time was on fatigue duty was frequently engaged in scouting parties.”

Source: United States Pension Bureau: Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty-Land Warrant Application Files. Record for Eliphilet Graves (#S 13,190). *Fold 3.com*. [www.http://fold3.com](http://fold3.com) : 2010. From National Archives publication M804.

Hardy, Constantine

[British Provincial 1759]

[Journal. Served with Col. Ruggles’ Massachusetts Regiment]

“July the 21. The army all im bract [sic] to Set out for tiantorogo and we got with in three or four miles of the Landing Place and then Lay upon our ores all Night and a tedious Night we had and in the morning the Rangers and Conl: Willems Ridgment and the Second Battalion of Bregidear Rugles Ridgment all Landed upon the East Side of the Lake and we marched Round upon the mountains and came In by the mils and then the Second Battalion

marched up By the East side of the Lake against their brest work and Built a Brest woork and then Cap: Maynard with about Fifty men went upon the Rocks upon a Point of Land wheir Lake George and the South Bay Emtyed in to Lake Cham Plain and Their they built another Smal Breast woork wheir they Capt a guard of twenty five men" (p. 237-238).

Source: "Extracts From the Journal of Constantine Hardy, In The Crown Point Expedition of 1759." *The New England Historical and Genealogical Register*. Vol. LX (July 1906). pp. 236-238.

Harris, Obadiah

[British Provincial Soldier 1758]

[Journal. Served in Capt. Ebenezer Cox's Company of Col. Timothy Ruggles' Massachusetts Regiment]

"y^e 7 Day The Army marcht up near the fort and sent out [spies?] to see what post[es?] of Defence [they?] was in there and found thare Numbers to be Large and that they was a making a breast work of a mile length To Keep our men from [intrenching?]" (p. 9).

"y^e 8 day Came on, And an Soufull Day it was to us for the men were ordered up before the breastwork to take it by force. And the french Discharged thare cannon upon us and Cut us Down in Grate Numbers battel began about 2 of the Clock in the After noon and Continued till Sun Set att the beginning of the fight Our Men Prevailed and got part of the breast work and the French seing our men Prevail, made as tho they would Surrender, and Sessed firing; pulled off thare hatts Set up an English flag and Our Men thought that we had got the breast work and they run up before the breast work [? -?] and the french turnd and fired upon us and Killed our men in Grate Numbers by which they was forsed to Retreat and the Enemy took full possession of the breast work again [?] our men tryed the second and third time but could not Prevail but was Killed Till the Ground was almost Covered with the Dead Boydes and we were forst to retreat back to thare [Quarters?] and [kept? a constant firing to Keep the Enemy from following and Orders came for us to Retreat to the Boats and we got back at the brake of Day" (p. 9-10).

Source: *Obadiah Harris Journal 1758 May 22-October 23*. The Huntington Library, Art Museum, and Botanical Gardens, San Marino, California; Manuscripts MsHM 591.

Hervey, William Capt.

[English Officer 1758]

[Journal. Served in the 44th Regiment of Foot]

[July 7th] "The 44th regiment, 6 companies Royal Americans, some (2000) Provincials marched to take possession of the post at the sawmill, which we found deserted. The rest of the army soon followed. 1200 Provincials and light troops advanced beyond the second hollow (brook) and intrenched themselves; our regiment on a hill between the saw mill and the Provincials" (p. 40-50).

[July 8th]. "The next morning Captains Abercrombie and Clarke went to reconnoitre the enemy, and brought word that they were making a breastwork, which we might easily get to and push down with our shoulders. An Ingineer, who was a foreigner and had and had been sent out to reconnoitre, made his report to the council of war in these terms 'Je voi tout clair devant moi, et s'il ya un retranchement, il faut que ca soit sous le cannon du fort.' About 12 o'clock orders came for the army to force it, and the troops marched with great cheerfulness, but to our cost we soon found it impossible to force it with small arms. Two irregular attacks were made without success; the picquets were drove back before half the army was come to their ground, the Highland regiment run along the front of our regiment marching up; many officers and men killed and wounded, and the whole at about 5 o'clock retreated in great confusion" (p. 50).

Source: *Journals of the Hon. William Hervey in North America and Europe from 1755 to 1814 with Order Books at Montreal 1760-1763 With Memoir and Notes.* Suffolk Green Books No. XIV. Paul & Mathew, England (1906).

Hitchcock, Enos Rev. (1)

[American 1776]

[*Diary*]

[August 16, 1776]: “Went over the ground where the battle of 1758 was fought, and found several human bones, pieces of shell, and one ball” (p. 268).

Source: “A Chaplain of the Revolution.” By Carlton A. Staples. *Unitarian Review.* Vol. 35, No. 4 (April 1891). pp. 267-278.

Hitchcock, Enos Rev. (2)

[American 1777]

[*Diary*]

[July 4, 1777]: “The enemy at work on the rising ground fronting French Lines several Cannon fired at them” (p. 117).

Source: “Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D.: A Chaplain of the Revolutionary Army.” By William B. Weeden (ed.). *Publications of the Rhode Island Historical Society.* New Series. Vol. VII (1899). pp. 87-134.

Holt, Joseph

[Provincial Solider 1758]

[*Journal: Served in Capt. Ebenezer Jones' Company of Col. Ebenezer Nichols' Massachusetts Regiment*]

“July 2nd Mr. Cummings marched with 340 men for Lake George 7 miles” (p. 307).

[July] “3d Encamped near Lake George” (p. 307).

[July] “4th. Col Cumming and regiment stationed at fort” (p. 307).

[July] “5th Gen. Abercrombie with 20,000 men marched forward to Ticonderoga; and we moved into the forts at the lake” (p. 307).

Source: “Journal of Joseph Holt of Wilton, N.H. In the Canada Expedition of 1758.” By Frederick Kidder. *The New-England Historical and Genealogical Register.* Vol. X (1856). pp. 307-311.

Hopkins, Samuel Rev.

[Provincial Chaplain 1758]

[*Letter. Rev. Hopkins to Rev. Mr. Bellamy.*]

“The next day the orders were that a number of the Provincial regiments march within 3 gunshots of the French fortification, and there ly [sic] on their arms flat on their bellies; that the Regulars should pass over them and make the first assault. If the Regulars were beat back and retired, they were to run over the Provincials were then to rise and do what they could. The regiments of the Provincials (the number of them I think was six) marched and posted themselves according to order. After they had remained in this position 3 hours (the French not attempting to do then any hurt, but seemed to be busy felling trees, &c.), the Regulars came and made the assault, but to no purpose; for when they came near the French entrenchments, they found they had fallen a great number of trees before their entrenchments, which much resembled trees blown down by a hurricane, lying from the ground 10 feet, so that there was no passing them but by climbing or creeping. Here the Regulars were non-plussed. They made many attempts to get through, but as often broke, their ranks and came back to form again. In the meantime the French cut them by hundreds with their small arms (for they made use of no

cannon). After some time a colonel came down from the engagement, and declared that the orders were that the provincials should come to the assistance of the Regulars. The Provincial colonels said this was contrary to the orders they had; therefore their men should not stir. Not long after other Regulars colonels came down and swore that it was the general's orders that the provincials should make an assault the Regulars being broken and defeated. Most of our colonels, knowing that here were no such orders, and that the attempt would be in vain and only prove the death of many of their men refused to stir. However, some of the captains and their companies could not be held back . . . the engagement lasted 6 hours, in which time an incessant heavy fire was kept up on both sides . . ." (p. 232).

Source: "The Battle of Ticonderoga in 1758." *The Gentleman's Magazine*. New Series Vol. XLIII (January-June 1855). pp. 230-233.

Hurlbut, John Jr.

[British Provincial 1759]

[Journal. Served from Connecticut]

[July 21, 1759]: ". . . we land without resistance and July 23 we marched up to tiantarog [sic] write into their intrenchments" (p. 321).

[July 27, 1759]: "we are making a fasen battery on side of breastwork and droughing up the cannon and mortar pieces—July 27 about midnight the French march out of fort and our men march in. The French set the fort on fire when the marched outside and destroyed all they could. We never fired one gun but they fired cannon and flung bums [sic] . . . We have not lost one man nor had one man wounded in our regiment. In the whole loss of men was 16 killed, one colonel one ensign, belonging to the 17th regiment and 50 wounded" (p. 321-322).

Source: "The Journal of a Colonial Solider." *The National Magazine: A Monthly Journal of American History Illustrated*. Vol. XVII (May 1893-October 1893). pp. 321-322

Innes, Robert

[Visitor 1772]

[Letter]

[At the French Lines]: "the outside loggs are evidently the same that were there when we attacked they are now to the height of three [logs] full of shot holes, balls are everyday cut out of them."

Source: "Robert Innes to James Grant of Quebec, 26 August 1772." Ms. National Records of Scotland. Transcription by R. Scott Stephenson in Fort Ticonderoga's research files.

Jewett, Benjamin Pvt.

[British Provincial Solider 1758]

[Diary. Served in Col. Eleazer Fitch's Company of Fitch's Connecticut Regiment]

[July] "Y^e 7 day . . . we marcht almost to y^e sawmill, which is within abought a mile and a hlf of y^e fort" (p. 63).

[July] "Ye 8 day ye artillery was caryed in ye morning towards ye fort, and sum fire began, and abought noon ye army marcht down to ye breastwork to ye French. Ye Connecticut ridgaments did not go, but kept chiefly upon ye south side of ye lake. Ye regulars, with ye Bay and York forces, went to ye battle at ye French breastworks. Ye regalars were drawed up within five rods of ye breastworks in plain sight and ye French kept behind ye breastwork and fired smartly on them. Ye New Ingland men kept behind tres and logs as much as they cold, but ye regulars kept so nigh and in plain sight that ye French cut them down amazin, and ye fight held till abought sundown . . ." (p. 64). "Y^e day abought noon y^e regalars and Bay and York and Jarsey Blues began y^e fight" (p. 64).

Source: "The Diary of Benjamin Jewett—1758." *The National Magazine: A Journal Devoted to American History.* Vol. XVII (Nov 1892-April 1893). pp. 62-64.

Lacey, John

[American Officer 1776]

[Served with the 4th PA Battalion]

"On the 18th the Pennsya Troops moved from their encampment near the old Fort Ticonderoga, and Encamped along and within the old French lines on the high ground to the Northward and Westward of the Fort. These lines consist of a string [decayed] of Redoubts or Breast Work, [picketed] with a ditch on the outside, which had been picketed, and appeared to have once been a formadable works, but now gone very much to decay and out of repair. They extended across a point or Neck of Land from the Southern to the Northeast bend of [the Lake] Lake Champlain, [our new camp adjoining it. These lines had gone almost down, the ditch nearly filled up with rubbish.] as far as the hight extended, to a Marsh or Morass on the Margin of the Lake. These lines or Redoubts appeared to be well calculated for [the sudden attack] defence against the sudden approach of an Enemy without Cannon, but required twice the number of Men composing the four Pennsya Regiments [completely] to defend it. Colo¹ S^t Clear [being the oldest Colo¹ had command of the whole all the troops.] having been appointed a Brigadier Gen¹ commanded the Pennsya line, Colo¹ Winds Regiment of New Jersey, and some other Troops attached to the Brigade. The Troops Officers and men lay in Tents, their daily occupation was repairing the[se old and decayed Breast Works – cleaning out the ditches.] old lines and building new Redoubts, not even Sundays excepted, officers as well as men laboured in cutting brush making and toting fashines, and digging in the ditches, not a moments time was lost, and only time allow'd to Eat. Fattigue [sic] and guard-mounting occupied [sic] all our time" (p. 344-345).

"From the 18th of July to the first of September, very little occurrence took place, Fattigue [sic] and Guards mounting was the principle duty & requires no particular notice; but on the beginning of Sept reinforcements were daily arriving from different Quarters" (p. 347).

Source: "Memoirs of Brigadier-General John Lacey." *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography.* Vol. 25, No. 3 (1901). pp. 341-354. Additional text from original manuscript in brackets, 2016.5.1-2, Fort Ticonderoga Collection, Fort Ticonderoga, New York.

Lapause, Jean-Guillaume-Charles Plantavit de Margon de

[Chevalier de Lapause]

[French Officer 1758]

"Le 7 au matin, on reconnaît une position pour faire des retranchements qui avaient été déjà examinés et tracés en partie, lesquels étaient à l'entrée du bois, à la portée du canon de la place. Le terrain était très inégal, ce qui faisait découvrir en partie certaines faces. Ils aboutissaient par la droite dans un bas fond qui régnait jusques à la rivière S'- Frédéric et qui était fort large. On avait retranché la crête pour garantir cette partie et mis la colonie dans le fonds avec un retranchement à la gauche. U y avait un revers vers la montagne ou plutôt la rivière de la Chute, au bas duquel était un petit bas fonds mais qui était presque tout vu des hauteurs. A 9 heures du matin, tous les 7 bataillons prirent les armes et furent avec les drapeaux se porter sur l'ouvrage; chacun ayant une partie marquée à fortifier, on mettait quelques arbres couchés les uns sur les autres pour se couvrir, et avec des broussailles on forma un abattis qui était jusques à 5 à 6 toises." (p. 81).

"Le 9, au point du jour, on fit travailler à racommoder les abattis" (p. 84).

"Le 10, on travailla peu, aux retranchements, nous enterrâmes nos morts." (p. 84).

“Le 30, ... Les travailleurs ci-dessus étaient employés à prolonger les retranchements à la gauche jusques à la rivière et racommoder le reste.” (p. 85).

September “Le 2, les 3,4,5,6, jusqu'au 18 exclusivement, tous les soldats sont allés travailler en corps à perfectionner les retranchements. Le reste du mois de 7° et du mois d'octobre on s'occupa de faire travailler au fort et aux retranchements jusques au 8 ou 10 8bre.” (p. 86).

Source: Jean-Guillaume-Charles Plantavit de Margon de Lapause, Chevalier de Lapause, *Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Québec pour 1931-1932*, (Québec Rédempti Paradis, 1932). This document can also be found on-line at [Rapport de l'Archiviste de la province de Québec | BAnQ numérique](#).

Translation by Shelly Naud

“On the morning of the 7th, a position was reconnoitered for building a defensive position which had already been examined and partially traced; it was at the entrance to the wood, within rand of the cannon of the place [the fort]. The terrain was very eneven, which partially exposed certain sides [or fronts / angles]. They ended on the right in a low ground which extended as far as the river St. Frédéric and which was very wide. The ridge had been fortified to guarantee this part and the Colonials were placed in back with defensive works to the left. There was a [flank?] towards the mountain [Mount Defiance?] or rather the Falls River [La Chute] at the bottom of which was a small shallow, but which was almost all seen from the heights.”

“On the 9th, at daybreak, work was done to mend the abattis . . .”

“On the 10th, we did little work at the defensive positions we buried our dead . . .”

“On the 30th . . . the above mentioned workers were employed to extend the entrenchments to the left as far as the river and repair the rest.”

[September] “On the 2nd, the 3, 4, 5, 6, until the 18th exclusively, all the soldiers went to work as a body to prefect the defensive works.”

“The rest of the month of September and the month of October we took care of having people work at the fort and the defensive works until the 8th or 10th of October.”

Additional Information Not Translated Due to Time Restrictions

Le 7 “. . . A 9 heures du matin, *tous* les 7 bataillons prirent les armes et furent avec les drapeauz se porter sur l'ouvrage; chacun ayant une partie marquée a fortifier, on mettait quelques arbres couches les uns sur les autres pour se couvrir, et avec des broussailles on forma un abatti qui eetait jusques a 5 a 6 toises. M'le marquis de Montcalm anima les troupes a faire avec celerite cet ouvrage. Le soir, il fut assez avance pour qu'on fut a couvert.” (p. 81).

“Le 8 au matin, on fit la disposition de defense et l'on travailla a l'abatti. La Reine et Bearn occupaient a la droite las crete du revers qui etait vers le bas fonds; et, la colonie, consistant a environ 300 hommes commandes par M'de Raymond, etait en arriere dans le donds, derriere un retranchemnet qu'elle avit fait. Guienne occupait après Bearn une face de 20 toises sur la 1(?) hauteur, et la moitie d'une ligne d'un redan; Royal Roussillon occupait l'autre moitie, et l'autre branche jusqu'a l'angle saillant du second redan. Les 5 piquets du parti de m'le ch. De Levis, qui etaient arrives la veille, occupaient l'autre branche jusques a l'angle saillant et l'autre branche jusques a l'angle reentrant Presque. Languedoc occupait une face et la Sarre occupait du reentrant au saillant jusques sur la crete du revers. Les volontaires etaient dans le fonds; chaque bataillon occupait 100 pas.” (p. 81-82) [*There is more to this account describing the battle*].

“Le 14 on employa 690 travailleures a reformer et perectionner les retrachments.” (p. 84).

Source: Jean-Guillaume-Charles de Plantavit de Margon, Chevalier de La Pause, *Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Québec pour 1931-1932*, (Québec Rédempti Paradis, 1932). This document can also be found on-line at [Rapport de l'Archiviste de la province de Québec | BAnQ numérique](http://www.banq.ca/banqnum/rapport/1931-1932.html).

Lee, Charles Capt.

[British Officer 1758]

[Letter to Miss Sidney Lee (sister) dated “Albany Sept^r the 16th 1758.” Served with the Grenadier Company of the 44th Regiment of Foot]

“We are now waiting for six Regiments from Louisbourg in order to cross Lake George a second time and make another attempt on Ticonderoga . . . The Indians will not go with us. They told the General that the English Army had very fine limbs but no head. That he was an old Squah that he shou’d wear a petticoat, go home and make sugar, and not by pretending to a task which he was not equal to, blunder so many braver men than himself into destruction [sic]” (p. 8).

[7th] “The same day the 44th Reg^t six Companies of Royal Americans, with 4,000 provincials and two pieces of cannon were detach’d to take possession of the Saw Mill, which is within a mile of the Fort, a place excessively strong bu nature & where there were two Battalions posted; but before we cou’d approach, to our great astonishment the French abandon’d this post . . .” (p. 11).

[About Lt. Clerk] “He sends his favorite Engineer (but I shou’d here inform you that this favorite Engineer was quite a stripling, who had never seen the least service & of scarcely any rank on the establishment) thro’ partiality to whom, he had remov’d all of the other Engineers who were his superiors on the most trifling errands in order to give him the chief command. This Gentleman with one of his Aid de Camps he sends to reconnoitre; what their Report was I cannot tell, but the Regulars were immediately order’d to march thro’ the intervals of the provincials & with Bayonets fix’d against the Enemy’s lines which were thrown up before the Fort & under their Cannon; the attack was accordingly made with most perfect regularity coolness & resolution; had the attempt been only hazardous & rash to the last degree, with a bare possibility in our favor, we might have succeeded by excessive gallantry of the Troops, but on our next approach we found that it was not in the power of Courage or even of Chance to bestow success unless we alter’d our method, the unevenness and ruggedness of the ground (which was almost made impossible by great fallen trees & the height of the breastworks which was at least eight feet, render’d it an absolute impossibility: this was perceiv’d very soon, & had we profited of our early discovery, & beat the retreat in proper time, there was no loss sustain’d which was by any means irreparable . . .” (p 12). “The fire was prodigiously hot, the slaughter of officers very great, almost all wounded, the men still furiously rushing forwards without any Leaders. Five hours they persisted in this diabolical attempt, and at length were oblig’d to retire, which they did in pretty good order notwithstanding they were their own Generals” (p. 13).

“There was one hill in particular which seem’d to offer itself as an ally to us, it immediately commanded the lines from hence two small pieces of cannon well planted must have drove the French in a very short time from their breast work” (p. 13).

Source: “The Lee Papers. Vol.1: 1754-1776.” *Collections of the New-York Historical Society for the Year 1871.* Printed for the Society, New York, New York. (1871). pp. 8-15.

Levis, Francois Gaston de

[French Officer 1758-1759]

“Juillet 1-5 M. le marquis de Montcalm avoit donne ordre a M. de Pontleroy, ingenieur, de reconnoitre la position d'un camp retranche sur les hautesures de Carillon et de la tracer, et ordonna a M. de Trecesson, commandant du second battalion de Berry, d'y faire travailler avec toute la diligence possible” (p. 132).

“Le 7 Au point du jour, on designa a chaque battalion, l'endroit qu'il deoit retrancher et defendre. On battit la generale au point du jour et l'on porta sur le terrain, que le sieur de Pontleroy avoit trace et reconnu, en ordre de batille; on envoya des volontaires et des grand'gardes et grenadiers en avant pour couvrir les travailleurs et chacun travilla aux retranchements” (p. 133).

[Juillet] “Le8. Au matin nous continuames a perfectionner nos abattis; les ennemis vinrent nous reconnoitre de dessus un montagne qui etoit du cote oppose de la riviers et ne nous ayant pas juge retrenches favorablement, ils resolurent de nous attaquer. En consequence, ils mitent en movement leur armee sur trois colonnes, et les volontaires et troupes l'egeres dan l'intervalle” (p. 136). “A midi et demi, nos gardes advances ayant ets respoussees, tout le mond fut a son poste; l'attaque commenca dans l'instant par un feu des plus vifs dans toutes les parties, fait par les troops l'egeres et autres qu'ils avoient destinees a cet effet, qui s'etoient places derriere les arbres a la sortie du desert” (p. 136). “Ce feu nous cacha le premier movement de leurs colonnes, don't je ne crois pas qu'elles eusset de points designes pour leur attaque, mais seulement la droite, la gauche et le centre. Celle de la gauche commence a apparoître vers la plaine, et ayant apercu qu'il fallut preter le flanc a la droite des hauteurs pou aller vers cette partie, se replia vers celle du centre qui parut vis-à-vis la droite des retranchements de la hauteur. M. le chevalier de Levis. Qui commandoit dans ces deux parties, ayant apercu ce Mouvement et voyant que les ennemis alloient faire un effort considerable dans cette partie, fit appuyer Bearn a Guyenne et doubler la Reine qui occupoit la branche qui alloit communiquer par la crete dans hautesures a la ligne de la plaine, sur le regiment de Bearn, et ordonna a la colonne qui occupoit la plaine de faire une sortie par les bois pour donner de l'inquietude a l'ennemi par ses derrieres, ce qu'il fit repeater plusieurs fois pendant tout le temps que l'ennemi attaqua la droite des hateurs” (p. 137). “A la gauche, une colonne se presenta pour attaquer; mais, dans cette partie ainsi qu'a celle de la droite, norte feu fut si vif que la colonne ennemie ne put paroître a la sortie du desert que par pelotons qui s'approcherent par differentes fois jusqu'a vingt pas des retranchements, mais qui, accables par notre feu, furent toujpus disperses ou detruits. Vers les cinq heures du soir, ils se retirerent, laisserent les troupes legeres pour continuer a fusiller afin de couvrir etcacher leur retraite; et ces memes troupes legeres se retirerent aussi a sept heures et demie. Elles emporterent le plus de blesses qu'il leur fut possible, et furent au portage, don't, apres avoir deblaye dans la nuit leur artilerie, munitions et blesses, ils s'embarquerent au point du jour retourner a leur camp du fort Georges” (p. 137-138). “De notre cote, etant trop foibles pour aller a la poursuite de l'ennemi et croyant qu'il nous rattaqueroit au point du jour, nous passames la nuit au bord des abattis, les soldats nettoyerent leurs armes (p. 138).

[Juillet] Le 9 “au point du jour, on battit la generale, ce qui fit hater le depart des ennemis qui current que nous allions marcher en avant, sachant que nous attendions a chaque instant un renfort considerable; nous bordames nos retranchements. Le sieur de la Roche Beaucourt fut envoye porter le soir la nouvelle de ce combat a M. le marquis de Vaudreuil. M. de Boulamaque fut blesse dangereusement. Nous perdimes neuf capitaines, cinq lieutenants, quatre-vingt-douze

soldats et nous eumes de blesses dix capitaines, six lieutenants, et deux de la Marinr, et deux-cent quarante-huit soldats. Des qu'il fut jour, l'on fit sortir les volontaires qui furent jusqu'a moitie chemin de la Chute ou ils trouverent un retranchement fait par les ennemis abandonne. On retira les blesses qu'ils avoient laisses sur le champ de bataille. On travailla pendant ce jour a perfectionner les retranchements. On n'avoit point de sauvages pour envoyer en avant a la decouverte" (p. 138-139).

[Juillet] "Le 10. "Au point du jour, il fut commandé les compagnies de grenadiers, les volontaires et cent Canadiens pour marcher aux orders de M. le chevalier de Levis pour aller aux Nouvelles de l'armee ennemie. Il fit apporter des blesses qu'il trouva sur son chemin et se porta par different endroits au bord du lac Saint-Sacrement, ou il trouba les debries de la retraite precipitee des ennemis. Il fit pecher nombre de quarts de farine qu'ils avoient jetes a l'eau et les fit conduire au camp, ainsi que tout ce qui put etre utile. Il envoya des detachments jusqu'a trois lieues en avant" (p. 139).

[Juillet] "Le 11. On fit enterer les morts des ennemis qu'on trouva monter a environ huit cents. Leur perte tues ou bleses peut etre evallee a environ quartre mille hommes. Les Troupes changerent de camp ce meme jour. Onles porta sur une entre le fort et les retranchements. Cette action a ete tres vive. Nos dispositions etoient aussi bonnes que la situation du terrain, l'etendue et le nombre des troupes pouvient le permettre. Les grenadiers et les picquets etoient en reserve derrier chaque corps, prêts a protenger les parties attaquees et don't on se servoit tres utilement pour renforcer cells ou l'ennemi fit ses plus grands efforts. M. le marquis de Montcalm qui etoit au centre fit passer a propos dans les parties attaquees les secours necessaries. M. le chevalier de Levis, dans sa partie qui fut la plus vivement attaquee, n'a cesse d'observer avec attention pendant toute l'action les mouvements des ennemis et a eu plusieurs coups de fusil dans ses habits et dans son chapeau. Par les dispositions qu'il fit en consequence, il les obligea, par le feu qu'il leur oppose dans les parties ou ils se presenterent, a se retirer avec la plus grande perte. M. de Bourlamaque en agit meme a la gauche ou il fut blesse dangereusement. . . . MM de Montreuil et de Bougainville y ont parfait rempli les devoirs de leurs charges; le dernier y a ete blesse. Le sieur Desandroins, ingenieur, s'est porte dans tous les endroits de lan ligne qui on tete attaquees pour voir s'il n'y etoit pas utile. M de Trecesson, qui etoit reste au fort avec le troisieme battalion de Berry, a servi utilement en procurant a la ligne les munitions et autres choses necessaires pour une defense aussi longue de meme que M. Lemercier, commandant l'artillerie. Pendant l'action, Les enemis ayant voulu paroître sur la riviere avec quelques berges, le cannon du fort en coula une bas et les autres disparurent. Il nous arriva successivement environ trois cents soldats de la Marine ou milicines qui se haterent de joinder pour y avooir part; ceux qui avoient ete postes dans la ligne de la plaine s'y comporterent avec beaucoup de zele et de courage" (p. 139-141).

[Juillet] "Le 12 M. le marquis de Langy-Laurent arriva avec environ trente sauvages de differentes nations. Il y apporta la Depeche de M. de Rigaud a M. de Montcalm pour lui demander ses orders sur les mouvements qu'il devoit faire pour nous joinder avec un corps d'environ trois mille Canadiens ou soldats de la colonie et sauvages croyant l'armee investee. M. de Rigaud arriva le 13 avec la premiere division le reste joignit dans les trois jours suivants. M. de Courtemanche fut detache le 17 avec deux cent sauvages et deux cents soldats de la colonie ou Canadiens pour se porter sur le chemin de Lydius en passant par le fond de la baie pour etre a memo de connoitre les movements des enemis sur leurs derrieres et les harceler sur ce passage" (p. 141-142).

[Before Sept 6] “Quant a la partie de Carillon, on travailla sans relache a perfectionner le retranchement comptant que l’ennemi feroit une nouvelle tentative avant la fin de la campagne, ayant une armee assez considerable pour entreprendre, et qui s’etoit retranchee au lac Saint-Sacrement” (p. 148).

[Septembre Le 6] “. . . M. le marquis de Montcalm partit de Carillon das nuit du 7 au 8 pour Montreal. M le chevalier de Levis rests charge du commandement de l’armee et continua a faire travailler avec le meme activite a perfectionner les retranchements” (p. 149).

[about the 16th of September] “apres que les retranchements furent perfectionnes M le chevalier de Levis fit travaillier avec la meme diligence a faire une seconde ligne de retranchements deupuis le fort jusqu’a la riviere, pour assurer la retraite de la premiere dans le cas que l’on y fut force pour pourvoir s’embarquer avec suete” (p. 152).

“Le 29 Septembre M. Le marquis de Montcalm a fait replier le camp de la Chute pour venir camper en ligne a Carillon ne laissant qu’un detatchment de deux cent hommes pour passer la journee sur les hautes de la Chute, et un compagnie des volontairs et quelques sauvages pour aller a la decouverte au Saint-Sacrement avec ordre de se replier a l’entree de la nuit avec le detachment de la Chute dan les retranchements” (p. 154).

[February 31, 1759, information from Hebecourt at Carillon about a scouting party] “un sergent qui ete fait prisonnier dans sa deposition, il dit que dans ce detachment il y avoit un ingenieur qui etoit venu pour lever le plan du fort et des retranchements, et il assura que les ennemis se disposoient a venir nous attaquer au pretemp; que l’on attendoit pour cela des provisions et des munitions au fort Lydius . . .” (p. 170).

[A statement made by a prisoner from the Royal Americans c. March 12-17]: “toutes leurs dispositions sont faites pour oprer des le petit printemps sur le fort Carillon” (p. 173).

[April 3, 1759]: “Il etoit problement sur que les ennemis ne pouuoient paroître devany Carillon tout au plutot qu a’La fin de juin. Cependant on mit en movement a la fin d’averil et au commencement de mai partie des milices et toutes les troupes qui etoient dans le gouvernement de Quebec faut de pouvoir y subsister. Et d’ailleures il etoit necessaire de faire travailler au fort et aux retranchements de Carillon qui n’etoient pas encore finis M. de Bourlamaque fut enyoye pour y commander” (p. 175-176).

[June 30, 1759]: “On travailla conformant au project ci-dessus a fortifier le fort de Carillon. Vers la fin du mois de mai le sieur de la Pause avoit ete enyoye al’Ile-aux-Noix pour faire traviller a la fortifier; on y enyoya ensuite le sieur Fourier ingenieur et nombre d’habitants” (p. 182).

Source: *Journal Des Campagnes Du Chevalier DeLevis En Canada De 1756 a 1760.*
C.A.E. Gagnon, Secretaire Provincial, Province de Quebec. C.O. Beauchemin & Fils, Montreal, Quebec (1889).

Translation by Shelly Naud

[July 1-5, 1758] “Mr. Marquis de Montcalm gave order to M. de Pontleroy, an engineer, to reconnoitre the position of defensive camp on the hights of Carillon and trace it, and ordered M. de Trecesson, commander of Berry’s second battalion, to work there with all due diligence.”

[July 7th] “At daybreak, each battalion was designed the place it was to fortify and defend. The general order was given at daybreak and we left for the area which the Sieur de Pontleroy had reconnoitered and traced out; volunteers and special guards and grenadiers were sent forward to cover the workers and everyone worked in the defensive work.”

[July 8th] "In the morning we continued to perfect our abatis; the enemies came to reconoiter from a mountain top on the opposite coast of the river and having not judged us not be favorably fortified, they resolved to attack us. As a result, they set army marching in three columns, and the volunteers and threir light infantrys in the interval."

"At 12:30 p.m., our advance guards having been repulsed everyone was at his post; the attack began that moment by a most lively fire in all parts, made by the light infantry and others that they have intended for this purpose, which were placed behind the trees at the exit of the desert [*possibly meaning at the boundary of the forest and the slashing?*]. This fire hid the first movement of their columns, which I don't believe had any designated points for their attack, but only the right, the left and the center. The one on the left begins to appear towards the plain, and having realized that it was necessary to pre-empt the flank to the right of the heights to go towards this part, folded [fell back] towards that of the center which appeared vis-a-vis the right of the fortifications of the heights. De Levis, who commanded in these two parts, having glimpsed [noticed] this Movement and seeing that the enemies were going to make a considerable effort in this part, sent support to Bearn [and?] Guyenne and doubled the Queen [LaReine], which was occupying the [section] which was going to communicate by the crest of the heights of the plain line, on the regiment of Bearn [*possibly meaning 'the column of British that came from the plain to confront Bearn's regiment'*], and ordered the column that occupied the plain [*probably meaning the Canadiens*] to make a sortie through the woods to harass the enemy from the rear, which he had repeated several times during the whole time that the enemy attacked the right of the heights. To the left, a column presented itself to attack; but, in this part as well as that of the right, our fire was so lively that the enemy column could only be seen at the exit of the desert by platoons which approached at different times up to twenty steps from the fortifications, but which, overwhelmed by our fire, were always scattered or destroyed. At about five o'clock in the evening, they retreated, left the light infantry to continue shooting in order to cover their retreat and these same light infantry also withdrew at half past seven. They carried as many as the wounded they could, and were at the portage, which after having been cleared away during the night their artillery, ammunition and wounded, they embarked at daybreak to return to their camp of Fort Georges."

"On our side, being too feeble to go in pursuit of the enemy and believing that they would attack us again at daybreak, we spent the night near the abatis, the soldiers cleaning their weapons."

[July 9th] "At daybreak, the generale was sounded, which hastened the departure of the enemy who now belived that we were going to advance, knowing that we were expecting a considerable reinforcement at any moment; we line up at the edges of the fortifications. On the previous evening the Sieur de la Roche Beaucourt sent the news of this battle to Marquis de Vaudreuil. M. de Boulamaque was dangerously injured. We lost nine captains, five lieutenants, ninety-two soldiers and among our wounded were ten captains, six lieutenants, and two of the Marines, and two hundred and forty-eight soldiers. As soon as it was daylight, the vvolunteers were sent out and they found a defensive work made by the enemy soldiers abandoned. We removed the wounded they had left on the battlefield. During that day, we worked to perfect the fortifications. There were no savages to send forward to the discovery [*as scouts*]."

[July 10] "At daybreak, it was ordered that the companies of grenadiers, volunteers and a hundred Canadians were to march under the orders of de Levis to find out what was happening with the enemy he had the wounded found on his route carried back and went to different places on the shores of Lake Saint-Sacrement, where he found the debris of the precipitous retreat of the

enemy. He had fished out many of the quarters of flour that had been thrown out into the water and had them taken to camp, as well as anything that could be useful. He sent detachments up to three leagues ahead."

[July 11] "The enemy dead were found to number about eight hundred. Their loss of dead and wounded can be evaluated to about four thousand men. The troops changed camps that same day. They were bought to a line between the fort and the defensive works."

"This action has been very lively. Our arrangements were as good as the situation on the ground, the extent and the number of troops could permit. The grenadiers and the picquets were in reserve behind each corps, ready to protect the attacked and of which we had served very usefully to strengthen those where the enemy made his greatest efforts. Mr. Marquis de Montcalm, who was in the centre, made the necessary relief to the attacked parts. Chevalier de Levis in his section which was the most heavily attacked, constantly observed the movements of the enemy throughout the action and had gotten several gunshots in his clothes and hat. By the dispositions he made in consequence, he forced them, by the fire he opposed them in the parts where they presented themselves, to withdraw with the greatest loss. M. de Bourlamaque had acted in the same manner in the left [flank] where he was dangerously injured. . . . Messrs from Montreuil and Bougainville perfectly fulfilled their duties; the latter was wounded. Sieur Desandroins, engineer, has gone to in all the places of the line that had been attacked to see whether he could be useful. M. de Tresson, who remained at the fort with Berry's third battalion, served usefully in providing the line with ammunition and other things needed for a lengthy defense as did Mr. Lemercier, commander of the artillery. During the action, the enemies who wanted to appear on the river with a few barges, the cannon of the fort sank one low and the others disappeared. There arrived in succession about three hundred soldiers of the Navy or Marine who hurried to take part; those who had were posted to the line of the plain behaved with great zeal and courage."

[July 12] "Mr. Marquis de Langy-Laurent arrived with about thirty savages from [of] different nations. He brought the distpatch from M. de Rigaud to M. de Montcalm to ask for his orders on the movements he was to make to join us with a corps of about three thousand Canadians or colonial soldiers and savages believing the army invested [surrounded]. M. de Rigaud arrived on the 13th with the first division the rest joined within three days [in the following three days]. M. de Courtemanche was detached on the 17th with two hundred savages and two hundred soldiers of the colony or Canadians to carry [move] themselves on the road to Lydius passing through the bottom of the bay to be able to reconnoiter the movements of the enemy from their rear and harass them on this passage."

[Before September 6] "As for those of us at Carillon, we worked without break [continuously] to perfect the retrenchment [defensive works] counting [expecting] that the enemy would make another attempt before the end of the campaign, having an army strong enough to undertake [to do so], and had set up a defensive position at Lake Saint-Sacrement."

[September 6] ". . . M. de Montcalm departed from Carillon on the night of the 7th to the 8th for Montreal. De Levis remained in charge of the command of the army and continued to work with the same activity to perfect the entrenchments [defensive works]."

[About September 16] "After the entrenchments [defensive works] were perfected, M. de Levis worked with the same diligence to make a second line of entrenchments [defensive works] from the fort to the river, to ensure [allow] the retreat from the first [line of defenses] in case we were forced to do so in order to be able to embark with safety [surety]."

[September 29] “Montcalm closed the camp at the falls, bringing the men to camp [on the lines of Carillion--KMK] come and camp online in Carillon leaving only a detachment of two hundred men to spend the day on the hights near the falls, and a company of volunteers and some savages to go reconnoiter at [Lake] Saint-Sacrement with orders to fall back in the evening to the fortified camp of the detachment at the Falls.”

[February 31, 1759, *Hebecourt at Carillion reported that*] “A sergeant who had been taken prisoner in his deposition he said that in this detachment there was an engineer who had come to lift the plan of the fort and the entrenchments [defensive works], and he assured that the enemies were preparing to come and attack us in the spring; once they had received expected supplies and ammunition from Fort Lydius . . .”

[March 12-17, 1759, *a reported statement made by a prisoner taken from the Royal American Regiment*] “. . . all their arrangements were made to operate in the early spring on Fort Carillon.”

[April 3, 1759] “It is probably a given that the enemies can not stand before [appear at] Carillon as anytime earlier than the end of June. However, some were put on the move at the end of April and at the beginning of May, including some of the militia, and all the troops of the Government of Quebec because of being un-able to survive there [lack of sustenance]. And moreover, it was necessary to work at the fort and the entrenchments [defensive works] of Carillon that were not yet finished Mr. de Bourlamaque was sent to command it [oversee this]”

[June 30, 1759] “The work was done in accordance with the above-mentioned project to fortify the Fort of Carillon. Towards the end of May, the Sieur de la Pause had been sent to Isle-aux-Noix to have it fortified; there was sent later the engineer, Fourier, and a number of habitants.”

Livingston, Henry Maj.

[Served with the 3rd NY]

American Officer 1775]

“Ticonderoga Fort is built on an Eminence on a point of land near the Lake & is now much out of repair altho the works are many of the still excellent . . . The famous Brestwork that prov’d so fatal to our Troops last war is near half a mile west of the fort & by its remains tis evident that its strength was once very great” (p. 13).

Source: “Journal of Major Henry Livingston of the Third Continental Line, August to December 1775.” By Guillard Hunt. *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*. Vol. XXII. (1898). p. 9-33.

Loring, Joshua

British 1758]

[The French Lines were] “reported to be a Slight Breast worke of Logs . . . so weakly bound together that is would be easy to push them down by the Light Infantry” (p. 97).

Source: *Chronicles of Lake Champlain: Journeys in War and Peace*. By Russell P. Bellico. Purple Mountain Press, Fleischmanns, New York (1999).

Lyon, Lemuel

[Journal. Served in Capt. David Holmes' Company of Col. Eleazer Fitch's Connecticut Regiment]

Provincial Solider 1758]

“Friday 7th. Majer Rogers went down to the mils and drove them of there from & kild and took upwards of 150 & at Son down the last of the Army marched down to the Mils and

Major Putnom made a Bridge over by the Landing place this night we lodged by the Mils" (p. 22).

"Saturday 8th. Then marched back 2 or 3 regiments to the Landing place to guard & help Get up Artillira and we worked all the fore noon onloading the Battoes and at noon we set out down to the Mils with the Artillira & we got near the Mils and we had orders to leave the Artillira their and go back & get our arms and we went down to the Mils of our regiment 2 Hundred were ordered to go over on the point to keep the French from Landing their and we stayed while next morning son 2 hours high & when we came in all our army and Artillira was gorn back & the Mils fierd and we marched back to the Landing place and had to secure matter of 200 Barrels of Flour & we heard the French were a coming upon us and we stove them all and come of us as soon as we could and about 10 Ock we sot sail & by Son down we arrived at Lake George according to all accounts the Engagement began about 10 clock and held 10 Hours steady we lost 3 Thousand rigulars" (p. 22-23).

Source: "Military Journal For 1758." *The Military Journals of Two Private Soldiers 1758-1775 With Numerous Illustrative Notes to Which is Added A Supplement Containing Official Papers on the Skirmishes at Lexington and Concord.* Published by Abraham Tomlinson, Poughkeepsie, New York (1855). pp. 11-45.

MacIntosh, James

[Civilian Informant 1777]

[Examination of James MacIntosh Inhabitant About Half A Mile Westward of Ticonderoga Brought Into Brigadier General Fraser's Camp River Bouquet 18th June 1777—By a Party of Indians Under the Command of Lieut. Scott.]

Q.: What State is the works of Ticonderoga in & what number of Guns are mounted? A.: A Redoubt of Seven Embrasures built where the French Sandy Battery was, close to the water Side and about a musket Shot from the Old Fort; two other Redoubts between it and that Fort; the First has three Embrasuers and the other two, one face fronting the River and the other flanking the the [sic] large Redoubt; that between the Seven Gun Redoubt and the nighest end of the French Lines there are two Redoubts fronting this way or northward, one mounting three Guns, the other two, each about Pistol Shot distant; at the Beginning of the French Lines there is a long Battery without Embrasuers for three Guns, behind which on a rising ground there is a half moon Battery for small Arms to fire over the last mentioned Battery; then on the French Lines one Gun on an Embrasuer [sic] that flanks the three Redoubts fronting the North. Still going along the lines, cross the opening for the main wagon Road, which is Shut up at pleasure with the Chevaux de Frise as do all the other Barriers; close to it (the Road) there is a Battery of three more Guns having Embrasuers for Nine pounders fronting still to the north. The Lines then turn and face the westward where there are three Embrasuers fronting my house, then the Lines turn toward the East, fronting Southward in which there is one Gun in Embrasuer [sic] to defend a Barriere thro which pass foot passengers, the line then turns to the Southward facing the westward no Guns, being intended to be defended by Small arms, at the south end of which there is a magazine capable of containing large Quantity of Powder dug in the Parrapet, the walls Stone, Roof Beams covered with Sod, and is a kind of Bomb Proof, at this Angle of the Lines the Ground breaks off to a Steep Rocky Cliff, at the Foot of which is the River that runs from the Sawmills and an abatis made on the Bank by cutting down a quantity of Small White Oaks."

Source: "Inquisition of a Spy." By Thomas C. Hart. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. X, No. 3 (1959). pp. 240-245. [Ms. In the collections of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum].

Marcy, Stephen**[American Solider 1777]***[Pension Declaration. Served in Col. Benjamin Bellows, N.H. Militia]*

c. July 1777: “. . . was marched over to Clarendon on Otter Creek near Rutland and then marched over a floating Bridge to Ticonderoga, where Gen'l St. Clair was in command and there done duty and helped build a Breast work . . .”

Source: United States Pension Bureau: Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty-Land Warrant Application Files. Record for Stephen Marcy (#S 23,784). *Fold 3.com*.

[www.http://fold3.com](http://fold3.com) : 2010. From National Archives publication M804.

Maurès Malartic, Gabriel de (1)**[French Officer 1758]**

[7th July 1758]: “. . . this abatis covered all of the land between the River Chute and goes up to the woods to the rear which border Lake Champlain. At 5 o’clock in the evening M. de Bourlamaque spaced seven battalions equally along the abatis and they were each given one hundred and twenty seven paces to guard; he permitted some tents to be held at the rear for lighting cooking fires; he ordered them to sleep in camp, the guards at the edge of the abatis to make frequent patrols outside and light great fires there” (p. 169-170).

[8th July 1758]: “Our generals visited the abatis and found it to be in a good state of defence. At midday the regiments of La Reine and Béarn began to build up some epaulements, to provide cover to enfilade some of the heights, when we began to hear a lot of shots fired from our left” (p. 170).

[12th July 1758]: “We began to re-work the abatis and make entrenchments” (p. 170).

[3rd August 1758]: “M. Pouchot, captain of Béarn, was charged with constructing to protect the right of the entrenchment” (p. 178).

Source: *Glories to Useless Heroism: The Seven Years War in North America from the French Journals of Comte Maurès De Malartic, 1755-1760*. Translated by William Raffle. Helion & Company, Solihull, West Midlands, England (2017).

Maurès Malartic, Gabriel de (2)**[French Officer 1758]**

[July 6th] “. . . at ½ past 9 set out for Carillon; at 7 o’clock arrived at the entrance of the clearing, where we formed ourselves in order of battle and bivouacked through the night” (p. 845).

“7th [July 1758] Beat the *generale* at day-light; some regiments took provisions; the three brigades proceeded at 6 o’clock to the edge of the wood, where they commenced an abatis, at which they worked industriously throughout the day. . . This abatis includes the entire ground between the River of the Falls and that which terminates at the reserved wood lining Lake Champlain . . . At 5 o’clock, the line of the abatis was equally divided between the seven battalions, and each had 127 to guard” (p. 845-846).

“8th [July 1758] The *generale* was beat long before day. Chev. de Levis arrived; At 5 o’clock, each battalion set to work to strengthen the abitis, 150 paces in front of which were posted, to protect the workmen. At 9 o’clock, a body of troops was discovered on the summit and at the foot of the mountain, on the right of the River of the Falls, whence they were examining our position, and fired a few shots at us. Bernard’s volunteers gave them a few shots in answer. Chev. d’Arenes, Lieutenant of that company, had his arm broken on that occasion. Our Generals made a tour of inspection of the abitis, which they found in pretty good condition and made arrangements for the defense. At ½ past 12, the regiment of La Reine and Bearn were

going to construct some epaulements to protect themselves from the heights, when a heavy firing was heard on the left; a moment after at the centre, and next at the right. The discharge of a cannon from the fort, announcing the arrival of the enemy, brought every man to his post. The companies of grenadiers and guards came in again without losing a single man. The battalions lined the abati, three deep, having their grenadier companies and pickets in line of battle in their rear, ready to march wherever needed. La Sarre's brigade, commanded by M. de Bourlamaque, responded by same effectual firing, to a column that shewed itself; the Royal Rousillion and Guyenne regiments, to two that attacked the centre where the M^{qs} de Montcalm was posted; and the regiments of La Reine and Bern to a fourth that had an anxiety to attempt the right. Several barges defiled from the River of the Falls to come and land some people and to turn our left. The company of the Royal Rousillion grenadiers and the Volunteers went down to the bank of the river to fire at them. A few cannon shot were fired from the fort which, after sinking two, forced the others to retreat up the river whence they made no further appearance. The fire was pretty hot on each side, though a little more active on ours. The attack and defence were sustained with incredible valor. The enemy's columns, though strengthened by reinforcements they were constantly receiving and though often combining to make united efforts, one time on the right, the centre and left, were not making any progress and experienced every where obstinate resistance . . . Chev. de Levis posted himself very apropos with the regiment of La Reine behind that of Guyenne where the enemy were appearing in force, desirous of making an impression; he checked them and sent out the soldiers of the Colony and the Canadiens who lay in reserve in the wood, to fire on the enemy's left flank. At ½ past 5 o'clock, the fire began to slacken; some soldiers were allowed to go out who took some prisoners'; at 6 o'clock the enemy made a new attempt with no better success than the first. Perceiving at 7 o'clock that they had not made any progress, they bethought them of a retreat, leaving their best marksmen to cover it" (p. 846).

"9th The *generale* was beat an hour before day; the troops lined the abati, anxiously hoping for the arrival of the enemy. Some detachments were sent out, which dispatched some of the wounded that whished to offer resistance, and brought in prisoners. A very thick smoke was perceived at the Falls, which led to the supposition that the enemy were abandoning that place and were occupying themselves only with retreat. M. de Bernard who went scouting with his company, sent word to the Marquis de Montcalm that on the road to the falls was an intrenchment which he could set on fire. That General immediately sent him the orders to do so, which was executed at once" (p. 847). "Buried all our dead." (p. 847).

"10th Chevalier de Levis went to the Portage with the grenadier companies and pickets; found some intrenchments on both sides of the Falls at the head of the Portage and at the Burnt Camp . . . had the English buried who were beginning to infect the outside of the abati" (p. 848).

"12th Began to work at the abatis and to give it the form of an intrenchment; M. de Rigaud arrived . . ." (p. 848).

[August] "3rd M. de Pouchot has traced a redoubt to secure the right of the intrenchment" (p. 850).

[August 7th]: "fire broke out in the intrenchment, and was eventually extinguished" (p. 851).

Source: "Journal of Occurrences in Canada 1757-1758--Journal of Occurrences in the Garrisons of Camps occupied by the Regiment of Bearn from 20th October 1757 to the 20th of October 1758." By Adjutant Malartic [Gabriel de Maurès Malartic]. *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Volume X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp. 835-855.

Maurès Malartic, Gabriel de (3)

[*Journal*]

“The 30th of June. The Marquis de Montcalm arrived there on that day with the regiment of Bearn. The other seven regiments had landed there some days before” (p. 721).

[July 8th] “The night was spent in cleaning the arms, in raising some epaulments on the left, as a cover from the damage to which we were exposed from the musketry, being seen in reverse. The troops bivouacked through the night along the abatis, very alert and wishing for the return of the enemy on the morrow” (p. 724).

[July 10th] “de Levis “found some intrenchments on both sides of the falls . . .”

Source: “Journal of the Military Operations before Ticonderoga.” By Adjutant Malartic [Gabriel de Maurès Malartic]. *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Volume X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp. 721-725.

- Note: There is more to this account, but it is similar to the one above, but with slightly different language and/or translation used.

Merriman, Samuel

[*Journal & Orderly Book. Served with Timothy Ruggles' Regt.*]

“July 23, our army marched up tow ye french Brest worcks with out any molestation & went to trenchen upon ye Enamies ground with in forty Rodes of ye french fort their march in tow Rigments into ye Intrenchments ye enemies continued their fire vary smart—three Enemi saled out vpon our intrenchments thy killed on ensine & wound 14 teen & then ye enemy Retired to their fort” (p. 664-665).

“July ye 25, 1759. Nothing extrodnary happened th Day only wone helander Col & wone priuate killed with a canon ball. No firering upon our side, three enemies fire is vary hauey. ye armi hath entrench within 30 Rodes of ye french fort our English went to ye fort & fired at ye sentry upon ye wale. Some of our men went into ye french garden & fetch a armfull ful of cabage to genl & he gaue then tow dolares & c” (p. 665).

“July ye 26, 1759. This day ye enemies fired vary smart til eleuen a clock at Night, then ye enemy sot ye Magazen on fire & blew up ye fort & went abord theire botoe . . .” (p. 665).

Source: *A History of Deerfield, Massachusetts: The Times When and the People by Whom it was Settled, Unsettled and Resettled: With a Special Study of the Indian Was in the Connecticut Valley; With Genealogies*. Vol. I. By George Sheldon. Pocumtuck Valley Memorial Association. Press of E.A. Hall & Co., Greenfield, Massachusetts (1895). pp. 661-668.

Metcalf, Simon

[*Report of Simon Metcalf given July 11, 1776*]

[British Informant 1776]

“I have in conformity to what I deem my duty Enclosed your Excellency a plan of the Camp at Crown Point, as to the number of men I cannot pretend to say, as all the time that I was there they never were mustered, it was with great difficulty they mended the [last?] Boats to fetch off the people from the Isle La Mott, after which they had neither guard nor sentries. They have a Camp on the east Shore, at the place called Hospital or Chimney Point, this as well as the encampment next to the woods I understood was occupied solely by the sick and their attendants such disorder believe never was beheld in a military camp, there not being the least precaution

against sudden attack . . . Their has been no preparation made for a Defense either there or at Ticonderoga except the Lines described on the plan, which are so poor a cover that I cannot think they would ever attempt to defend them as to entrenching tools I was told they had none, but for the truth of that fact I cannot vouch."

Source: *Haldimand Papers*, H-1737; Images # 898-904. Available on-line at: https://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_mikan_105513.

Moneypenny, Alexander Capt. (1)
[Orderly Book]

[British Officer 1758]

[July 7]: "all the prisoners lately taken to be deliver'd to Captain Gordon of the 27th Regt & to be sent ny him to the island & put under the direction of Capt DuBois of the New York Regt."

Source: "Moneypenny Orderly (Continued from Volume XII, Number 5)." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XII, No. 6 (October 1970). pp. 434-461.

Moneypenny, Alexander Capt. (2)
[Orderly Book]

[British Officer 1759]

"Monday 23 July 1759 . . . The Regiments to march & encamp as soon as the Ground is mark'd [sic] out for them. The Regulars who are to defend the Breast Work must immediately raise a Banquet in the Front of the Center of each Regt. with Logs & Earth so that the Piquet of each Regt. can stand up upon it to defend the Breast Work without pulling any part of the Breast Work down, as it covers the camp from the shot of the place. The men may boil their pots as soon as they will. A camp will be mark'd [sic] out for Lyman's, Worster's & Fitch's in the Wood. They will face out wards & advance their Piquets in Front, that no straggling Indians may pick off their people."

Source: "The Amherst Expedition-General Orders." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. II, No. 6 (July 1932). pp. 219-251. [Ms. In the collections of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum].

Montcalm, Loius-Joseph de (1)
[Report]

[French Commander 1758]

"The 6th. At four o'clock in the morning, the vanguard of the opponent's army was located in sight of the portage. At once the Marquis de Montcalm sent orders to the Sieurs de Pontleroy and Desandrouins to lay out, in front of Carillon on the ground already marked, trenches and abattis and to the 2nd Battalion of Berry to work at them . . ."

"The 7th. The French army was all employed working at the abattis which had been started the day before by the 2nd Berry Battalion. The officers were setting the example and the flags were hoisted—the plan of the defenses had been laid out on the heights, 650 fathoms from the Carillon fort. On the left side it was backed up by an embankment 80 fathoms away from the Chute River, the top of which was capped by a wall. This wall was flanked by a gap back of which 6 cannon were to be placed to fire at it as well as to the river. On the right it was also backed by an embankment the slope of which was not as steep as the one on the left; the plain between this hill and the Lake Saint Sacrement River was boarded by a branch of the trenches and also by a battery of 4 cannon which were only placed there the day after the battle. Also the guns of the Fort were pointed toward this plain as well as any other disembarkment which might be effected on the left. The Center followed the sinuosities of the ground, keeping the top of the

heights, and all the parts flanked one another reciprocally. Several, to tell the truth, were hit here, as well as on the right and on the left by a cross of fire of the enemy, but it was because we didn't have time to put up traverses. That kind of defense was made by tree trunks put one on top of the other, and had in front of it fallen trees the branches of which, cut and sharpened, gave the effect of a chevaux de frise . . .”

“The 8th. At dawn, we beat the drums, so as to let all the troops know their posts for the defense of the entrenchment, following the above arrangement, which was about that in which they worked . . . This arrangement, fixed and known, the troops at once fell back to work; some of them got busy improving the abattis, the rest erecting the two batteries mentioned above and a redoubt to protect the right . . . At half past twelve, the English army debouched upon us . . . The left was attacked first by two columns, one of which was trying to turn the trenches . . . the other directed its efforts on a salient between the Languedoc and the Berry battalions. The center, where the Royal Roussillon was, attacked almost at the same time by a third column; a fourth attacked the right between the Bearn and the Queen's battalion . . .”

Source: “The Battle of Carillon.” By John S. Watts. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. II, No. 2 (1930). pp. 69-75.

- **Note:** See the same document, but with slight differences in translation: “M. de Montcalm's Report of the Battle of Ticonderoga: An Account of the Victory gained at Carillon by the King's Troops, on the 8th of July 1758.” *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York.* Vol. X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp. 737-741.

Montcalm, Louis-Joseph de (2)

[Letter to the Marquis de Vaudreuil “Du cap de Carillon le 9 Juillet”]

“6th Messrs de Pont le Roy, de Sandrouins [sic], have superintended the work of the intrenchment, which was crowning the height, the left on the river, and the right on a curtain. Our seven battalions—the 2nd of Berry having been entrusted with guarding the fort . . . worked with incredible ardor in constructing abatis, which in the course of the day of the 7th, were finished, both good and bad . . . The few Canadians and Colonial troops I had by me, were posted at 5 o'clock in the morning . . . the general disposition for the reception of the enemy was completed by the 7th. Throughout the 7th we had our guards and grenadiers outside to protect the work; the companies of volunteers drafted from our troops, and which I had placed under the command of Messrs Bernard and duPrat, were always in advance to give intelligence of the enemy's movement. Messers deLangy and Daillebout were going to scout also; the army lay on its arms” (p. 748).

“8th Men continued strengthening the abatis, our volunteers as usual exchanged shots with the enemy's advanced guards; the arrival of Chevalier de Levy caused no other change in my arrangement than to commit the defense of the right to him, and to remove M. de Bourlamaque to the left” (p. 748).

“At 1 o'clock we were attacked by the enemy with an impetuosity worthy of better troops; they made 6 consecutive assaults, and even reached the abatis; they formed 3 principal columns; the firing on both sides was kept up briskly until 6 o'clock in the evening and continued until night . . . the Colonial troops and Canadians . . . because they were nimbler men he [de Levis] ordered two sorties . . . M. d'Hery Adjutant of La Reine, headed one; Captain Denau of the same regiment, the other. As the enemy could land a force in barges, which, in fact, they attempted at the beginning of the attack, Bernard's and Du Prat's volunteers guard this

[French Commander 1758]

part, and M. de Louvicourt, who was managing three guns of the fort, sunk a barge and pontoon . . . The enemy retired at night abandoning a part of their wounded . . ." (p. 748).

"We estimate from the report of prisoners, that they were at least 12000 of their best fighting troops; they had left the remainder behind some abbatis, between the Falls and our field of battle to protect their retreat . . . 2000 corpses which lie among our abbatis" (p. 748).

Source: "Copy of the Letter written by M. de Montcalm to the Marquis de Vaudreuil July 9, 1758." *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*. Vol. X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp. 748-749.

- **Note:** In the postscript to this letter as printed in: *Collection De Manuscrits Contenant Lettres, Memoirs, Et Autres Documents Historiques Relatifs a la Nouvelle-France Recueillis Aux Archives de la Province de Quebec, Ou Copies a l'Etranger*. Vol. IV. Mis En Ordre Edites Sous Les Auspices de la Legislature de Quebec. Impimerie, A. Cote et C^{ls}, Quebec (1885). p.172, Montcalm added: "Je changerai ma position au retour du detachment de Monsieur le Chevalier de Levis pour donner plus de commodite a mon camp et m'occuper aussi serieusement de finir Carillon et d'y former retranchment pour arreter l'enemy s'il devoit en tenter encore le seige, ce qui pourroit bein etre au retour des troupes de Louisbourg s'ils le prenaient."

Google Translation

- *I will change my position on the return of the detachment of Monsieur le Chevalier de Levis to give more commodite to my camp and take care as seriously to finish Carillon and form entrenchment to arrest the enemy if he had to try the seige again, which is likely to be the return of the troops of Louisbourg if they took it."*

Montcalm, Loius-Joseph de (3)

[French Commander 1758]

[Letter. M. de Montcalm to M. de Belle Isle (Department de la Guerre), "Camp at Carillion 27 8^{her}, 1758"]

" . . . the garrison of the fort will be composed of pickets of our battalions. I have made choice of Captain d'Hebecourt of the regiment La Reine, who has already commanded there; he is an officer of merit, agreeable to all, even to the Indians . . ." (p. 860).

Source: "M.de Montcalm to M. de Belle Isle Camp at Carillion 27 8^{her}, 1758."

Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York. Vol. X. By John Romeyn Brodhead (ed). Weed, Parsons, and Company Printers, Albany, New York (1858). pp. 860-862.

Montcalm, Loius-Joseph de (4)

[French Commander 1759]

[Lettre De Monsieur De Montcalm Au Ministre A Montreal. le 8 may 1759]

" . . . Monsieur de Bourlamarque, don't la sante est bien retablie est en marche avec un corps de 3,000 hommes, compose du bataillon de la reine et des duex de Berry, Troupes de la colonie et des Canadiens. Ce corps sera rassemble et campe sur les hauteurs de Carillion du 15 au 20 du mois. Le surplus des troupes reste dans ses quartiers. Elles se tiennent pretes a marcher au premier ordre." (p. 244).

Source: *Collection De Manuscrits Contenant Lettres, Memoirs, Et Autres Documents Historiques Relatifs a la Nouvelle-France Recueillis Aux Archives de la Province de Quebec, Ou Copies a l'Etranger*. Vol. IV. Mis En Ordre Edites Sous Les Auspices de la Legislature de Quebec. Impimerie, A. Cote et C^{ls}, Quebec (1885). pp. 244-245.

Google Translation

“. . . Monsieur de Bourlamarque, don't the health is well restored is on the march with a corps of 3,000 men, consisting of the Battalion of the Queen and the two of Berry, Colony Troops and The Canadians. This body will be gathered and camped on the heights of Carillion from the 15th to the 20th of the month. The surplus of troops remains in its quarters. They are ready to walk in the first order.”

Montresor, James Col.

[*Journal*]

[British Officer / Engineer 1759]

“Saturday 21st The General beat this morning at 2 and the tents were struck at 3 and by 4 the remainder of the artillery & regiments began to Embark & were all Embarked by 10 . . . Two mortars sunk and some Powder” (p. 82).

“Sunday 22nd Order'd every man to be under arms at 12 o'clock. The boats to be calked. Platform made for the mortars to be got up, but left one behind in the Water and went away with one & a sling cart carriage some fix't ammunition and cartridges . . .” (p. 82).

“Wednesday 25th This morning at 5 o'clock received an Express by letter from the General acquainting me, that he had taken possession of the French lines before Ticonderoga the 23rd and had Established his camp near the place but under cover, Except Ricochet shot & shells, that he sent 20 wounded men to the Hospital & that Ensign Harrison of Forbes was killed . . .” (p. 83).

Source: “Journals of Col. James Montresor 1757-1759.” By G.D. Scull (ed).

Collections of the New-York Historical Society for the Year 1881. Printed for the Society, New York, New York (1882).

Murray, James Capt. (1)

[*Letter to Mr. John Murray Dated 19 July 1758; served with Black Watch*]

[British Officer 1758]

“The next day being the 7th, we were making preparations to invest a fort called Theenderora which is five miles from Lake George and is situate on a neck of land that runs into Lake Champlain. As to the dimensions of the lake I can't say, and marched within a mile and a half of it that evening. The next morning the light infantry made the French sentries and small posts retire to the entrenchments for the French had an encampment about half a cannon shot before their fort and were entrenched after the following manner: They had cut trees laid one above another a man's height and in the outside there was brush and logs for about 45 paces [second source says “15 paces”] from it which made it impossible to force their breastworks without cannon . . . Between one and two we marched up and attacked the trenches and got within twenty paces of them and had as hot a fire for about three hours as possible could be, we all the time seeing but their hats and the end of their muskets” (p. 47-48).

Source: “Like roaring lions breaking from their chains:” The Highland Regiment at Ticonderoga.” By Nicholas Westbrook. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. XVI, No. 1 (1988). pp. 16-93. Also in: “The Black Watch at Ticonderoga.” By Frederick B. Richards. *Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association.* Vol. 10 (1911). pp. 367-464.

Murray, James Capt. (2)

[*Letter to his brother dated “Camp at the Lines of Burning, Theanderoga [sic], 27 July 1759”*]

[British Officer 1759]

“. . . invested the Fort 23rd and was very buisy [sic] carrying on the worcks [sic] till the 26th in the night, at which time we had three batteries ready to open, when the enemy abandoned at set fire to the fort. During the time that the enemy remained they could not keep a hotter fire, for I dare say that fired ten thousand cannon shot and five hundred bombs and I don’t believe there has been forty men killed and wounded during that hott fire, altho’ all the Bombs fell in different parts among us and that we were nigh point blank of the cannon shott but the line had been of so much hurt to us last year saved our men this” (p. 393).

Source: “The Black Watch at Ticonderoga.” By Frederick B. Richards. *Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association*. Vol. 10 (1911): pp. 367-464.

Nichols, Joseph

[Journal. Served in Capt. John Taplin’s Company in Col. Bagley’s Massachusetts Regiment]

“. . . about Nine oClock as near as can guess our Forces went in order to attact the[ir?] fort Johnson & his Indians went Over the Lake to Surprize our Enemy by shouting & yelling In the Mean while Major Rogers and the Light Infantry was to begin the Attact their Fort as I understand is nigh the Lake our Enemy Dug a Trench Round theire Fort about Sixty or Eighty Rods distance from the Fort & the out Side Side of the Trench among the woods they [Built?] a Strong Breast work of Loges--Our Artillery in the meanwhile was transporting down to us will all Haste--Next to Major Rogers Party Drew in the Provincial Forces in two Curcles two deep around theire Breast Work. The Regulars orders was to Force them from their Breast work after our men had formed themselves in the manner Mentioned—As near I can guess it was about 10 o Clock when small parties of each force Begun to fire from each parties & so continued an hour or more—Then Rogers & his party & Light Infantry begun to draw near the Breast Work—The Enemy at the same time Sallied out upon our men from theire Breast Work & the Fire was Exceeding Hot Indeed—Orders was Soon Given to the New York Forces to Repaire to Rogers Assistance—Our enemy Soon Retreated To Their Breast works which was Built So High that Our Enemy Could Stand Behind & Receive our Fire without Danger—Our Forces Fell Exceeding Fast it was Surprising to me to think more of y^e Regiments Should be Drawn up to the Breast work for such Slaughter—it was not Long before our Regulars was Ordered to Force the Enemys From theire Breast work—our Regiment had no orders to March so we Stood Still & Viewed the Action—The Regulars march’d in order Right up before theire Breast work & Swiffles—when our Regulars March’d Nigh the Breast work The Enemy as one man Hoisted English Coulars & Pulled off theire Hats & Clubbed Their Guns which our men took for a Token of Resigning up to our English—no Sooner Had our men come nigh [there?/them?] & Begun to Leap over theire Breast work—But our Enemys fired upon our men & Cut them Down Like Grass. The fire Continued Exceeding Hot & one Regiment was Drawn up after another. In about an hour—Orders came for Col Bagly Regiment to march up Directly—We march’d a Small Space & then Orders came to Halt Several of the Soilders went up without Orders & was Killed & Several wounded our Capt Took much Care to Keep up back from Going Forward & Keep our Ground. [Good?] so our Company fell not a prey as many other companys Did--The Engagement Lasted from the Time I mention’d till just as the Sun Sett—Then we Carried off Some our Wounded men & I am apt To think many was Left to the Marcy of the Enemy--Our Regiment and Chief of the men that Engaged the Enemy Retreated back to a breast work that Col. Ruggles Regiment made in the Time of Battle—There we Tarried till the Latter part of the Night . . .” (p. 21-23).

[British Provincial Soldier 1758]

Source: Joseph Nichols' *Military Journal 1758-1766*. The Huntington Library, Art Museum, and Botanical Gardens, San Marino, California: Manuscripts MsHM 89.

Noyes, John Pvt.

[Provincial Solider 1758]

[Journal. Served in Capt. Joseph Newhall's Company in Col. Jonathan Bagley's Massachusetts Regiment]

“July y^e 7th we marcht a little before Sun Set and we wade over a river to join the battalion and we had got about half way and was Lost and we Coold Not find them and we Stood to arms all Knight and the Next Morning we marcht to Join the Battallion” (p. 74).

“July y^e 8th we marcht up to the Sawmill and from there to the brest work and we marched up In a String that was too mile long and we marcht up to the French and begun to fight and they begun about Noon and they Kept a Continual firing while Sun Set there was no Sessation arm [sic] Not won minuet and we came of to the brest work and all the Rigulars Came of all the rest & left us behind and we was Ralied about midnight and we Stayd while all the wounded ware Carried by us and then we Came of and we got down to the Lake by about Sun Rise and we got all into the Battoes and we Lost about too thousand men and we Coul Not tell how many French we Killed be we Kild Some Considerable of them” (p. 74).

Source: “Journal of John Noyes of Newbury in the Expedition Against Ticonderoga, 1758.” From the Original Manuscript in the Possession of Elwell Noyes of Salem.” *Essex Institute Historical Collections*. Vol. VLV (1909): pp. 73-77.

Orderly Book

[American Orderly Book 1776]

[October 19, 1776] Col. Baldwin First Engineer will takethe Command of the Works upon the Side of Ticonderago . . .” (p. 15).

[October 19, 1776]: “all of the Spears that can be spar'd from the Vesells to be deliver'd for the Defence [sic] of the French Lines and Redoubts” (p. 17).

[October 20, 1776]: “No person is to direct any new Works or the repairing of any old ones without first receiving the Engineer’s approbation and Direction for the Same” (p. 18).

Source: *Orderly Book of the Northern Army at Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence From October 17th, 1776, to January 8th, 1777, with Biographical and Explanatory Notes, and An Appendix*. J. Munsell, Albany, New York (1859).

Parkman, William

[British Provincial Solider 1758]

[Journal. Served in a Massachusetts Regiment, either Preble, Williams, Partridge or Doty]

“Landing Place, July 7, 1758. This morning the whole army was drawn up at the landing place, where we lay until late in the morning when we marched to the mills with some artillery, and there the regulars camped; but our regiment and some others went about three-quarters of a mile nearer the fort, and there we built a breastwork and camped this night.” (p. 244).

“July 8. This morning we arose in high spirits, and lay by until eight o’clock, and then we marched up and formed in a line a little distance from the enemy’s breastwork, where we had orders to lie until our front retreated, we being in the rear. Our lines were formed thus: rangers, &c., in the front, regulars next, provincials in the rear. Here we lay some time, but the fire at eleven o’clock growing very hot, we marched some what nearer, where we lay until near sunset. During this time there was a constant and exceeding hot fire in our front with those in the enemy’s breastwork. This being stronger vastly than we expected to find it, we were obliged to

draw off, which was our great misfortune; we having great numbers killed and wounded." (p. 244).

Source: "Journal of William Parkman." *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society.* Vol. XCVII (1879-1880). University Press, John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1880). pp. 243-244.

Partridge, Alden

[Visitor 1820]

[In 1820, Capt. Alden Partridge (1785-1854) visited both Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence and made some observations]

"These low grounds, I am induced to believe, were formerly covered with water . . . the old French lines . . . commenced at the eastern verge of the ridge . . . and, running along the edge of the declivity on that side, in a north-westerly direction, until they attained the highest part of the ground when they were extended across, in a southerly direction, to the verge of the declivity on the right; thence, along the edge of this declivity, in a south-easterly direction, to the lower grounds where they terminate. These lines consisted of a parapet of earth, with a ditch in front, except where they were on the verge of the declivity. The faces formed salient and re-entering angles, which constituted the whole of their flank defence [sic]. On the highest ground within those lines, there appears to have been an enclosed work, which was probably indented [as?] a kind of citadel, in case the lines were carried."

Source: [No title article]. *Daily National Intelligencer*, (Washington D.C.), August 4, 1820. p. 2.

Partridge, Oliver Col.

[Provincial Officer 1758]

[Commander of a Massachusetts Regiment; Letter to His Wife Dated Lake George July 12, 1758]

" . . . July 7 we soon laid a bridge over the Lake at y^e Falls & marched thro y^r French encampm^t where y^r had Spread desolation destroying every thing in their power we passed on with 3 Mass Regiments My Battalion & Col Broadstreets with y^e Battou men to y^e French Advance post within ab^t a mile of Tyconderoga fort where we heard Montcalm was posted with 6 Battalion this place is called y^e mills & y^e last of any difficulty to obtain before we come to Ticonderoga Fort here y^r had a large encampm^t which they had destroyed & ran off burning y^e very carts & attempting to Burn their mill. After we had taken possession of this the Body of y^e army came up & encamped. Col prebble Doty Wm^s & I with our [?] were ordered to go half way to y^e French Fort & encamp which we did. Next morn July 8 Col. Gages Light Infantry & Battou men & Rogers Rangers were ordered forward to drive in y^e French Cent[ries?] the Next line consisted of Doty on y^e Right Prebble next my Battalion next Col Wms Next Bagley & New Yorkers completed the line from Lake to Lake about 3 hours after we had formed y^e Regulars came who was to attempt y^e French line which if y^r could not carry y^r were to retire & draw out the French to us who were formed in y^e woods ab^t 2 musquet Shot of y^e French entrenchment they had not only y^e ditches but ranges of Trees without [?] resembling a Hurricane the New York Force fell in with a French Advance party where a hot fire began the regulars came up & fought with great resolution but it was out of their power to get over their Trees & Ditches they attacked & retreated once & again the provincials came up to y^r assistance but to no purpose an Incessant heavy fire continued near six hours in which time many of y^r regulars were Killed & wounded & [considerable?] less Number of y^r provincials I cannot ascertain either. The main of y^e army retired to y^e mill. Col. Williams & I with our provincials were where we Lodged the

night before ab^t midnight we [accidently?] found out the whole army were moving off which [was?] to our great Surprise we came along in y^e night to our Battoes in y^e morning."

Source: "Oliver Partridge to His Wife Dated Lake George July 12, 1758." Israel Williams Papers; Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts.

Pelissier, Christopher

[American Engineer 1776]

[Letter to Gen. Gates; dated "Tyconderoga 7bre 23, 1776"]

"Ayant ete informe ce matin, par Mons Clajon, que vous desireriez connoitre ma facon de penser au sujet des partis que l'on pourroit tirer des fortifications nouvellement faites icy, et des travaux les plus essentiels que l'on pourroit y ajouter en huit ou dix jours, ayant egard au tems et aux circonstances: mon opinion seroit d'etablir, a quatre-vingt toises de distance des lignes des Francais, un glacis, et de remplir l'intervalle qu'il y a entre luy et le fosse d'un plus grand nombre des branches qu'il n'y en a. Avec une telle disposition, l'ennemi ne pourroit point attaquer les lignes avec du cannon, a moins qu'il n'en tut le siege, ce qui pendroit du tems. Si l'on donnoit dix-huit pieds de large au banquette, on pourroit, au moyen de cinq ou six coulisses portalire, battre avec du canon par-dessus le parapet, en enfiler les colonnes par tout ou elles se presenteroient. Une facine d' epine qui borderoit le bord exterieur du parpet, ne seroit pas inutile. Il seroit bon aussy qu'il y eut un chemin couvert, pour communiquer, sac l'aile droite d'une redoute a l'autre, celle du General Briquet non comprise. J'ay l'honneur d'ete tres respectueusement, Monsieur votre tres humble et tres obeissant serviteur" (p. 484).

Source: "M. Christopher Pélissier Engineer, To Gen. Gates." *American Archives: Fifth Series: Containing A Documentary History of the United States of America From the Declaration of Independence July 4, 1776 to the Definitive Treaty of Peace with Great Britain September 3, 1783.* Volume II. By Peter Force. M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, Washington D.C. (1851).

- **Note:** Pélissier arrived at Ticonderoga in September of 1776 and served as an assistant engineer under Col. Jeduthan Baldwin until late December when he returned to Congress to solicit promotion to chief engineer at Ticonderoga (see notes accompanying <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-06-02-0207>). Pélissier also wrote a harsh critique of the Jersey Redoubt on October 21, 1776; see *American Archives: Fifth Series: Containing A Documentary History of the United States of America From the Declaration of Independence July 4, 1776 to the Definitive Treaty of Peace with Great Britain September 3, 1783.* Volume II. By Peter Force. M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force. Washington D.C. (1851). p. 1970.

Pell, William (1)

[Advertisement 1833]

"To Lease For A Term of Years. The farm at Ticonderoga Point, Known as the Garrison Ground. The Whole of this valuable property and Stone House, excepting about twenty-five acres, would be leased to a good and efficient Farmer upon reasonable terms. The best crops in the country are produced upon this Farm and to a person of ordinary industry and application, it would be made an object. ALSO; THE HOUSE recently erected and about twenty-five acres of ground would be leased for seven or 10 years, to a person who might wish to keep a First Rate Hotel, and to none other and for no other purpose. It is believed that this location possesses advantages of no common character, as a very large proportion on the persons who visit the Springs, or who passin [sic] to Canada, visit this place, and would probably continue three or four days, if the house was kept properly. The contemplated Rail Road to Caldwell—and a boat

of increased speed upon Lake George, cannot fail to make this place of fashionable resort . . . During the last season, there was an average of from thirty to forty persons a day examining the grounds: and, there will probably be increase numbers, with increased accommodations and facilities."

Source: "To Lease." *Middlebury Argus* (Middlebury, Vermont), November 30, 1833. p. 4.

Pell, William (2)

[Advertisement 1844]

"A Good Farm to Let. Possession 1st of April next. The Farm known as Ticonderoga Point, in Essex County, New York, bounded on three sides by Lake Champlain and the outlet of Lake George. It consists of 650 ACRES of Land more or less, in good Fence and in good Farming order. The Meadows are well laid down to Clover and Timothy, and will cut in many parts more than two tons to the acre. About two hundred acres is a rich loamy soil, one hundred and fifty good sandy soil, and the remainder good Wheat and Pasture Land. The Farm Buildings consist of a good Farm House, three smaller ones, three BARNS and a STABLE. It is situated about a mile and a half from the town of Ticonderoga, where a market may be had for all its products. On the property is a District School House, and in the town are three churches. To a tenant wishing to send his crops to the New York markets, the use of the Dock on another part of the property will be guarantied [sic]. To a good Farmer with capital, it will be let for a long term of years at a low rent. Apply if by letter post paid, to Mr. Pell 85 Wall Street, New York."

Source: "A Good Farm to Let." *Poughkeepsie Journal* (Poughkeepsie, New York), August 10, 1844. p. 3.

Perry, David

[British Provincial Soldier 1758]

[Post-War Recollection. Served with Col. Preble's Massachusetts Regiment]

"The army moved on that day to within a short distance of the enemy, and encamped for the night. In the morning we had orders to move forward again, in a column three deep, in order to storm the enemy's breast-works. known in the country by the name of 'the Old French Lines.' Our orders were to 'run to the breast-work, and get in if we could.' But their lines were full, and they killed our men so fast, that we could not gain it. We got behind trees, logs and stumps, and covered ourselves as we could from the enemy's fire. The ground was strewed with the dead and dying. It happened that I got behind a white-oak stump, which was so small that I had to lay on my side, and stretch myself, the balls striking the ground within a hand's breadth of me every moment, and I could hear the men screaming, and see them dying all around me. I lay there some time. A man could not stand erect without being hit, any more than he could stand out in a shower, without having drops of rain fall upon him; for the balls came by the handful. It was a clear day—little air stirring. Once in a while the enemy would cease firing a minute or two, to have the smoke clear away, so they might take better aim . . . We lay there till near sunset and, not receiving orders from any officer, the men crept off, leaving all the dead, and most of the wounded . . . We got away the wounded of our company; but left a great many crying for help, which we were unable to afford them" (p. 11-13).

Source: *Recollections of an Old Soldier, The Life of Captain David Perry: A Soldier of the French and Revolutionary Wars Containing many Extraordinary Occurrences Relating to His Own Private History, and an Account of Some Interesting Events in the History of the Times in Which He Lived Nowhere Else Recorded.* Republican & Yeoman, Windsor, Vermont (1822).

Perry, George W.**[Visitor 1901]***[Magazine Article]*

"Passing north of the main fortifications, we find only the foundations of the 'stone battery,' the materials of its upper works having been utilized in building the neighboring fence. East of this should lie the lime kilns. We search for them in vain for a while, but find them at length, completely overgrown with shrubbery, while near them are the quarries. Beyond them in the meadow we notice a long, narrow copse of small trees. Pushing our way through the tangle, we find ourselves on the top of a line of earthworks, the ditch before which is still full of water and growing many aquatic plants. Several similar fortifications are found farther to the north. As these are not on the British chart made in 1759, they were probably thrown up by the Americans after the abandonment of Crown Point. Passing along the highway to the westward, we notice two or three cellars, of which there is now no explanation, and several earth redoubts, which were built either by Montcalm for his men to fall back into if overcome, or by the British force during their occupancy. It is easy to distinguish the cellars from the redoubts, as the latter have a ditch outside of the embankment. Crossing the railroad, which here passes through the highest part of the promontory by a tunnel, we come to the French lines in the bloody battle of July 8, 1758. They are distant from the barracks nearly three-fourths of a mile, and form an irregular curved line more than half a mile in length. At the northern end the breast works are only three or four feet high, as at the time of the fight this portion of the approach was an almost impassable swamp. In the centre [sic], where the battle took place the earth was piled up to a height of ten feet, while at the southern end rock work was built instead of earth, advantage being taken of the natural ledges on the brow of the slope to the lake. The whole line of defences [sic] is almost as perfect as on the day of its erection. As we stand on top of the central portion, we have before us a large, level plain, upon which was fought one of the bloodiest battles of history, two thousand English and Colonial soldiers falling in the attempt to carry the works. The battleground is now completely covered with a growth of trees, mostly oak, while upon the breastworks themselves stand some gigantic pines. So, except for the greater dryness of the soil, the place is much as it was at the time of the fight, only enough of the forest having been cut to make the insurmountable abatis" (p. 126-127).

Source: "Ticonderoga." By George W. Perry. *New England Magazine*. New Series. Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (April 1901). pp. 119-127.

Pond, Peter**[British Provincial Solider 1758]***[Journal. Served Col. Nathan Whiting's Connecticut Regiment]*

[7th] "At Lengh we Got to the Water just Before Day Lite in the Morn. What Could be found of the troops Got in sum Order & Began our March a Bout two a Clock in ye Afternoon Crossing the Raped Stream & Left it on Our Left the rode on this Side was Good & we advansd toward the French Camp as fars the Miles About a Mile from the Works & thare Past the Night Lying on Our Armes. This Delay Gave the French What thay Wanted-time to secure thare Camp which was Well Executed. The Next Day [8th] which was Satterday about Eleven we ware Seat in Mosin the British Leading the Van it was about. Thay ware Drawn up Before Strong Brest Work but more in Extent then to Permit four thousand five Hundred acting. We had no Cannon up to works. The Intent was to March over this work But Thay found themselves Sadly Mistaken. The French had Cut Down a Grate number of Pinetraise in front of thare Camp at som distance. While som ware Entrenching Others ware Employed Cuting of the Limbs of the Trease and Sharpening them at Both ends for a Shevoe Dufrease, others Cuting of Larg Logs and

Getting them to the Brest Works. At Lengh thay ware Ready for Our Resaption. About twelve the Parties Began thare fire & the British Put thare Plan on fut to March Over the Works But the Limbs and tops of the Trease on the Side for the Diek Stuck fast in the Ground and all pointed at upper End that thay Could not Git threw them til thay ware at Last Obliged to Quit that plan for three forths ware Kild in the attempt But the Grater Part of the armey Lade in the Rear on thare fases til Nite while the British ware Batteling a Brest work Nine Logs thick in Som plases which was Dun without ye Help of Canan tho we had as fine an Atilrey Just At Hand as Could be in an armey of fifteen thousand Men But thay ware of no youse while thay ware Lying on thare fases. Just as the sun was Seating Abercrombie came from left to Rite in the rear of the troops ingaged and Ordered a Retreat Beat and we left the Ground with about two thousand two hundred Loss as I was Informd By an Officer who saw the Returns of ye Nite Wounded and Missing. We ware Ordered to Regain our Boates at the Lake Side which was Dun after traveling all Nite so Soley that we fell asleep by the Way" (p. 319-320).

Source: "1740-75: Journal of Peter Pond (Reprinted from *Connecticut Magazine*, Vol. X. pp. 239-259)." *Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin*. Volume XVII. By Reuben Gold Thwaites (ed). Democrat Printing Co., Madison, Wisconsin (1908). pp. 314-354.

Pouchot, Pierre Capt.

[Served with the Bearn Regiment]

[French Officer 1758]

"On the 5th of June some prisoners taken up by a party of Nepissens informed us that the English army had begun to assemble at Ft. George. On the 7th the Languedoc left its quarters for Carillion on the 12th the Guienne [sic], on the 15th the Royal Roussillion, on the 17th the Sarre. and on the 20th the Bearn. The Berri and the Queen [La Reine] also left Quebec to repair to this fort, as also did M. M. de Montcalm and de Bourlamaque" (p. 106).

[*On his arrival Pouchot was*] "told that the camp was on the heights four hundred toises in front of the place, and that the troops were busy intrenching themselves. He at once proceeded to the hill, to observe their works. He found a plan of intrenchment vey well drawn, for the character of the ground and a great amount of work done for the short time, which was only seven hours since the beginning. The intrenchment was an abattis of trees. The parapet was covered by branches interwoven, presenting their points most difficult to tear from the palisade, and affording shelter for a sudden movement. It was difficult to distinguish this kind of intrenchment, which the enemy might easily take for a simple abatis" (p. 108-109).

[*The French forces*] "retired 400 toises from that place [Fort Ticonderoga], to the end of a swell of ground that slopes towards Carillion. Upon reaching that place, they began at once to form intrenchments, as we have above described. The 8th being a day so memorable . . . it deserves a detailed account. We will first speak of the contour of the ground, in order to better understand the operations. The land which stretches from the Falls to Carillion, formed an elevated peninsula, the summit of which was rounded, and sinuous, with ridges and elevations at intervals. The road from Carillion to the Falls, is along this summit. There were three or four hills, which run from this summit to the river at the falls, and there the road passes between these hills which rendered it susceptible of defence, for the distance of the eighth of a league. The slope of the ground towards the river was quite steep, but on the left side it was more gentle. There were a few knolls near the bottom of the slope, and then a flat of about 200 toises to the river. The left of our intrenchments descended along this steep slope to the river, and crowned the summit of the ground. Our right was on the height, which commanded the little flat of 200 toises [1,279 ft], where the intrenchment was scarcely traced" (p. 114).

“The Colonial troops and Canadiens occupied this plain. The Queen’s and Bearn were on the height to the right, the Guienne [sic], Royal-Roussillon, Languedoc, and a battalion of Berri, were upon the summit, and a battalion of Berri and the Sarre, were upon the slope on our left. This intrenchment was about 980 paces in circumference. On the night of the 7th, the enemy were employed in opening roads, and in intrenching their camp at the portage, the burned camp and that of the Falls. On the 8th they advanced to within 150 toises [959.25 feet / 319.75 yards] of our intrenchments, where they formed an abattis of defence [sic], and several works of this kind extending to the falls to cover their retreat . . .” (p. 115).

[*The French*] “troops worked incessantly in fortifying their intrenchments. About 10’o’clock, a platoon of troops appeared upon the Mountain Serpent-a-Sonnette, who fired into our camp, and the soldiers busy at their work, but did no damage . . . At half past noon, the English attacked our advanced guard of grenadiers and volunteers, who were posted at the end of our covert, which was not more than 40 to 50 toises wide [sic] in front of the intrenchment. They replied in good order, and held [*end p. 116*] the enemy in check for some time. As soon as the troops, who were dispersed on their several labors heard the musketry somewhat sharp, they ran to arms without waiting for the signal, and just in time, as the head of the enemy’s columns had begun to emerge from their covert of fallen trees . . . Four columns of the enemy advanced at about the same time, of which that on the right, at once attacked the Sarre and Berri. The center then advanced, and two from the left of the enemy, who marched near each other, the one towards the summit, and the other along the slope of the hill, expecting under the fire of the upper column, to approach and drive from our works the Bearn and Queen’s regiments, which the upper column saw somewhat from the rear. They became hotly engaged at this place, as also on our left, where they were able to take the cover of a little bank that protected them. We might therefore say, that all parts on the intrenchments, were in turn attacked with the greatest fury. In the intervals between the columns, several small bodies of troops were scattered, who by their fire, greatly incommoded those in the intrenchments. The attack was pressed with vigor during four hours. The fire of our regiments was more lively and active than could be expected from a like number of troops. If the abattis deranged somewhat the march of the enemy’s columns [*end p. 117*] they also found them well manned and covered” (p. 118).

“They had many killed within ten or twelve paces from the intrenchments” (p. 119).

“The colonial and Canadian troops who occupied the intrenchments on the flat, who were not in condition for defence, but by continual sorties, they dissuaded the English from attempting anything on their side, where they could have easily turned their works had they known their ground, and the facility of taking them” (p. 120).

“The Royal Scottish Regiment, which attacked the angle on the right, of fourteen hundred men, lost nine hundred and fifty men and nearly all its officers (p. 120-121).

“On the 11th, we began to correct our intrenchments, having good occasion to know their faults. On the 12th M. Rigaud arrived with about three thousand Canadiens or colonial soldiers. He was followed on the 13th by six hundred Indians” (p. 122).

“In the month of October M. de Vaudreuil sent a reinforcement of 1,300 Canadiens to Carillion. On the 26th, we learned from another deserter, that the English had broken camp to go into winter quarters, that they had evacuated Fort George, and sunk their barques [sic]” (p. 126).

Source: *Memoir Upon the Late War in North America Between the French and English 1755-60 Followed by Observations Upon the Theatre of Actual War and By New Details Concerning the Manners and Customs of the Indians; with Topographical Maps By M. Pouchot.*

Translated and Edited by Franklin B. Hough. Volume II. Printed for Elliot Woodward, Roxbury, Massachusetts (1866).

Price, John

[American Soldier 1777]

[“English Examination of American POWs March 1777; Ichabod Tupper and John Pierce of Col. Marshall’s Massachusetts Regiment Captured by Capt. Samuel Mackay Between Ticonderoga and Fort George”]

[John Price]: “confirms the accounts as given in by Tupper relating to the defenses about Mount Independent &c. That he was at work on the New Bridge; they had sunk four of the piers in the middle of the Channel: There were about 20 of these Piers at about about 48 feet distance from each other. That there is no probability of finishing this Bridge if the Ice gives away soon.” [This account continues with minor comments on Bennington, Boston, Rhode Island].

Source: *Haldimand Papers* H-1737; Images #935-937. Available on-line at:

https://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_mikan_105513

- Note: In his pension declaration, Ichabod Tupper related that he was a member of Capt. Phillip Thomas’ Company, of Col. Marshall’s Regiment (10th Massachusetts) and was “taken prisoner by the Indians” at Lake George on March 19, 1777, was “conveyed to the British” and taken to Quebec where he “afterwards obtained parole and came home.” He later lived in Monson, Massachusetts. His wife, Rebecca Ripley (who he married Middleborough, on October 31, 1780), would later relate that he: “having been with others to take some horses to Sabbada [sic] Point he was surprised by a party of Indians under the command of a British Officer, taken prisoner and sent to Quebec—that he was subsequently sent to New York where with a number of others he was at length paroled.” United States Pension Bureau: Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty-Land Warrant Application Files. Record for Ichabod Tucker (W#15,440). *Fold 3.com*.
www.fold3.com : 2010. From National Archives publication M804. The Find-a-Grave website indicates that Ichabod Tupper was born on January 21, 1752, died on April 27, 1825, and was buried in Moulton Hill Cemetery in Monson, Hampden County, Massachusetts.
- Note: Capt. Samuel MacKay’s account of the action in which Tupper and Rice were captured dated March 31, 1777, from the *Haldimand Papers*, H-1737, Images 939-943: states: “March 19th. My party arrived at Lake George about 9 Miles from Ticonderoga at 12 o’clock in the day, we intended waiting until night in order to cross over Lake George to take a view of Tyconderoga. About three o’clock the Indians discovered some men coming towards us with horses. I ordered the party to retire back into the woods for fear of being discovered. I did everything that lay in my power from taking them . . . but in spight [sic] of everything I could do or say they would not comply with my orders . . . when I plainly perceived they would not listen to what I wished them to do, that if they promised to go with me to Tyconderoga I would overlook their taking these men . . . when the Indians whent [sic] after them I desired Mr. [Chevalier deLorimier] to see that they did not commit any cruelties towards them. So soon as the Indians had taken these men they wanted to return home without executing any-thing further” [This account continues with the fight at Sabbath Day Point].

Putnam, Rufus

[Provincial Solider 1758]

[Journal. Served with Col. Timothy Ruggles’ Massachusetts Regiment]

[July 8, 1758] "All preparations for marching down to engage the Enemy at the Breast-work which we found was chiefly finished. About 11 o'clock our men marched down to the Battle. There were also some Field pieces went down the River toward the Fort, on Floating Batteries which our men builded below the Falls. How far these Field Pieces went, I am not able to say. Col. Lyman's and Col. Ruggles' Regiments were left at the Mills as a Rear guard, and to build a Breast-work in, or for Defence [sic] if the Enemy attacked us in the Rear. There was a party of Col. Ruggles' Regiment sent down under Command of Lieut. Williams, to carry powder and about 3 o'clock Col. Lyman's Regiment was called off to the Battle. At about Sun an Hour high, there was another Party sent down to carry powder, under the command of Ensign Brown, among whom I was. When I came to the Army they were Retreated into a Breast-work that Col. Williams, men had builded. I was very much amazed to see so many of our men killed and wounded. The path all the way was full of wounded men. I was much amazed to see the floating Batteries Rowing back, the meaning of which I could not tell. I came to the Regiment where I found them employed as before. The most of the Troops retreated into the Breast(-work) which we had builded. After proper guards were posted, we were ordered to refresh ourselves, which we accordingly did, and then camped. About midnight, we were all mustered and ordered to march . . ." (p. 70-71).

Source: *Journal of Gen. Rufus Putnam Kept in Northern New York During Four Campaigns of the Old French and Indian War 1757-1760.* By E.C. Dawes. Joel Munsell's Sons, Albany, New York (1886).

Rea, Caleb Dr.

[Provincial Surgeon 1758]

[Journal; Served with Col. Jonathan Bagley's Massachusetts Regiment]

[July] 7th Cloudy weather one small Shower. march'd toward Ticonderoga Fory with field pieces . . . y^e Light Infantry or Rangers were sent as advance Guards on all Lines. this evening took possession of y^e ground against y^e fort began intrenchment" (p.25-26)

[July] "8th a clear Day and not very hot wind S.W. . . this morning carried a Morter [sic] Piece toward y^e Enemy's Fort, a number of men preparing a Breast work where we landed . . . this monrn'g about 9 or 10 o'clock our Army attacked the Enemy in their advanc'd Breastworks and Soon drove them out and followed then to their Entrenchments which was strongly form'd by art and Nature & fortified with Cannon, also under cover of y^e Fort it is said, the Regulars who gave y^e first attack were all swept off by Grape Shot from y^e Cannon as well as by small arms, for when y^e Enemy saw the intrepidity of our Troops, forcing the Intrenchment with their Bayonets, they retreated hoisting English Colors thereby decoyed our men into y^e French and then fired their Canon with Small Ball and Grape Shott Slaying many Hundreds, notwithstanding all this our men once again got possession of different part y^e Intrenchment, but at last obliged to retreat with great loss. Why this was not attacked with Cannon and Mortars I know not, many conjectures there are, but I shall say nothing of them here. But it seems it was absolutely necessary to Reduce this before we cou'd attack y^e Fort, as it lay before it reached fro' Lake to Lake, half a mile or more in Length, y^e Fort placed on the Point or Neck of Land between y^e Lakes and no coming at but over this Intrenchment. The Battle lasted hot 'till 3 or 4 after Noon when our men only fired fro [sic] y^e Breastwork they first recovered of y^e Enemy, and from Trees, Stumps, Loggs &c. in y^e evening orders to keep y^e Ground 'till late in y^e Night, and then with all Caution and if possible undiscovered to y^e Enemy retreat to y^e Landing with y^e Cannon &c which was accordingly done . . ." (p. 26-28).

[July] “10th Cloudy . . . Day was chiefly employed in makeing [sic] returns of y^e State of y^e Army as to y^e Killed, wounded, sic &c from our going from hence to Ticonderoga . . . I can’t but remark and that with regrett [sic], the horrid cursing and swearing there is in y^e Camp, more especially among y^e Regulars . . .” (p. 28).

[July] “13th . . . why the Enemys Trench was forced by Small Arms only when the Cannon & Morters were just by & a whole Day being spent without attacking y^e Enemy at all which was time enough to have carried the Cannon and laid a Regular Siege, and it is Remarkable that y^e greater part of y^e Provincials new nothing of the Retreat, but as we may suppose the orders were given to y^e Rere when they drew off y^e next Party followed and so on till they all came off, and left the ground they knew not for what, and when they came to y^e Landing there was y^e greatest alarm and Confusion . . .” (p. 30).

[July] “15th . . . One of y^e Highlanders came in who had been taken Captive in y^e late Action at Ticonderoga & informs that the morn’g after we retreated y^e Enemy came out of their Intrenchment & took up near 200 of our wounded and dealt very kindly with them, that there were when he left’m Ten Thousand Strong, that they expected the Day we came off to have given us their Intrenchment . . .” (p. 31).

[July] “16th . . . y^e Deserters that came in yesterday say y^t the French had but 3500 when we attacked their Trench, and having y^e News of out coming y^e Night before we arived [sic] by a German Deserter from our Army they had secured all their Baggage in Battoes at Champlain Lake and expecting we should unavoidably force them at Ticonderogue they intended to push off (demolishing Crown Point on their way) to Chamblee where was a large force, and there they intended to make a stand if we pursued, but that now they had gott Seven Thousand stronge at Ticonderogue They inform us also that y^e French had but Eleven of our wounded men whom they. The best acn^t I’ve yet been able to get of y^e Number killed in y^e action at Ticonderouge amounts to about 1000 and y^e wounded about 500, there are Several Field Officers and many other Brave Officers of y^e Regulars fell in y^e fatal Action of y^e 8th the Rangers suffered a little, but excepting y^e Yorkers and Jersy Blews all y^e Provincials didn’t loose more than 100 men killed and wounded as far as I can learn” (p. 32).

Source: *The Journal of Dr. Caleb Rea: Written During the Expedition Against Ticonderoga in 1758.* By F.M. Ray (ed). Salem, Massachusetts (1881).

Richardson, Amos

[Journal. Served with Col. Ebenezer Nichols’ Massachusetts Regiment]

[July] “Munday the Third Day: and we came from where we campd the Night Before which was aBought a Half mile from the Lake and the Ginell ordered the Rest of ouer Regiment to Staey there all Summer; and thay Twock it quit Hard; BeCius thay Could not goo with the Rest of the Armey Doun to the Nerusere” (p. 274).

“Wednesday the fift Day: The Armay Imbarked aBoriad the Battwos in oder to goo Doun the Nerusers: and there was a fine pasel of them: and after was Gorn we went into the Fort . . .” (p. 274).

“Friday the Seventh Day . . . and in the afternoon there was aBought Eight Hundred of New hamsher men . . .” (p. 275).

“Sunday the Ninth Day thay Senr the Frinch Down to fort Edward: and I went to wook and there was a Grat Deal of Nues from our Army of won sort or another; and at Night the houll army all came Back again: But for what we could not tell:” (p. 275).

[British Provincial Soldier 1758]

Source: "Amos Richardson's Journal, 1758." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XII, No. 4 (September 1968). pp. 267-297.

Ritzema, Rudolphus Col.

[American Officer 1775]

[Journal. Served with the 1st New York Regiment]

"August ye 21st—Embarked at South Bay & arrived safe in the Evening at Ticonderoga—here everything bore an unmilitary Appearance—the Fortifications in Ruins & not repairing" (p. 98).

Source: "Journal of Col. Rudolphus Ritzema of the First New York Regiment August 8, 1775 to March 30, 1776." *The Magazine of American History with Notes and Queries*. Vol. I. (1877). pp 98-107.

Robbins, Ammi R.

[American Chaplin 1776]

[Journal]

[Saturday, April 20, 1776]: "Here are great and surprising works of the French, still to be seen" (p. 9-10).

[Sunday, April 21, 1776]: "Viewed the place of Ambergrombie's defeat in 1758. Saw many holes where the dead were flung in, and numbers of human bones, thigh, arms, & etc., above ground. Oh the horrors of war" (p. 10-11).

Source: *Journal of Rev. Ammi R. Robbins, A Chaplin in the American Army in the Northern Campaign of 1776*. B.L. Hamlen, New Haven, Connecticut (1850).

Rogers, Robert Maj. (1)

[British Officer 1758]

[Journal. Commander of Rogers Rangers]

"At sunrise on the 8th, Sir William Johnson arrived with 440 Indians. A 7 o'clock, the Rangers were ordered to march. A Lieutenant of Capt. Stark's led the advanced guard. I was within about three hundred yards of the breast work when my advance guard was ambushed and fired upon by about 200 Frenchmen. I immediately formed a front and marched up to the advanced guard, who maintained their ground and the enemy immediately retreated: soon after the bateaux men formed on my left, and light infantry on my right. This fire of the enemy did not kill a single man. Soon after, three regiments of Provincials came up and formed in my rear at two hundred yards distance. While the army was forming, a scattering fire was kept up between our flying parties and those of the enemy, without the breast work. At half an hour past ten, the greatest part of the army being drawn up, a smart fire began on the left wing, where Co. De Lancey's (the New Yorkers) and the batteaux men were posted upon which I was ordered forward to endeavour to beat the enemy within the breast work and then to fall down, that the pickets and grenadiers might march through. The enemy soon retired within their works; Major Proby marched through with his pickets within a few yards of the breast-work, where he unhappily fell, and the enemy keeping up a heavy fire, the soldiers hastened to the right about when Col. Haldiman came up with the grenadiers to support them, being followed by the battalions in brigades for their support. The Col. Haldiman advanced very near the breast work which was eight feet high. Some of the provincials with the Mohawks came up also. We toiled with repeated attacks for four hours, being greatly embarrassed by trees felled by the enemy without their breastwork, when the General though proper to order a retreat directing me to bring up the rear, which I did in the dusk of the evening" (p. 83-84).

Source: *Journals of Major Robert Rogers: Containing An Account of the Several Excursions He Made Under Generals Who Commanded Upon the Continent of North America, During the Late War.* Printed by the Author. J. Millan Bookseller, London, England (1765).

Rogers, Robert Maj. (2)

[*Journal. Commander of Rogers Rangers*]

[July 22, 1759, marched] “. . . to the bridge at the sawmills; where finding the bridge standing, I immediately crossed it with my Rangers, and took possession on the rising ground on the other side, and beat from thence a party of the enemy, and took several prisoners, killed others, and put the remainder to flight, before Col. Haviland with his grenadiers and light infantry got over. The army took possession that night of the heights near the sawmill . . .” (p. 100-101).

[July 23, 1759] “. . . order me in front with directions to proceed across the Chestnut plain, the highest and best way I could, to Lake Champlain, and endeavor to strike it near the edge of the cleared ground, between that and the breast-work, where I was to halt till I received further orders . . . The General by this time had appointed and formed a detachment to attack their main breastwork on the hill, and had gotten possession of it. I was ordered to send two hundred men to take possession of a small entrenchment next to Lake Champlain; and Captain Brewer, whom I sent to take possession of this post, happily succeeded. From the time the army came in sight of the enemy kept up a constant fire of cannon from their wall and batteries at our people. The General at this time had left several Provincial regiments to bring the cannon and ammunition across the Carrying Place . . .” (p. 101).

[July 24, 1759] “. . . all this day the engineers were employed in raising batteries as was likewise a great part of the army in that work, and in making and fetching facines till the 26th . . .” (p. 101-102).

Source: *Journals of Major Robert Rogers: Containing An Account of the Several Excursions He Made Under Generals Who Commanded Upon the Continent of North America, During the Late War.* Printed by the Author. J. Millan Bookseller, London, England (1765).

Romaine, Lawrence B.

[1776]

[*Diary*]

[May 3, 1776]: “Along here was where . . . the Army was defeated when they March’t up against the breastwork of the Enemy, many Hundreds were killed, the Bones of which are some of them still to be Seen as they were left unburied” (p. 29).

Source: *From Cambridge to Champlain, March 18 to May 5, 1776, A Manuscript Diary* By L. B. Romaine. Private Printing, Middleboro, Massachusetts (1957).

Searing, James Dr.

[Provincial Surgeon 1758]

[*Served with the New York Forces*]

“. . . the situation of the enemy was but little known (no prisoners having been taken, nor any deserters come in for some time before our departure) . . .” (p. 113).

“On the 7th, the march through the woods was not pursued, but Col. Bradstreet, with the 44th Regiments and six companies out of the first battalion of Royal Americans, and as many provincials, as made up his command to six thousand, were ordered to establish a post at the saw mills . . .” (p. 114).

“The lake becoming extremely narrow here, a bridge of logs was made over it, and the engineer went in the evening to reconnoitre the enemy” (p. 115).

[The] “rangers, some batteaux men and a detachment of light infantry, (the whole amounting to 2000 men), were ordered to advance on the 8th instant, about 10 o’clock in the morning, so nigh the enemy as to draw on them some of their fire, and also to discover if any parties lay concealed to observe our motions. As this precaution had its full effect, with some loss to the enemy, but none to us, and the enemy’s party were retired to the breastworks, the whole line marched up to sustain this advance, about 11 o’clock, and continued moving on till they came within 120 yards of the enemy’s works; which from thence became almost inaccessible by reason of underwood and timber that had been felled for the purpose” (p. 115).

“As a farther precaution and in some measure to divide the enemy’s force, Sir William Johnson was ordered, with the Indians, to cross the lake, and make the Indians hollow, about the time that the general attack should begin. This attempt produced no other effect, than to force back a small party, who were without the breast work” (p. 116).

“The situation now being free from trees, there was nothing to intercept our view of the works, which appeared to be made of square logs, well fitted together, with slits left open between them at a proper height, for loop holes—and made so high as to come above their heads. There were small boughs stuck in to prevent our view of the loop holes, and to prevent our climbing over. The whole well flanked with two bastions and two redeaus [sic], and nearly extending to the lake on both sides the neck of land on which the fort stands. A little advance from the principal work, was a sort of fence made of loose logs which served to cover the out parties, the line being formed with a front extending to the whole length of the work. Major Proby advanced with the piquets in the center of the work between the two bastions, being sustained by Col. Haldiman at the head of the lines. The enemy received us with a very heavy fire, which we returned whe we came within fifty yards of them. At 12 o’clock, by the directions of Mr. Clerke, engineer, in pursuance of his reconnoitre, two redeaus with two six pounders each and one royal howitzer, was ordered down the lake towards the fort: the orders given to the officer who commanded, were to repair down the lake under cover of the bank, till he came to an open space asspot, and there enfilade the enemy’s works in reverse. But after going down, till both shot and shells were fired at them from the fort, they could find no such place described—so concluding the intelligence to be false, he turned about to regain the lines” (p. 116).

“They had not one piece of cannon in their work, and many of their muskets loaded only with buckshot” (p. 117).

Source: “The Battle of Ticonderoga, 1758.” Benjamin F. Thompson (contributor). *Proceedings of the New York Historical Society January-May, 1847.* William Van Norden, New York, New York (1847). pp. 112-117. **Note:** This account thoroughly details the train of artillery that was with the British army.

Schuyler, Phillip Maj. Gen.

[American Officer 1777]

[Letter to George Washington dated “Albany Feby 27th 1777”]

“Your Excellency will have percieved by my last that I mistook the plan you mentioned for a Fort on Mount Independence—I find it was for the Defence of all the Works to the Northward.

I do not much approve of a Line from Mount Hope to the three Mile point—The great Length is not the only Objection, for unless we could effectually at that place stop the Navigation and erect very strong Fortifications to prevent the Enemy from clearing the Lake of the

Obstruction that might be placed there it would be of no Kind of Service—The Navigation may be obstructed, but no Fortifications of any Force can be erected to defend them, the Ground on both Sides being commanded—if then the Enemy should pass the three Mile point they can land within our Lines and possess themselves of Tyonderoga and all Intercourse between Mount Hope & Mount Independence would be cut off unless by crossing the Lake to the Highland South of Tyonderoga.

Mr Pellesier has certainly not taken much pains to inform himself of the Country as he supposes that the Ground in Front of the Intrenchments he proposes can be laid under Water—I am very confident that it cannot be done in any part there.

My Intention was to fortify Mount Hope for the Reason he gives, and which I suggested to him—to draw a Line from that to the old French Lines, supported by a strong Redoubt between from the Foot of the Eminence on the right Flank of the old French Lines: to continue the Lines to the Lake by the nearest Way and to have this part of the Lines defended by a Ditch, which if twelve or fifteen Feet deep, I believe, may be kept full of Water out of the Lake—if the Enemy should attack any part of these Works and carry them a Retreat is secured by the Bridge between Mount Independence and Tyonderoga or by Batteaus to lay in the Rear of the Works on the Water from Lake George, or by the Bridge at the Saw Mill which will be covered by the Fortification on Mount Hope—if a Retreat is made in the latter the Troops can be brought in Batteaus from the point South of Tyonderoga.

The Necessity of a Naval Force on Lake George and that of obstructing the Navigation between Mount Independence and Tyonderoga I long since suggested to Congress, who have already given their Orders on the Subject and every Thing is preparing to carry them into Execution.

It is certain that if only half the Number of Troops necessary for the Defence of all the Works can be collected that in that Case Mount Independence and the Naval Forces on Lake George are to claim all our Attention.

Mr Pellesier observes “that the Works should be considerably advanced before the Season opens.” I fear it will not be possible to do much for Want of Men.

Inclose your Excellency a Narrative of an Officer of Livingston’s Regiment and that of a Canadian who came with him out of Canada.

Colonel Dayton’s leaves Tyonderoga on Sunday—Lake Champlain is still open, & I believe will not close this Season. I am Dr Sr most respectfully Your obedient humble Servant
Ph: Schuyler

Source: <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-08-02-0487>

Scull, P. Maj.

[American Officer 1776]

[*Letter from Maj. Scull to Dr. Jonathan Potts, dated Ticonderoga, July 30, 1776*]

“...the Pennsylvanians here are repairing the old French lines and are encamp^t within the heights which are remarkable for so many brave men under Abercrombie. God grant we give the English cause to remember the place by a second defeat. We hear from below by a prisoner who escaped from St. Francis, in Canada, that we may expect a visit the beginning of next September from General Burgoyne. They are carrying on much preparation with vigour [sic]. . .” (p. 229-230).

Source: “A Contribution to the Medical History of the American Army During the War for Independence.” By Edward S. Neil. *Macalester College Contributions: Department of*

History Literature and Political Science. Second Series, Number Ten. Pioneer Press, Publishing Company, Saint Paul, Minnesota (1892). p. 223-254.

Sherwood, Justice Capt.

[British Officer 1777]

[Scouting Report]

[Given on April 7, 1777]: “A true description of the situation of Tyconderoga with an exact account of its fortifications and number of forces within &c.

1st The Fort There are mounted on the Fort eight cannon, double fortified 18 pounders, each —[?] is secured with piquets—on the northwest side abundance of sharp pointed brush—is fitted all round to render it inaccessible—between the Fort and the old French Redoubt is erected a Block House.

2nd Old French Redoubt This redoubt is about 200 yards eastward of the fort and thereon is mounted six pieces, four of them are 9 pounders the other two 12 pounders. The Redoubt is repaired agreeable to its former construction and has round it for its preservation, plenty of the sharp pointed Brush.

3rd Old French Lines Newly Repaired These lines are destitute of Cannon and are but indifferently picketed all round.

4th 5 Redoubts on the Lowlands by the Lake The five Redoubts are not fortified, nor is there any notice taken of them, they are situated north by east of the Fort NB: These posts are but indifferently manned, and that with raw undisciplined Yankeys the number of which it will be specified hereafter with other particulars under the word particulars:

Mount Independence Opposite Tyconderoga 1st

To the Northward of the Mount is raised a sting [sic] Breastwork; within which is mounted twelve pieces; one of them is a 32 Prs; The rest are 16 and 12 Prs; round the outside of the Breast work is fixed plenty of sharp pointed Brush 2d Within the Breast work and about 100 yards distance from it is another Breastwork without Embrasures on which is mounted 5 pieces 15 and 24 Prs 3d Southward of this is erected Barracks picketed all round and screened on the outside of the piquets with sharp pointed brush, within the Piquetts are mounted 5 cannon 9 Prs N:B: Behind their Batteries are twelve pieces 9 & 12 Prs Not Mounted

Particulars

The Number of forces at present do not exceed 1350 men but daily are expected 15 regiments as a reinforcement—There is plenty of provisions both at Tyconderoga and Mount Independence – No shipping at either places building. They are busy repairing old Batteaux. A new galley, an old sloop and two Schooners are all the vessels they have—The Troops from New England are going up in great Numbers by Number 4.”

Source: “Captain Justice Sherwood’s Report April 7, 1777.” *Haldimand Papers*, MG21/mss.21836 [B-176,1], Folios 50-51B, British Library, London. See also: on-line resource: Haldimand Papers H-1737; Images #949-953. Available at: https://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_mikan_105513.

Shute, Daniel Rev.

[Provincial Chaplain 1758]

[Journal; Served with Col. Joseph Williams Massachusetts Regiment]

“July 8 The Gen^l thought proper to attempt to force ye^e Enemies entrenchments before ye^e fort only with small arms. In ye rash attempt, Killed 571. Wounded 1363, Missing 34. The slain and wounded, chiefly Regulars, who were in ye^e centre, the Provincials upon each wing in ye^e

attack. It is reported by those on ye spot, that a Skirmish between our advanced Guard and ye French advanced Guard began very early this morning ours consisted of about 100 men; y^e Gen^l suffered none to go to y^e relief; the skirmish ceased at 10 o clock, y^e French retreating and a volley was fired from y^e Entrenchment, when the Gen^l gave the orders to march immediately and force y^e Entrenchment, but would allow no cannon, ‘tho eno’ lay handy. The engagement continued late in the afternoon . . .” (p. 137).

Source: “A Journal of the Rev. Daniel Shute D.D., Chaplain in the Expedition to Canada in 1758.” James Kimball (Communicated by). *Essex Institute Historical Collections*. Vol. XII, Part II (April 1874). pp. 132-151

Skinner, Henry Lt.

[English Artillery Officer 1759]

“Camp before the lines, July 23, [1759], The General, as soon as he found the enemy had left the lines, marched into their lines with his grenadiers, with fixed bayonets. This drew the fire of the fort on them with cannon and mortar; but neither the shot nor shells did any execution . . . The army incamped behind the lines, with their tents two deep, yet did not take up the extent of them; they are made of squared logs, with earth rammed betwixt, much as in the same form as last year . . .” (p. 383).

“Camp before Ticonderoga, July 24. Got to the saw-mills two 24 pounders and two 10 inch mortars, with an Officer of artillery. Last night, the French and Indians attacked our advanced guard of the trenches in which attack we lost one Officer, and 15 killed and wounded. It is imagined, that our men fired on one another . . . The enemy kept a constant fire all night with their cannon, and threw a great many shells at our men carrying on the approaches, and continued firing all the morning. The general determined not to open his batteries till his battering guns were all up, and the mortars” (p. 383). “Today the wounded of last night, after being dressed were sent to Fort William Henry” (p. 383).

“July 25 Major Ord of the artillery was ordered to send up a 13-inch iron mortar, and to come up himself; got up with the mortar two 24 pounders, with their ammunition. Four men killed by a shell from the enemy, who have got the distance to the camp, and kill and wound many of our men . . . The enemy keep a very constant fire all day, at our men carrying on the approaches, and constructing the batteries. Col Townsend killed by a cannon-ball on the trenches . . . In the night they [our troops] carried the approaches within 600 yards of the place; and Rogers with his rangers, amused the besieged by continually firing into the covered-way” (p. 384).

“July 26. The enemy continue firing shot and shells—Busy in getting up battering-plank, shot, shells, &c. which are drawn by men as we had no horses till to-day. . . Major Rogers ordered to fire into the covered-way, as the night before; which drew their attention on his parties . . . The enemy, it is imagined, have burst one of their mortars, and some of their guns, as their fire in the afternoon is much abated, and only now and then a gun in the night . . . (p. 385).

“July 27 . . . Our batteries were all ready to play when the enemy left the place, and only waited for day-break”

Source: “A Royal Artillery Officer with Amherst: The Journal of Captain-Lieutenant Henry Skinner, May 1-July 28, 1759.” By Gary S. Zaboly. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XV. No. 5 (1993). pp. 363-388.

Smith, Joseph

[Journal. Served with a Connecticut Regiment]

[British Provincial Soldier 1758]

“ . . . in the morning on ye 8th a Party of men went up upon a hill some distance from the fort to gard an ingenear for him to take a Plan of the ground around the fort to know where to Place the artelery then we came back again to the french sawmill and then about noon the rangers and the ragelars yansyblews and the Rhodeislanders and mohex lade seeage to the breastwork there ingagement was so hot they Ceppt a Continual fireing for about two or three hours they held the ingagement till night and then was abliged to retreat back from the breastwork . . . ” (p. 306-307).

Source: “Journal of Joseph Smith, of Groton, Born December 25, 1735, Died November 1, 1816, Communicated by Welcome A. Smith Esq. Of Norwich.” *Papers and Addresses of the Society of Colonial Wars in the State of Connecticut.* Volume I. [No publication information] (1910). pp. 303-310.

Spicer, Abel

[British Provincial Soldier 1758]

[Diary. Served with John Stanton's Company of Col. Nathan Whiting Connecticut Regiment]

[July 7] “ . . . we marched as far as the Ticonderoga Mills about two miles from the fort and there encamped” (p. 394).

[July 8] “In the morning there was a number of men sent after some more of the cannon and the whale boats and artillery stores and provisions and such stores and at the same time the engineer went with a guard upon a mountain against the fort for to look and see if he could find a good place to plant the artillery and he came back again about 8 o'clock. And when we came in we was ordered to stay there for a while and rest ourselves and the chief of Colonel Whiting's regiment was sent about 3 miles back after the artillery stores and provisions. And while they was gone Major Rogers fired on the French sentry and then our regulars was marching to the fort and they had two brass cannon on a floating battery and the rest was not got to the lake but came very soon. But the regulars pushed on as fast as possible and marched up the breast works ten deep and fired volleys at the breast works which was as high as the enemies heads, and they had holes between the logs to fire through, and the regulars ventured very near the breast works and they fell like pigeons. And the highlanders fired a few volleys and rushed on upon the breast works with their swords and bayonets and killed some of the French in the trench, and the French fired upon them with grape shot from the fort, which killed almost all that had got into the trench, and them that was left of them was forced to retreat. And before that they had done this the chief of the other forces came up and fired and the French set their hats just above the top of the breast work for to deceive the soldiers . . . And them that was left behind and had not been in the fight was ordered to build a breast work and after it was bult they was ordered for to carry back their cannon. And after all the men had got within the breast work, about midnight, we was ordered to take our packs and go down to the bateaux and we rallied all and marched off and it was very dark and the way miry which made a very tedious march but we arrived to our bateaux just as day broke” (p. 394-395).

[Second account of the battle in Spicer's Diary pp. 406-408]

July 8th A. Dom. 1758. Saturday.—This morning after a tedious nights march Captain John Stanton with about half of his men and as many more from other companies that was a mind for to go with him went with the engineer to the top of a mountain against the fort for to view it and for to see if he could find any place for to plant their artillery to advantage. And we went and stayed on the side of the mountain next to the fort where we had a fair prospect at the fort and the men at work. And we see them drum off their guard and while we was there the Mohawks fired upon them and we see them run into the fort and within their breast work. And

after a small space of time they ventured out to work again and after the engineer had viewed the fort he ordered them all for to return back again. And we got to our encampment at 9 o'clock in the morning and at the same time there was a number of men sent to the place where we landed our stores after cannon and artillery stores and wale [sic] boats. And they came back before that the engineer [was ready] and was sent back again for more stores. And when he got back the guard that went with him was ordered for to tarry there till further orders. And the chief of Colonel Whiting's regiment was sent after stores and the Mohawks went upon the same mountain after we came down and fired and shouted for to alarm the French and then came down and went to the fort and fired on the enemy. And the rangers fired on them which alarmed the French and this was before that our artillery had got up except six small brass cannon and 3 cohorns which was brought up the night before and they had them on a floating battery. And then the rangers began to fire and then the regulars and Jersey Blues marched on as fast as possible and they had not above a mile and a half for to go before they came to the breast work. And while they was going the French fired on the floating battery from the fort but did no harm to it. The regulars marched on and was ordered not for to fire till they had orders and the French fired on them and killed a great many of them, but the regulars was not yet ordered for to fire and the French loaded and fired on them again before they had orders which killed the chief of the officers belonging to the regiment that was in the front for they had nothing to shelter them but the open air. And they was ordered for to march ten deep and the enemy had a breast work for to defend them. And in the heighth [sic] of action the rest of the artillery stores was brought up to the place where we encamped and there was a guard set over it.

And the provincials marched after them but did not venture so near and they had a small wood for to cover them and there was but a few of them killed. Some regiments did not go to the field of battle but was ordered to build breast works for fear the enemy would drive them back again and they should have no place to defend themselves. But the battle continued with a continual fire from 1 o'clock in the afternoon till night and the wounded was carried along, them that could not travel, and them that could travel went along back again, to the place where we landed. The streets was almost full all the time of the fight. And in the evening after the battle here there lay men, some dead, some wounded that could not go. The roads was so full that a man could hardly walk without treading on them. And after the fire ceased the men that was left came within the breast works that we had built, but I left before they came in. There was orders for to carry back the stores and artillery and put them aboard of the bateaux. And after they had to all within the breastwork we was all rallied and ordered for to march off as fast as possible and we had but very little sleep for two nights before. The night being cloudy and in the woods which made it very dark so that a man could not see by the man that was before him and the path was very miry so that it would take a man in half leg. And every regiment was scattered amongst other they being rallied in the night, but they got down to the place where they was ordered next morning. The number of the killed and wounded was about 4065 and wounded about 1730, and a great many of them was mortally wounded" (p. 406-408).

Source: *History of the Descendants of Peter Spicer: A Landholder in New London, Connecticut, As Early as 1666, and Others of the Name.* By Susan Spicer Meech and Susan Billings Meech. Standhope Press, F.H. Gilson Company, Boston, Massachusetts (1911).

State of Vermont

[Law 1799]

[November 4, 1799]: ". . . granted to John S. Larraby [sic] of Shoreham . . . the exclusive right and privilege of keeping a ferry for the term of ten years, from Rowley's Point, in this State

[Vermont], to a place in New York, commonly known by the name of the Sandy Battery . . ." (p. 104).

Source: *Acts and Laws Passed by the Legislature of the State of Vermont.* Alden Spooner, Windsor, Vermont (1801).

Sweat, William Capt.

[Provincial Officer 1758]

[Journal. Served in Capt. William Osgood's Company Col Preble's Regiment Massachusetts]

"fryday 7 Day, our people got very near their intrenchment & encamped this night" (p. 43)

"Saturday 8 Day, our armey Sayled up to their intrenchment, & Began their Battle; Rodgers' men in the front, the granedears next, & then the Reglers; & held their engagement 6 hours & then returned Back to the mills, where they incamped this night" (p. 43).

Source: "Captain William Sweat's Personal Diary of the Expedition Against Ticonderoga May 2-November 7, 1758." By Paul O. Blanchette (ed). *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.* Vol. XCIII, No. 1 (January 1957). pp. 36-57.

Thatcher, James Dr.

[American Doctor 1776]

[Journal]

[c. September 1776] : "Among our defensive weapons are poles, about twelve feet long, armed with sharp iron points, which each soldier is to employ against the assailants when mounting the breast works" (p. 63).

[November 15, 1776] "the earth is frozen" (p. 66).

Source: *Military Journal During the American Revolutionary War From 1775 to 1783 Describing Interesting Events and Transactions of This Period, With Numerous Historical Facts and Anecdotes From the Original Manuscript.* Second Edition. Cotton & Barnard, Boston, Massachusetts (1827).

Thompson, Samuel Lt.

[Provincial Officer 1758]

[Diary. Served in Col. Ebenezer Nichols' Massachusetts Regiment]

[July 1] "Monday in y^e morning, we marched down to the Lake, and fetches our men; and Col. Cummings had orders to stay with 500 men to keep at the Lake, and many of our men were uneasy and sorry . . ." (p. 549).

[July 5] "Wednesday, our Army set sail in battows for the Narrows; and the army consists of 25000 & 400 odd men . . . At 5 in the morning they mustered and set off as fast as they could and we saw then till noon, and when they had got off, we struck our tents and removed into the Fort William Henry, and set up our tents and camped" (p. 549).

[July] "7 Friday: The Mohawks set sail for the Narrows. Abijah was sick and took a vomit. I scarcely time to cook, as the Hampshire forces came to us in the afternoon" (p. 549).

[July] "9 Sunday morning, in a surprise by bad news from the Narrows and all day in a Concern; for sometimes we heard that our army was defeated, and then that they did prosper and gain ground; but on the whole our army was forced to give over their trial for the Narrows, and return to out great astonishment & amazement, and with great loss . . . our army came and landed at Fort William Henry, and brought it many wounded men . . . our Provincials did not lose so many men as we feared we had lost. The Highlanders lost many men, and the Regulars lost many; the Jersey Blues lost many, and the Yorker suffered in the loss of many men" (p. 549).

Source: *The History of Woburn, Middlesex County, Mass. From the Grant of Its Territory to Charlestown, in 1640, To The Year 1860.* By Samuel Sewall. Wiggin and Lunt Publishers Boston, Massachusetts. (1868). Appendix No. IX. pp. 547-558.

Tinkham, Seth Sgt.

[Provincial Solider 1758]

[Journal. Served in Capt. Benj. Pratt's Company of Col. Doty's Massachusetts Regiment]

[July 8, 1758] "We marched with the Light Infantry. They went forward Co^l Doty Brought up the Rear in Sight of the Fort, there we Drawed up 4 Deep, the Light Infantry about 10 Rods before us Expecting Every moment To be fired upon, in the mean Time Co^l Johnson with a party of Indians upon the west side of ye Lake marched up to the Top of a hill where he with his Indians fired upon the Fort with the hideous yelling of the Indians the worst noise I ever heard, and Drove a party of French into the Lake. About Eleven o Clock the Regulars marched up and all the Rhode Islanders and a Little past 12 o Clock they began To fire upon The French at the Breastwork which was made of heaped Timber and a Trench around it very strong which was Built after we Drove the advanced Guard off, had we Gone forward at our first Landing we Could have Got the Ground, the Regulars Drawed up before the Breastwork and fought against it with Small arms 5 hours, the French would fire upon them with their Artillery and with one field piece Killed 18 Grenadiers dead on The Spott, the number of men Lost is not ascertained by all accounts we Lost 3000 Besides wounded. Had Major Rogers had his Liberty and Done as he Intended we Should have Drawed them out of their Breastwork, but Co^l Bradstreet Come up with his Reg^{ts} and Drove on and Lost almost all his men, our Artillery Com up the Lake almost to us and was ordered Back I know not for what Reason, and towards night we was Ordered back to the advanced Guard and Got there about 9 o Clock . . ."

Source: *The Peirce Family of the Old Colony: Or the Lineal Descendants of Abraham Pierce Who Came to America as Early as 1623.* By Ebenezer W. Peirce. David Clapp & Son, Boston, Massachusetts, 1870, pp. 119-128.

True, Henry Rev.

[British Provincial Chaplain 1759]

[Journal]

"Monday. July 23d—Our men intrenched—at night ye Indians cam on our regulars, killed one of our men, kept ye ground—our men carried up ye tents, some artillery, &c., this evening rained thundered" (p. 10).

Tuesday, July 24th—our men proceeded in entrenching within a little way of ye fort—not firing—tho' ye enemy continued to fire shot and shell. About ten o'clock I went within about a quarter of a mile of Ticonderoga fort, saw it plainly, ye cituation of ye place and ye bombs fired and cannon &c. . . Ye enemy fired 500 balls and bombs in ye forenoon and never harmed one man, as many more in ye afternoon killed one" (p.10).

Source: *Journal and Letters of Rev. Henry True of Hampstead, New Hampshire, Who was a Chaplain in the New Hampshire Regiment of the Provincial Army in 1759-1762: Also an Account of the Battle of Concord By Captain Amos Barrett, A Minute Man and Participant.* Printed for Henry True, Star Press, Marion, Ohio (1900).

Trumbull, John Col.

[American Orders 1776]

[Orderly Book]

"21st September 1776, In consideration of the Troops having been constantly employd in the Public Works every day without intermission ever since their arrival at the Camp, the

General Orders all works, but that for the equipment of the Vessels, Gun Carriage makers & Black Smiths, to cease tomorrow" (p. 97).

Source: "Trumbull's Orderly Book-Ticonderoga, September and October, 1776." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. III, No 2 (July 1933). pp. 84-end vol.

Tupper, Ichabod

[American Soldier 1777]

[“English Examination of American POWs March 1777; Ichabod Tupper and John Pierce of Col. Marshall’s Massachusetts Regiment Captured by Capt. Samuel Mackay Between Ticonderoga and Fort George”]

“... came to Mount Independent on the 1st of March by the way of Worcester, crossed the Connecticut at South Hadley, by North Hampton, New Providence, to Bennington and so on to Skenesborough. There is no vessels building there—There were part of several Regiments on Mount Independent in all about 1200 men, The Barracks on top of the Hill are picketed around with an abbatis round them also there is a blockhouse near these barracks to the southward—There is one battery below the barracks mounting 6 pieces of cannon; there is no ditch nor abbatis round it; the lower Battery facing the Lake Mounts about 20 pieces of Cannon, some 24 and 16 Prs and is surrounded by an Abbatis. The Rebels here begun to sink the piers of the New Bridge. There is no probability of their finishing this Bridge before the Ice Breaks up. No vessel Building—There are five vessels lying in the Channel. There are some pieces of Cannon Mounted in what is called the old French Redoubt. The French lines are Repaired with a new Breastwork and the ditch picketed—There is an Abbatis round part of these lines and some Cannon Mounted in them—The old fort is repaired and picketed and an Abbatis round it —There is a quantity of Salt provisions in the King’s storehouse. Knows nothing of Mount Hope. He understood there were to be 15 regiments from Massachusetts and [5? or 6?] Regiments from New Hampshire to defend Tyconderoga this Spring--The establishment of a regiment is 6 Companies of 100 men each . . . ” [This account continues with comments about Boston, Bennington, and Skensborough].

Source: *Haldimand Papers*. H-1737; Images #944-945. Available on-line at:
https://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_mikan_105513

Tuttle, Timothy, Sgt

[American Solider 1776]

[Journal; Served with a New Jersey Regiment]

[August 8, 1776] “our party is at work at the Redout [redoubts] down by the side of Lake . . . ”

[August 10] “on fatigue at the Jersey Redoubt, 3 hours on & 3 off . . . ” [September 12] “Our Battalion has now don [done] the Jersey Redoubt” [October 22] “Pa. Battalion at work [on] the blind [on] the inside of Jeresy Redoubt”

Source: Quoted in *The American Northern Theater Army in 1776: The Ruin and Reconstruction of the Continental Force*. by Douglas R. Cubbison. McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, North Carolina (2010): pp. 189-190.

Van Vechten, Samuel Capt.

[American 1776]

[Orderly Book]

“The pennsylvania regiments to encamp upon the new Ground to morrow. Colo Lindan with the assistance of Colo Wayne will this morning march out the Ground for their Encampment. The Genl, anxious to preserve the new camp perfectly clean and free from infection Recommends in the strongest manner to the Commanding Officers of Regiments to

have their necessaries fixed on the brink of the precipices or in such places as are least obnoxious if there is a necessity of having any Dug in the front of the Regiments care must be taken to have them Frequently covered and no person to be suffered to ease himself in any other part of the encampment."

Source: "Captain Samuel van Vechten Orderly Book at Fort George, Ticonderoga, and Skenesborough, 10 May 1776-4 October 1776," MS.6014, in the collections of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, Ticonderoga, New York.

Waterbury, David Jr. Capt.

[British Provincial Officer 1758]

[Personal Roster and Diary. Served with Col. David Wooster's Connecticut Regiment]

"July ye 8th 1758. Rise early in the morning and Got Brecaft and Our Orders was to be Ready to march at a minutes Warning and Likewise we was and between Eleven and twelve a Clock Our Orders was to March up towards their Fort the Regulars Marcht in the front four in Rank and Fifteen Hundred in Files and the Proventials Marcht in the Rear of the Regulars in the Same Form by then the Rear of the Army had Marcht the Front of the Regulars had Got Within about three Quarters of a mile of the Fort Where the French had Erected a Breastwork in Order to keep us from Gaining the Ground and the Engagement began Between twelve a Clock and One in the afternoon and Continued till between Seven & Eight and Our Orders Was then to Return to the Mills and Likewise we Did . . ." [this account continues with an interesting account of a rearguard posting that night in the vicinity of Mount Defiance / the sawmill].

Source: *Copy of the First Ninety-Seven Pages of the Personal Roster and Diary of Campaign David Waterbury in the Lake George Campaign 1758.* By Dr. Charles Samuel Ward, Complements of William F. Waterbury. Ms. in the collections of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, Ticonderoga, New York.

Wayne, Anthony Col. (1)

[American Officer 1776]

[Letter from Col. Anthony Wayne to Benjamin Franklin dated "Ticonderoga July 31st 1776"]

" . . . We are in high expectation of shortly seeing Burgoyne, who will attempt a Junction with Howe. He'll not effect it without the loss of much blood. Col St Clair, Dehaaes, & myself are in possession of Mont Calms lines. We shall render them more formidable than they ever were in a few days. We are to be joined by Col. Hartley and the 6th Pennsa, Battalion we shall then Amount to about 1600 effective Men in these lines Officers included, under the Command of Colo. St Clair. The Jersey and eastern Troops are station'd on the opposite Side of Lake Champlain to US, on a peninsula inaccessible except at one Spot, which they are beginning to fortify; they are compos'd of three Brigades and Amount to about 1900 or 2,000 Men at most, so that our whole force of effective Men may be nearly 3,600. Col St Clair and myself have commenced Engineers in chief, We amend, form, and alter such part, and parts of the old french Lines as We think proper a plan of which is here inclose'd. I rest assur'd that if Burgoyne makes an Attack upon Us the British Troops will meet a worse fate than when under Abercrombie in 1758. They'll find an Enemy fertile in expedients, and altho' week in Number yet brave by nature, who will push them hard for Victory and long for revenge for the unfortunate affair at the Three Rivers . . ."

Source: <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-22-02-0318>

Wayne, Anthony Col. (2)

[American Officer 1776]

[Letter from Col. Anthony Wayne to Col. Joseph Penrose, "Ticonderoga, 23 August 1776"]

“ . . . here . . . it appears to be the last part of the world that God made & I have some ground to believe it was finished in the dark—that it was never Intended that man shou’d live in it is clear—for the people who attempted to make any stay—have for the most part perished by pestilence or the sword. I believe it to be the Ancient Golgotha or place of Skulls—they are so plenty here that our people for want of Other Vessels drink out of them whilst the soldiers make tent pins of the shin and thigh bones of Abercrumbies men” (pp. 36-37).

Source: *Major-General Anthony Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line in the Continental Army.* By Charles J. Stille. J.P. Lippincott, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (1893).

Wayne, Anthony Col. (3)

[American Officer 1776]

[Letter from Col. Anthony Wayne to Benjamin Franklin, “Tyconderoga 1st Septr 1776”]

“I have nothing new to write you except that we have lately Recd. A Re enforcement of upwards of 4000 men from the Eastward, that St. Clair and myself have Rendered the old french lines much Stronger than ever, that our men have Recovered health and Spirits . . .”

Source: <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-22-02-0349>.

Wayne, Anthony Col. (4)

[American Officer 1777]

[Letter from Col. Anthony Wayne to Gen. Schuyler, “January 2, 1777, Ticonderoga”]

“For the present I am using every Effort to Render this place strong. I shall soon Complete the Abattis Round the Old fort . . .” (p. 49).

Source: *Major-General Anthony Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line in the Continental Army.* By Charles J. Stille. J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (1893).

Webster, Robert

[British Provincial Solider 1759]

[Diary. Served in Capt. David Holmes’ company of Col. Eleazer Fitch’s Connecticut Regiment (4th CT)]

“Sunday, the 22nd of July, This morning we landed about eleven o’clock without the loss of one man or without the firing of one gun. We marched to the mills and the Indians wounded three of our men. We marched and some pitched their tents over on the hill beyond the mills . . .” (p. 319).

“Monday, the 23rd of July, This day we marched to Carillon. The whole army marched into the breastwork and got into the Breastwork without the Loss of one man. The Enemy fired four hundred shot and shells at us out of their cannon. They killed two of our men. They continued firing all night at us. This night we got our cannon unloaded carried two of them to the mills” (p. 319).

“Tuesday, the 24th of July, Still at Carillon. All brave and hearty all but our Clerk. We are all tired with hard work . . . They continued firing cannon and their bombs very smart . . .” (p. 319).

“Wednesday the 25th of July, . . . We got up the remainder of our cannon and warlike stores and Col. Townshend was slain with a cannon ball. There was five or six hundred men cutting facines and entrenching as fast as they can” (p. 321).

“The 26th of July, . . . this night we opened our battery upon the French and the French set fire to the Fort and went away by the light of it” (p. 321).

“Saturday, the 28th of July, We struck our tents and marched within the breastwork and camped at the southwest corner of Fort Carillon” (p. 321).

Source: "Diary of Robert Webster, April 5 to November 23, 1759." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. IX, No. 5 (Summer 1954). pp. 306-343. Reprint from: *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. II, No. 4 (July 1931). pp. 120-153. [Note the regimental roster says he was in Benjamin Lee's company; but he could have transferred]

Wesson, Stephen

[Parent 1758]

[Letter from Stephen Wesson to his sons, Ephraim and Nathan, serving with Col. Ebenezer Nichols' Massachusetts Regiment, dated "July ye 30th 1758"]

"These lines I must confess, I write with an aching heart, full of deep concern for my children, friends and acquaintance, but I commit them all to the care of God. I would inform you that we have heard of the lamentable defeat at Ticonderoga. I am full of concern for the Western army, what the success may be. We have hear that near 1600 went over the lake in high spirits and landed safe. You inform me that you are stationed at Fort Miller, very contrary to your mind. Submit with patience to the will of God. Be not hasty in rushing forward, but let it be your main care that the favor and presence of God may be with you" (p. 1153-1154).

Source: *The History of Washington County in the Vermont Historical Gazetteer*. By Abby Maria Hemenway. Vermont Watchman and State Journal Press, Montpelier, Vermont (1882).

Wheeler, Rufus Lt.

[American Officer 1776]

[Journal]

[October 5, 1776]: "I mounted guard at the redoubt east of the Jersey redoubt" (p. 374).

[October 17, 1776]: "I mounted guard at the redout next to the French lines. This day we expected the enemy but were disappointed" (p. 374).

[October 20, 1776]: "... six batallions of Bostoners, Pennsylvanians and Jersey blues drawed up and a priest from the Southerd made a fine prayer . . ." (p. 375).

[October 31, 1776]: "thurs . . . I mounted the guard at the French lines having the command of the same. The same night the Sentinels of my guard fired several guns at the Indians as they said upon which I went out by the Sentinels to the place where they saw them as they said and searched the place well but found none" (p. 376).

Source: "Journal of Lieut. Rufus Wheeler of Rowley: Fort Ticonderoga July 23 to December 10, 1776." *Essex Institute Historical Collections*. Vol. LXVIII, No. 4 (October 1932). pp. 371-377.

Whiting, Nathan Col. (1)

[British Provincial Officer 1758]

[Letter. Commander of a Connecticut Regiment]

[July 3, 1758 at Lake George]: "we are under order to march next Day after tomorrow morning the Whole Army Consisting of about 16000 men" (p.140).

Source: "Letters of Col. Nathan Whiting, written from Camp During the French and Indian War." By Lemuel Aiken Welles. *Papers of the New Haven Colony Historical Society*. Vol. VI. Printed for the Society. The Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor Co., Printers, New Haven, Connecticut (1900). pp. 133-150.

Whiting, Nathan Col. (2)

[British Provincial Officer 1759]

[Letters; Commander of a Connecticut Regiment]

[July 24, 1759 ‘Camp at French Landing’]: “I have the pleasure to tell you the Army Landed safely without loss of a man the 22th & Yesterday took possession of the French Lines in which I Imagine consisted half the strength of Canady. . . We shall open a battery this Day” (p. 142).

Source: “Letters of Col. Nathan Whiting, written from Camp During the French and Indian War.” By Lemuel Aiken Welles. *Papers of the New Haven Colony Historical Society*. Vol. VI. Printed for the Society. The Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor Co., Printers, New Haven, Connecticut (1900). pp. 133-150.

Wild, Ebenezer

[American Solider 1776]

[Journal. Served with John Trescott’s Company, Massachusetts Regiment]

“31 Aug. . . . we arrived there [Ticonderoga] about 5 o’clk in the afternoon, and encamped there on the side of the lake. . . ” (p. 8).

“4 Sept. About 3 o’clk this afternoon we removed our encampment to the hill near the French lines . . . ” (p. 8).

“9 Sept. This day I went on fatigue at the French lines . . . ” (p. 9).

“13 Oct. This morning I went on fatigue at the French lines. About 10 o’clk we heard a very heavy firing of cannon down the like, which continued till about 12 o’clk. Soon after that we heard that the biggest part of our fleet was destroyed by the enemy, and that they had Crown Point in their possession; which alarmed our camps very much” (p. 10).

“14 Oct. This morning very foggy. We turned out before daylight and manned the lines, expecting that the enemy would pay us a visit . . . ” (p. 10).

“20 Oct. . . . After prayers I mounted the Jarseys redoubt guard” (p. 10).

“26 Nov. This day I went on fatigue at the French lines . . . ” (p. 10).

“30 Nov. This day I went on fatigue. Took a party of men and went all over the encampment, and, picked up all intrenching tools and carried them into the fort” (p. 11).

Source: *The Journal of Ebenezer Wild (1776-1781): Who Served as Corporal, Sergeant, Ensign, and Lieutenant in the War of the Revolution*. James M. Bugbee (ed). John Wilson and Son, University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1891).

Wilkinson, James

[American Officer 1777]

[Memoir and Selected Letters]

“On the 17th of June Major-general Schuyler visited Ticonderoga . . . On the 18th the General officers made a critical inspection of the fortifications, and I was invited to accompany them” (p. 173).

[July 17, 1776]: “As soon as the rear of our army got up from Crown Point, and the camp was pitched, our labours ours were directed to the improvement of the old French lines, and the erection of new works on the same side of the lake, and also on Mount Independence, which is separated from Ticonderoga by a strait about 80 poles wide . . . ” (p. 80).

[July 1777] “On the 2d, the right wing, consisting of the British line, moved forward and took possession of Mount Hope, and also of an eminence about one thousand yards in front of the old French lines, which had been repaired and improved, and constituted our advanced works . . . Captain Fraser and his marksmen, with several hundred Indians, preceded this movement of the enemy, and whether intoxicated or deceived by the ground (which being perfectly flat and covered with brushwood concealed our lines of defence [sic] until close upon them) they charged

a picket of sixty men, within two hundred yards of a battery of eight pieces, forced it to retire with considerable loss, killing a man as he entered a sally port, and advancing within sixty, eighty and an hundred yards of our works, scattered themselves along our front among the brush wood, and kept up a brisk fire . . . Suspecting . . . they intended an assault, and that this party had been sent forward to draw our fire and produce disorder, General St. Clair directed the troops to sit down on the banquet, with their backs to the parapet, as well to cover them from the shot of the enemy, as to prevent their throwing away their own fire . . . the enemy, who continued to crawl upon us under cover of the brushwood: I at length observed a light infantry man who had crept within forty paces of the ditch, and was loading and firing from a stump, behind which he had knelt. I stepped to a salient angle of the line, and ordered a sergeant to rise and shoot him: the order was obeyed, and at the discharge of the musket, every man arose, mounted the banquet, and without command fired a volley; the artillery followed the example . . . when the smoke dispersed, the enemy were observed at three hundred yards distance, retreating helter skelter . . .” (p. 182-183).

Included in this volume were some personal letters including:

[Letter from James Wilkinson to Gen. Gates dated Ticonderoga May 16, 1777]

“One whole company of carpenters are constantly employed in forming a kind of friezed abbatis, on the exterior of the glacis of the French lines. The works are precipitated on the plan laid down by Colonel Baldwin: the redoubt at those lines goes on fineley; it is formed by certain lines beginning at the east end of the curtain on which the three north embrasures are opened, and closing at the south sally-port” (p. 165-166).

[Letter from James Wilkinson to Gen. Gates dated Ticonderoga May 31, 1777]

“Ten pieces of ordnance [sic] have arrived, which will be mounted, Major Stephens tells me, in five days; the rest are hourly expected . . . the works are now pushed on B---‘s unmeaning plan.—For God’s sake, let Kosciusko come back as soon as possible, with proper authority” (p. 171).

Source: *Memoirs of My Own Times*. Vol. I. By General James Wilkinson. Abraham Small, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (1816).

- **Note:** Wilkinson reflected on the area’s previous history: “When the French officer who commanded at Ticonderoga heard of General Abercrombie’s approach, he found it necessary to the defence [sic] of the post, to take possession of an elevated ridge on the direct route to it, from the landing at Lake George, which, at less than half a mile, entirely overlooked the works. This ridge is flat on the summit, and extends westerly about half a mile to the sawmill at the perpendicular falls . . . where it terminates in still higher ground, called Mount Hope. On the south it presents a bold acclivity, washed by the strait, and to the north it declines until it sinks into a plain, which is extended about an hundred rods to the shore of the lake, where the bank is ten or twelve feet high; across the crown of this ridge, at the extremity nearest the fort, the garrison hastily threw up an intrenchment with a common ditch judiciously flanked, which was strengthened by felling the forest trees in from outwards, and these they trimmed, pointed and formed into an impervious abbatis sixty or eighty rods deep” (p. 80).
- **Note:** In 1777 Wilkinson returned to the Northern Department as an aide to General Gates (who’s HQ was at Albany). Wilkinson traveled to Ticonderoga about April-May

of that year. In late May, Wilkinson was appointed deputy adjutant-general to the army in the northern department.

Williams, Edward Payson Capt.

[American Officer 1776]

[Letter from Captain Edward Payson Williams to Colonel Joseph Williams, "27 August 1776."

Capt. Williams served in Col. Greaton's 24th Continental (Massachusetts) Regiment]

"we got to Ticonderoga . . . the fort old & a tumbling down i viewed the place where the battle was faught In the year 1750 [sic] found several mens bones they Never half bury'd our people . . ."

Source: "Captain Edward Payson Williams, Skeneborough, to Colonel Joseph Williams, Roxbury, Massachusetts, 27 August 1776." Auction Catalog: Joseph Rubenfine List 121, Item 9 (1994).

Williams, Phillip

[Loyalist Civilian 1777]

[British informant from Bridport, Vermont, "opposite Crown Point"]

" . . . the men at Tyconderoga have complained exceedingly of being harassed all this winter in strengthening and fortifying their works."

" . . . was informed and with certainty, that the Rebels have begun to make a kind of Boom Bridge across the Channel of the River at Tyconderoga by preparing to sink large square logs put together filled with stones, and a Platform to be raised across these logs about 14 feet wide. There is but 25 feet depth of Water in the Channel."

Source: *Haldimand Papers H-1737; Images #1215-1217.* Available on-line at:
https://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_mikan_105513.

Williams, Stephen Rev.

[British Provincial Chaplain 1758]

[Letter to his parents at Springfield dated "Camp Near Fort Miller July the 16th 1758"]

"I come from the Lake last night. Things look with a very different face of what they did 8 days ago . . . can not write as to the particulars concluding that you have heard before now how things are with us. We have lost almost 1800 of the Regulars that are killed & wounded, trying to storm the trenches which was a very wild scheme though by all of our proventials [sic] the loss of New-England men is small compared with the Regulars . . . of our Regiment 0 Killed & wounded I am not certain. Things look very dark on us at present. Let our neighbors know that our people are all alive that went from our town."

Source: "Letter from Rev. Stephen Williams to his parents at Springfield [MA] dated Camp Near Fort Miller July the 16th 1758." Henry Stevens Sr. Collection 1753-1862, Vermont State Archives & Records Administration, Middlesex, Vermont. Item Series ID: SE-117, Microfilm F-1454; French and Indian War Papers: Box 1: Folder 2.

Williams, William Col.

[British Provincial Officer 1758]

[Commander of a Massachusetts Regiment; Letter to his brother, Col. Thomas Williams, dated "Lake George July 11, 1758"]

" . . . It was not long after this before Col^o Bradstreet informed a few of use we must refresh ourselves and go with him to the mills about 2 miles below and Dislodge Mons^r Montcalm, who the prisoners informed us lay there with 4 Battalions; while we were eating, his Carpenters Laid a Bridge over the Narrows of the Lake against the Consumed Fort . . . we march'd Exceeding regularly, and when we came to the mills about 2 miles below we found

nobody there . . . Some were Employed in laying the Bridges over, which were Destroyed, I made a Float with my regiment to carry over the Cannon, this being done and the Gen^l being informed of our Gaining this Important post, almost all marched to it before night, Col^o Prebble & I was order'd, sun about 1½ hour high to advance to an Eminence within ¾ of a mile of the Enemys Breastwork and there to make a Breastwork around us to se ourselves which we did with the greatest Dispatch, made a good one, and a 9 at night Col^o [Partridge] joyn'd us. Early in the morn we were ordered to [illegible] . . . when we were informed, that an attack was [illegible] . . . the Enemys Breastwork in the following manner, The light Infantry upon the right, the Battoe men in the Center and Rogers on the Left in a Single Rank to Extend from Lake to Lake, Then Doty, Prebble, Partridge, Myself, Bayley and the Yorkers in a Double rank from Lake to Lake, when we were so formed the Regulars were to march up and we were make the Intervals and they pass thro' and Do the Work—We to Lay on our arms as a sustaining party, and in Case the Enemy rush'd out and they could not withstand them they were to pass through us and we repell them till they could form again—About half after 12 they came up, but Col^o D Lancey being a mind to see more than he could see from the post the pilot put him in, advanced so far as to come nigh before he was aware and the attack really began before the Regulars came up, when they came they ventured up bravely as well and as fast as they could but the Enemy had fell'd trees Cris Cross that mightily impeaded them, and finally prevented their doing anything to purpose saving bringing their men to the Slaughter, and great [*havock?*] has been made, indeed the number at present is purposely secreted. As the fire grew Exceeding heavy we advanced too nigh for a sustaining party and the only way we had to secure Ourselves was by making the men lay flat and some were kill'd & Wounded in that position, it was impossible to keep our men back, and those that ventured up shar'd the same fate with the Regulars, but by my running from Wing to Wing I prevented mine in some good measure, and I believe suffered as little as any Reg^t having but 2 kill'd & 13 wounded. For 6 hours or more there was by far the heaviest Fire I ever heard, the Earth for the whole time Shook like the beginning of an Earthquake, there was not the least Space of Time but there was firing and about the middle of the p.m. it was greatly Increased by Musketry, wall pieces swivels &c . . . Having been from morning to Sun about ½ an hour High without water or any other refreshment I drew off my Reg^t 20 rods and then went to look for the Gen^l but could not find him, I asked his aid d Camp Cap^t Cunningham where the Breastwork or Intrenchment was to be made, he show'd me, I went to work with what axes I had fell a No of Large white pine Trees which the French hearing did fire Merryly upon us, I then repaired toward the Lake to get spades, Shovels &c and found the Batteaux all gone off, and looking Round found all gone by the Highland Regiment & mine upon which I march'd off upon their [*urging?*], but a Bullet could not hurt me more unless it took my Life, my heart fell into my Shoes and my Tears upon them. The Loss I mean giving up of the very Spott where we could have intrenched ourselves to our Ease, that would have done the Business in two Days at Least, for [illegible]; and which needlessly cost a Great Effusion of Blood and without doubt must now necessarily cost more to obtain . . . ”

Source: “Col. William Williams to Col. Thomas Williams Dated Lake George July 11, 1758.” Henry Stevens Sr. Collection (1753-1862); Vermont State Archives & Records Administration, Middlesex, Vermont. Item Series ID: SE-117, Microfilm F-1454; French and Indian War Papers: Box 1: Folder 3.

Wilson, [Commissary]

[British 1759]

[July 23, 1759]: "... The Regiments to march and encamp as soon as the Ground is marked. The Regulars, who are to defend the Brest Works, most [sic] immediately raise a Bankuet in the Front of the Centre of each Regiment with Loggs and Earth so that the Picquits of each Regiment can stand upon it and defend the Breastwork without pulling any of the Breastwork down, as it covers the Camp from the Shott . . . A Camp will be marked out for Lymons, Worcesters, and Fitches in the Wood; they will face outwards . . ." (p. 93).

[July 24, 1759]: "... The Commanding Officers of each of the Regular Regiments will chuse [sic] an intilligent [sic] Serj^t that they judge will answe [sic] for assisting the Engineers as Overseers . . . immediately to attend Lieut. Collo. Eyre . . . When working Parties are orderd into the Trenches, they most take their Arms with them; when they work to the Right they most lodge their Arms to the Right, and when they work to the Left they most lodge their Arms to the Left . . . Serj^t Murray of the Royall Highland Regt. Is appointed to oversee People making Fasciens, and keep an Accompt of the Number made" (p. 94).

[July 25, 1759]: "... The Battⁿ of the Royall to mount in the Trenches at Retreat Beating, . . . Six Companys will mount on the Right, three on the Left, and one in the Centre" (p. 96) "the Generall [sic] Hospital is by Worsters Regiment, near the Road coming into Camp, where any Wounded Men may be sent to . . . Sixty of Major Rogers Rangers will march with the Commanding Officer to the Trenches this Night, and will be employed at a proper Time to alarm the Enemy by firing into their Covered Way, and keeping their Attention from the Workmen" (p. 97).

[July 26, 1759]: "... Late Forbess Regiment to mount the Trenches this Night. The Regiment will march in by the Right; three Comp^{ys} to the Trenches on the Right and five Trenches on the Left. Brigadier Gages will give on Captain 2 Subalterns and 100 Men for the Centre" (p. 98).

[July 27, 1759]: "As soon as the working Parties of Provincials arraive, the Approaches and Batteries to be immediately levell'd" (p. 99). "... the Commanding Officer of the Artillery to send a Report immediately of what Guns he fired on the Fort" (p. 100). ". . . the Rangers, Light Infantry and Grenadiers, Lymans and Worcesters Regiment will interly destroy the Road they have made in their Front, by laying Loggs across and cutting some Trees in necessarie so as to make in impassible from Lake Shamplaine to the Road leading from the Saw Mills to the Fort, that the Brush may grow up and no Appearance of a Road may remaine" (p. 100). "The Royall will hall [sic] in the 12 Pounder that is on the Right in the Front of the Lines . . . and Montgomoerys will do the same by the 12 Pounder that is on their left" (p. 101). "30 men of the Light Infantry of Regiments and 30 Men of the Grenadiers, with 2 Subalterns to go immediately to the Hospitall without Arms, to carry the Wounded to the Saw Mills" (p. 102).

Source: *Commissary Wilson's Orderly Book, Expedition of the British and Provincial Army, Under Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Amherst, against Ticonderoga and Crown Point. 1759.* J. Munsell, Albany, New York (1857).

Wood, Lemuel

[Journal. Served in Col. Willard's Regiment]

[British Provincial 1759]

[July] "ye 22 . . . ye Regulars and Rangers went over ye river at ye mills and went to Clearing a Road for ye Cannon as fast as Posibal . . ." (p. 19).

"ye 23 . . . this morning when we Came to view ye fort again we saw that all there tents was struck are gone and there arose a great Smoke from ye fort it was soon noised yt ye fort was on fier but afterwards we found it was not ye fort but [that] they [had] set there hut on fier and

houses near the fort . . . our men kept getting up ye Cannon and geting [sic] it over the falls as fast as Possabel our Regulars Drove out towards ye fort and about 9 o'Clock they Came before ye french breastwork but saw no man there they soposed [sic] ye Enemy Lay Close that they might not be Discovered our men Sent 3 or 4 men to ye breastwork to see what was there when they Came to ye Trenches they found not a man there our army Rushed on and took Posession of there Breast work ye french fird with there Cannon from ye fort on our men very Smart but did Little or no Damage our People Set to trenching within there Breastwork ye french Continud fireing with there Cannon and Throwind Bombs at our men But Could not Drive them off we on ye East Sid of ye River Lay in open view of ye fort about noon ye french fird 2 cannon aCroft ye River at us but did not come near us about 2 o'Clock our Rigm't was ordered Back to ye mills from thence we went back to our Battoes weary and very hungry having had northing [sic] to Eat Sence we first Landed we no sooner got to ye Landind Place but we was Put to drawing Cannon to ye mills . . . ye french kept fireing with there Cannon all night by times and our People was busise all nite giting up Canon and artiley Stoers . . ." (p. 20-21).

"ye 24 . . . our men got up there Cannon and morters and ammunition as fast as Posibal but fird not a gun at ye fort yet all Day ye Enemy Kept firing at our men at ye trenches . . . Last night we had one man killed at ye trenches and another had his arm Shot of [sic] with a Canon Ball and 10 or 12 more wounded . . . this afternoon there was a great Quanity of Ball and Shell Sent up to ye trenches & some morters" (p. 22).

"ye 25 this mor[n]ing ye great morter was Sent up to ye trenches and some large Canon . . . this mor[n]ing we had 6 men Kiled in ye trench with a bomb and Some moer hurt the french Kept fiering Day and night at our men in ye trench while they offrd then no abuse at all this afternoon Coll Townshend . . . was Cut in two Parts with a Cannon Ball as he was Rideing at ye generals Side near ye Trenches . . ." (p. 22).

"ye 26 Last night ye French fird with there Canon very briskely all night at our men in ye trenches but Did them Little Damages . . . this Day about noon ye flat Bottomd boat Came Down from fort william Henry with 60 horses on Bord her & Wagons on Bord Battoes they was Imeadiatly Set to Work Caring up Stoars and amition up to ye trenches ye Carpanders ware Sent up this afternoon to Lay Platforms for the Canon and giting all things Ready to open ye hamberers [sic] to-morrow mor[n]ing at Brake of day . . . this Day we had 8 men Killed in ye Trenches and about 20 wounded ye Indians Killed 2 men of wosters Rigm't as they was Cutting fasheans ye Enemy kept a Pretty steady fiering all this Day and in ye Eve[n]ing till about 8 or 9 oClock when they Left fiering and took what they could carry of with them and Pushed of Leaving a match to there magazine about 11 o'Clock at night ye magazien took fier and blew up ye Noise of it was heard by our men at ye Landing Place it was very Lowd and Shaking . . ." (p. 23).

"ye 27 this mor[n]ing our People went into ye fort . . . they found in ye fort 15 Pieses of Cannon Great and Small and 2-13 inch morters and Sevarel other small morters they also found about 200 barils of gun Powder . . . we had not more than 20 men Killed and 70 wounded" (p. 27).

[*Wood revisited the site on Wednesday, August 15, 1759. And added observations of the French Lines*]: "wensday [sic] ye 15 this day Leut granger & Ensn Peabody obtained Liberty of ye Coll to go up to Ticonderoga I accidently went up with them and Viewed ye fort . . ." (p. 28). ". . . about 60 rod from ye fort on ye west is ye grand Breastwork from Lake to Lake built with Logs and Earth 8 or 10 feet high Some of ye top Logs 3 feet through [.] it is built full of Short Crooks and angles so yt it may be Cleard Every way with Places for Cannon to Play on[.] on ye

out-Side a Large Row of brush about 41 Rods [676.5 ft] off [.] under ye breastwork a magazien.” (p. 30).

Source: *Diaries of Lemuel Wood of Boxford: With an Introduction and Notes.* By Sidney Perley. Printed for the [Essex] Institute, Salem, Massachusetts (1882).

Woods, John

[British Provincial 1759]

[July 23]: “. . . went upon Som Ledges of Rocks with Capt Maynard to view ye actions of ye french about noon ye Regulars Marcht up to ye brest work without aney Resistance the Cannon Began to play on our men I lay there & Saw them play with them Can & bomes till Sun one our high then came up to ye landing & helpt Draw on Cannon Down to ye mill then Back again & Campt” (p. 308).

[July 24]: “Pich’t our Tents att Ye landing Place & went to Trenching tere to save our Stores Att Night Took A back Load Tools to Cary up to ye brest Work . . .” (p. 308).

[July 25]: “They Workt a giting up ye artillery to ye brest work the French kept firing all ye time at our men kill more or less Every day our men not loued to fire one gun” (309).

Source: “John Woods His Book.” By Alice Lee Clark. *The Genealogical Magazine.* Vol. 1, No. 11 (1906). pp. 307-312.

Woolsey, M. Taylor Col.

[British Provincial Officer 1758]


[Private letter to brother dated “Schenectady 26th July 1758.” Served as a commander of a New York Battalion]

“I also wrote you again on our return, or rather flight giving some account of our having most sadly be---st the voyage, and suffered greatly, especially in the person of Lord Howe, whose conduct and prudence. I make no doubt, would have saved the lives of many brave fellows, who were set as targets to be fired at by the enemy, without being allowed to return the fire; and had they returned it, would have been to but little purpose, as the enemy had a breastwork of wood and earth which quite covered them. In this action we lost about eighteen hundred killed and wounded, amongst whom were a great many officers of worth. The only one among the provincials that you known, was your intended brother, Lieutenant Smith, whose wound proved mortal, notwithstanding the best endeavors of all the surgeons” (p. 59).

Source: *Townsend-Townshend 1066-1909: The History, Genealogy and Alliances of the English and American House of Townsend.* Revised. By Margaret Townsend. Press of the Broadway Publishing Company, New York, New York (1909).

APPENDIX B: HISTORIC MAPS

Anonymous (1)




Title: "A Plan of Fort Carillon or Ticonderoga."

Cartographer: Unknown.

Published in: *Fort Ticonderoga; A Short History, Compiled from Contemporary Sources*. By Stephen H. Pell (1948). Printed for the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, Ticonderoga, New York. p. 24.

Archive: British Library CXX/105--Maps K.tops 121.105.

Anonymous (2)




Title: "Plan of Tioninderoge."

Cartographer: Unknown

Archive: Fort Ticonderoga Museum (208.648)



Anonymous (3)
(Vaudreuil Map)



Title: "Plan du fort Carillon et du Camp retranche pour s'opposer a l'attaque des Anglais, avec l'ordere des colonnes a l'action du 8 Juillet 1758."

Cartographer: Unknown

Archive: Bibliotheque Nationale de France
BnF Gallica; <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b8493718k>

Anonymous 4
[Pompadour Map]



Title: "Carte des environs du fort de Carillon en Canada a Madame la Marquise de Pompadour."

Cartographer: Unknown.

Archive: Bibliotheque Nationale de France,
<https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b52512273b/f108.item.r=Fort%20Carrillon>
BNF Gallica; Collection MARGRY. Contained in a folio entitled: "Realitive a l'historie des Colonies et de la Marine francaises, Lettres et journaux de Bougainville" (Jean Pierre Bougainville).

Anonymous (5)


Image Unavailable

Title: “*Plan du fort Carillon et du Camp retranche pour l'opposer à l'attaque des anglaise avec l'ordre des Colonnes à l'action du 8 Juillet 1758.*”

Cartographer: Unknown

Archive: National Archives Canada, Archives / Collections and Fonds, Box 2001422241, Item #4156580.

Anonymous (6)





Title: *[A map of the southern part of the Lake Champlain, from 'Tienderoga fort' to Crown Point]*

Cartographer: Unknown

Archive: British Library, Catalogue of Maps, Charts, and Plans and of the Topographical Drawings in the British Museum // Catalog of Maps, Prints, Drawings etc., Forming the Geographical and Topographical Collection Attached to the Library of His Late Majesty King George the Third, London, 1829. Donated to the Nation by George IV. Shelfmark: Maps K. Top 121.19. System Number #004987780

Available: Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center at the Boston Public Library
<https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:hx11z332b>

Anonymous (7)




Title: "Ticonderoga as it was in 1759."

Cartographer: Unknown.

Archive: Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division; LC Maps of North America 1750-1789, 1118.
<https://www.loc.gov/item/73691640/>

Anonymous (8)



Title: "Map of the Fortifications at Ticonderoga in the Summer and Autumn of 1776"

Cartographer: Unknown

Included in: *General Persifor Frazer: A Memoir Compiled Principally from His Own Papers by his Great-Grandson Persifor Frazer.* Published by Author, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (1907). pp. 216-217.

Alternate Archive: British Library / Haldimand Papers H-1432

Anonymous (9)




Title: "A Map of Ticonderoga with the Old and New Lines and Batteries taken from an Actual Survey & Other Authentick Informations 1777."

Cartographer: Unknown

Archive: Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division
LC Call Number: #G3804.T5S3 1777.M3
<https://www.loc.gov/item/78692736/>



Anonymous (10)
[St. Clair Trial]



Title: "Map of Ticonderoga, Mount Independence et cet. from St. Clair's Court Martial."

Cartographer: Unknown

Archive: Fort Ticonderoga Museum



Anonymous (11)





Title: "Plan of Carillon ou Ticonderoga which was quitted by the Americans in the night from the 5th to the 6th of July 1777."

Cartographer: Unknown

Archive: Bibliotheque Nationale de France
<https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b84940817?rk=21459;2>

Anonymous (12)
[Pell Survey c. 1910]



Title: *"Fort Ticonderoga Reservation."*

Cartographer: Unknown. Property Surveyed for the Pell Family c. 1910.

Archive: Fort Ticonderoga Museum

Arnot

Image Unavailable

Title: “*A Sketch of Ticonderoga and its Environs.*”

Cartographer: Hugh Arnot

Archive: Unknown. Published in “Like roaring lions breaking from their chains:” The Highland Regiment at Ticonderoga. *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XVI, No 1. (1998), by Nicholas Westbrook. p. 42.

Brasier (1)




Title: “[A map of Fort Carillon and environs]”

Cartographer: Attributed to William Brasier

Archive: British Library, Catalogue of Maps, Charts, and Plans and of the Topographical Drawings in the British Museum // Catalogue of Maps, Prints, Drawings etc., Forming the Geographical and Topographical Collection Attached to the Library of His Late Majesty King George the Third, London, 1829. Donated to the Nation by George IV. Shelfmark: Maps K. Top 121.25. System Number #016739147.

Available: Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center at the Boston Public Library
<https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:hx11z5374>

Brasier (2)





Title: [A map of Fort Carillon and environs]

Cartographer: William Brasier c. 1756

Archive: British Library, Catalogue of Maps, Charts, and Plans and of the Topographical Drawings in the British Museum // Catalogue of Maps, Prints, Drawings etc., Forming the Geographical and Topographical Collection Attached to the Library of His Late Majesty King George the Third, London, 1829. Donated to the Nation by George IV. Shelfmark: Maps K. Top 121.25. System Number #004987773.

Available: Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center at the Boston Public Library
<https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:hx11z3419>

Brasier (3)



Title: "Project for the attack of Ticonderoga: Proposed to be put in execution as near the circumstances will admit of May 29th. 1759."



Cartographer: William Brasier

Archive: Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division Washington, LC Call #G3804.T5S26 1759 .B7
<https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3804lar300900/>

A different version of this map can be viewed on the website of the Norman B. Leventhal Map and Education Center at the Boston Public Library at <https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:q524nd67z>

*See maps attributed to William Eyre

Brehm-Brasier





Title: "A Survey of the Fort at Tienderoga and its Environs, with the French Lines and part of Lake Champlain 1759."

Cartographers: Lt. Dietrich Brehm and William Brasier, "Draughtsman to the Ch. Engin.r of N. America."

Archive: British Library, R.U.S.I Maps Vol. LXXVII; Places on Lake George and Lake Champlain, (#10); MS57712.
Access: Norman B. Leventhal Map and Education Center at the Boston Public Library,
<https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:hx11z174f>.

Carleton-Hutchins




Title: [Map of Fort Ticonderoga included in the "Letters from Joseph Carleton and Thomas Hutchins 1779-88, and Records Relating to Military Affairs"]

Cartographer: Unknown

Archive: Papers of the Continental Congress Compiled 1774-1789; National Archives M247

Cleaveland



Map made July 8

The mark in the Angle is Ticonderoga Fort. The cross line the French entrenchments which did not extend quite from Lake to Lake.

The first Strokes under the Line are on the Right, Rogers; center, Light Infantry; Left, Royal

The next marks from the Right: (1) Col. Babcock; (2) Col. Dote; (3) Col. Preble; (4) Col. Williams; (5) Col. Bagley; (6) Col. Delancey.

(Editor's note: Further explanation of map)

The lower marks the Regulars who were to march thro these yt lay before and make the attack upon the Breast-Work and to be covered in their retreat, if driven back, by the provincials; but the French not pushing the Regulars when they retreated, the Provincials were ordered up. The Connecticut Regiments were not in the fight except ColWhiting's and ColWooster's who came up about Sun an hour high; an account of the manner our Troops attacked ye entrenchment July 8, 1758 per John Cleaveland Chaplain to Col. Bagley.


Title: "Map Made July 8. [1758]"

Cartographer: Rev. John Cleaveland.

Archive: Fort Ticonderoga Museum.

Published in: "Journal of Rev. John Cleaveland June 14, 1758- October 25, 1758." *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Volume X., No. 3. (1959):192-236. On page 199.

Chesnoy




Title: *"Plan of Carillon ou Ticonderoga which was quitted by the Americans in the night from the 5th to the 6th of July 1777."*

Cartographer: Michel Capitaine du Chesnoy

Archive: Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division; LC Call #G3804.T5:2F6S3 1777 .C3.
<https://www.loc.gov/item/00557013/>


Dwight Powder Horn




Title: [Daniel Dwight's Powder Horn]

Archive: Fort Ticonderoga Museum (PH-008).

Daniel Dwight was Second Surgeon's Mate in Gen. Phineas Lyman's First Connecticut in 1758. He returned the following year as Surgeon's Mate and was promoted to Regimental Surgeon in July of 1759. Information from the *Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol. XV., No. 5. (1993): p. 394.



Eyre (1)




Title: [Ticonderoga 1759].

Cartographer: Tentatively Attributed to William Eyre.

Archive: Royal Collection Trust, The Royal Collection, George III's Collection of Military Maps (RCIN 732105)
<https://militarymaps.rct.uk/the-seven-years-war-1756-63/ticonderoga-1759>.

Note: This source lists the cartographer as William Eyres.

Eyre (2)



Title: "Project for the Attack of Ticonderoga proposed to be put in Execution as near as the Circumstances and Ground will admit of."

Cartographer: Tentatively Attributed to William Eyre c. 1759.

Archive: Royal Collection Trust, The Royal Collection, George III's Collection of Military Maps (RCIN 732106)
<https://militarymaps.rct.uk/the-seven-years-war-1756-63/ticonderoga-1759-project-for-the-attack-of-tiondaroga>

Note: This source lists the cartographer as William Eyres.

Jefferys





Title: "A plan of the town and Fort of Carillon at Ticonderoga: with the attack made by the British army commanded by Genl. Abercrombie, 8 July 1758."

Cartographer: Thomas Jefferys; "London: Published by Thomas Jefferys near Charing Cross 1768."

Archive: Fort Ticonderoga Museum.

Lotbiniere




Title: "Plan du fort de Carillon et de ses environs avec l'attaque des retrachements fait par une armee Angloise de 25000 homes aux ordre de mylord Amhercrombie le 8e Juillet 1758."

Cartographer: Michel Chartier de Lotbiniere

Archive: Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan

Collection: Jeffery Amherst Maps, ID #597.

William L. Clements Library Image Bank <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/w/wcl1ic/x-597/wcl000704>



Moneypenny




Title: [Map included in a letter from Alexander Moneypenny to John Calcraft July 11, 1758]

Cartographer: Alexander Monypenny

Archive: Private Collection, Published in: *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*. Vol. XVI, No. 1 [1988].

Meyer





Title: "Sketch of the Country Round Tyconderoga."

Cartographer: Lt. Elias Meyer (60th Regt)

Archive: British Library, Journals of Voyages and Exploring Expeditions in Various Parts of North America 1750-1773
Add MS 21686.

Available: Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center at the Boston Public Library
<https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:hx11xz54c>





Title: "A Plan of the Country from the Landing Place with the Encampments. And Marches of the Troops under Major General Abercrombie at the Attack of Ticonderoga."

Cartographer: T. Phinn

Archive: Fort Ticonderoga Museum (1991.58).


Potts




Title: [Potts Map].

Cartographer: Jonathan Potts.

Archive: Fort Ticonderoga Museum (MS 2095).



Rivez Map (1)




Title: [British attack upon Ticonderoga, July 7 & 8, 1758]

Cartographer: Charles Rivez (Attributed to)

Archive: William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/w/wcllc/x-5532/WCL005609?lasttype=boolean&lastview=thumbnail&med=1;resnum=1;size=20;sort=relevance;start=1;subview=detail;view=entry;rgn1=ic_all;select1=all;q1=Ticonderoga



Rivez (2)



Title: "A Map from the Landing Place to Ticonderoga" c. 1758"

Cartographer: Charles Rivez

Note: "To His Excellency the Right Honorable The Earl of Loudon By his most obedient servant Charles Rivez"

Archive: Royal Collection Trust, The Royal Collection, George III's Collection of Military Maps (RCIN 732069)
<https://militarymaps.rct.uk/the-seven-years-war-1756-63/ticonderoga-1758-a-map-from-the-landing-place-to>

Roque



Title: "Plan of the Fort at Tienderoga at the Head of Lake Champlain 1759."

Cartographer: Mary Ann Roque.

Published Work: Map No. 26 in *A Set of Plans and Forts in North America Reduced from Actual Surveys*, which was published in 1765 in England.

Available: Fort Ticonderoga Museum



Skinner





Title: "A Plan of the Fort in Ticonderoga and Environs at the head of Lake Champlain November 1759."

Cartographer: William Skinner

Archive: British Library, Western Manuscripts, Maps and Plans, Fortifications and Surveys collected by Gen. W. Skinner ante 1780. Add MS 33231 A-PP.

Available: Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center at the Boston Public Library
<https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:6108vv52m>

Skinner-Hinton



Title: "A Perspective View of Lake George."

Cartographers: H. Skinner and John Hinton

Archive: Norman B. Leventhal Map Center, Boston Public Library; Call # G3804.T5 1759 .55
<https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:6t053q40c>


Sparks

Image Unavailable

Title: "Ticonderoga Jared Sparks' Sketch of. Aug 1830. Plans of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, Plan III"

Cartographer: Jared Sparks

Archive: Houghton Library, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts. Jared Sparks Personal Papers.
Series II: Compositions and Works, Subseries II.B: Articles Reports and Essays 1808-1842. Plans of Ticonderoga
and Crown Point. (Item Identifier: Ms Sparks 106-162, (MS Sparks 128). Pages 19-20, 21-23, 21-24.



Therbu-Coentgen





Title: "Attaques des retranchemens [sic] devant le Fort Carillon en Amerique: par les anglais commandees par le general Abercrombie contre les francais aux ordres du Marquis de Montcalm le 8 juillet 1758."

Cartographers: L. Therbu and Hugo Heinrich Coentgen [Frankfurt-Main, Germany? s.n., 1790?].

Archive: Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division; LC Maps Call #G3804.T5S26 1790.T4
<https://www.loc.gov/item/91683242/>

Also Available: Fort Ticonderoga Museum

Trumbull (1)



Title: "Ticonderoga & its dependencies, August 1776"


Cartographer: Col. John Trumbull

Archive: Library of Congress: Geography and Map Division Washington, D.C. 20540-4650 USA:
G3804.T5S3 1841 .T7.

Available: <https://www.loc.gov/item/73691879/>



Trumbull (2)





Title: *"Original Water-Color Plan Made by Colonel John Trumbull in Fort Ticonderoga August 1776, by order of General Washington."*

Cartographer: Col. John Trumbull.

Archive: Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University Library, (BrSides Folio 2015 13): Gift of the McCullough Family in Honor of Hall Park McCullough (Yale 1894).

U.S. Engineer Department (1)



Title: "Fort Ticonderoga Reservation."

Cartographer: United States Engineer Department Top[o] Bureau, c. 1815.

Archive: Fort Ticonderoga Museum



U.S. Engineer Department (2)



Title: "Fort Ticonderoga Reservation."

Cartographer: United States Engineer Department Top[o] Bureau, c. 1815,

Archive: Fort Ticonderoga Museum.



Wintersmith



Title: "Plan of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, including Mount Hope, and shewing the rebel works & batteries, as they were when His Majesty's troops took possession of them on 6th July 1777, expressing also the encampment of the British on the 5th instant, with the extensive communication which was made in one day for the transport of the heavy artillery from the 3 Miles Point to the proposed batteries, including likewise Sugar Hill, where a battery of 4 12 pounders would have been ready to open on the 6th at noon."

Cartographer: Lt. Charles Wintersmith / Carl Gottfried Julius Winterschmidt, Assistant Engineer.

Archive: John Carter Brown Library, Providence, Rhode Island.

<https://jcb.lunaimaging.com/luna/servlet/detail/JCBMAPS~1~1~2703~101233:Plan-of-Ticonderoga-and-Independence>

Also Available: Fort Ticonderoga Museum and Silver Special Collections, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont.